



به نام خداوند جان و خرد



مجموعه آثار
مقالات، مصاحبه‌ها و سخنرانی‌ها

جلد اول

سال‌های ۱۳۳۲ تا ۱۳۵۷

تهران ۱۴۰۰

به نام خدا

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به نام خدا

مقدمه اول

۱. مجموعه آثار نوشتاری دکتر ابراهیم یزدی، شامل مقالات، سخنرانی‌ها و مصاحبه‌های علمی، اجتماعی و اسلامی، به زبان فارسی از سال ۱۳۳۲ تا ۱۳۹۳ جمع‌آوری و در پانزده جلد به علاقمندان تقدیم می‌شود. آثار صوتی و صوتی - تصویری شامل سخنرانی‌ها و مصاحبه‌ها به‌طور جداگانه جمع‌آوری و منتشر خواهند شد.

۲. در طی سال‌های ۱۳۵۷ تا ۱۳۹۳ آقای دکتر یزدی در دانشگاه‌های متعدد در آمریکا و اروپا سخنرانی داشته‌اند و رسانه‌های بین‌المللی با ایشان مصاحبه داشته‌اند. مجموعه‌ی سخنرانی‌ها، مقالات و مصاحبه‌های ایشان به زبان انگلیسی در یک جلد، به‌طور جداگانه منتشر می‌شوند.

هیئت جمع‌آوری و تدوین آثار

فروردین ۱۳۹۴

به نام خدا

زندگی صحنه یکتای هنرمندی ماست،
هر کسی نغمه خود خواند و از صحنه رود،
صحنه پیوسته به جاست،
خرم آن نغمه که مردم بسپارند به یاد^۱

۱. جامعه ایرانی ما در دوران گذار تاریخی به سر می‌برد. تاریخ معاصر ایران، از بُعد تحولات سیاسی و اجتماعی، با شورش تنباکو آغاز شده است اما هنوز به سرانجام مقصود نرسیده است. آرمان‌های راهبردی ملت ما، در طی مبارزات صدساله اخیر هنوز تحقق پیدا نکرده‌اند. داستان همچنان ادامه دارد. راهی طولانی آمده‌ایم و راهی طولانی‌تر در پیش داریم. آنچه در این گذرگاه مهم و مفید و تأثیرگذار است انتقال تجارب به نسل و نسل‌هایی است که باید این بار را به دوش بکشند و آن را به جایگاه نهایی برسانند. من دوره ابتدایی تحصیلات خود را در دبستان ادب، کوچه پشت مدرسه سپهسالار گذرانده‌ام. مرحوم فاطری مدیر این مدرسه بود. معلم ورزش ما، در ساعت ورزش شاگردان کلاس ما را در صحن مدرسه به دو گروه تقسیم می‌کرد. هر گروه در یک صف، به موازات هم، قرار داده می‌شدند. جلوی دیوار انتهای صحن مدرسه، روبروی دو صف هر یک از دانش‌آموزان. دایره‌ای کشیده می‌شد که به آن قلعه گفته می‌شد و یک نفر از هر گروه در داخل دایره قرار می‌گرفت. به نفر اول در هر صف چوب‌دستی کوچکی داده می‌شد. با سوت معلم،

۱. من این شعر را، که سروده خانم ژاله اصفهانی (۱۳۱۰-۱۳۸۵) است، به یاد آن زندانی سیاسی، که با خطی خوش آن را بر دیوار سلول ۴۲ بازداشتگاه امنیتی ۲۰۹ نوشته بود، در اینجا آورده‌ام.

۱۰ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

بازی شروع می‌شد. نفر اول در هر صف با سرعت تمام به طرف قلعه می‌دوید و چوب‌دستی را به کسی که در قلعه بود می‌داد و جای او می‌ایستاد. کسی که چوب‌دستی را می‌گرفت با سرعت تمام می‌دوید و آن را به نفر اول در صف گروه خودش می‌داد و به آخر صف می‌رفت. هر گروهی که زودتر برنامه را تمام می‌کرد برنده شناخته می‌شد. تحقق آرمان‌های یک ملت و نهادینه شدن مردم‌سالاری و حاکمیت ملت با مبارزه یک نسل و دو نسل به‌دست نمی‌آید. انگیزه من در نوشتن خاطرات و جمع‌آوری مجموعه آثار این است که اکنون که، بعد از ۶۰ سال صبر و تلاش، در حال پیوستن به قافله رفتگان از گروه دوندگان این راه هستم، چوب‌دستی این امانت را به نسل کنونی بسپارم تا آنها، با بینشی روشن و برخوردار از تجارب گذشته، این رسالت و این راه را ادامه دهند. این مسیر نه بزرگراه است و نه حتی شوسه، راهی است بسیار طولانی، با فراز و نشیب‌های فراوان، با کُتل‌ها و گردنه‌های صعب‌العبور و پرمخاطره.

برای رسیدن به این مقصود، عمر نوح، صبر ایوب، خُلق محمدی و شجاعت علوی لازم است. این مجموعه به رهروان جدید و جوان تقدیم می‌شود.

ابراهیم یزدی

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ب. مقالات و کتاب‌های علمی

- قسمت اعظم این مقالات، که حاصل تحقیقات در مراکز علمی هستند، در مجلات علمی معتبر جهان چاپ شده‌اند. فهرست کامل این مقالات ارائه شده و علاقه‌مندان به این موضوعات می‌توانند به اصل مقالات رجوع کنند. متن کامل برخی از سخنرانی‌ها و مقالات علمی، که در دسترس بوده‌اند، در پایان این بخش آمده است.
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بخش دوم:

مقالات، سخنرانی‌ها، مصاحبه‌های سیاسی و اسلامی به زبان انگلیسی

Complete Works Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi

Part Two

Speeches, Articles and Interviews

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1. U.S. Options

The Mac Neil/Lehrer Report. Public Television Station. December 12, 1978

In New York Robert MacNeil, Executive Editor

In Washington D.C. Charlayne Hunter-Gault, correspondent

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, khomeini Spokesman

Marvin Zonis, University of Chicago

Joseph Sisco, President, American University

Producer: Jo Franklin,

Reporter: Robert Hershmann

Robert MacNeil: Good evening. The Carter administration is faced with a growing dilemma over Iran. Last week the President let fall a remark expressing hope but uncertainty that the Shah would survive the massive campaign to overthrow him. Today Mr. Carter returned unequivocally to firm support for the embattled monarch and a confident prediction that he would survive. Yet the campaign of opposition in Iran does not abate. Two days of mammoth peaceful demonstrations organized by Muslim leaders turned violent in the provincial city of Isfahan last night and today.

Police fired on demonstrators, government spokesmen said six were killed, opposition claims went much higher. Production of oil, crucial to Iran's economic health, today fell to one quarter of normal volume. Tonight: is Mr. Carter's confidence deliberate wishful thinking, or is it realistic? What alternative does the United States have? Jim Lehrer is off; Charlayne Hunter-Gault's in Washington. Charlayne?

Charlayne Hunter-Gault: Robin, President Carter made his statements this morning at a press conference. In response to a question on Iran, he had this to say:

President Carter: "I fully expect the Shah to maintain power in Iran and for the present problems in Iran to be resolved. Although there have been, certainly, deplorable instances of bloodshed which we would certainly want to avoid or see avoided, I think the predictions of doom and disaster that came from some sources have certainly not been realized at all. **The Shah has our support**, and he also has our confidence. We

have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran, and we have no intention of preventing others to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. The difficult situation there has been exacerbated by uncontrolled statements made from foreign nations that encourage blood-baths and violence. This is something that really is deplorable, and I would hope would cease after this holy season passes. I think it's good to point out that the Iranian people for 2,500 years, perhaps as long as almost any nation on earth, have had the ability for stable self-government. There have been changes in the government, yes, sometimes violence; but they have a history of an ability to govern themselves, and because of that and other factors which I've just described, I think the situation in Iran will be resolved successfully."

Hunter-Gault: The Associated Press called President Carter's condemnation of "uncontrolled statements made from foreign nations" an obvious reference to Ayatollah Khomeini, the Muslim religious leader now in exile outside Paris. Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi is a close associate of Ayatollah Khomeini, and is visiting in the United States. Dr. Yazdi, do you think that President Carter was referring to Ayatollah Khomeini?

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi: I think so; it was very obvious that he was referring to the statements that are being made by the Ayatollah Khomeini, it's true.

Hunter-Gault: What is your reaction to that?

Yazdi: Since President Carter was talking about the history. I may also remind him of the American history. When George Washington was elected as the first president of America, the British king, said, is George Washington the shah - in America? He was told no, he is a president and he will be changed after four years. Then they said, 'No, it can't be; a country without a shah will not survive.' When Mr. Carter refers to the situation in Iran, I was wondering if he has received and has heard the message of the Iranians. The Shah confessed that he heard the message of the revolution, our people's revolution. He has not responded but with guns. The message is that we don't want monarchy; we don't want this dictatorship that has been installed by the American CIA in 1953.

Hunter-Gault: What do you think would be the consequences of the kind of unequivocal support that President Carter seemed to be giving today to the Shah? What would be the consequences if that kind of support continues?

Yazdi: Well, there's only one way. The whole nation has raised, and no power, no superpower can stop a nation to demand the liberty of their country and to choose any political system that they wish to choose. Regardless of whether Mr. Carter supports The Shah or not, our people will not accept the present system. The huge massive demonstrations, peaceful ones, in the past two or three days actually were a referendum saying no to the President regime.

Hunter-Gault: Will the attitudes of the people toward the present regime also apply to President Carter and the United States if he continues to support the regime?

Yazdi: Definitely; definitely. This is not the first time that President Carter has supported the Shah. At the eve of Black Friday, the day of mass murder, President Carter, who won the presidency on the platform of human rights and once introduced himself to the world opinion as a champion for human rights, called the Shah and supported him. That's very strange.

Hunter-Gault: When we talked with you and Ayatollah Khomeini outside Paris on December first, you reported at that time that you had made no contact or had had no contact with American officials. Has anything changed since then in that regard?

Yazdi: Not at all. No.

Hunter-Gault: While you're here do you plan to have any contact, try and make any contact?

Yazdi: No.

Hunter-Gault: What position do you think the United States should take at this point?

Yazdi: Well, number one, we appeal to the American people that if they wanted to preserve their reputation, they have to put pressure on their government to stop supporting the tyrannical, despotic regime of the Shah, who is massacring our people by the army which is trained by the Americans and is maintained by the Americans, the army that is equipped by the American arms. Definitely the Americans should stop supporting the Shah.

Hunter-Gault: Thank you. We'll come back. Robin?

MacNeil: President Carter himself has expressed displeasure at the performance of U.S. intelligence operatives in Iran. But there are Americans who have broad and important contacts throughout Iran; one of them is Marvin Zonis, director of Mideast Studies at the University of Chicago. Mr. Zonis has just returned from two weeks in Iran, where he talked to everyone from construction workers, opposition Muslim leaders, to the Empress. He then spent three days in Paris and had long conversation with Ayatollah Khomeini. He was in Washington today to brief State Department officials on what he saw and heard.

Dr. Zonis, do you believe there's any basis for Mr. Carter's optimism expressed today the Shah will be maintained in power?

Marvin Zonis: I think that it's highly unlikely that some significant changes cannot help but be made within the Iranian political system, and it's very clear that there is major opposition to the continued rule of the Shah in virtually every segment of Iranian society and in every geographical area within Iran. The issue is not so much what kinds of political formulas will keep the Shah in power but whether he can remain in power at all.

MacNeil: And you doubt that.

Zonis: It seems to me that the situation is absolutely impossible in the terms in which we have known the Shah in the last five years, and even doubtful in any form in the next year.

MacNeil: You saw the Empress, the Shah's wife, for a couple of hours. Did you find the royal family itself optimistic or fatalistic?

Zonis: Well, I wouldn't use either of those adjectives. I think Her Majesty was extremely concerned, distressed, puzzled; very involved in attempting to work out a new political formula which would allow her husband to remain as a constitutional monarch in a future Iran.

MacNeil: Has anything changed in the week between Mr. Carter's perhaps inadvertent remark, which was widely played around the world last week, expressing some uncertainty, about the shah's survival, and today? Has anything changed?

Zonis: Well, the crucial thing that's changed, which bothers me a great deal, is the apparent interpretation which was made by the President of the demonstrations during the two days of **Ashura**. As we saw in your film and as Dr. Yazdi mentioned, those days were filled with peaceful demonstrations with millions of individuals on the streets of the cities of Iran. I hope those were not interpreted as meaning that the Shah has "weathered the storm," given that there was no violence, given that "torrents of blood" did not flow. I think it would be a very faulty interpretation to believe that because the Iranian people did not resort to violence that means that they accept the continued rule of the Shah.

MacNeil: What is the correct interpretation of those demonstrations?

Zonis: I believe that the correct interpretation is that there is very deep and fundamental mistrust of His Majesty, which will make it very difficult to work out a new political formula with him in the role of constitutional monarch; but it is certainly the case that there is pervasive opposition to his remaining the kind of Shah he has been over the last several years.

MacNeil: Do you detect - - and your antennae must be fairly sensitive to this - - a genuine agonizing reappraisal going on in Washington?

Zonis: I think there's an agonizing reappraisal, yes. I do think that it is within the framework, in many parts of the government, which the President articulated today, which is to say we start off with the framework of maintaining the Shah in power and then we see how it is possible to work out a new political formula. I'm afraid that what is required is a much broader vision of possible alternative scenarios for Iran in the next several months.

MacNeil: Well, is this official optimism being maintained as a kind of front behind which to consider alternatives? Would that be fair?

Zonis: I think it's true for certain individuals, but I do think that basically the President was articulating the line which is genuinely believed in important segments of the American foreign policy establishment.

MacNeil: What effect on administration thinking are the rather fierce statements that Ayatollah Khomeini has been issuing

recently, for instance yesterday, threatening the United States with an oil embargo, assuming his party later came to power, if we continue to support the shah? What effect are those statements having on administrating thinking?

Zonis: I don't think that the administration is terribly cowed by those statements, to be honest with you. I think that the Ayatollah is probably making a mistake by making those kinds of statements. I think what the administration is much more concerned about is the possibilities of various kinds of disintegrations in the entire political system. I don't think it would be correct to focus exclusively on Ayatollah Khomeini; there are central opposition groups in addition to him, there are other elements of the opposition. There is of course the military to be concerned about and how they will respond to any political formula. This is a very complicated political situation in which many actors need be satisfied. And how to satisfy them is what is not easy to determine.

MacNeil: Well, we'll come back and consider that in a moment. Charlayne?

Hunter-Gault: President Carter's reaffirmation of support for the Shah is in line with long-term American policy in the area. Between 1969 and 1976, first as Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, then as Undersecretary, Joseph Sisco helped to form and execute that policy. He is now president of American University in Washington, and remains in close touch with the State Department. Joe Sisco, there were reports that there had been an intense debate going on, both in the White House and the state Department, about how to handle Iran. Does the President's statement today mean that that debate is over?

Joseph Sisco: Oh, not at all, and I'd be very surprised if intense debate and discussion were not taking place. Insofar as the President's statement that we've just heard, I think that this is a very deeply held hope in term of the present situation; and certainly I think it must be said that it hasn't been a static situation. The Shah has moved on a program of liberalization. There is a serious question as whether it's too little, too late. The United States has endorsed that move towards a liberal democracy. So that the policy is evolving, as is the situation in Iran itself.

Hunter-Gault: The policy articulated today appears to be more reflective of the so-called hard liner in the State Department. Is that true?

Sisco: Charlayne. I don't believe it's a question of hard-liners and soft-liners. I think that this underscores the absolutely overwhelming vital interest that the United States has in a stable Iran. I can recall, for example, when I took over as Near Eastern Assistant Secretary in 1969. It was at the time of the exodus of the British. And we had two basic options at that time that were put before the National Security Council: does the United States try to fill that vacuum directly as a result of the British exodus; or does the United States pursue a policy of regional cooperation, the two pegs being support for Iran and support for Saudi Arabia as the elements of stability in the Gulf and in the area of the Arabian peninsula? And I would suggest that there's no reason that the United States should be defensive about that particular policy. The Shah has made mistakes; I think we've made mistakes. But for twenty- five years that policy has worked, in my judgment. It has maintained stability; it has, I think, promoted the national interests of the United States.

Hunter-Gault: Is that, in your view, the overriding sense of importance that Iran has to us, maintaining the stability in the area?

Sisco: I think that there are political interests that we have in the area, we have very significant economic interests in terms of the sources of supply of energy, and very significant strategic interests. If, for example, there should be a seriously prolonged destabilized situation in Iran, it could have a very significant impact on countries such as Kuwait, the Emirates, and certainly in time Saudi Arabia would not be free of this kind of a destabilization. So therefore our concern as Americans and as American policy makers is entirely understandable given these overwhelming interests that we have in the area.

Hunter-Gault: Just briefly the President seemed to have gone out his way to condemn the Ayatollah today. Does he know something about that whole situation that we don't yet know?

Sisco: Well, I'm not so sure, as I read the statement - - and it's my own interpretation - - that it was directed exclusively to these quarters. There's no question that the Ayatollah's statements are

feeding the violence in Iran itself. Moreover, he's been totally uncompromising and there is no negotiation when the only position that's being expressed is for the Shah to capitulate. If there are alternatives - - and I think that there undoubtedly will be alternatives explored in the days ahead - - it seems to me that they cannot be on the basis of total capitulation. That's not a negotiation.

Hunter-Gault: All right; thank you. Robin?

MacNeil: Dr. Yazdi, are there, from your point of view, alternatives to total capitulation?

Yazdi: No. The Ayatollah does not ask for violence; the Ayatollah is asking people to remove the violence. The United States has supported the Shah, and as you heard, the President is going to support him. The Shah is the source of instability in the area. The Shah is not the source of stability. Whatever they refer to as stability is the iron fist of the Shah and his army, and the cost is thousands of the political prisoners, and torture of our people, innocent people.

MacNeil: What do you say to Mr. Sisco's observation and the observation that the United States has endorsed it, that the Shah has moved a long way to removing some of those objections to him, saying that he would release political prisoners and in other ways liberalize the regime?

Yazdi: Yes, he is releasing some of the political prisoners and killing them in the streets. They found out it is very difficult to keep them in the prison behind closed doors; the world opinion would not support that, so they found an easier way to get rid of them, to kill them. If you look at the report card of the Shah during the last year, you see that thousands of people have been killed in the streets.

MacNeil: Dr. Zonis, what is your reaction to the point we've just heard from the sort of Ayatollah Khomeini's point of view, that it is the Shah who is the destabilizing force in the area?

Zonis: Well, six of one, half a dozen of the other. I think that the crucial question for us to confront is that we are right now in the mist of what is indeed a very unstable situation, and what is required is a creative search to determine how the stability of Iran can best be guaranteed in the future. In my own view, the long-term interests of the Iranian people and those of the

American people are not incompatible. It seems to me both seek many of the same kinds of values. And the most difficult challenge which confronts us right now is how we can move from here to there. We are in a highly unstable situation; to read the last two days of peaceful demonstrations as meaning we've somehow, escaped the difficulties is to me to completely miss the point, and we now have to get down to the hard business of negotiating a future political life for Iran.

MacNeil: The Muslim forces who are behind much of the demonstrations against the Shah, as Dr. Yazdi has just indicated, do not appear to be for negotiation.

Zonis: I think that's a misreading of the situation. The Muslim forces are ninety-eight percent of the population of Iran, so that we are in the one sense talking about the entire population of Iran. On the other hand, much of the political opposition which they express, which they articulate, is not necessarily of the kind which we have heard from Dr. Yazdi today. There are many who are willing to think of various kinds of arrangements which run all the way from the abdication of the Shah, which was the position that Dr. Yazdi, for example, is advocating, to various kinds of interim arrangements of coalition governments; even people are talking about the possibilities of regency councils if the Shah abdicates, but there are also people who are trying to work out of way for the Shah to assume the role of a truly constitutional monarch. The difficulty is that after thirty-seven years of his rule people are very unwilling to accept the idea that he would be willing to put himself into that position. But there's an entire gamut of opinion there.

MacNeil: Mr. Sisco, faced with this dilemma, what In fact can the United States do at this moment other than make statements such as the President made today?

Sisco: Robin, we're very limited in trying to affect the situation directly. I think from a tactical point of view it would have been a mistake for the United States to give any indication other than full support for the Shah. But the United States has also - - and I think this is important to underscore...

MacNeil: Does that mean that if we had failed to do anything such as the President did today it just would have been pulling the rug out from under the Shah?

Sisco: Well, I think it weakens the negotiating position of the Shah and tends to strengthen the forces who are not interested in negotiations. I want to respond to Dr. Zonis. I said a bit earlier that the one position of total capitulation is obviously unacceptable. Now let's take the other element, namely the National Front. Clearly the Shah and his people have been pressing in recent days negotiations, trying to achieve some form of a constitutional monarchy and some evolution in the situation. One fundamental difficulty has been that the leader of the National Front has not wanted to get out in front, has not wanted to really put himself in a position to make possible the negotiation of a broadly based government perhaps within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.

MacNeil: You're talking about **Mr. Sanjabi**.

Sisco: I certainly am.

MacNeil: Dr. Yazdi, what is the opinion of Khomeini and the other Ayatollahs who are leading these Muslim demonstrations, towards the National Front?

Yazdi: Well, of course Mr. Sanjabi came and visited the Ayatollah, and he heard the statements and the views of the Ayatollah and finally he came to the conclusion that he's right, and he accepted the views of the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is not only the Ayatollah Khomeini, it is the whole nation. No one can go against the demand of the nation. After thirty-seven years of the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, people will not accept anything, people will not believe anything. A few weeks ago Shah came to the television and confessed to the people that he was mistaken, he'd made mistakes, he repented; but at the same time he installed a new military government and the next day massacred another group of people. How do you expect people to believe such a man? It's impossible.

Zonis: Robin, could I make a point?

MacNeil: Yes.

Zonis: I really do think that to state the Americans do not have a central role to play in the unfolding of this political process is to really deny the ever-present reality of day-to-day Iranian politics. **We are involved in Iran up to our ears on a day-to-day basis.** It's not merely the statement made by President Carter today, but the American embassy in Iran is as involved

in the running of Iran right now as anybody else in that entire country, and to deny that role and therefore our responsibility to work out a new arrangement seems to me to be denying what is an essential and dramatic reality of contemporary Iranian life.

Sisco: Well, I would agree with that basic statement, Robin, that we do have a continuing central role. Our difficulty is that there really is no basis at the moment for the United States to play the kind of role which I think it can play in these circumstances. The framework at the moment for genuine negotiations to try to achieve an evolution towards a liberalized democracy - which, by the way, is the stated goal of the administration; President Carter in this regard has been very clear-cut - the conditions don't exist at the moment for that negotiation to take place.

Hunter-Gault: All right, gentlemen, in the last few minutes that we have left - not even minutes now let me just ask you, if you were in a position to advise the White House or the Secretary of State about what the United States should do with respect to Iran, starting with you, Dr. Yazdi, what would you tell them?

Yazdi: The only solution for the Iranian problem is to remove the monarchy. No solution can be reached in the present situation.

Hunter-Gault: That's take the Shah out of commission.

Yazdi: Out of it.

Hunter-Gault: Do you agree with that?

Zonis: No, I don't think that's the way to start. It may ultimately come to that end, but I don't think we have reached that situation right now. I think that this is the moment to bring about the negotiating conditions which Dr. Sisco referred to as being absent. I think we can go a long way towards making that possible...

Hunter-Gault: Can you do that without the participation of the Ayatollah and all of the other people who are supporting him?

Zonis: We can do that with the participation of some members of the Iranian political ruling groups who do follow and believe in the Ayatollah.

Hunter-Gault: Mr. Sisco, can you just tell me briefly what you would tell the policy makers.

Sisco: Well, in two sentences, maintain support for the Shah, but also proceed on the policy of doing what we can to evolve the

situation towards liberalization in Iran. And I think we are pursuing this two-pronged policy.

Hunter-Gault: We have to leave it there; thank you. Robin?

MacNeil: Yes, gentlemen, thank you all very much for joining us this evening. Good night, Charlayne.

Hunter-Gault: Good night, Robin.

MacNeil: That's all for tonight. We'll be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil. Good night.

2. The Men who Surround Khomeini

By Jim Browning, Special to The Christian Science Monitor - Tuesday, January 23, 1979

(Neauphle-Le-Cbateau, France)

Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi is a genial, soft-spoken man who up until last fall was doing medical research at Baylor University in Texas.

Today Dr. Yazdi is the closest personal associate of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite Muslim patriarch who has led Iran's popular uprisings from his exile in a small bungalow near Paris.

Dr. Yazdi is one of three or four close advisers who keep the ayatollah informed of world events, who help him develop strategy and proposals for the formation of his 'Islamic republic', and who translate and explain the ayatollah's statements to an often uninitiated press corps.

It is these advisers who have become the reclusive ayatollah's contact with an increasingly curious Western world, and they are expected to form the nucleus of the entourage he takes with him when he returns to Iran a journey scheduled for January 26.

Although they all have been active in anti-Shah organizations, often as students in American or European universities, none has any direct political experience. When discussing Iran's future, they tend to talk in terms of a nonaligned kind of third-world socialism, with the accent on internal development rather than on military strength.

They reject comparisons with other regime, such as those of Libya or Algeria, insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be unlike any other country.

Their theories tend to make Western officials shudder.

"The people around Khomeini are well educated" says one French official. "They have lived and studied in the West, but they have no idea what it takes to run a modern state. They are out of touch with reality."

Analysts familiar with the Shiite religion however, note the Ayatollah's repeated statement that he has no intention of governing Iran himself. Traditionally, although the Muslim religion always has played a political role, Shiite leaders have remained personally out of power

His aides therefore are considered more likely to play intermediary and architect roles than to exercise direct political power.

It is Dr. Yazdi's job to persuade the foreign press that the Ayatollah is a thoughtful and independent man, not hostile to the West, not fanatical, and above all not a Soviet tool. The economic specialist in the entourage is Abolhossein Banisadr, a Western-educated economist long active in the Iranian exile community in Paris. His biggest interest is the transfer of Shah-controlled land to peasant; and the establishment of modern mechanisms for cooperation among small farmers.

He also is helping put together proposals for an Islamic economic system, to replace the Shah's heavy dependence on multinational companies.

A third and more controversial adviser is Asfahani Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was expelled from the United States in 1969 for anti-Shah activities. Some French reports have accused him of Communist sympathies, although he denies that.

3. Exile Back from America Helping Create a New Iran

By John Kifner. New York Times, Sunday April 1, 1979

Tehran, Iran – Clearly, the carefully lit space behind the desk of Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs Ibrahim Yazdi once held a portrait of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Shahs, Light of Aryans; all such spaces did under the old regime.

Now, instead, there is a neatly framed inscription in Persian, a passage taken from the orders of all, son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed, a revered figure to Shiite Muslims. The Persian, of course is poetic, but the sense of the passage which has do with

the doctrine of individual responsibility central to Islam, comes down to this: "Don't ever say that you were only following orders."

From his desk drawer, Dr. Yazdi takes out a sheaf papers that have loose-leaf binder holes along one edge. At the top left of each page is a small picture, like a college yearbook shot, of a young man or woman with a strong, direct gaze. Stapled to each page is a larger, glossy photograph of the same person dead, the young bodies tortured and mutilated, the faces are gaunt, the eyes bulge; in many of the pictures the skin is horribly blacked with acid burns. Neat writing records when the arrest was made, torture was applied and by whom, and the date of death. These are the ledgers of Savak, the shah's secret police.

It makes you sick, he said in an interview last week. Look, they have made a note of what they have done; they have given a report to their superiors. Dr. Yazdi himself had fled the country 18 years ago, becoming an assistant professor at Baylor University in Texas, where he worked on cancer research. Now he is back and, as a member of the provisional revolutionary government and a close adviser to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, he is an important figure in the unfolding of the revolution and presumably, in the writing to an Islamic constitution that was to be announced following this weekend's referendum on an Islamic republic.

Revolutionary courts have ordered more than 60 people shot to death. The number, Dr. Yazdi and other officials here repeatedly insist, is far fewer than in other revolutions in history. After protests by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who threatened to resign, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the revolutionary trials halted until new legal procedures are established. There are an estimated 8,000 prisoners linked to the old regime jammed into Qasr prison in Teheran and thousands more in the provinces. Last week 300 prisoners in the capital were cleared by the revolutionary authorities and released.

In a half-dozen instances, Dr. Yazdi said, officials of the old order were killed in the street. In Isfahan, a Savak torturer was himself tortured to death. Leafing through the grisly bureaucratic records, the Deputy Prime Minister went on, "If this was your sister, you wouldn't bring it to my committee.

Who is going to wait for us to bring them to trial? In which revolution? In the American Revolution, in the Chinese, in the Russian? I cannot tell them to be civilized,” he said. “Now that you are capturing them, be nice to them because Amnesty International doesn’t like you to kill in the streets. The revolution,” Dr. Yazdi said, “must be seen in terms of the culture of Iran and of Islam. The westerners, they come and say this is a wild revolution. They say we are not civilized,” he said bitterly. “This is a clean revolution.”

The big, comfortable office in the old prime minister’s palace was quiet save for the ringing of telephones. A narrow bed has been stuck into the adjoining bathroom, where Dr. Yazdi sometimes sleeps. He has a toothbrush and a comb in his shirt pocket. An aide, one of the young air force technicians whose rebellion sealed the fall of the old regime passed him a note reminding him not to forget his afternoon prayers.

He had been, he said, an activist beginning as a student leader in the late 1950’s after Mohammed Mossadegh, who briefly unseated the shah and nationalized Iranian oil, was toppled in a Central Intelligence Agency-backed coup. He was a follower and associate of Ali Shariati, a hero to young Muslim intellectuals. The author of more than 200 books, he sought to create a radical, nationalist ideology by returning to the roots of Islam. Mr. Shariati died in his early 40’s, supposedly of a heart attack, in London. His followers believe he was murdered.

“After the martyrdom of Shariati I went to see the ayatollah and we talked,” Dr. Yazdi said, Ayatollah Khomeini was then in exile in the Shiite holy shrine of Najaf in Iraq. He persuaded the Ayatollah to move to Paris, where communications were better for distribution of the tape cassettes of his speeches that were a force in the making of the revolution. Thus, Dr. Yazdi, who directed much of the revolutionary strategy, joined the inner circle of the Ayatollah’s camp when the elderly holy man returned to Iran in triumph. Other key figures were Sadeh Ghotbzadeh, who was responsible for the Ayatollah’s security and is now in charge of the revolutionary radio and television, and Ahmed Banisadr, an economist who had tough at the Sorbonne.

“Now the struggle is more complicated,” Dr. Yazdi said. “You have to remember we are at a very historical moment.” The difficulty now for Dr. Yazdi and his colleagues was discussed in a seminal essay by the sociologist Max Weber on the charismatic leader and the bureaucracy: the problem of institutionalizing revolutionary fervor into a functioning government.

It is a problem here with a specifically Iranian twist, for this is a country whose entire political experience is dominated by despotism, intrigue and corruption. Political scientist Marvin Zonis has found the principal characteristic of the Iranian governing class to be, quite simply, cynicism.

“What I refer to as the shahanshahi culture, the shahanshahi mentality, cannot be changed overnight,” Dr. Yazdi said, “we have overthrown the shah, we have overthrown despotism. It is a new era but still many are following the same mentality.”

“To destroy a building is very easy: to rebuild takes time. But we have faith in our revolution,” the professor turned revolutionary said. Then he excused himself and alone in his office, got down on the floor to pray to Mecca.

4. Interview by Richard Hunt

NBC, May 3rd 1979

Q. Mr. Minister, President Carter once called Iran an island of Stability, now some Americans are saying it is an area of disaster, what is your view? Was it ever an island of stability? Is it now really an area of disaster?

A. No, It was not an island of stability, never. We know that since August 1953, when the American CIA overthrew the national Government of late Dr. Mossadegh, the American Administration were always trying to justify their intervention in our internal affairs and sell to the American public their activities in Iran. They tried to sell Iran as an island of stability. Maybe in the eyes of the American administration or some American people it was an island of stability, but it was the Iranian people who were paying a dear price for that stability. During the Shah's rule, as you may know, a large number of political dissidents were imprisoned and brutally tortured by

Shah' Savak. If you call that stability, yes it was. But if one considers the stability a balanced democratic process of society, then we never had any such stability here. When you see this revolutionary explosion in Iran, it did not happen overnight. It was not something which developed in one night; it was the conclusion of a very long and lasting process which actually started a long time ago. And it was only through the brutal suppression of political activists by the Shah's Savak that it appears to be stabilized. It was never stabilized. Is it a disaster? No, it is not a disaster for us. Well, for the American Administration, yes. For the Iranians, it is a big victory.

Q. Is it, in your opinion, necessarily a disaster for the United States? Or is there some hope in the situation?

A. Well, we hope, and we have always said to some of our American friends that we hope the American government would learn from the disaster in Vietnam. We hope that American government would learn from the past mistakes. In reality whether this is a disaster for the Americans or not depends on how the American Administration, the American establishment, the elite wants to take this revolution. We know that the revolution has changed the political map of the region. We know that some political interest groups, among them The Zionists, are badly hurt from our revolution. But it is up to the Americans to make a very clean and clear line between the interests of the American people and that of the Zionists. I don't think there is any conflict between the Iranian people's interests and the American people's interest. You can find a lot of historical and cultural reasons for the friendship and cooperation between Iranians and American people.

Q. What are the present states of the Alliance, the treaty or Alliance of 1959?

A. Well, the Provisional Government is studying it, not only that one, but also other similar bilateral agreements between Iran and some other countries, we are studying all of them, and we are reporting to the cabinet, but it is not finalized yet.

Q. It is no secret that the United States is thinking about building up its naval strength in the Indian Ocean and is building up a

so-called a quick strike force, obviously with the Middle East in mind. Does your country feel threatened by this?

- A. Let us put it this way, if you ask me whether the presence of these forces in the area contribute to the peace and stability of the region, I would say no. I think the presence of any super-power forces in this region will create more trouble and definitely will agitate and will intensify the trouble. But, if you ask me whether we are frightened, I would say no. Because our mission has very deep root among the masses, and there is no power in the world that can threaten our revolution through a military forces.
- Q. One of the things that American strategists are worried about is the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormoz, in the Persian Gulf, obviously because the world oil supply goes through that way. What is the attitude of your government towards the freedom of navigation in these waters?
- A. Freedom of navigation in this waterway is definitely our policy. But there is no need for any super-power to act as a big brother and superintendent of the region. No, it is within our own power and right to safeguard the free navigation through this waterway, and we are strong enough to do so.
- Q. You are saying that Iran and other neighboring states can take care of the freedom of navigation.
- A. Of course. We don't see any threat to this freedom of navigation. If there is any threat, it may result from outside intervention. And the only way to stop this threat is for the superpowers to stop intervening in this area; you see, we can deal with the situation.
- Q. Iran has made the decision to stop selling oil to Israel and South Africa. Are there any more such political decisions about the sale of oil in future, or will your policy be commercial in this point?
- A. Well, as you know the question of oil is as political as commercial.
- Q. Some people say oil and politics don't mix.
- A. Oh, no. In 1953 Americans were the first who started to mix politics with commercial, so they made a military coup for the sake of the British Petroleum Co. No, oil is a political weapon

as much as a commercial one. We don't hide that; it is idealistic to say no, it is not. To use it in the future depends on the case. In the case of South African, we know that the U.N. has condemned apartheid. So we are following the U.N. line.

- Q. Can you suggest, under world circumstances, you might make further use of oil as political weapon in similar situations as we have in South Africa? It is a moral problem.
- A. It is moral as well as political. It is economical question. I don't think the white Christian minority are concern of the anti Christian morality of apartheid.
- Q. I am suggesting whether if you were threatened from a certain quarter, the use of oil as leverage might occur to you.
- A. That is a probability, it might. If there is any threat, it comes in different forms of economical, political and military dimensions. So we can't say that we will confront the threat using oil as leverage. It depends on from what dimension this threat is coming to us. So we will respond to it respectively.
- Q. Would it be fair to say that you would not rule out the use of oil as a political weapon?
- A. Yes that is right.
- Q. What is your view of the future of economic relations between Iran and the United States? What is going to happen to all these contracts, services, supplies that American used to provide?
- A. Well, as you know we have said there are contracts that we would definitely cancel, and we are already in negotiations with the American authorities to cancel some of them. There are contracts that, I would say, we would keep. Then there are contracts that need to be revised, so I can't give an answer for all of them.
- Q. What is the economic policy of your government with regard to the U.S.? Is U.S. a forbidden partner now?
- A. No. If the U.S. is willing to deal with us, based on mutual respect and as equal partners we will deal; we do not have any inferiority complex, we know that being independent we can deal with other countries and we can resist any intervention in our internal affairs. So it all depends on America's behavior and policies at both governmental level and at the private sector. They have to know one thing; the bonanza is over. The time for

the kind of deals with the Shah's administration is over. They can't have that any more. But if they are willing to deal with us, based, as I said, on equal partner transaction which will be beneficial for both of us, we are ready to deal with them.

Q. You were very kind to deal with all the questions of mine. Is there anything in particular you would like to talk about?

A. I don't know if the question of religious minorities in Iran is still an issue in United States or not.

Q. What should we say to Americans about the status of religious minorities in Iran? Can you reassure them?

A. You know that in Islam there is a great tolerance towards other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism. Our constitution, the present one, has guaranteed the rights of religious minorities. And in the drafted constitution for the Islamic Republic, also the rights of religious minorities to practice their own religion are well protected. That is one of the obligations of the Islamic Government to protect the rights of the religious minorities. Despite all propaganda against our revolutionary government concerning the religious minorities, particularly, the Jews, I have to say that the Jewish minorities in Iran are supporting our revolution. After the recent propaganda against our revolutionary government particularly in the U.S., the leaders of Jewish minorities met Ayatollah Khomeini; they came and met me here, to give their support for the Islamic Republic. So there is no reason to fear. One historical fact in Jewish history, as you may know, is that the golden age of Jewish history was during the Islamic Empire. During the persecution of Jews in Spain, they found a good refuge in Moslem countries, in Morocco, in Turkey. So traditionally and historically, we never had any problem with Jewish and/ or Christian minorities in Iran.

Always, we have had good and cordial relations. Of course, we differentiate between a person belonging to a religious minority and political offenders. When a person has committed a crime and co-operated with the Shah as a members of the inner circle of the criminal system of the Shah, we don't ask him whether he is a Jew or a Christian or Zoroastrian. He would be tried and punished according to his deeds. So it is very unfortunate for

American people that some of the political influential groups make baseless accusations against our revolution. Jews and other religious minorities in Iran have more freedom now than ever before. Under the Shah's Administration, the Jews were suppressed as much as any other citizen, men, women, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians or Muslims. People were not free to speak freely their thoughts.

5. Yazdi: "Capitalism Kills"

Time Magazine, Monday, Aug. 06, 1979

Iran's tough-talking Foreign Minister **Ebrahim Yazdi**, 47, is an American-trained microbiologist who lived and worked in the U.S. for 18 years before joining the Ayatollah Khomeini's entourage in Paris last October. In a candid interview last week, he discussed the prospect of an "Iran gate" scandal, the fate of his country's F-14s and other topics with TIME Tehran Bureau Chief **Bruce van Voorst**. Excerpts:

"**On U.S. military hardware in Iran** we have already begun negotiations to sell back the F-14s. We have started talks with the intention of selling all of them - the whole system. We have no problems with other systems and will not be trying to sell off other military hardware.

On evidence of payoffs to U.S. Congressmen, officials and journalists by the Shah. The Washington embassy files were bare, with the exception of lists of people who received mundane things—champagne, perfume, caviar for Christmas. However, we are determined to track down huge amounts of money which went to Washington, and we have asked the FBI to help us. Some \$19 million was spent by the ex-Shah's secret police [SAVAK] in 1976-77. The FBI wants to know whether the Alien Registration Act has been violated, and we want to know what SAVAK Chief Mansur Rafizadeh did with \$8 million in 1976. There's no record of how it was spent or who got it. Another \$11 million was transferred to the embassy during the imperial couple's mid-November visit to Washington in 1977. We gave the FBI considerable evidence on both cases some six weeks ago, and are waiting for results. [The FBI confirmed last week that the Iranian government had asked for its help in tracking down the money and said it was still investigating.]

On the possibility of an "Iran gate" the presumption is that the really sensitive secret documents relating to the Shah's dealings with foreigners are in the imperial court archives. We have asked for these documents and I would expect the truly explosive materials would be among them. [There is one] document in which former Iranian Ambassador to the U.S. Ardeshir Zahedi recorded the support of such prominent figures as [Zbigniew] Brzezinski, [Henry] Kissinger**, [Nelson] Rockefeller and Senators [Howard] Baker and [Abraham] Ribicoff for the Shah's move in setting up a military government in the fall of 1978. This is the document in which Zahedi quotes Kissinger* as arguing for a "stiff stand against" opposition figures and adding that "my view is that all the political prisoners released earlier should be arrested and put back in jail." We didn't release it, but I can assure you the document is genuine. Some Americans must be squirming at the thought of what's in the other documents.

On reports of "foreign agitation" in Khuzestan and Kurdistan. Do you think the Israelis, the greatest losers in the revolution, will sit there and do nothing? If you are looking for signed receipts for equipment sent across the border, I do not have them. Persons engaged in covert operations do not leave behind documents. But the logic is that these same people (the Israelis and Americans) will not sit and do nothing about the loss of their interests in Iran. The Americans, the Israelis, the Zionists had great influence here before the revolution. The remnants of their influence are still here. We know capitalism stops at nothing. It kills. It destroys. It did so in Iran in 1953, in Chile, Viet Nam, and would try again here if we don't stay alert.

* The former Secretary of State believes that the documents may have been fabricated to "blacken his name". Last week **Kissinger** told Time that on "the date of that alleged conversation, I was not even in Washington. Secondly, I have no recollection whatever of any such conversation. It is not true. The only thing which I can't say is by whom it was invented."

6. Statement of Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

At the sixth summit of non-aligned countries Held in Havana, Cuba September 3-7, 1979



CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR
GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES
3-7 SEPTEMBER, 1979
CUBA,

NAC/CONF.6/DISC.47

Statement of Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
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at The Sixth Summit of Non-Aligned Countries
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Mr. President, Brothers and Sisters, 'Peace be upon you'
*We have been discussing about Revolutions for 5 days. Every Revolution has martyrs. Martyrs are "the heart of history". Last year on this day, the Iranian revolution offered close to 500 martyrs, on the day known as **Bloody Friday**. Tomorrow our people will commemorate the memory of our martyrs. For the memory of Iranian martyrs and martyrs of all revolutions in Asia, Africa, and the America; for the memory of all martyrs of history of struggling people, Let us observe a moment of silence, (one moment of silence was observed)."*

It is a matter of special privilege and immense pleasure for me to bring to you the greetings of the Iranian people, of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and of the great leader of our revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This occasion is very dear to us because after nearly thirty years of struggle against a tyrannical regime we have ended imperialist domination of our country and Iran is now proudly joining the community of Non-Aligned nations. At this moment we hope that our membership in this community will be a herald for other peoples who are now struggling against oppression and imperialism.

We are delighted to witness the destruction of Somoza's dynasty so soon after the demise of the Pahlavi tyranny. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the delegation from the liberated Republic of Nicaragua. Let us all hope that at the next summit of Non-Aligned nations we shall be greeting delegates from those countries which are yet to break from the imperialist bondage. The government and the people of Iran express their solidarity and support for the liberation movements of the Third World; and in their hour of struggle we stand one with them. As a fraternal people who suffered from imperialist and Zionist oppression and struggled for more than seven decades, the people of Palestine and their sole and legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization command our greatest commitment.

I feel a sense of pride to recognize President Tito of Yugoslavia as a founding father of the Non-Aligned movement. He began his work at a time when the superpowers did not even accept the legitimacy of his efforts. President Tito championed the cause of non-alignment at a time when Stalinism and U.S. imperialism

perceived non-alignment as a front for one or the other superpower. The Iranians have a very unpleasant memory of this period because the late Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, our beloved prime minister at the time, who was an original advocate of non-alignment, was a victim of the superpowers' position toward non-alignment.

It would also like to honor the memory of Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno whose pioneering work reflected the very best ideas of the No-Aligned movement.

And finally, as an Iranian who has come here from the ranks of a thirty year old revolutionary movement, I like to say a few words about our host, president Fidel Castro, not in regard to his or Cuban people's incredible hospitality, which truly defies language; but rather about my honest impressions of him as a person. When the special envoy of Cuba, Mr. Antonio Esquivel, recently visited Iran and saw the revolutionary achievement spirit of our people, he said: "If this is Islam, then long live Islam." Now that I have come to Cuba and seen the achievements of the Cuban revolution, I like to say that based on the Islamic principle of judging people by their deeds rather than their words, I consider Fidel Castro to be closer to Islam than many of those who claim to be Muslims. So I salute him for his untiring and authentic leadership of the Cuban revolution and sincerely thank him for making this conference an unequivocal defender of the rights and humanity of the oppressed peoples of the world.

Since this is the first time the revolutionary government of Iran is participating in an international forum of this magnitude, I would like to take the opportunity to present to you an outline of the Islamic Republic of Iran's political and ideological perceptions. The change in Iran is so dramatic that our positions on isolated issues do not fully explain the nature of the transformation which has taken place in our national and international affairs. Thus my remarks to you contain two interrelated parts deals with the historical conditions and ideological orientation shaping the character of our revolution; and the second part involves a discussion of our views on those trends and tendencies in international politics and economics which we regard as important for the future of the Non-Aligned movement.

I am aware that my presentation is somewhat uncharacteristic for the conclusion, but since Iran is a newcomer to this honorable movement, I take the liberty of going beyond the immediate issues before us in the hope of giving you an understanding of where we come from and what you might expect from us in the years to come.

I would like to mention that if my descriptions are limited to Iran, it is not because of lack of interest in the plight of other oppressed peoples or revolutionary movements. Like the rest of you, we are agonized over the suffering of our Palestinian and Lebanese brothers who are daily subjected to the genocidal rain of death by the U.S. made Israeli bombers. Like the rest of you, we condemn the rule of the racist minority regimes in Southern Africa where repression has become comparable to Nazi criminal acts. As a revolutionary nation, we are firmly committed to the noble struggles of all the oppressed peoples of the world.

I. The Ideological Dimension

We join the community of Non-Aligned nations as a provisional revolutionary government going through the difficult and at times agonizing process of institutionalizing our power. It is therefore appropriate to begin this message with a brief analysis of the character and history of our revolution. The Iranian revolution is committed to a fundamental transformation of the Iranian society based on the Quranic principles of justice, equality, and participation. Revolution is a quest for freedom and from the perspective of Islam freedom involves the unchaining of human beings from economic oppression, exploitation, political and cultural manipulation, mental slavery, egocentrism and all other causes of alienation. In the Islamic world view one is capable of recognizing God only after one has unchained himself from the conditions of his alienation. The final goal of all revolutions is the destruction of the sources of human alienation, whether in capitalism, totalitarianism racism or exploitation. In discussing the alienation of human beings, it is first necessary to define the nature of man. Indeed, it is imperative for a revolutionary movement to confront the question of who is man and what are his limitations and potentials. For revolution aims at the destruction of the existing socio-political order and institutionalization of a new order intended to create a new system of values and social relations. In

Islamic doctrines, man is perceived as a free being with responsibilities to order his own life. No agent or agency mediates responsibilities to order his own life. No agent or agency mediates between man and God. Not only an individual Muslim is free to judge his own actions and intentions, but also he is required to make choices and accept responsibility for his decisions. According to Islam, all human beings are equal in the sense of coming from a uniform nature and disposition, regardless of race, sex, or color.

The goal of the Islamic revolution is to create a society in which all men can fulfill their potentials regardless of their race, religion, and sex. The end of the Shah's regime was the first step of the Iranian revolution toward this goal.

Needless to say, this was the less difficult part of our task; the more complex revolutionary work is ahead of us.

Islam has long been misunderstood in the West and this misunderstanding has been transmitted to the non-Muslim countries of the Third World by colonial and socialist scholars as well as the prejudiced diplomats and journalists. The misinformed and biased perspectives portray life under Islam as dogmatic, mysterious, irrational, unchanging and ultimately inferior. When the Muslims of Africa and Asia met European colonizers with physical and cultural resistance, European scholars and government officials perceived this lack of enthusiasm as a sign of backwardness or barbarism, which reinforced the distortion. Contrary to such distorted views, Islam embodies an intricate complex of legal/theological schools and an extraordinary diversity of ideas, rituals, and practices. The history of Islam during the past century has been a story of revival and readjustment.

The moral explosion of Iranian masses in 1978 was greatly inspired by the Quranic doctrines and the efforts of Prophet Muhammad to transform the wealthy and clan dominated societies of his time into egalitarian and democratic communities of the Islamic faithful. Iranians have always honored those Muslim and national leaders who exemplified the qualities of justice, equality and moral rectitude. The Iranian people have an old and rich tradition of resisting tyrannies. It is interesting to note that all of Iran's popular political heroes were killed or imprisoned by ruling

monarchs. The leader could be a contemporary post or a religious scholar who have his life in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. The concept of martyrdom is central to the comprehension of this tradition.

Until the middle of December, 1978 the press of both Eastern and Western blocs failed to describe the events in Iran as revolutionary. Since the ideology of the struggle against the Shah and U.S. imperialism was overwhelmingly Islamic, both the Capitalist and the Communist observers seemed to have difficulty perceiving Islam as a revolutionary ideology. It is not surprising that many socialist thinkers have as much trouble understanding the radical and progressive nature of the Iranian revolution as the apologists for imperialism. When Karl Marx described religion as the opium of the people, he had the history of Western Europe in mind. He knew very little about Islam or the Afro-Asian societies. It is a fact that the development of secular/scientific culture in Europe was opposed by the organized church. This was not the case in the Islamic societies simply because Islam has no organized and centrally controlled institution. The prejudice of the colonial scholars was, and continues to be, heavily influenced by the imperialist interests, while the misperception of the Marxist writers has been a logical extension of the assumption that "religion is the opium of the people," a contention that could have been true in one society or region but not necessarily true in other societies and regions of the world. Instead of using Marxism as a tool of analysis, many Western and Eastern thinkers have substituted the Marxist doctrines for an independent study of Third World societies within their own native socio/historical context.

It is unfortunate that too many of the contemporary liberal and socialist observers of the Third World are still pursuing the framework developed by their nineteenth century predecessors. The 19th century socialist thinkers were as Eurocentric and ethnocentric in formulating a mutilated view of the Afro-Asian societies as the Cecil Rhodes and Lord Curzons.

All societies have their own organic development regardless of what the ethnocentric social theoreticians would like to believe. It was the consequence of this reality that in February 1979, after one hundred years of struggle, enabled the Iranian people to force their illegitimate monarch into permanent exile and welcomed home

their most popular leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. These events were a culmination of more than a year of nation-wide demonstrations, protests and strikes against the Pahlavi regime and U.S. imperialism. The dominant slogans of the protest demonstrations and mass marches were: ‘‘Death to the Shah’’ and ‘‘Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Republic.’’

The roots of the Iranian revolution can be traced back to the anti-imperialist and anti-monarchical movement of the late 19th century. It was, however, in the post W.W.II period that some intellectual Muslims in Iran made a systematic effort to regenerate the egalitarian and libertarian character of the ‘‘Islamic doctrines’’. The present Prime Minister of Iran, Mehdi Bazargan, was a leading theoretician of this movement from the very beginning of its inception in early 1940’s. Ayatollah Taleghani, the popular political leader and theologian, was also among the pioneers of the movement. It was the culmination of the efforts of men like Bazargan and Taleghani that inspired Dr. Ali Shariati to pursue the task of formulating the ideological foundation of the new Islamic movement in Iran. Shariati called upon Muslims to revive the original revolutionary content of their religion. He contended that a truly Islamic society requires as a precondition the existence of an equitable system of production and distribution. However, his conception of equity was not limited to the material realm. He repeatedly argued that a society without a moral dimension, which is separate from and beyond the material structure, inevitably degenerates into dictatorial and fraudulent practices. Shariati interpreted the Islamic thought as a historic ideology of the oppressed. Above all, he regarded radical socio-political action as the ultimate proof of one’s faith. Shariati effectively articulated the growing conviction among the Iranian intelligentsia that the ideology of any progressive and lasting change in the degenerate socio-political structure of the country has to be rooted in the native history and values of the society. Ayatollah Khomeini is undoubtedly the most popular political leader of the new Islamic movement. Indeed, he is the most beloved leader in the history of Iran’s popular movement. In the absence of a mass political organization or any real democratic tradition, popular movements against tyranny often involve charismatic leaders. Besides being immensely charismatic, Ayatollah Khomeini personifies the

traditional qualities by which Iranians have judged their popular resistance leaders-perseverance and taqva (piety, integrity, simplicity and modesty). During the years of his leadership in exile, he demonstrated a superb understanding of the Iranian people and an astute recognition of the moral emptiness of the regime in power.

II- U.S. Imperialism in Iran

United States policy during and after W.W. II in the Middle East was to replace the British economically but to support a British military presence in Greece, Iraq, Jordan, and Libya. The post W.W. II National Front movement in Iran and the nationalization of Iranian oil industry created the first scene of competition between the two imperialist powers. The National Front was an anti-imperialist coalition of a number of small political parties, the progressive bazaar merchants, the progressive religious leaders and the liberal, leftist intelligentsia, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was the unchallenged leader of this coalition. The unifying objective of the National Front was to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian oil company and end British interference in the affairs of the country. The Tudeh Party, the Communist Party of Iran, was against the nationalization proposal because the Soviet Union under Stalin was seeking to secure oil concession in northern Iran.

As you all know, Shah played a major role in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East. The Nixon Doctrine was the outcome of the U.S. failure in Vietnam, but it was intended to pursue the same counterrevolutionary policy that brought about the direct military involvement of the United State in the Indochina war. When this method of defeating or containing the Vietnamese revolution failed, the policy makers in Washington formulated the strategy of Vietnamization to pursue the same objective.

However, Vietnamization as you know, was not just a policy in the Indochina war, but rather it was the beginning of a new phase in the global counter-revolutionary strategy of the U.S. It was this larger meaning of Vietnamization which became the essence of the Nixon Doctrine.

Two domestic groups in the U.S. welcomed the Nixon Doctrine the most: politicians and arms manufactures. The politicians

wanted to extricate the American troops because their constituencies could not stand the heavy casualties; the arms manufacturers were badly in need of foreign orders.

The decision to transform Iran into an outpost of American power was mutually satisfactory to the Shah and to the United States. They both, acted without any regard for the best interests of the Iranian people. The Shah simply believed that “he was born to be a king, that his legitimacy was rooted in the supernatural, that he was the embodiment of the divine law, and thus beyond criticism.” And the United States believed that the Shah was loved by his people and that Iranians who opposed him did not have the capacity to be more than troublesome.

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine (followed and supported by President Carter) was in fact the continuation of more than a quarter century of U.S. imperialistic practices in the country. From the August, 1953, the time of military coup to the final days of the Pahlavi dynasty, the United States treated Iran as a client state. Furthermore, from the very beginning of its involvement in Iranian affairs the United States perceived the Iranian military as the principal instrument of its objectives in the country.

Until the inception of the Nixon doctrine, however, U.S. military assistance to Iran consisted of loans and grants, which amounted to approximately \$1.5 billion between 1946 and 1972. During this period more than 11,000 Iranian military personnel were trained in the United States. Cold war rivalry and containment of domestic to the monarchy were the twin motives behind United States military aid to Iran for thirty years.

Since the Pahlavi rule lacked any significant base of popular support, it was logical for the Shah to want constantly to expand the coercive base of his power, particularly in times of popular challenge to his rule. For example, in early 1960's, due to an intensified climate of disaffection, the opposition resumed its open activities, and the Muslim leaders became more vocal in their condemnation of the Pahlavi dictatorship. The Shah responded to this challenge by seeking to expand the military.

The Kennedy administration refused the Shah's request for more and better weapons. Instead, President Kennedy urged the

Shah to begin social reforms in order to enlarge the middle class and preempt the opposition.

The Shahs “**White Revolution**” was definitely influenced by the pressure from the Kennedy administration. However, realizing that his propaganda apparatus had already failed to project a reformist picture of his rule, he expanded the SAVAK and increased the repression of the opposition. The principal resistance to the intensified reign of terror came from the Muslim leaders. This resistance led to the mass rebellion of June 1963 in which an estimated 15,000 Iranians were gunned down in the streets of Tehran, Shiraz and Qum. The leader of this rebellion was none other than Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian government immediately blamed “reactionary” mullahs for instigating the rebellion. The truth of the matter was that 1963 was the third consecutive year of an economic depression which had particularly hurt the lower classes in the cities-the elements of the Iranian society most responsive to religious leadership. The Shah’s decision in early 1970s to expand his military strength was once again influenced by the increased activities of the opposition, particularly the emergence of armed urban guerrillas and expansion of the religious opposition.

However, the response of the Nixon administration to the Shah’s requests was far beyond the expectation of the Shah himself. It was the Nixon Doctrine which gave the Shah everything he asked for. The selling of conventional arms to a non-Western country without any restraint in regard to their quality, quantity and variety was a departure from the previous arms sale policies of the United States.

The success of the Iranian revolution exposed the contradictions of U.S. imperialism in Iran. The Shah’s public relations apparatus nurtured a number of myths about Iran. Until very recently, such efforts were amplified by official Washington, which had long since come to believe the myths it had created about Iran.

The myth of Iran’s stability was overriding in the minds of U.S. policy makers for years. The famous President Carter’s toast to the Shah on New Year Eve (1978) could have been uttered by one of five other presidents, beginning with Eisenhower. How did the myth of stability take hold? Exactly what was it that the CIA or the State Department failed to bring to Washington’s attention?

One answer lies in the idea of political stability itself, an idea badly misunderstood in Washington. Stability defined in real, rather than abstract terms, includes an economic and political environment in which a population perceives its life as more or less satisfactory, or at least hopeful of becoming so. Most definitions also take account of the need for minimal tacit consent to a government's values and priorities. Neither of these criteria fit Iran under the Shah's rule. More than a half-million Iranians were imprisoned for political reasons during the 25 years after the Shah was restored to power in the 1953 coup. Another problem was that official Washington fought and underestimated the character of the Iranian people, their ability and will to resist.

In brief, then, America's foreign policymakers had come to confuse the notion of political stability with the Shah's ability to keep the lid on. This problem of equating coercion with consent was compounded by a view of Iranians as another third world people simply too incompetent to shape their own destiny.

The popular revolution in Iran should not have come as such a surprise to the Western observers. The realities of Iran under the Shah were not concealed. Even a quick reading of Iranian history would show that the people have an old and rich tradition of resisting tyrannies; that all of Iran's popular political heroes were killed or imprisoned by ruling monarchs; that the confrontation between the absolute monarchy and liberalizing forces had been going on for a hundred years; that the monarchy was defeated in 1911 and 1953 - only to be restored by a Western power (England in 1921 and the United States in 1953); that between 1953 and 1978 more than 65,000 opponents of the Shah were gunned down by the army - about two thousand of them officially executed; and that during this period more than half a million Iranians served time in prison for their opposition to the regime. It might have been deduced from these facts that the Iranians were not going to be indifferent to the imperialist design on their lives and resources.

III- New Trends in the International community

Until recent decades the ruling elites in the official or unofficial colonies of Africa, Asia and Latin America did not need the assistance of colonial or imperialist powers in order to maintain their privileged position. In fact, in many cases the traditional

rulers attempted to resist the Western penetration of their societies not only for political but also for cultural and ideological reasons. Until the outbreak of W.W. II, cultural and ideological orientation of the typical traditional ruling class in the underdeveloped world was not too different from that of its own general population.

To be sure, peasant life in the class-ridden underdeveloped countries was, and is, short, brutish and nasty. But the landed gentry or its equivalent had constant contact with the exploited peasants. They all identified with the same religious symbols and justified their actions and intentions in similar fashion. The mode of transportation and communication used by the owners of land and capital was not a mystery to the peasants. The privileged children visited the village regularly and their education and attitudes were familiar to the villagers.

Today the situation is completely changed. The peasants are still living under the same conditions or have moved to urban ghettos, but the owners or controllers of the means of production have adopted a cultural and ideological orientation that is a mystery to the general population. The privileged few, whether they belong to the commercial, bureaucratic or military sector of the ruling elites, have little socio-cultural contact with the exploited many. In terms of their concrete aspirations and ambitions, they identify with the West to the point of being alienated from their own roots.

Thus as the economic gap between the privileged few and the wretched many increases, so does the cultural gap. The enclaves of wealth and power in many underdeveloped countries are also enclaves of imported cultures and lifestyles. The presence of multinational corporations in such countries shapes the enclaves of imported culture and benefits the enclaves of wealth and power in the sea of misery, of course, the national elites who control the political and economic institutions of the country have their disagreements with the managers of the multinational corporations. But the disagreements do not usually involve the nature of the multinationals' operations. The concerns and questions of the native elites, when they arise at all, relate to tactics of operations and their share of the profits.

In our time, corporate internationalism and the revolutionary threat to the class structure of the underdeveloped countries have

led the functional unity of dominant classes across national boundaries. The beneficiaries of this coalition have more in common than their opposition to the revolutionaries.

The ostentatious life style of the elites in the underdeveloped countries predates the multinational corporation. But in recent decades this ostentatious life style has been divorced from its native roots. The rapid growth of international finance, movement of goods and services, travel and communication have led to a global standardization of values, goals and aspirations among those who benefit from these activities. Since the technology and the ideology of this dramatic phenomenon are the product of organic socio-economic growth in the West, the standardization of values, goals and aspirations among the ruling elites of the world has added a new dimension of cultural domination to the evolving character of imperialism in the contemporary world. Today, even the liberal education, the manners, the dress fashion, the fade and the consumptive norms of the elites in the subordinated countries are similar to those of their counter parts in the advanced industrial world.

It is also understandable that the United States has become a generous exporter of arms and repressive technology to the subordinated countries, particularly those who defend the economic and political status quo in the international community. United States military sales to the underdeveloped countries since 1970 amount to \$50 billion; plus \$20 billion in credit sales and \$10 billion in commercial sales. United States military assistance, in the form of grants and credit to underdeveloped countries between 1946 and 1976, amounts to \$71 billion. United States assistance to police forces of underdeveloped countries from 1961 - 1978 amounted to \$322 million, not to mention the covert assistance.

Besides bringing revenues to the arms industry, such vast transfer of arms and repressive technology is supposed to enable the ruling elites to protect themselves against revolutionary movements. While President Carter speaks of his “undeviating commitment” to human rights, some of the most insidious torturers of the world continue to receive weapons, repression technology and intelligence training and advice from the United States.

In our time imperialism has produced an unprecedented amount of resentment among the populace in these subordinated societies. This resentment which is a response to exploitation, coercion and consumptive oriented manipulation, has resulted in an intensified and expanded revolutionary challenge from below. Thus installation of repressive technology in the dominated society and militarization of its state have become necessary in order to maintain the status quo. And yet it is a mistake to think of the export of manipulation, repression and militarism to the underdeveloped countries as a reaction to the resentment of the wretched. Since the resentment itself is a product of imperialism, the response to it is also a product of imperialism. Seen in this light, manipulation, repression and militarism are the organic commodities of imperialism in search of global markets.

It is sad to say that too many of us are anxious customers for the latest commodities of imperialism. Too many of us spend the precious resources of our peoples in parasitic and paranoia producing arms race. Too many of us are more responsive to the greed of the few for luxury goods than to the essential needs of the many. The arms race and the insatiable hunger for luxury goods are integral parts of the imperialist design for the contemporary world. Too many of us are the unconscious victims of imperialism. The perceptions which were imposed on our fathers by colonialism and imperialism have gradually become so internalized by us that we think they are the product of our own thinking. Cultural imperialism has penetrated the deepest levels of our psyches. Too many of us use the imported instruments of repression and oppression against our own peoples more effectively than their producers intended for us. Too many of us spend more of our resources on the institutions of coercions than on education or public health. The deposed Shah of Iran was perhaps the most irrational ruler in this category, but we all know that there are too many smaller shahs in the world, with a shah's mentality. Some can even be found in the Non-Aligned movement.

Let us face the fact that our struggle for justice, independence, and freedom should in part be directed against our own habits and perceptions. It is certain that the racists and exploiters of this world will not treat us better than we treat ourselves. Why did China have to teach Vietnam a lesson? What justification was there for the Pol

Pot regime in Cambodia to pursue a course of action that resulted in more than two million deaths of its own citizens? Why did Vietnam find it necessary to invade Cambodia? If the new regime in Cambodia is popular and legitimate, why are foreign troops compelled to continue their presence in the country?

We will betray our own commitment to peace, justice, independence and freedom if our answers to these questions are superficial, evasive, self-serving and one-dimensional. It was not class struggle or economic considerations which caused the tragic behavior of the socialist countries in Indochina. And it is not enough to claim that the subjective factors are at work without pursuing the question of what we mean by subjective factors and what should be done to remove them. It is our responsibility to analyze the conflicts within our own movement and among the non-imperialist countries with as much vigor and commitment to truth as we apply to unmask the nature and consequences of imperialism. The Marxist theory of conflict falls short of explaining all the problems of our time; and when it does explain a particular conflict situation, it is a mistake to perceive such an explanation as final. There is an abundance of historical evidence that materialist categories of explanations or prescriptions whether rooted in Marxism or capitalism, neither fully comprehend of human conflict nor sufficiently satisfy human aspirations.

The revolutionary experiences of this century are once again demonstrating the ancient truth that the struggle for justice, freedom, peace and independence requires a moral dimension which is separate from and beyond the material structure. The nuclear weapons and the real possibility of a global holocaust have intensified the need for this recognition in an unprecedented manner. The 19th century conditions of growth and industrialization made morality subservient to materialism in social theories and political actions. The contemporary revolutionary movements can no longer continue this unnatural situation. They have to recognize that imperialism, war and oppression cannot be defeated by materialism alone.

The problem in the Third World countries is not just the political and economic domination by the alien forces of superpowers, but also their cultural domination. Many of the Third World countries are dominated by the ideological, philosophical

and cultural tendencies which are alien to the native societies. As a result, many intellectuals in the Third World are alienated not only from themselves but also from their own people. This situation has produced an unprecedented crisis of the intellectual in the Third World, to the extent that communication between the intellectuals and the masses has become extremely difficult, at times impossible. Many of the educated elements in the Third World speak the native language; they might even like the natives, but they think, feel, taste, see, and hear Western of Eastern. In other world, their sense perceptions are taken over by alien forces. This is the worst kind of slavery human beings can be subjected to. This mental slavery is the most distinct consequence of imperialism in the contemporary world, which seems to be a cheap and effective tool of perpetuating imperialist domination.

If non-alignment is to serve the interests of the masses, we have to recognize the alienating and habitual cultural alignment with superpowers, and make a systematic effort to free ourselves from the mental bondage of cultural domination.

Mr. Chairman, Brothers and Sisters: It is undeniable that the Iranian revolution is a tremendous achievement, an achievement for which our people have paid a very dear price - the blood of our martyrs. All revolutions have their martyrs and the martyrs have a "message". I have come from the tulip garden of our martyrs, and I would like to convey their message to you:

As long as there is injustice, go on brother and fight.

As long as there is oppression, go on brother and fight.

As long as there is colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, hegemony, racism and exploitation, go on brother and fight.

Brothers and Sisters: We are fighting for our convictions, our values, and our Islamic values. We will never compromise our revolutionary values. There is no price for our values. The final victory is ours. The final victory is for the oppressed people of the world. The final victory of the oppressed people of the world is inevitable. That is the promise of Allah:

«وَنُرِيدُ أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضِعُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ»

"It is our determination to bless the oppressed people of the earth, and turn them into the vanguards, Imams, and the inheritors of the earth." Thank you.

7. Oil's Role in Foreign Policy

Iran Week-5 September 1979

In two important international conferences, the Sixth summit of Non-aligned Countries in Cuba, and the Thirty –Fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iran's Islamic Revolution was introduced and defined to the world, while at the same time, its foreign policy was touched upon by foreign minister, Ebrahim Yazdi.

Bearing in mind that clearly outlined foreign policies of a nation are the basis for that country's recognition and acceptance by the world community, Iran Week's Editor –in-Chief, Abbas Abdi, met with Dr. Yazdi for clarification of several outstanding issues. The result included the possible use of oil as a weapon in Iran's quest for the achievement of a just settlement to certain problems. Here are the highlights:

Q: What were the results of your meeting with U.S. Secretary of state Cyrus Vance?

A: There are certain problems and difficulties as far as Iran-U.S. relations are concerned. These were discussed at the meeting; one of the issues discussed was the American "Big Brother" stance which is totally unacceptable for us. For example, there's the case of Bruce Laingen, the American Embassy's charge in Tehran, who objected to the recent execution of individuals with affiliation to the past regime.

On this basis, we stressed we must be convinced that the U.S. has no intentions of interfering in our affairs, and just saying so is not enough, considering past relations between the two countries. Of course, Vance expressed the American government's interest in resuming normal relations. We asked for proof of this intention.

We also discussed the problems that have been left over from the Shah's regime. Most of these problems concern weapon sales contracts between the two countries. Vance accepted that it was a problem that should be dealt with by the American Defense Department and the Iranian Ministry of Defense.

Q: Will Iran buy more arms from the United States?

A: The government's policy is to maintain the arms that were purchased by the Shah, through the purchase of spare parts. These spares will be purchased from the United States or any other country that is willing to sell it to us.

Q: Even Israel?

A: Except Israel and South Africa.

Q: Did you meet with other American authorities?

A: We also had a meeting with Defense Department authorities to review the problems that I mentioned. Some of the contracts have been fulfilled but the bills have not been received. Therefore, in order to clarify the financial aspects of the contracts we need to have precise invoices.

Q: What do you mean by precise invoices?

A: The orders for the purchase of arms were made through the (former) Ministry of War to the American Defense Department. According to the agreement, the price of the orders had to be paid in advance.

The American Defense Department made contracts with arms manufacturers and paid them with the money that it had received from Iran. The manufacturers would then bill the Iranian government through the American Defense Department. Therefore, in order to finalize, the purchase must be presented to the government of Iran.

To emphasize the importance of the issue, it should be mentioned that between 1968 and the time of Shah's downfall, over \$21 billion worth of arms were ordered to the United States, all the money paid in advance. In order to review the cases, the American Defense Department must make a detailed report to the Iranian government so that the government can decide whether they are acceptable or not. Over half of the purchase price is related to arms that have not been delivered to Iran.

The outcome of these reviews and the amount that must be refunded to Iran by the U.S. is one of the decisive factors in the future of Iran-U.S. diplomatic relations.

Q: Will the U.S. accept?

A: We hope that the United States will find a way to solve these problems, paving the way for future relations. The U.S. must realize under what conditions these contracts were made, and with which government, making it all in favor of the U.S. government. The Americans must realize that the majority of the contracts were one-side and were against the interests of Iran. It is the U.S. that

can take a positive step to compensate for some of the losses imposed upon us.

Q: What was Iran's final proposal?

A: We would like to receive equipment for the mechanization of our agriculture instead of these arms. We have told them of our needs and certain agreements have been reached in principle.

Q: What is the condition of Iran –U.S. trade at the present?

A: Some of the American companies came up with strange excuses for the sale of spare parts or raw material that we require, refusing to make the sales we have requested. This lack of cooperation has placed Iran under a great deal of pressure. We explained that if the American businessmen continue their present policy, not supplying us with our requirements, we will probably do the same in the sale of our goods.

Q: Is oil one of these goods?

A: Yes.

Q: Have there been any talks concerning the exchange of ambassadors?

A: The exchange of ambassadors was not discussed but we have been informed, indirectly, that the U.S. government is in the process of selecting an ambassador for Iran, who must be someone acceptable to us.

Q: What was the outcome of Iran's ultimatum to Morocco?

A: We are waiting for a reply from the Moroccan government. They have recalled their ambassador, and we are awaiting a formal reply.

Q: Is it true that Syrian president Hafez Assad is coming to Iran as a mediator?

A: There is no issue involving mediation. It is a question of our relations with the Arab countries, including Syria.

Q: Do we have any problems with the countries in the region?

A: We have certain differences, but we have not asked Syria to mediate.

Q: It is said that a neighboring Arab country is interfering with Iran's internal affairs. Is it true?

A: We verified the meddling of an Arab country in our internal affairs, and that is why we warned the Iraqi government in our talks that in view of the main objectives of Iran's revolution, being anti-imperialistic, against the domination of the U.S. and Israel, the position of Iraq is against Iran's revolution and that country's interference will only be beneficial for Iran's enemies and the enemies of Islam.

Q : The Iraqi Foreign minister has said that the returning of three island in the Persian Gulf - the Greater and the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa - will be a basis for eliminating the differences that exist between Iran and the countries of the region. What is Iran's stand on this issue?

A: The Iraqi government is not the spokesman for the Arabs in the Persian Gulf, especially when such a task has not been assigned to them. Any attempt to change the existing conditions in the Persian Gulf will only cause further problems which certainly will not help clarify the differences between Iran and the Arabs.

Q: How does the Iraqi government tie in with the problems in Kurdistan?

A: They are sending trained military men into Iran, who are connected to the former SAVAK or CIA.

Q : What is Iran's stand on the issue of a foreign power creating a base to protect the Straits of Hormoz?

A: We are and will be against the establishment of any base that is set up by a power from outside of this region.

8. A Letter from Hugh B. Jones, president of the Revelation Foundation, to Dr. Yazdi

Sept. 19, 1979

In Praise of Iran,

Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Foreign Minister of Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Iran, Tehran, Iran.

Dear Dr. Yazdi,

By the time you receive this letter, I may be dead. It is quite possible that I may be electrocuted by "free men" who protest the use of firing squads in support of their own cause. Personally, I am revolted at the extremes of man's judgment against others, but that may not stay my execution on a charge such as treason. For this

reason it is imperative that I communicate with you in the righteous cause of Humanity. I am hoping that you will also give due attention to the enclosures.

In that you are a man who has lived amongst and has discoursed with western peoples and has demonstrated your disdain for cultural filth, I need not outline western society's corruptions and its dominant contagious effect on mankind; for despite its pretentious claim as the guiding light to human decency and its equally arrogant materialistic claim to affluence attained through science and technology, western society is largely a cultural morass and a moral wasteland of social filth drawn from a mix of various cultures and advancing in decadence – while savoring its corruptions in “freedom” in the “pursuit of happiness”, and like a prostitute, it shamelessly invites the rest of mankind to abandon the decency underlying their innocent cultures, that they may partake ... at a price. It is a terrible price for Humanity to pay within any misguided context of “RIGHTS” – and this is recognized by sensible Iranians such as yourself. Therefore, let me explain my mission to you briefly.

I am Jamaican (West Indies) by origin, emanating from within the greater influence of western civilization. How I wish that I was born elsewhere and that I had never known this corrupt way of life; for it is a matter of fact that one is only corrupted by that which is corrupt. Most certainly, poverty may be a curse, but it is not in itself corrupt or indecent; for most of mankind's problems have been caused by the evil structure of western society built by migratory Europeans, in duplicates, throughout the world. Western society is lead chiefly by a State patterned off the old senatorial system of the old Roman Empire, and whereby the imperialist powers of “Caesar” (the country), its senators and/or its representatives, and the insatiable lusts of its people are coercively felt throughout the world, in like manner as the imperialist power of old Rome and its armies extended Caesar's lusts – the lusts of a political octopus. What makes the new “imperialist child-of-Caesar” more dangerous to Humanity is that it commits all its national deeds and misdeeds in the name of God ... as one nation under God – in abrogation of other people's god: but with its practice of separation of Church and State, is it really a nation of godly beings? Worst yet, that part of the State which is separated

from God has taken upon itself to dictate the kind of beings we should be, and the kind of society in which we should live.

For the above reasons, I implore you to use every means that the one true God gives you to resist (without being vindictive) the corruptive influences which such western nations seek to impose upon other peoples in the name of the unnamed masked “God” in which they declare their trust, in guise of “flag” and country, and more recently, in the name of “human rights” ... with callous indifference to what is intrinsically right or wrong – while forcibly administering “law” in the style of old Rome. Surely, the image of the god in which such people trust must be imprinted or engraved on the currency by which they trade, in valuing human life. For it is that god which causes that and similar nations to nurture any kind of corrupt “persons” that people choose to be – as long as they or the government can pay their way through life and medical science can correct their physical ailments and diseases ... temporarily ... that they may pursue “happiness” through “competition” and teach the world so to do. It is an exact duplicate of the old Roman Empire reliving its corrupt hedonism, as painted on the ceiling of the Christine chapel in Rome, and tending toward another subtle death of civilization.

There is a better way for mankind. Therefore, let your example and you influence be carried throughout the Muslim world in devising a better society for mankind in accordance with the spirit of Islam. Above all, do not allow false notions of “human rights” and “woman’s liberation”, as preached from within corrupt States, to change the righteous order of family and societal structure set out by Islam; for the suffering arising out of such societal demise is always greater than human sufferings due to poverty ... though neither is to be preferred against the other.

I am a Christian by belief. As a believer, I believe in God rather than in religious doctrines; and as a true believer in the one true God and in the original word of God, I necessarily believe the principles of Islam, as pertaining to all original revelations of God ... from God, to man. In so believing, I renounce, without regrets, all evils that mostly people of European descent have generated amongst mankind – while adapting from other cultures and then selling the product or otherwise imposing their resulting way of life and/or evil cultural corruptions on others in the name of evolution,

modernism and “human rights”, while sublimating in a cesspool of immorality in democracy.

With the characteristic arrogance that was evident in your female interviewer while you were being reprimanded by that career western news-reporter, it is clear that such people are mindlessly and egoistically committed to impose the kind of existential, materialistic and hedonistic society that they want mankind to have with the help of their corrupted religious doctrines, their ideological philosophers and their modernistic doctrinarians ... backed by armed might. For it is this continuing paternalistic and arrogant attitude which is the singular cause of the worldwide strife, conflict and political confrontation mostly between the two European-built ideologically powered “superpowers” ... with each recruiting or otherwise luring willing and unwilling segments of mankind who foolishly align themselves ideologically in joining the respective cause, while extending war from within its “super powered” source ... by means of its congenitally corrupt political ideologies. Again, that original source of paternalistic arrogance which eagerly sought your country’s subservient allegiance was evidenced by the tone and nature of the Havana interview that you granted the well-known female reporter of the “free-world free-press” society. Her attitude, like all others of her kind – with regard to cultural origin rather than sexual gender – was paternalistically reprimanding – but thank God, you withstood the test.

With that inner strength of uncommon uncompromising character, you will certainly help to build a decent society for you people. Let Islam dictate your mores, your interpersonal and societal relationships, your societal structure and the decent application of science and technology in determining the mundane quality of your lives ... without genetic engineering, test-tube babies and/or human clones. In that way, and with, the right application of all aspects of preventive medicine, the spiritual aspect of life will be secure in God.

As a nation of people now uprooting and casting off the shackles of immorality and corruption imported into your society, never again allow such reckless demise to recur amongst you by deviating from the path of eternal truth and right; for contrary to the beliefs of indoctrinated libertarian “free beings” in western

societies, there is no such thing as an antiquated “truth”, or “right”, or “morality”, or “right way of living”. For while devising the material transformations which we must make in assisting each other to live with progressively less pain in our natural environment of matter, all peoples are at all times required to live truly and rightly, each in relation to the other in Space and Time ... according to how the eternal laws of life relate us within God’s Creation.

No one has a divine mandate to change that societal structure by any notion of “rights” and/or “equal rights”. Therefore, those who pursue that way of life as individuals, as families and as nations do so at their own risk. Sane men must resist them: for all would be well if such people could keep their aspirations, their desires, their influence and even their demise within their own personal borders ... but they cannot. The worst threat to mankind is that the obscene segment of the westernized “free-world free-press society” with their self-devised freedoms have voted themselves a mandate to impose their corrupt libertine concepts of freedom on the rest of mankind ... in the name of being “free”, “modern” and “sophisticated”. It is a career-minded obscenity that must be contained by those of us who have the will to do so in protecting the innocent and in maintain human decency – not for some, but for all, and even if the “free-world free-press society” is offended by the censorship that you have imposed on their warped reporting’s – that is, warped to suit the selfish aims and purposes of their own societies and/or nations.

Thus, turn a deaf ear to all idiotic western statements by people who are inspired by their egos to preach “free-world” and “free-press” politicized sociological ideologies from within deviate contexts of “liberation” ... while denouncing and proclaiming the Islamic way of life as being antiquated. Shun the corrupt free-for-those-who-want-it “life-styles” which they export in political, commercial, legal and religious packages in replacement of the decent and humane structured Islamic way of living: for such are the tainted voices from within evil beings; they think that because they utter words in majority support of universally popular causes that their government and their way of living attained by their collective words and their deeds are right, decent and just ... by reason of their own corrupt desires for themselves and for others.

A. collection of human opinions and/or votes does not constitute God's command.

God feeds his flocks, but He does not do so by majority vote; for He is a majority in One. Rule then only by God's command -- and not by the words, and the laws of men, whom, by their liberty, have appointed themselves advisers to God through imagined processes of social or physical evolution ... rather than growing with respect to the eternal laws of Creation. Yet, because they know no other way of life, they feel compelled to ask other peoples to live like they do.

In relation to others, you have done well thus far; continue in God's righteousness ... and use this letter and its accompaniments as it suits your purpose in furthering your just cause and in answer to your European and/or westernized career lip-flapping critics and detractors: for from here onward, theirs will be the greater price to pay ... and not only in material terms.

Yours respectfully. Hugh B. Jones

On The Matter Of Separate Existence Of Church And State, The Great Divide

How subtly evil: - more subtle and more evil than the advent of the symbolic “evil serpent” on this our cosmic Eden as seen from the Moon: as symbolic as the serpent on the cross in the wilderness, since reality takes on substance only as it is created. For the fool’s notion of separation between Church and State unwittingly guarantees that the nation so constructed will inevitably self-destruct at some future date within its dichotomous existence. It is the original invisible cosmic dividing line now in mundane disguise, and on either side of which, all human societal rifts derive and from whence they merge like flowing streams into the widening societal chasm that is growing between Church and State ... as is evident in the mores of the people, toward each extreme, on either side of the dividing line.

Thus, together, both elements comprising the divided nation dig a cosmic pit into which it will fall. The social explosions which delineate the individual and national “pursuit of happiness” on either side of “the great divide” are reminiscent of the old Roman Empire ... competing in various arenas in pursuit of its own destruction ... in search of happiness. The results are opposing social, moral, spiritual, ideological and political explosive expositions that are now taking place within and without, and which are symptomatic of the serpentine cosmic chasm into which the multi-divided nation of people will fall and be destroyed ... even though, in self-righteous malaise, its competing “roman-citizens” now gloat in “super-powered” contentment with a false sense of security, while squandering their imaginary freedoms in seduction, licentiousness and carnality in competition ... while, in academics, they simultaneously promote and deny the truth of man’s existence, in mock-obedience to God ... as a nation. How

subtle: -- damned serpent; your cosmic “head” will be crushed by the cosmic “heel” of God. For the “head” is necessarily joined to the “heel”.

Yet, in that people are ultimately destroyed by their own doings in relation to each other, the signs of self-destruction are becoming increasingly more defined and more evident, as they must be, before and during the culmination of the final event. In the meantime, and like the Roman Empire of old, the nation and its people bask in self-glorification in search of preeminence, while flourishing in “superpowered” ignorance ... in arrogance. As a nation, the old Roman Empire also separated itself from God who is the Church ... and it died of self-destruction. Yet, they were free men.

We therefore learn that the mode of freedom which men dictate for themselves and for others is not lasting ... and neither are such “free societies”: for though men and their nations live in sophistry and die sophisticated deaths, nevertheless ... they die their own insidious deaths – both physically and spiritually. Hugh B. Jones, President, Revelation Foundation.

9. Letter from the Editor

Iran week, October 19, 1979

The changes that Iran's foreign policy has undergone after the revolution marks the beginning of a new era of diplomacy for a country that for the past 25 years has made its policy decisions on the basis of its alliance with one country, the United States.

The establishment of new relations and the severing of other relations will, undoubtedly, place Iran in a bargaining position, diplomatically speaking, that this country may - and should - manipulate to compensate for almost three decades of "dictated" foreign policy. Our new foreign relations revolve around the premise that non-alignment is the most advantageous position for the beginning of this new era.

Iran Week devoted this week's cover story to Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy, following the presentation of this country's revolutionary ideals at the sixth summit of Non-Aligned countries in Havana and also at the 34TH session of the United

Nations General Assembly by Iran's foreign minister Ebrahim Yazdi who also granted an exclusive interview to this magazine.

The pictures for this week's cover story were provided by the famous Iranian photographer Abbas Attar.

10. Shaping New Relations

Cover Story Iran Week October 19, 1979

Almost eight months after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, certain signs of stability in the country's foreign policy have begun to emerge, and at the same time two subsequent events in the past month have helped gain a degree of acceptance for post-revolution Iran in the world community: first, Iran's membership in the non-aligned camp; second, the successful presentation of the country's revolution to the 34th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Iran's main concern in its foreign policy revolves around the country's ties, and problems with the countries in the region. The Arab nations of the Persian Gulf region and the Arab community in general are seemingly divided in three camps, dealing with Iran on the basis of their alliance with the two superpowers and some acting on an independent basis.

In recent months, Iran has been host to many diplomatic guests, most of whom came from Arab nations. It seems that Iran's neighboring Arab countries are trying to develop some kind of fresh understanding of their once "mighty" neighbor, and friend for some.

It is obvious that these countries are anxious about the consequences of Iran's revolution, having put up a defensive wall in their diplomatic relations with Iran. Aside from the problems in the region, Iran has taken on two of the world's giants, accusing the United States and the Soviet Union of meddling in its internal affairs.

Of course, Iran's ties with its neighbor to the north seems to be of the love-hate type of relationship, but experts in the field state that there is no love lost between the two countries. But the Soviet Union is nevertheless trying hard to develop friendly relation with Iran, and supports the Islamic revolution, at least on the surface.

Iran's main problem with its neighbors concerns Iraq which has been accused of supporting the counter-revolutionary elements in

Kurdistan, and in some cases bombing border villages. The Iraqis have been very open in their hostility toward Iran, and with their problems with the Kurds, their support of disruptive elements in that region places Iran in a dilemma as far as its policy of non-aggression is concerned.

Developments in Iran's neighboring country to the east, Afghanistan, and the struggle of the Afghan Muslims against the communist-backed regime in Kabul now led by Hafizullah Amin has prompted the government, of Iran to openly support the cause of the Muslims. However, the plight of the Afghan refugees who have been pouring into Iran and Pakistan have caused the Iranian government to review its policy toward that country and, lately, the refugees have been turned back at the border.

The establishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, following the revolution, and Iran's membership into the non-aligned movement, marks a major development in the foreign relations of the Islamic government. The anti-communist sentiments at home, and the beginning of a seemingly friendly relationship with Cuba have puzzled certain diplomatic circles.

When Ebrahim Yazdi, Iran's foreign minister attended the sixth summit conference of non-aligned nations held in September, the prospects of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries seemed high, but the warm reception that was awarded Iran's foreign minister initiated a series of speculations as to the nature of the newly formed relations.

Quoting Antonio Esquivel, Cuba's special envoy to Iran, saying that "if this is Islam, then long live Islam" after visiting Iran, Yazdi said "Now that I have come to Cuba and seen the achievements of the Cuban revolution, I like to say that based on the Islamic principle of judging people by their deeds rather than their words, I consider Fidel Castro to be closer to Islam than many of those who claim to be Muslims."

At the Non-Aligned Summit, the Iranian foreign minister stated that this was the first time the revolutionary government of Iran was participating in an international forum of this magnitude. The rhetoric concerning Cuba and Fidel Castro and the fact that it was Iran's first post-revolutionary attempt at gaining recognition on an international scale prompted the west to view the event as more

than a diplomatic show and try to establish a firm basis for its future dealings with Iran.

At both the Non-Aligned Summit and the U.N. General Assembly Yazdi attempted to define the foreign policy of Iran. In terms of an Islamic ideology, however, the Cuban "deal" did not hide the fact that a cat-and-mouse play of a sort with the eastern bloc countries as well as with the United States was in the making.

The cryptic nature of Iran's relation with the United States and the "cold" environment in which it is being carried on is another high-priority item on the long list of foreign policy matters facing Iran. In view of the strong attacks on the policies of the United States toward Iran, and the relative indifference with which the U.S. receives the attacks and threats, referred to as a "cover" by some diplomatic experts, they assert that relations between the two countries have not deteriorated as much as it appears, while others maintain that Iran-U.S. relations have not only remained unchanged but the prospects of 'friendlier' ties are imminent.

In a press conference last week, the Foreign minister stressed that one of the main obstacles in the relations between Iran and the United States is the matter of arms contracts signed by the former Shah's regime. He said that "the United States is imposing conditions on the sale of military spare parts to Iran, which this country cannot accept." Yazdi added that Iran had been lured into a one-sided deal with the Americans in the past. "Our refusal to accept the conditions set forth by the United States, as far as the sale of military spare parts are concerned, revolve around a \$9 billion debt which the U.S. must pay back to Iran."

Iran has paid a total of \$21 billion for the military hardware that it has purchased from the U.S. but most of the goods have not been delivered and only \$9 billion worth of equipment has been received so far. "One week before the fall of the Bakhtiar government, a \$9 billion contract was cancelled and, so far, we have neither received the money nor the goods," Yazdi said. He added that the maintenance of military hardware requires spare parts and the U.S. is imposing unacceptable conditions on the sale of these spare parts.

However, Yazdi emphasized that no country can remain in total isolation, and that Iran's position concerning its foreign policy

remains the same with the U.S. and any other country that will deal with Iran on an equal and fair basis. As far as the United States is concerned, the cancellation of contracts by many American companies caused Iran to lose a great deal of money and suffer some irreparable damages. "Only our strong stance will make the Americans understand that we are no more their puppet and that that must deal with us on a fair basis, otherwise we will have no choice but to retaliate."

Another important foreign policy move by Iran concerned the attendance of the Foreign Minister at the 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly. Yazdi's statements at that conference involved the introduction of Iran's Islamic Revolution more than a presentation of this country's foreign policy. In his opening remarks Yazdi said, "As an Iranian who has come here from the ranks of a 30-year-old revolutionary movement, I have enjoyed the satisfaction of screaming the outrage of my people at you on several occasions from the.....walks in front of this building. Although from the outside, the walls of this complex seemed difficult to penetrate, I never questioned the necessity of appealing to the conscience of the world in our struggle against tyranny."

He added, "Now that we have penetrated the walls and you are hearing me loud and clear, I would like to say categorically that since the CIA-engineered coup of 1953 in Iran, this is the first time the Iranian delegation in the United Nations is representing the true preference of the Iranian people."

Expounding on the Iranian Revolution, Yazdi said that both the western and eastern worlds have difficulty understanding the nature of the Iranian revolution. "In the west, religion is defined as a relationship between man and the supernatural. In this definition there is no room for political, economic and social consideration. Islam however consists of a set of doctrines based on a world-view. The Islamic doctrines define and conceptualize both man and the social universe with the purpose of transforming them in accordance with the Islamic world-view. Seen in this light, the religion of Islam has its own political, social, and cultural perspective."

In another part of his speech, the Iranian foreign minister said that bloc alliances based on a military network serves only the

cause of imperialism and tyranny. "The disbanding of and disassociation from military bases and alliances involving Iran, which catered to the imperialistic game plan, was one of the initial foreign policy decisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was also a logical step for revolutionary Iran to join the ranks of the non-aligned states."

Yazdi added that "we were all too familiar with the facts of the East conflict. For us," he said, "the most important fact is the displacement and suffering of the Palestinian people. There million human beings have either been expelled from their ancestral homes or live under the Nazified terror of the Israeli military occupation simply because they are not Jews." The Foreign Minister added that the Iranian government was proud to have taken concrete steps in contributing to international efforts aimed at "unmasking such deceptions and undoing the violations and criminal acts emanating from Israel."

Concerning the African continent, Yazdi commented that nowhere are the vestiges and remnants of colonialism and imperialism more apparent than in Southern Africa. "In keeping with our conviction that seek for others the same dignities and freedom that we have sought for ourselves, the Iranian government took prompt action regarding the abhorrent policies of apartheid and racial discrimination on the African continent." This, he said resulted, among other things, in the total cut off of Iranian oil shipped to South Africa. "Such a measure was adopted with the intent of applying economic pressure on the Pretoria regime, and indirectly upon the equally racist and illegal regime in Rhodesia."

In regard to the plight of the Afghan Muslims, Dr. Yazdi pointed out that the rebellion in Afghanistan has produced thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of refugees who are pouring into Iran and Pakistan. "The irrational and alienated elements justify such actions in the name of an imported 'ism'."

The foreign minister, expressing his views on the problem in such countries is not just the political and economic domination by the alien forces of superpowers, but also their cultural domination. Many of the Third world countries, he added, are dominated by the ideological, philosophical and cultural tendencies which are alien to their native societies. Yazdi said that "as a result, many intellectuals in the Third world are alienated not only from

themselves but also from their own people. Many of the educated elements in the third world speak the native language; they might even dress like the natives, but they think, feel, taste, see and hear western or eastern." In other words, Yazdi added, their sense perceptions are taken over by alien forces. This, he said, is the worst kind of slavery human beings can be subjected to.

Concluding his speech, the Iranian Foreign Minister said that it is the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the United Nations should be as active in combating the new forms of imperialism as it was in the struggle against colonialism." For a quarter century a half million Iranians served time in prison, more than 65,000 of them were killed by the Shah's men, over 2,000 of them, all young men and women were publicly executed and an unknown number were tortured to death; and yet not a word about these hideous crimes was mentioned in this assembly."

Yazdi concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to the proposition that the most sacred mission of the United Nations is to support, within a realistic framework, the rights of the oppressed at all times and under all circumstances.

Although Iran's foreign policy seems clear, on the surface, there seem to be, however, strong implications of unmentioned and puzzling policies and relations. The presentation of the country's foreign policy at the Non-aligned summit and U.N conference leaves much room for questions and speculation concerning the stability of Iran's relation with first, the countries of the region and the more radical Arab nations and second, with the two superpowers.

The establishment of new relations following the revolution with such countries as Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the severing of relations with Israel, South Africa and Egypt, and also the so called "cold" relations with the United States are by no means the final policy of Iran in the international scene. It is obvious that Iran's domestic policies are not yet clear and defined, making it almost impossible to establish stable relations with various foreign countries.

Government spokesman Sadeq Tabatabai's trip to Syria, and his subsequent remarks on Iran's relations with the Arab countries of the region, taking place at almost the same time that the Foreign

Minister was attending the U.N. conference has posed some puzzling questions as to the development of Iran's diplomatic relations and ties who is to comment on the official nature of a diplomatic mission.

The paramount issue remains with the development of national policies upon which the country's foreign relations will be evolved. It is the general consensus that until such time when an elected government comes into office Iran's international ties will not be clearly delineated. But Foreign Minister Yazdi announced upon his return from the U.N. that elections will be held within two months and a government installed.

11. Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi and Ayatollah Khomeini

Gregory Rose, New York Times

(This interview was done by Gregory Rose for the New York Times, who subsequently published it in Penthouse magazine. The magazine then was mailed to many people in Iran, including Ulama in Qum. I considered legal action, but was told not to pursue it. EY)

American Business Enterprises Plundered our People robbed them of their Wealth and their Culture.

More than a million people mobbed his car, carrying his picture and chanting "Khomeini is Imam, our leader", when he arrived at Tehran's airport last February. His picture is everywhere - on every street corner, every wall, every telephone pole, in every demonstration. Few leaders of any other nation in recent memory have been the object of such determined adulation. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Marja Taqlid - Source of Imitation for Shi'ite Muslims - is for most Iranians the incarnation of opposition to the shah and of their hopes for Iran's future. For twenty years the seventy nine year old religious leader has been the foremost voice raised against the Pahlavi dynasty.

Born in 1899 in the village of Khumain, Khomeini lost his father, a mullah (legal scholar) vocally opposed to the Qatar dynasty to Qatar assassins in Arak. He was raised by his mother in Khumain and became, after her death when he was fifteen, a student of the prominent Muslim scholar Haeri. He followed Haeri to the holy city of Qom and applied himself to the rigorous study

of Islamic law, philosophy theology, and mysticism. In 1927 he married (he has two sons, three daughters, and fourteen grandchildren) and began teaching ethics in Qom's religious school. Throughout the 1930's agents of Reza Shah raided Khomeini's classes repeatedly, eventually forcing him to go underground for a time. In 1942 Khomeini published his book, *The Uncovering of the Secrets*, in which he attacked the institution of the monarchy and savaged the Pahlavis. In 1944 his classes were again raided, and he was forced, once again, to go underground.

In September 1941 Reza Shah abdicated, and his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded to the throne. In March 1951, when foreign oil companies in Iran were nationalized and the shah was forced to appoint Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh premier, Khomeini supported Mossadegh's government. The oil nationalization was in-tolerable to Western governments, however, and in 1953 a CIA-inspired coup overthrew the democratically elected Mossadegh and brought the shah to full power. Khomeini bitterly opposed this coup but continued his religious studies. He was elevated to the rank of ayatollah in 1960 on the death of Qom's Ayatollah Borujerdi. Sensitive to the demands of his position, Khomeini began to attack the shah and the monarchy publicly. In March 1964 he was arrested. Shortly thereafter he was proclaimed a grand ayatollah.

He was released in May 1963 and immediately launched a campaign against the Shah's "White Revolution" and the large landlords who benefited from the so-called agrarian reform. He also pointed to the privileges and power Americans increasingly enjoyed in Iran and the huge personal holdings of the shah and his family. During the mass demonstrations of June 1963, he was again arrested and imprisoned for four months, released; he began his attacks again and was jailed once more. Finally, he was exiled, first to Bursa, Turkey, and then, in 1964, to An Najaf, Iraq, a Shi'ite shrine. Under pressure from the shah's government, Iraq asked him to leave in mid-1978, and he was granted asylum in France, settling just outside Paris.

In October 1977 Khomeini's son Mustafa died under mysterious circumstances that suggested murder at the hands of SAVAK, the shah's secret police. Khomeini is reported to have responded to the

news by remarking, "I see no difference between my son and all the others who have died resisting the shah".

Now residing in Qom, ninety miles south of Tehran, Khomeini is at present the most important figure in Iranian life. He is "Imam", the leader - not the Hidden Imam of Shi'ite Islam, but, as grand ayatollah, in mystical communication with the Hidden Imam and a source of God's revelation in the present.

To become an ayatollah is a process likened by some Western scholars to obtaining five Ph.D. degrees and often takes upward of thirty years. A mullah advances to ayatollah only after lengthy study of the Shari'a, the Koran, tradition, and theology and through acknowledgment by others of his eminent personal virtues. Only the other ayatollahs can make a new ayatollah, less by a process of election than by one of cooptation. Above the ayatollahs stand the Ayatollahha al-Ozma, the grand ayatollahs, described by tradition as mujtahids, those "pure in manners who have acquired all the sciences to such a perfect degree that they can respond immediately and without prompting to all questions that are posed to them on religious and civil law". In present-day Iran there are five grand ayatollahs: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, seventy-nine; Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Kazem Shariat-Madari, eighty-two; Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Golpayeghani, eighty-three; Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Shahbeddin Marashi-Najafi, eighty-one; and Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Ab-luqassem Kho'I, eighty-five. Any of the grand ayatollahs may co-opt another, lesser ayatollah to their number, and their hierarchical ranking is a matter of speculation. A year ago Shariat-Madari was most senior. Now pride of place has been given to Khomeini. It was on the authority of one of Khomeini's revelations that the general strike was called that brought the shah down and that Bakhtiar was dismissed and the Bazargan government installed.

The Komiteh - the Imam Khomeini Committee - acts in his name on countless matters of which he never hears. So great is his authority that the mere expression of his wish is taken for command - a situation that has led to misinterpretation and countless problems for the Provisional Government. Khomeini's closest aides include his son Ahmed and Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi. Among Iran's revolutionary leaders, it is Yazdi who most clearly has Khomeini's ear. Yazdi holds what is, perhaps, the most

sensitive post in the provisional revolutionary government-deputy prime minister for revolutionary affairs, with far-ranging powers to supervise and coordinate the activities of the Revolutionary Committee and the central government - a delicate task in a time when the power of the Komiteh has rivaled, if not exceeded, that of the appointed government. Among those who made the Islamic Revolution-the rank and file in the streets, clergy, peasants, shopkeepers, revolutionary militiamen-Yazdi enjoys a respect and personal loyalty afforded few of Iran's leaders. For years he has been a close friend and adviser to Ayatollah Khomeini, with a reputation for tough-mindedness and personal courage. Yazdi, however, is not lacking for critics. Hedayatollah Matin-Daffari, the grandson of Mossadegh and leader of the National Democratic Front, a left-of-center faction split off from Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi's National Front, has bitterly attacked Yazdi for his stand on the national referendum and for what he terms an "erosion of human liberties". For which he blames Yazdi and the men around him. Advocates of a Western-style parliamentary democracy for Iran have also criticized Yazdi, claiming that his vision of an Islamic republic is that of a harsh theocracy nearly as repressive of dissent as the shah's regime was. Yet few can deny Yazdi's diligence and his grinding schedule. Arriving at his office in the prime-ministry complex before eight in the morning, he begins a whirlwind schedule of conferences, telephone conversations, and public appearances that often extended far past midnight. Nor are his personal courage and decisiveness often challenged. During the February siege of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by left-wing extremists, eighteen Americans were taken hostage and more than seventy others forced to take refuge in the embassy's communications center, surrounded by nearly 100 armed guerrillas. While pro-Khomeini militiamen exchanged sporadic fire for hours with the guerrillas, many feared that the American hostages would be killed. Yazdi, informed of the situation, sped to the embassy and began negotiations with the guerrillas. A tense half hour followed, with the bitter shouting punctuated by firing outside. One American who heard much of the exchange thought that Yazdi and his aides might easily be killed by the leftists. Finally, agreement was reached and the siege broken. "He has no fear", said a Yazdi aide after the incident.

More recently, Yazdi personally intervened when two sons and a daughter-in-law of Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleghani were arrested by militiamen at the order of komiteh official, Muhammad Qarazi. Queried by Yazdi, Qarazi denied any knowledge of the affair. Eventually, Qarazi admitted ordering the arrests, and Yazdi ordered that the three be released. When the militiamen refused to obey the order, Yazdi arrested Qarazi on the spot and the prisoners were released. "There is only one government in Iran", Yazdi is reported to have remarked angrily after the incident. Although he is a scientist by profession, Yazdi is no newcomer to politics, Born in Tehran on September 26, 1930, he was an active supporter of Mossadegh while he was a pharmacology student at Tehran University. A practicing pharmacist through the fifties, Yazdi was increasingly drawn to the Islamic opposition and engaged in clandestine activities against the shah. Under increasing police surveillance, Yazdi chose to emigrate in 1960 rather than face arrest. He enrolled in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from which he received a Ph. D. in pharmacology. From 1968 to 1978 he worked as a cancer researcher at Baylor University and at the microbiology department of Veterans Hospital in Houston, Tex. From the mid-1960s he became closely associated with the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, and he was called to Khomeini's side in December 1978 in Paris. He quickly became Khomeini's authoritative spokesman and closest adviser, accompanying Khomeini on his triumphant return to Iran. Yazdi is married and has six children, one of whom, Lily, is married to the revolutionary government's charge d'affaires at the embassy in Washington. His wife and remaining children, at the time of this writing, reside in Houston. In three interviews last March, Yazdi and the Ayatollah Khomeini spoke with freelance writer Gregory Rose in Tehran.

As this interview was going to press, the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan announced that Yazdi had resigned as deputy prime minister to replace Karim Sanjabi as foreign minister (Sanjabi had resigned to protest the continuing power of the Revolutionary Committee). He also assumed co chairmanship of the Central Revolutionary Committee. While some Western press observers have suggested that this move was a demotion, resulting from conflicts with Bazargan on the role of the Komiteh, sources in Iran paint the move less as a power struggle with Bazargan than as

Yazdi's attempt to gain greater control of the sometimes recalcitrant Revolutionary Committee and to move to give stronger definition to Iran's floundering foreign policy. Regardless of the circumstances, it is clear that Ibrahim Yazdi will remain a power to be reckoned with in revolutionary Iran.

N.Y.T: The first foreign leader to be officially received by the Islamic Republic was Yasser Arafat. What will be the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Palestinian liberation movement?

Yazdi: We, of course, recognize the Palestine Liberation Organize the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and condemn the Zionist-imperialist occupation of Palestine. The PLO has been in the forefront of support for the revolutionary straggle of the people of Iran, and we cannot be deaf to the struggle of our brothers.

NYT: Will Iran offer bases or logistical support to the PLO?

Yazdi: No, our Palestinian brothers already have the resources they need for their struggle. They do not need basses for military operations in Iran. They have opened liaison offices in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran, but these will not serve a military purpose. What the PLO needs is recognition of its legitimacy, and that is what we have given.

NYT: If a Palestinian entity is established in the territories currently under Israeli occupation, will Iran provide such an entity with economic assistance?

Yazdi: That would depend on many factors; it is too early to make any judgment on that one.

NYT: One of the first acts of the revolutionary government was to cut off oil to Israel. Up until that time Iran had been one of Israel's main suppliers. Are there any circumstances under which you would reconsider that decision?

Yazdi: Yes – the victory of the Palestinian revolutionary straggle.

NYT: Many Western strategists are increasingly concerned about Soviet influence and expansion in the Near East. They speak of a Soviet pincer surrounding the oil fields of the area, stretching from Ethiopia to South Yemen to Afghanistan. Do you agree with this evolution?

Yazdi: Imperialism has always found the Middle East a fertile area for exploitation. In Iran our experience has been mainly the struggle against American imperialism. Elsewhere the struggle has been against Russian imperialism. We reject both imperialisms. You have heard the slogan. "Neither west, nor east, just Islamic republic". That is exactly our position. We reject the imperialism of both superpowers. We want to follow a policy of genuine nonalignment, to have proper relations with all countries. We will not tolerate the interference of any superpower in our internal affairs, not the United States, not Russia. We have just emerged from an enormous from an enormous struggle to free ourselves from the domination of American imperialism. That is our main struggle. Do you think we would invite another imperialism to replace it? We will oppose any actions of American or Russian imperialism that threaten our interests and the integrity of Iran.

NYT: Relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic are cool. If you were in President Carter's place, what steps would you take to improve relations with Iran?

Yazdi: You must start from what American policy has been. The United States has been the strongest supporter of the shah in the world. In 1953 your government engineered the coup which brought down Mossadegh and put the shah back on the throne. The CIA did that. The world knows it. We have the proof. The CIA trained the SAVAK torturers in our prisons. American businesses plundered our people, robbed them of their money and their culture. Carter praised the shah while the shah was machine-gunning the Iranian people in the streets.

NYT: What you say is true. But if you were President Carter, what would you do to redress the situation? What first steps would you take?

Yazdi: We need concrete proof that the United States has changed its policy. Members of the shah's family and other criminals of the old regime have received protection in the United States. We want a correct relationship with the United States, but the United States must show its good faith. For thirty years the American government has been the enemy of the Iranian people.

NYT: IF Iran is to develop into a modern, economically stable stat, it will need the technology of the West. With Western technology comes Western influence. Can a balance be struck between Western technology and Western culture and influence?

Yazdi: Of course we need Western technology. There is much we can learn from the West-you only have to look at the agriculture production figures to realize that. The average farmer in the Middle East produces food for five people; the average farmer in Europe for eleven people, the average farmer in the United States has knowledge and technology that we need if we are ever going to be able to revitalize our economy by developing our agriculture. But using Western technology does not have to mean that we accept Western culture and influence. We must be on guard against what is bad in the West and learn from what is good.

NYT: Will Western economic advisers ever be allowed to return to Iran?

Yazdi: That is possible. We have made no decision yet.

NYT: Will the Islamic revolution be exported to other countries?

Yazdi: Revolutions are not something you can export like a commodity. Of course, our revolution has had a great impact on the Islamic world. You can see it in Afghanistan. You can see it in Egypt. That is because our revolution has touched something deep in the hearts of people under the heel of imperialism.

NYT: Is the Islamic Republic aiding the Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan?

Yazdi: No. We are not in the position to do so. We have enormous problems of our own to deal with. We do not have the resources to do anything in Afghanistan.

NYT: But a pro-Communist government in Kabul is bombing your Muslim brothers in Heart. How does that make you feel?

Yazdi: Feel? Of course I have feelings about it, but having feelings is different from being able to do anything about them. We cannot intervene in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan problem is spilling over into our country. There are thousands of refugees coming across our border, and the Red Cross is helping them. But there is nothing more we can do.

NYT: Iran's most precious natural resource is oil. The United States, Japan, and much of Western Europe depend on Iranian oil for their economic well-being. Will oil exports ever return to their former level of 5 million barrels a day?

Yazdi: We will soon be exporting 4 million barrels of oil a day, and our production for export will eventually reach 6 million barrels a day. We cannot squander this resource. We must adjust our production in accordance with our development objectives that will determine how much oil we export.

NYT: Is the economic dislocation in the developed countries, which a cutback in Iranian oil production will exacerbate, a consideration in oil-export decisions taken by the Islamic Republic?

Yazdi: Not at this time. When the oil workers went on strike during the revolution, our objective was to put pressure on the powers that were supporting the shah. But now our objective is to develop our own country. That is our only objective and our only consideration.

NYT: Will nuclear energy continue to play a role in Iran's economic future? Will some of the nuclear power plants ordered by the shah continue to be built?

Yazdi: We have a group of experts evaluating this at this time. No decision has been made yet.

NYT: Can a modern banking system operate without interest? Since Islamic law prohibits interest, what will Iran's banking system look like under Islamic law?

Yazdi: Again, we have a group of experts studying the situation and they will make a report soon.

NYT: Will there be service charges instead of interest?

Yazdi: Yes, there will be service charges.

NYT: One of the most striking facts about the shah's regime was the extraordinary disparity between the rich and the poor in Iran. What steps will the Islamic Republic undertake to close this gap between economic classes?

Yazdi: Certain basic necessities will be provided to all poor Iranians, but that is an interim step. What we must do is revitalize Iran's agriculture. That is the key to our economic

development. Bazargan's speech at the stadium last week outlined some of the steps, particularly the decision to concentrate on the villages rather than housing construction in South Tehran.

NYT: So you see a need to reverse the migration of population from the villages into Tehran?

Yazdi: It's not only a question of reversing the migration from the villages to Tehran. It is one of revitalizing our agriculture. We know that many of these farmers left their lands because of lack of facilities, low income at the village level, and the pseudo-situation of employment in Tehran. That is why so many people came here. We want to revitalize our agriculture. For that reason we start all our development at the village level.

NYT: Many of Iran's technological elite-engineers, doctors, technicians, and so forth-were educated in Western countries and have adopted Western customs and attitudes. What role will such people play in the economy of the Islamic Republic? Is there a chance that such people will emigrate, creating a "brain drain"?

Yazdi: No, not at all. During the shah's regime we had this migration of our brain tank from Iran to foreign countries, what you call a "brain drain". But since the success of the revolution, the situation is completely reversed. We have a large number of our experts just coming from the United States, from the countries of Europe. They are coming back to the country. And the fact that they are educated in the Western countries does not necessarily mean that they are bringing Western culture. They are highly motivated by our revolution. They are supporting the revolution. So we don't see and major problem with their coming back. They are coming back.

NYT: What scope is there for personal liberties in the Islamic Republic?

Yazdi: I think that liberty under the Islamic Republic, in one sense, is deeper than what you have in Western societies.

NYT: In what sense is that?

Yazdi: In the sense that in Western society the culture is based on a kind of racism. Originally, it was a Hellenic culture, and

Hellenic culture is racist. The Greeks divided the world into the Greeks and the barbarians. Whoever is not Greek is a barbarian.

The same attitude prevails in Western culture. What you mean by "democracy", "liberty", is quite flexible according to your own interests. An American can come to Vietnam and drop bombs on helpless and unarmed villages and go back home to the United States and get a big medal or a big welcome ceremony. This is not a true liberty. This is liberty for only your own race. So this will have no place in the Islamic Republic.

Then, there is a question of mental pollution. We know that Western industrialization, the kind of societal relationship that now exists-capitalism- has alienated man. Although you are "free", under the domination of the system man is alienated from his own nature. That kind of situation will not be permitted in the Islamic Republic or in the future development of Iran.

NYT: Permit me to pose a hypothetical test of liberty under the Islamic Republic. Suppose that someone were to publish a newspaper critical of the Islamic Republic, of Imam Khomeini, of Prime Minister Bazargan, and of you. Would any steps be taken to control such a publication?

Yazdi: Not at all. We have already such papers- the newspapers are not all of them for the Islamic Republic, not for Khomeini, not for Bazargan, not for any of us. We know that some of these papers are still working for the old regime under new covers. They are highly critical of the situation, and the government has done nothing to stop them or tell them what to do. They are free to say anything they want to.

NYT: What about foreign reporters? Many have complained recently about what they call government control or censorship of their news coverage. Is this an example of revolutionary zeal, or is it your government's policy?

Yazdi: It is not, an excess of revolutionary zeal. You have to remember that we have fought and won a big battle. The foreign domination has been very deep here. Although the shah has gone, although the army collapsed and the Bakhtiar government collapsed, these deeply rooted elements of the old regime are not uprooted. They are here. They make a lot of

provocations, a lot of agitation. They did in Kordestan; they're doing so in Turkomen. So in a revolution we cannot just say. "All right, we have succeeded in the first step. Let us ease up; let's relax". This is just safeguarding the fruits of our revolution. We cannot permit just any foreigners to come here and do whatever they want to do.

NYT: Bur couldn't people come back and say. "Well, what does an Islamic republic mean?"

Yazdi: The people of Iran know what an Islamic republic is. In a sense, they have already voted for it. It is an insult to the intelligence of the people to say that they cried and shouted "Freedom, Liberty, Independence, and Islamic Republic!" against the bullets of the shah but that they didn't know what an Islamic republic is. It is an insult to the revolution. Fine-if there are people who are anti-Islamic, they can say whatever they want. But as far as the referendum goes, one issue is asked of the people, and that's it.

NYT: What will the constitution of the Islamic Republic look like?

Yazdi: That, of course, must be decided by the constituent assembly. But we have a group of experts preparing the draft the government will submit to the assembly.

NYT: What are its main features?

Yazdi: There will be a president, elected directly by the people every five years. There will be a one legislative house, also elected freely and directly by the people. The rights of all citizens-men, women, national minorities-will be guaranteed.

NYT: Will there be a body of mullahs with veto powers over the actions of the legislature, as rumors have suggested?

Yazdi: Yes. They will review civil legislation to see that it is in agreement with Islamic law.

NYT: Many women in Iran are genuinely concerned about their rights in an Islamic republic. The women's marches against the Ayatollah Khomeini's dictate that Muslim women preserve their purity by dressing modestly, with the veil or chador are over, but questions remain to be considered.

Yazdi: The issue of the chador was no issue. Women may wear the chador or not wear the chador. That is their choice. The rights

of Iranian women will be guaranteed by the constitution. There can be no compromise on this.

NYT: Would you agree with the proposition that is easier to overthrow a government than it is to govern?

Yazdi: Yes, I do agree.

NYT: why?

Yazdi: Because always destruction is easier than building. If you want to destroy this building, four sticks of dynamite will do the job. But if you wanted to build it, you would have to have the plan, the engineer, the architect, and many other things.

NYT: We don't necessarily think Marxism is progressive.

Yazdi: Not you-the West. The West regards the Marxist movement as automatically revolutionary and progressive. That view is automatic.

NYT: Not to those of us who have seen the results.

Yazdi: Well, maybe the West is getting some experience, but only after fifty, sixty years of Marxism in practice. But automatically when you are confronted with the Islamic Revolution, you say. "This is fanatical; this is bad" and so on which is not correct. We don't have any problem of, you know, believing in our own ideology. It's not a question of obeying or disobeying God, or of choosing to go to hell and so drinking alcohol. We don't look at that. Alcoholism is not a private issue for us. It is a social issue. So we cannot let it go without control. You have full control of your body. If you want to consume alcohol, you can go to your own private room and do it. But it is a social phenomenon. We cannot say. "You cannot choose to go to hell". You want to drink your alcohol-that's it". But it is a social issue.

NYT: The Islamic Revolution appears to be one of the gentlest revolutions ever beyond the executions, there seems to have been little of the revenge and retribution one might have expected, given the repression of the shah's regime. Why is this so?

Yazdi: You mean, why is it so clean?

NYT: No, but there are some who wouldn't mind if you executed every member of SAVAK.

Yazdi: Well, we don't want to execute everyone in SAVAK. Some were not guilty of the torture of people. Just being a member of SAVAK does not warrant being killed.

NYT: Some would introduce the principle of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which established that certain organizations- the SS and the Gestapo, for example- were criminal organizations and the membership itself in such organization could lead to criminal penalties.

Yazdi: We do not agree with that. If they have participated in conspiracy and killing and for torture, then they have to be brought to trial and punished. I do agree with you that our revolution has been very clean, and that's because it's an Islamic revolution. It does not come from the point of revenge and hate. It comes from love and understanding. However the trials will continue, and those that are found guilty will be punished.

NYT: Senior officials of the Komiteh have admitted to me that they cannot trust the regular military garrisons in much of provincial Iran. Do you plan to take any steps to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces or to neutralize the threat of a military counterrevolution?

Yazdi: Well, the army is in the phase of reshaping. So there are members of the old regime in the army, and confidence in their loyalty is questionable.

NYT: In Iran there is considerable military hardware obtained by the shah from the American government-notably, sophisticated F-15 aircraft. What will become of this hardware?

Yazdi: This equipment has been secured and is safe. A final decision on what will happen to it has not been made, but I expect that much of it will be sold back to the United States. We have no use for it ourselves.

NYT: Will there be any place for the Komiteh, the Revolutionary Committee, after the constitution is ratified and a government elected?

Yazdi: We hope to dissolve most of the various committees in the near future. Their future role, to the extent that they exist, will be that of watchdog.

NYT: What do you see as the future of the Islamic Republic?

Yazdi: That is in the hands of God and the people of Iran.

12. Council on Foreign Relations

Meeting in honor of his Excellency Ebrahim Yazdi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iran

Tuesday, October 2, 1979, 5:15-6:30 pm, Richard C. Steadman, J.H. Whitney & Co. Presiding

Summary statement:

It is a unique opportunity for me to address this gathering and engage in a discussion of the issues involved in U.S.- Iranian relations. I have been told that Council on Foreign Relations plays a significant role in solving the problems of American foreign policy. Being somewhat familiar with the practical records of a number of your colleagues, I am not at all sure whether the Council contributes to the resolution or creation of problems in U.S. foreign relations. I only hope that my brief introduction and the subsequent discussion will contribute to your understanding of the Iranian revolution and to the way our people perceive the forty years of U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs.

1. The role of Ideology in Revolutions:

- A. Islam as the ideology of the Iranian Revolution.
- B. The perceptions of Islam in the West:
 - a) The definition of religion in the West.
 - b) Secularism – a product of Western experience.
 - c) The positions of Western Intellectuals toward religious traditions.
 - d) Religions as perceived by Marxism and Western Liberalism.
 - e) The influence of the Western view of religion on a segment of our intellectuals.
 - f) Shah's propaganda.

2. The US media vs. the Iranian Revolution:

- A. The distortion and misrepresentations have a thirty years old history, the present lies about Iran in American journals and newspapers are not new.
- B. The treatment of Mossadegh, vicious to the core – the reality and its misrepresentation (exhibit#1)
- C. It took the US press twenty years to accept the fact that the 1953 coup in Iran was engineered by the CIA.

- D. The myth of the Shah as the modernizer- the myth of stability- the myth of development,
 - E. The distortions of the past eighteen months have as much to do with misperceptions and ethnocentrism as much as with prejudice and antipathy towards our culture and revolution.
3. The achievements of the Iranian revolution:
- A. Defeating the Shah's dictatorship against great odds, internal and external
 - B. Building a Democratic Order
 - (a) The referendum
 - (b) Drafting of the Constitution
 - (c) Election of Council of Experts
 - (d) Tolerating the inevitable difficulties of the task
 - (e) Restraining revenge and punishment among the populace
 - C. The Struggle for Reconstruction
 - D. Cancelling Military Contracts and Planning for New Priorities in Public Expenditures
 - E. Developing a New Foreign Policy and Supporting Liberation Movements of the Oppressed throughout the World
4. U.S. Iranian Relations
- A. The beginning of U.S. involvement in Iran - defense of the status quo and use of the Iranian military as an instrument of oppressing its people.
 - B. Treatment of Mossadegh and the 1953 coup
 - C. The Amini-Peach Agreement and the Plundering of Iran
 - D. Establishing the SAVAK and Training its Agents
 - E. The Implementation of "Vietnamization" in Iran-Making the Shah the Deputy Sheriff of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf Area.
 - F. The Plundering of the Iranian Oil Money
 - G. The Arm Sales and the Other Contracts
 - H. The Cancellation of Some Agreements in February
 - I. The Unresolved Issues and the Claims.

The following is the full text of the speech.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a unique opportunity for me to address this gathering and engage in a discussion of the

issues involved in U.S. - Iranian relations. I have been told that Council on Foreign Relations plays a significant role in solving the problems of American foreign policy. Being somewhat familiar with the practical records of a number of your colleagues, I am not at all sure whether the Council contributes to resolution or creation of problems in U.S. foreign relations. I only hope that my brief introduction and the subsequent discussion will contribute to your understanding of the Iranian revolution and to the way our people perceive the forty years of U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs.

As you know, the strategic location of Iran has been a principal factor in shaping the history of the Iranian people. Invasion from without and oppression from within were, until the success of our revolution last February, the twin dimensions of our rusty history. Henry Kissinger was not the first global strategist who some designs on our lives and resources. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Ivan the Terrible, Joseph Stalin and Allen Dulles are Mr. Kissinger's predecessors.

Since we Muslims believe in the Day of Judgment, I leave the determination of who has committed greater sin against our people to Allah. I suspect, however, that deepest layer of hell is saved for those who justify their crimes against nations in the name of realism. Even though your fellow Council member Henry Kissinger was not the fires theoretician who used Iran as a laboratory for his dreams of gold and glory, I would like to convey to you that Iranian people are determined to make Mr. Kissinger's experimentation the last one of its kind. In other word, the Iranian people are determined to be truly independent for the first time in their long and agonized history. Indeed, the history of Iran is a story of privileged families, tribes, armies, classes, and dynasties fighting among themselves while at the same time exploiting and oppressing the masses. It was the normal continuity of this history when the competing imperialist powers of the 19th century, Britain and Russia, divided Iran into zones of influence and kept the central government weak and dependent. Due, in part, to this situation at turn of the century, for the first time in the history of Iran, the institution of absolute monarchy was challenged by a democratic opposition demanding constitutional government. The constitutional movement ended by a British engineered coup in 1921 led by Reza Khan the guise of an anti-communist, law and

order rationale. By monopolizing the power of the army, the police and the gendarmerie, Reza Khan eliminated or suppressed his opponents and, in 1925, crowned himself as Reza Shah, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty. The success of this British directed undertaking ended two decades of more or less open politics in Iran and replaced it with a system of terror and criminality which lasted for twenty years. It was at the end of this first period of Pahlavi terror in 1941 that the U.S. government entered the Iranian scene. In 1941, Reza Shah's military autocracy was ended, not by revolution but by intervention. His original ally, Great Britain, together with the U.S.S.R. became alarmed about his pro- German sympathies and invaded Iran with the announced purpose of keeping Iranian oil safe for the allies. He was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The exile of Reza Shah to South Africa unleashed the repressed political energy of the country. Almost immediately, the country came to life: the monarch became a figurehead: public debate blossomed: freedom of assembly became a reality; the number of periodicals swelled to more than 450, and political parties and trade unions were restored. Gradually, the once- defeated Constitutionalists and their more radicalized successors forged a National Front which emerged as the front runner in Iranian politics. The National Front was an anti-imperialist coalition of a number of small political parties, progressive bazaar merchants, religious leaders and the professional- bureaucratic intelligentsia. Its unquestioned leader was Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. The Tudeh (Communist) party was the only real competition to the National Front capable of translating the general challenge to the existing social structure into an effective political force. However, the Tudeh Party's influence over politics had been seriously diminished by its support of a Communist movement in the province of Azerbaijan at the end of World War II, a move which alienated many Iranians long suspicious of Russian intentions in Iran. Unlike the post – World War I period in Gilan, this movement was more an extension of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran than an indigenous phenomenon, and once Russia, pressured by the United States and maneuvered by the Iranian government, withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan in May of 1946, the secessionist movement collapsed. The economic situation in post- war Iran was one of chaos. As one

scholar has written: "It soon became clear that the perpetual crisis of the Iranian economy would only be resolved by a radical revision of the country's oil company had now become a state within a state, an industrial giant that drained the nation's main resource with little profit to the Iranian people. In 1950, at the height of its power, the AIOC produced 30 million tons of crude oil, employed 80,000 workers (the white-collar workers and technicians being British) and held 13 per cent of the world's reserves, whereas Iran, after 46 years of intensive oil production, still remained one of the poorest countries in Asia. .. Clearly, a new contract had to be negotiated. However, the AIOC made it known that it would reject any new settlement."

Faced with the intransigence of the AIOC, the unifying objective of the National Front became one of nationalizing the country's oil and ending British influence in the country. In the spring of 1951, after five years of struggle, intense debate and mounting public pressure, the Iranian Parliament unanimously approved Mossadegh's proposal for the complete nationalization of the country's oil resources, and elected Mossadegh Prime Minister. Thus began 27 months of stormy politics. This period can be described as an exciting, highly passionate experiment in democratic politics. Until this point the U.S. had remained pretty much an onlooker to Iranian affairs. During World War II, the Iranian army had been aided by United States advisors, and later was provided with an American training mission and equipment. But Washington hardly was blind to Iran's economic and strategic possibilities, nor was it ignorant of Britain's greatly reduced circumstances following the war. The British request for help provided the opening U.S. policymakers had been looking for.

The U.S. gave the appearance of support, for instance, to the nationalist movement and helped to steer National Front forces against the British, all the while taking care to continue its support of the Shah and his army. The shaky Anglo-American alliance launched a world-wide boycott of Iranian oil which plunged the economy into deep trouble. Gradually, a Central Intelligence Agency mission under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt, Teddy's grandson, took over management of the anti-Mossadegh campaign and eased the British out. It was during this period (1951-1953) that the American news media began to pay closer attention to

events in Iran and to establish a pattern of coverage that invariably portrayed Iranian nationalist and democratic elements in a shallow, often grossly distorted light. When Mossadegh took office, for example, U.S. News and World_Report regarded him as a "Moscow backed Mossadegh, helped him when he needed it, counted on him to clear the way for a communist take-over."

In 1951, Time magazine was generous enough to describe him as an "honest fanatic who is hard to deal with, but preferable to the Communist Tudeh Party which might take over Iran if he should fall." But by 1952, when Time named Mossadegh Man of the Year, the caption beneath his cover photo read: He oiled the Wheels of Chaos. The cover piece on Mossadegh began claiming that "behind his grotesque antics lay great issues of peace or war, progress or decline, which affect many lands far beyond his mountains".

As it would nearly a quarter of a century later, the news media returned again to the theme of a communist threat in Iranian politics. Newsweek, which often referred to Mossadegh as "old Mossy" in 1953 described events in Iran in no uncertain terms: "The situation is such that the West may at any instance face the choice of occupying south Iran or watching the entire country go Communist by default. If Iran goes, then Pakistan -- where the Reds have done a remarkable job of infiltration -- would probably be next. This would isolate India, probably topple the rest of the Middle East within months, and would mean that the west would have to make the terrible decision whether to begin fighting war or accept the loss of the cold war."

What the press could not grasp or chose to ignore was the simple fact that the real competitor of the United States in post-World War II Iran was not the Soviet Union or Communism, but Great Britain. The strategy of the United States in the Iranian crisis was to replace the British as the dominant major power in the country, politically and economically. There is a brittle irony in the fact that the American press was labeling communist threat in Iranian politics. Newsweek, which often referred to Mossadegh a pro-Communist at the same time the Tudeh newspapers in Iran were portraying him as "a running dog of imperialism".

A more measured assessment of communist threat in Iranian politics. Newsweek, which often referred to Mossadegh's politics

than that offered either by the American press or the Tudeh party was advanced in 1961 by Justice William O. Douglas: “When Mossadegh in Persia started basic reforms we became alarmed. That man, whom I am proud to call my friend, was a democrat in the La Follett-Norris sense of the term. We united with Britain to destroy him; we succeeded, and ever since our name has not been an honored one in the Middle East.”

Contrary to Douglas, the rationale of fighting communism was a sufficient smokescreen for Cold War America and the false issue served to obscure the United States direct involvement in the crisis as the power played neared a resolution in 1953. In August of that year, the Shah made his move against Mossadegh with the advice and help of the United States. He attempted to dismiss Mossadegh as Prime Minister, a ploy that resulted in a public outcry sufficient that the Shah decided that discretion dictated he flee to Rome. His exile was short lived. The CIA quickly organized a military coup on August 19 that overthrew Mossadegh. Allen Dulles, then CIA Director, a founding member of this Council, personally escorted the Shah back to Tehran in a special plane. For the second time in 2,500 years of monarchical oppression, a brief period of parliamentary democracy was ended in Iran with the help of foreign powers, this time to be replaced by a police state. Thus from the very beginning of its involvement in the Iranian affairs, the United States chose to defend the oppressive status quo and chose the military as the principal instrument of its policy. Seen in this light, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine (followed and supported by later presidents represent a century of U.S. imperialistic practices in the country.

The Nixon Doctrine was the outcome of the U.S. failure in Vietnam, but it was intended to pursue the same counterrevolutionary policy that brought about the direct military involvement of the United States in the Indochina war. When this method of defeating or containing the Vietnamese revolution failed, the policy makers in Washington formulated the strategy of Vietnamization to pursue the same objective.

However, Vietnamization, as you know, was not just a policy in the Indochina war, but rather it was the beginning of a new phase in the global counterrevolutionary strategy of the U.S. It was this

larger meaning of Vietnamization which became the essence of the Nixon Doctrine.

Two domestic groups in the U.S. welcomed the Nixon Doctrine the most: politicians and arms manufacturers. The politicians wanted to extricate the American troops because their constituencies could not stand the heavy casualties; the arms manufacturers were badly in need of foreign orders. The decision to transform Iran into an outpost of American power was mutually satisfactory to the shah and to the United States. They both acted without any regard for the best interests of the Iranian people. The Shah simply believed that "he was born to be a king, that his legitimacy was rooted in the supernatural, that he was the embodiment of the divine law, and thus beyond criticism." And the United States believes that the Shah was loved by his people and that Iranian who opposed him did not have the capacity to be more than troublesome.

From August 1953, the time of the CIA military coup, to the final days of the Pahlavi dynasty, the United States treated Iran as a client state. From the very beginning of its involvement in Iranian affairs the United States perceived the Iranian military as a united instrument of the Nixon Doctrine, however, U.S. military assistance to Iran consisted of loans and grants, which amounted to approximately \$1.5 billion between 1946 and 1972. During this period war rivalry and containment of domestic opposition to the monarchy were the twin motives behind United States military aid to Iran for thirty years.

Since the Pahlavi rule lacked any significant base of popular support, it was logical for the Shah to want constantly to expand the coercive base of his power, particularly in times of popular challenge to his rule. For example, in early 1960's, due to an intensified climate of disaffection, the opposition resumed its open activities, and the Muslim leaders became more vocal in their condemnation of the Pahlavi dictatorship. The Shah responded to this challenge by seeking to expand the military.

The Kennedy administration refused the Shah's request for more and better weapons. Instead, President Kennedy urged the Shah to begin social reforms in order to enlarge the middle class and preempt the opposition.

The Shah's "White Revolution" was definitely influenced by the pressure from the Kennedy Administration. However, realizing that his propaganda apparatus had already failed to project a reformist picture of his rule, he expanded the SAVAK and increased the repression of the opposition. The principal resistance to the intensified regime of terror came from the Muslim leaders. This resistance led to the mass rebellion of June 1963 in which an estimated 15,000 Iranians were gunned down in the streets of Tehran, Shiraz and Qom. The leader of this rebellion was none other than Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian government immediately blamed "reactionary" mullahs for instigating the rebellion. The truth of the matter was that 1963 was the third consecutive years of an economic depression which had particularly hurt the lower classes in the cities – the elements of the Iranian society most responsive to religious leadership. The Shah's decision in the early 1970s to expand his military strength was once again influenced by the increased activities of the opposition, particularly the emergence of armed urban guerrillas and expansion of the religious opposition.

However, the response of the Nixon administration to the Shah's requests was far beyond the expectation of the Shah himself. It was the Nixon Doctrine which gave the Shah everything he asked for. The selling of conventional arms to a non-Western country without any restraint in regard to their quantity and variety was departure from the previous arms sale policies of the United States.

The success of the Iranian revolution exposed the contradictions of U.S. imperialism in Iran. The Shah's public relations apparatus nurtured a number of myths about Iran. Until very recently, such efforts were amplified by official Washington, which had long since come to believe the myths it had created about Iran.

The myths of Iran's stability were overriding in the minds of U.S. policy makers for years. The famous President's toast to the Shah on New Year's eve 1978 could have been uttered by one of five other presidents, beginning with Eisenhower. How did the myth of stability take hold? Exactly what was it that the CIA or the State Department failed to bring to Washington's attention?

One answer lies in the idea of political stability itself, an idea badly misunderstood in Washington. Stability defined in real,

rather than abstract terms includes an economic and political environment in which a population perceives its life as more or less satisfactory, or at least hopeful of becoming so. Most definitions also take into account the need for minimal tacit consent to a government's values and priorities. Neither of these criteria fit Iran under the Shah's rule. More than a half-million Iranians were imprisoned for political reasons during the 25 years after the Shah was restored to power in the 1953 coup. Another problem was that official Washington underestimated the character of the Iranian people, their ability and will to fight and resist.

In brief, then, America's foreign policymakers had come to confuse the notion of political stability with the Shah's ability to keep the lid on. This problem of equating coercion with consent was compounded by a view of Iranians as another third world people simply too incompetent to shape their own destiny.

The popular revolution in should not have come as such a surprise to the Western observers. The realities of Iran under the Shah were not concealed. Even a quick reading of Iranian history would show that the people have an old and rich tradition of resisting tyrannies: that all of Iran's popular political heroes were killed or imprisoned by ruling monarchs; that the confrontation between the absolute monarchy and liberalizing forces had been going on for a hundred years; that the monarchy was defeated in 1911 and 1953 - only to be restored by a Western power (England in 1921 and the United States in 1953); that between 1953 and 1978 more than 65,000 opponents of the Shah were gunned down by the army - about 2,000 of them officially executed; and that during this period more than half a million Iranian served time in prison for their opposition to the regime. It might have been deduced from these facts that the Iranians were not going to be indifferent to the imperialist designs on their lives and resources.

Your principal source of confusion and frustration about the Iranian revolution lies in your inability to understand the nature of Islam as a religion and revolutionary ideology. Islam has long been misunderstood in the West, where popular perspectives portray life under Islam as dogmatic, mysterious, irrational, unchanging, and ultimately inferior. When the Muslims of Africa and Asia met European colonizers with physical and cultural resistance, European scholars and government officials perceived this lack of

enthusiasm as a sign of backwardness or barbarism, which reinforced the distortion.

Contrary to the Western view, Islam embodies an intricate complex of legal/ theological schools and an extraordinary diversity of ideas, rituals, and practices. The history of Islam during the past century has been a story of revival and readjustment. Because of its Ijtihad logic and law, the Shiite school of thought is particularly adaptable.

Muslim thinkers are free to question established notions in the face of new realities, inspired by such well known sayings attributed to the Prophet as, "seek knowledge, even unto China", and "the ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr".

Furthermore, the Western intellectuals as a class developed their distinction in opposition to the Church, particularly the Catholic Church. They were perceived to be rational rather than emotional and committed to the doctrine that knowledge is the product of pure reason. During the Dark ages, which in its specific sense were exclusively a Western phenomenon, the church rejected the existence of non-religious or non-theological knowledge. The attitude of the Christian clergy's resentment and contempt toward the early scientific discoveries is well known.

In such a situation it was logical for the scientists and secular thinkers to distinguish their activities as separate from or opposed to religious doctrines. When the clock, invented by Muslims, was taken to the French court, the priests labeled it as the work of the devil and ordered their servants to destroy it. Thus when Western intellectuals began to advocate the separation of Church and State, they were actually choosing freedom over the arbitrary power of organized religion. They were against superstition and denial of natural joy, not ethics or morality. Consequently, the antagonism of the intellectuals to the Church in the West made a significant contribution to social and scientific advancement. However, when Western secularism was transformed to the colonized societies, particularly Islamic societies, and popularized among the educated elements, the results were not social and scientific advancement but alienation of the intellectuals from themselves as well as from the masses.

In Islamic societies, when the intellectuals opposed religion and religious values, echoing either Marxism or Western liberalism, the result was the destruction or weakening of the moral force capable of confronting colonial aggression and imperialism, particularly in its cultural form.

When Karl Marx described religion as the opium of the people, he had the history of Western Europe in mind. He knew very little about Islam or the Afro-Asian societies. It is a fact that the development of secular/scientific ideas was not the case in the Islamic societies simply because Islam has no organized and centrally controlled institution. The prejudice of the colonial scholars was, and continues to be, heavily influenced by the imperialist interests, while the misperception of the Marxist writers has been a logical extension of the assumption that "religion is the opium of the masses," a contention that could have been true in one society or region but not necessarily true in other societies and regions of the world.

It is unfortunate that too many of the contemporary liberal and socialist observers of the Third World are still pursuing the framework developed by their 19th century predecessors. The 19th century socialist thinkers were as Eurocentric and ethnocentric in formulating a mutilated view of the Afro-Asian societies as the Cecil Rhodes and Lord Curzons.

All societies have their own organic development regardless of what the ethnocentric social theoreticians would like to believe. It was the consequence of this reality that in February 1979, after one hundred years of struggle, enabled the Iranian people to force their illegitimate monarch into permanent exile and welcome home their most popular leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. These events were a culmination of more than a year of nation-wide demonstrations, protests and strikes against the Pahlavi regime and U.S. imperialism. The dominant slogans of the protest demonstration and mass marches were: "Death to the Shah" and "Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Republic".

The moral explosion of the Iranian masses in 1978 was greatly inspired by the Quranic doctrines and the efforts of Prophet Muhammad to transform the wealthy and clan dominated societies of his time into egalitarian and democratic communities of the

Islamic faithful. Iranian have always honoured those Muslim and national leaders who exemplified the qualities of justice, equality and moral rectitude.

The Iranian people have an old and rich tradition of resiting tyrannies. It is interesting to note that all of Iran's popular political heroes were killed or imprisoned by ruling monarchs. The leaders could be a contemporary poet or a religious scholar who gave his life in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. The concept of martyrdom is central to the comprehension of this tradition. Until the middle of December 1978, the press of both Eastern and Western blocs failed to describe the events in Iran as revolutionary. Since the ideology of the struggle against the Shah and U.S. imperialism was overwhelmingly Islamic, both the Capitalist and the Communist observers had difficulty perceiving the movement as revolutionary. It is not surprising that many socialist thinkers have as much trouble understanding the radical and progressive nature of the Iranian revolution as do the apologists for imperialism.

It is your responsibility to understand us in the context of our own values and aspirations, if you wish to deal and interact with us. Authentic respect and equity in international relations have to be based genuine mutual understanding. The history of U.S.–Iranian relations has so far been based on exploitation and imposition. Your involvement in Iranian affairs was beneficial only to those super rich Iranians who were so alienated from their own society that they identified their interests and aspiration of the Western elites than with the interest and aspirations of the Iranian people. They lived in islands of political and financial power, which were also islands of imported culture, in the native sea of misery and frustration. The Iranian political refugees can be described as 747 refugees; they already had purchased their palaces in Paris, London, New York, Los Angeles, Miami Beach and San Francisco. They are criminals who, in cooperation with foreign elements, plundered, murdered and brutalized our people.

Having escaped the wrath and judgment of the Iranian people, now they have become the source of information and financial support for the enemies of our revolution.

The first thing we want from the United States is to publically disassociate itself from such criminal elements. The Iranian people

have every right to be suspicious of your government. One cannot logically expect them to be otherwise. If the U.S. government finds this attitude difficult to work with, it should take some concrete steps toward the modification of the situation.

The American press has created such vicious and mutilated picture of the Iranian revolution that I cannot even begin to unmask the deception. No one factor can explain the incredible distortion of the Iranian revolution by the U.S. media. Loss of interest, ethnocentrism, ideological blindness, ignorance, prejudice and outright viciousness are all contributing factors to the abominable way the American journalists and commentators have portrayed our revolution. A widely quoted article in *Columbia Journalism Review* (January – February 1979), “Reporting Iran through the Shah’s Eye”, documents these assertions.

You have opposed all genuine revolutionary movements since the turn of the century. You have always opposed the struggles of the oppressed people against the conditions of their oppression. You aided French colonialism in Algeria and Indochina; you aided Portuguese colonialism in Africa; you continue to support the racist and expansionist practices of Zionist Israel against three million Palestinians simply because they are not Jews. You are the principal exporter of arms and repression technology to the police states of the world. And you do all these things, strangely, in the name of freedom and democracy. There is no consistency between your words and your actions in the Third World. Your policy makers are often aware of the inconsistencies and many good hearted Americans even feel guilt about it. The literature on the U.S. imperialism demonstrates this clearly.

The unique contribution of the British to the history of imperialism was deceit; the French are remembered for their arrogance and the Portuguese for their stupidity. It might well be that the unique characteristic of U.S. imperialism is this feeling of guilt or schizophrenia about your treatment of the oppressed. This could mean hope or despair for the world, depending on how we analyse the roots of the characterization. The Council on Foreign Relations can play a significant role between words and deeds in the U.S. treatment of the Third World. I do not mean to sound self-righteous. I know America does not act in a vacuum. I am aware of the weaknesses and inadequacies of my own country or other Third

World countries. I presented my views here in the hope of demonstrating how you are perceived by our people. I hope my presentation can be accepted as a contribution to the strengthening of the friendship which has long existed between the American and Iranian people.

Some attendees: Mansour Farhang, Embassy of Iran; Ali Agah, Embassy of Iran; Jamal Shemirani, Iran's Mission to the United Nations; Charles Loring, Cabot Corporation

Members and Staff of the Council: James B. Alley, Norbert L. Anschuets, Charles Agee Atkins, Robert L. Barlow, William E. Barlow, Nancy Bearg, Travers J. Bell, Jr., Maureen Berman, Bloch, John A. Breck, Henry C. Breck, Judith Bruce, William Bundy, William J. Bulter, Henry Simon

13 Statement by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi

Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Islamic Republic of Iran

Before the Thirty-Fourth Session, the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, October 4, 1979

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MOST GRACIOUS, MOST
MERCIFUL

«يا أيها الناس إنا خلقناكم من ذكرٍ و أنثى و جعلناكم شعوباً و قبائل لتعارفوا إن أكرمكم

عند الله أتقىكم» (سوره حجرات آیه ۱۳)

Brothers and Sisters, Mr. President

I would like to congratulate your election to the presidency of the 34th session of the General Assembly. The unanimous of this body in your support is a tribute to Africa, to your country and to you personally. I would also like to express my respect for Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim whose continuous search for world peace ought to be an example for all peace-loving nations.

Permit me to convey to you the greetings of the Iranian people, of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and of the great leader of our

revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. I would also like to note that this is not the first time I am addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations, even though this is the first time you are actually hearing me. As an Iranian who has come here from the ranks of a thirty year old revolutionary movement, I have enjoyed the satisfaction of screaming the outrage of my people at you on several occasions from the side walk in front of this building. Although from the outside the walls of this complex seemed difficult to penetrate, I never questioned the necessity of appealing to the conscience of the world in our struggled against tyranny.

Now that we have penetrated the walls and you are hearing me loud and clear, I would like to say categorically that since the CIA engineered coup of 1953 in Iran, this is the first time the Iranian delegation in the United Nations is representing the true preferences of the Iranian people. It is an undeniable fact that during the past twenty five years the Shah of Iran was a puppet of imperialism and Zionism. While our people identified with the liberation movements in the Third World, the Iranian delegation in the General Assembly sided with the racist or imperialist oppressors. While the Iranian felt a deep sense of solidarity with the people of Palestine and their sole and legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Iranian delegation voted with the Zionists whose repression of the Palestinians and the Lebanese has become comparable to Nazi criminal acts

It is a moment of immense pleasure for me to announce in this session of the General Assembly that from now on the Iranian delegation in the United Nations will act and vote the true preferences and aspirations of the Iranian people. It is intrinsic to the Islamic Republic of Iran that our representatives in the world organization should always side with the victims of colonialism, imperialism, exploitation, racism and Zionism.

The Iranian revolution is committed to a fundamental transformation of the Iranian society based on the Quranic principles of justice, equality, and participation. Revolution is a quest for freedom, and from the perspective the Islam, freedom involves the unchaining of human beings from economic oppression, exploitation, political and cultural manipulation mental slavery, egocentrism and all other cause of alienation. In the Islamic World view one is capable of recognizing God only after

one has unchained himself from the conditions of this alienation. The final goal of all revolutions is the destruction of the sources of human alienation, whether in capitalism, totalitarianism, or exploitation.

The goal of the Islamic revolution is to create a society in which all men can fulfill their potentials regardless of their race, religion and sex. The end of the Shah's regime was the first step of the Iranian revolution toward this goal. Needless to say, the destruction of the Pahlavi rule was the less difficult part of our task; the more complex revolutionary work is ahead of us. For example, we have to restructure the society at a time when our agriculture, due to the neglect and irresponsibility of the old regime, can feed no more than 30 percent of Iran's population.

The moral explosion of the Iranian masses in 1978 was greatly inspired by the Quranic doctrines and the efforts of Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) to transform the wealthy and class dominated societies of his time into egalitarian and democratic communities of the Islamic faithful. The Quranic doctrines and the Prophet's tradition will continue to guide and inspire our revolution. One of the most popular slogans of the demonstrators during the last phase of the revolutionary struggle was: "Neither East, nor West, only Islamic Republic".

It is indeed true that both the Western and the Eastern worlds have difficulty understanding the nature of the Iranian revolution. The difficulties of the East are rooted in a number of misperceptions.

1. In the West religion is defined as a relationship between man and the supernatural. In this definition there is no room for political, economic and social considerations. Islam, however, consists of a set of doctrines define and conceptualize both man and the social universe with the purpose of transforming them in accordance with the Islamic world wide. Seen in this light, the religion of Islam has its own political economic, social and cultural perspectives. It is the imposition of the Western definition of religion on Islam which prevents most western observers from comprehending our revolution.

2. The development of secular/scientific culture in Europe was opposed by the organized Church. This was not the case in the

Islamic societies simply because Islam has no organized and centrally controlled church.

The Western intellectuals as a class developed their distinction in opposition to the Church particularly the Catholic Church. They were perceived to be rational rather than emotional and committed to the doctrine that knowledge is the product of pure reason. During the Dark Ages, which in its specific sense were exclusively a Western phenomenon, the Church ejected the existence of non-religious or non-theological knowledge. The attitude of Christian clergy's resentment and contempt toward the early scientific discoveries is well known.

In pre-Renaissance Europe, the papal system had transformed religion into a stagnant institution closely connected to the ruling classes of the time. A principal function of theology and religious literature was to comfort the oppressed masses with the promise of heaven. With the Renaissance, science and philosophy broke away from the bondage of Papal totalitarianism and began their free and independent inquiry. With the passage of time, this sense of liberation, along with the scientific reasoning brought about by the Renaissance, became the weapon of the intellectuals against organized religion, which fought back with all of its resources.

In such a situation, it was logical for the scientists and secular thinkers to distinguish their activities as separate from or opposed to religious doctrines. When the clock, invented by Muslims, was taken to the French Court, the priests regarded it as the work of the devil and ordered their servants to destroy it. Thus when the Western intellectuals began to advocate the separation of Church and State, they were actually choosing freedom over the arbitrary power of organized religion. They were against superstition and denial of natural joy, not ethics or mortality. Consequently, the antagonism of the intellectuals to the Church in the West made a significant contributor to social and scientific advancement. However, when Western secularism was transformed to the colonized societies, particularly Islamic societies, and popularized among the educated elements, the results were not social and scientific advancement but alienation of the intellectuals from themselves as well as from the masses.

The West moved toward secularism as a way of solving this problem. The separation of Church and state was the outcome of this movement, which served the progressive interests of science and society. The Islamic world has never such an experience. Those Western observers who assume their experience with religion has universal application are often confused when they see a religious leader has become the leader of a great political revolution.

3. The Western experience with religion also contributed to the development of philosophical materialism. When Karl Marx described religion as the opium of the people, he had the history of Western Europe in mind. He knew very little about Islam or the Afro-Asian societies. In the Islamic societies, when the intellectuals opposed religion and religious values, echoing either Marxism or Western, liberalism, the result was the destruction or weakening of the moral force capable of confronting colonial aggression and imperialism, particularly in its cultural form.

The prejudice of the colonial scholars was, and continues to be, heavily influenced by the imperialist interests, while the misperception of the Marxist writers has been a logical extension of the assumption that ‘religion is the opium of the people’, a contention that could have been true in one society or region but not necessarily true in other societies and regions of the world. Instead of using Marxism as a tool analysis, many Western and Eastern thinkers have substituted the Marxist doctrines for an independent study of the Third World societies within their own native socio/historical context. It is unfortunate that too many of the contemporary liberal and socialist observers of the Third World are still pursuing the framework developed by their nineteenth century predecessors.

4. Works of the many so-called Western orientalist on Islam are, for the most part, so prejudicial that even those who wish to learn about the reality of Islam as a revolutionary ideology have difficulty finding adequate literature. Most students of Middle Eastern affairs in western universities study with teachers who have a built-in antipathy toward Islamic cultures.

5. For a quarter century the deposed Shah spent millions of dollars in order to portray a progressive image of himself in the Western World. A component of this undertaking was to present

his opponents as either Marxists or religious extremists opposed to his modernization programs.

Given such preconceived notions and prejudices, it is no wonder that many observers of socialist and liberal persuasion have as much trouble appreciating the radical and progressive nature of the Iranian revolution as do the apologists of imperialism.

All societies have their own organic development regardless of what the ethnocentric social theoreticians would like to believe. It was the consequence of this reality that in February 1979, after one hundred years of struggle, enabled the Iranian people to force their illegitimate monarch into permanent exile and welcome home their most popular leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. These events were a culmination of or than a year of nation-wide demonstrations, protests and strikes against the Pahlavi regime and U.S. imperialism. The dominant slogans of the protest demonstrations and mass marches were: "Death to the Shah", "Independence, Freedom and Islamic Republic" and "Neither East, Nor West, and only Islamic Republic".

The swiftness with which the Islamic Republic of Iran acted against Zionist Israel and the South African racists exemplifies the ideals embodied in the international posture of our revolution. It demonstrated our unequivocal commitment to the right of all peoples to a sovereign and independent life, free of oppression, domination and exploitation, in all their manifestations.

We are of the view that maintenance and propagation of bloc alliances based on a military network serves only the cause of imperialism and tyranny. The disbanding of and disassociation from military bases and alliances involving Iran, which catered to the imperialistic game plan, was one of the initial foreign policy decisions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was also a logical step for revolutionary Iran to join the ranks of the non-aligned states. The ideals represented by the non-aligned movement reflect many of our own. Our recent participation in the Havana Conference of Non-Aligned States signaled the beginning of what we hope to be a very active membership in the non-aligned movement. Our beloved national hero and Prime Minister from 1951 to 1953, the late Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, was an original advocate of non-alignment. He championed the cause of non-alignment from the

United Nations tribunes in 1953 when Stalinism and United States imperialism did not even respect the legitimacy of non-alignment. The CIA engineered coup against Mossadegh was, in part, due to his advocacy of non-alignment, exemplified by his refusal to join the U.S. sponsored military alliance which came to be known as Baghdad pact.

We are all too familiar with the facts of the Middle East conflict. For us, the most important fact is the displacement and suffering of the Palestinian people. Three million human beings have either been expelled from their ancestral homes or live under the Nazified terror of the Israeli military occupation simply because they are not Jews. I know such a formulation of the problem might sound oversimplified but it is nevertheless the naked truth. This is why Zionism has to be regarded as one of the most vicious forms of racism in recorded history; it displaces and terrorizes human beings simply because they do not belong to a particular race and religion.

Poor people have always used less sophisticated means of killing their enemies than the rich. This inequality of means in warfare, which is tremendously intensified by the industrial and technological advancement of the past century, has enabled the rich to distort the reality of their actions and intention. When the Israeli bombers rain death on the impoverished Palestinians and Lebanese, their media apologists in the Western countries, particularly the United States, describe their genocidal aggression as defensive aerial attacks on Palestinian military bases. No correspondent goes to the Palestinian refugee camps or the Lebanese villages to report on the plight of the victims. But when the Palestinians blow up a bus in occupied Jerusalem or assassinate an Israeli secret agent, they are described or assassinate an Israeli secret agent, they are described as terrorists. This hypocrisy is characteristic of systems of oppression that deny the rights and humanity of their victims.

My government is proud to have taken concrete steps in contributing to international efforts aimed at unmasking such deceptions and undoing the violations and criminal acts emanating from Israel. To this end, the cutting off of the shipment of Iranian oil to Israel and the breaking off of any and all relations with Israel can be noted. It is our judgment that the wheels of time and justice,

influenced by the courageous struggle of the Palestinian people, have begun to turn in favor of the oppressed and against the oppressor in the Middle East.

Nowhere are the vestiges and remnants of colonialism and imperialism more apparent and stark than in southern Africa. In keeping with our conviction that we seek for others the same dignities and freedoms that we have sought for ourselves, the Iranian Government took prompt action regarding the abhorrent policies of apartheid and racial discrimination on the African continent. This action resulted, among other things, in the total cut of Iranian oil shipped to South Africa. Such a measure was adopted with the intention of applying economic pressure on the Pretoria regime, and indirectly, upon the equally racist and illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. Five months ago the Special Committee on Decolonization held a series of plenary meetings in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Iran participated in those deliberations and enunciated its views on apartheid and decolonization in greater specificity and detail. We mentioned then, and repeat those views now, that the Iranian Government finds the situations existing in South Africa/Namibia and Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe disgraceful and deplorable. We add our voice to those already expressed through the channels of the United Nations and elsewhere, denouncing any solution not entailing, without qualification the right of the majority to self-determination and freedom. It is our hope that the Security Council in particular will further contribute to this end by strengthening all existing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and that all member states will cease and desist from violating the letter and spirit of these prohibitions.

In the case of South Africa, our policy is predicated on the same tents of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism that combine to form the moral underpinnings of our position on Southern Rhodesia. As mentioned earlier, the existing racist nature of the apartheid South African regime remains in direct contravention of Iran's policy of supporting efforts aimed at creating an international society free from the evils of colonialism, neocolonialism and racial discrimination in all their forms. As such, South Africa has done little to ameliorate its present posture in either style or substance as witnessed by its continuing discriminatory, exploitative, and provocative policies in Namibia, all in the face of the unanimous

call by the international community for a peaceful and just settlement in that Territory. We believe that it is high time the United Nations adopt more effective economic and other measures including the application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against the Government of South Africa.

Although the revolutionary government is only eight months old, the provisional government of Bazargan, under the moral guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini, has made it abundantly clear that Iran has proudly joined the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forces. However, what is distinct about our revolutionary posture, in both domestic and international realms, lies in our conviction that the struggle for justice, independence and freedom should in part be directed against our own habits and perceptions. It is certain that the racists and exploiters of this world will not treat the nations and peoples of the Third World any better than the way we treat our own people and relate to one another across national boundaries. Until recent decades the rulers in the official or unofficial colonies of Africa, Asia and Latin America did not need the assistance of Colonial or Imperialist powers in order to maintain their privileged position. In fact, in many cases the traditional rulers attempted to resist the Western penetration of their societies not only for political but also for cultural and ideological orientation of the typical traditional ruling class in the underdeveloped world was not too different from that of its own general population.

Today the situation is completely changed. The peasants are still living under the same conditions or have moved to urban ghettos, but the owners or controllers of the means of production have adopted a cultural and ideological orientation that mystifies the general population. The privileged few, whether they belong to the commercial, bureaucratic or military sector of the governing class, have little socio-cultural contact with the exploited many. In terms of their concrete aspirations and ambitions, they identify with the West to the point of being alienated from their own roots. Thus as the economic gap between the privileged few and the wretched many increases, so does the cultural gap. The enclaves of wealth and power in many underdeveloped countries are also enclaves of imported cultures and life styles. The rapid growth of

international finance, movement of goods and services, travel and communication have led to a global standardization of values, goals and aspirations among those who benefit from these activities. Since the technology and the ideology of this dramatic phenomenon are the product of organic soci-economic growth in the West, the standardization of values, goals and aspirations among the ruling classes of the world has added a new dimension of cultural domination to the evolving character of imperialism in the contemporary world. Today, even the liberal education, the manners, the dress fashion, the fads and the consumptive norms of the ruling classes in the subordinated countries are similar to those of their counterparts in the advanced industrial world.

In our time imperialism has produced an unprecedented amount of resentment among the populace in the subordinated societies. This resentment which is a response to exploitation, coercion and consumptive oriented manipulation, has resulted in an intensified and expanded revolutionary challenge from below. Thus installation of repressive technology in the dominated society and militarization of its state have become necessary in order to maintain the status quo. And yet it is a mistake to think of the export of manipulation, repression and militarism to the underdeveloped countries as a reaction to the resentment of the wretched. Since the resentment itself is a product of imperialism, the response to it is also a product of imperialism. Seen in this light, manipulation, repression and militarism are the organic commodities of imperialism in search of global markets.

It is sad to say that too many of us are anxious customers for the latest commodities of imperialism. Too many of us spend the precious resources of our people's in a parasitic and paranoia producing arms race. Too many of us are more responsive to the greed of the few for luxury goods than to the essential needs of the many. Arms race and the insatiable hunger for luxury goods are the integral parts of the imperialist design for contemporary world. Too many of us are the unconscious victims of imperialism. The perceptions which were imposed on our fathers by colonialism and imperialism have gradually become so internalized by us that we think they are the product of our own thinking. Cultural imperialism has penetrated the deepest levels of our psyches. Too many of us use the imported instruments of repression and

oppression against our own people more effectively than their producers intended for us. Too many of us spend more of our resources on the institutions of coercion than on education or public health. The deposed Shah of Iran was perhaps the most irrational ruler in this category, but we all know that there are too many smaller shahs in the world.

Why did China have to teach Vietnam a lesson? What justification was there for the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia to pursue a course of action that resulted in more than two million deaths of its own citizens? If the new regime in Cambodia is popular and legitimate, why are foreign troops compelled to continue their presence in the country?

The rebellion in Afghanistan has produced thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of refugees, who are pouring into the Iranian and Pakistani territories. The irrational and alienated elements justify such actions in the name of an imported ism. It does not matter if the natives reject the imported formula or do not! Wish to be represented by those who arrogate scientific mission to themselves.

We will betray our own commitment to peace, justice, independence and freedom if our answers to those questions are superficial, evasive, self-serving and one dimensional. It was not class struggle or economic consideration which caused the latest tragedies in Indochina. And it is not enough to claim that the subjective factors and what should be done to remove them. It is our responsibility to analyze these conflicts with as much vigor and commitment to truth as we apply to unmask the nature and consequences of traditional imperialism. The Marxist theory of conflicts falls short of explaining all the problems of our time; and when it does explain a particular conflict situation, it is a mistake to perceive such an explanation as final. There is an abundance of historical evidence that materialist categories of explanations or perceptions whether rooted in Marxism or capitalism, neither fully comprehend the nature of human conflict nor sufficiently satisfy human aspirations.

The revolutionary experiences of this century are once again demonstrating the ancient truth that the struggle for justice, freedom, peace and independence requires a moral dimension which is separate from and beyond the material structure. The

nuclear weapons and the real possibility of a global holocaust have intensified the need for this recognition in an unprecedented manner. The 19th century conditions of growth and industrialization made morality subservient to materialism in social theories and political actions. The contemporary revolutionary movements can no longer continue this unnatural situation. They have to recognize that imperialism, war and oppression cannot be defeated by materialism alone.

The problem in the Third World countries is not just the political and economic domination by the alien forces of superpowers, but also their cultural domination. Many of the Third World countries are dominated by the ideological, philosophical and cultural tendencies which are alien to the native societies. As a result, many intellectuals in the Third World countries are dominated by ideological, philosophical and cultural tendencies which are alien to the native societies. As a result, many intellectuals in the Third World countries are alienated not only from themselves but also from their own people. This situation in the Third World, to the extent that communication between the intellectuals and the masses has become extremely difficult, at times impossible.

Many of the educated elements in the Third World speak the native language; they might even dress like the natives, but they think, feel, taste, see and hear Western or Eastern. In other words, their sense perceptions are taken over by alien forces. This is the worst kind of slavery human beings can be subjected to. This mental slavery is the most distinct consequence of imperialism in the contemporary world, which seems to be a cheap and effective tool of perpetuating imperialist domination.

The global problems diversely analyzed from this podium during the past ten days have a cultural dimension which is at least as crucial to be comprehended as their economic, political, commercial and military components. The multifaceted crisis confronting us all can be reversed if our attention is not limited to the objective conditions of oppression and exploitation. We must also confront the habits and perceptions which we have inherited and internalized without thought or reflection. The problems of development, poverty, inequality, insecurity and violence in the Third World can be effectively dealt with only in native socio-

cultural contexts; otherwise we will continue to be, however unknowingly, the tools of the superpowers.

The producers and sellers of arms live in a few advanced industrial societies but increasingly those who use the ever advancing weapons are the impoverished people of the Third World. This is a new but less visible form of domination and exploitation the wretched of the earth are subjected to. The poor have become the fighters of the rich's proxy wars. This is why the militarization of politics in the Third World has reached a sorry stage. In the name of security and the dubious claim of knowing what is good for their people, many rulers of the Third World have substituted forces submission for civil society and voluntary association. Nationalism, once a source of solidarity against imperialism, is now becoming an excuse for militarized societies to engage in civil and regional wars. Both the East and the West are exploiting the misperceptions and militarization of the Third World countries in accordance with their imperialistic game plans, which includes the expansion of their own self-serving arms race.

Mr. President, it is the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the United Nations should be as active in combating the new forms of imperialism as it was in the struggle against colonialism. The cultural domination and militarization of the Third World can be destructive to the rights and humanity of nations as a violation of their sovereignty. That this consciousness has placed them at the service of imperialism is as inevitable as was the confrontation between the natives and their colonial oppressors and the forces of national self-determination; it was instrumental in reducing the violence of the confrontation.

In the past decade the United Nations has played a significant role in unmasking the deceptiveness of Zionist Israel or arousing the conscience of the world against the racist regimes of Southern Africa. The Western mass media have a near monopoly of information and communication facilities and it is extremely difficult for the poor or the oppressed to appeal to world public opinion. The plight of the oppressed is not sensational enough for the monopolists of information and communication facilities. The United Nations can be more helpful in this regard than it has been in the past.

For a quarter of a century half million Iranians served time in prison, more than 65,000* of them were killed by the Shah's armed men, over 2,000 of them, all young men and women, were tortured to death; and yet not a word about these hideous crimes was mentioned in this assembly. There are other shahs. The United Nations should head their shouts and reflect them in its public deliberations.

The crimes of the shahs cannot be ignored by the world organization simply because they take place within national boundaries. If the oppressors have to be their arms, ammunitions, spies, advisors and repression technology from without their national boundaries then their concern over their crimes cannot be limited within their national boundaries either.

The legitimacy of the United Nations can be deepened if this challenge is taken seriously. The oppressors, the monopolist of information and communication facilities, those who benefit from proxy wars and cultural domination, whether they live within or without certain national boundaries, will certainly advise the United Nations to tolerate the crimes of those who rule by coercion alone. But if we are to serve the cause of peace and justice in the world, we cannot ignore the plight of the oppressed without losing our legitimacy. The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to the proposition that the most sacred mission of the United Nation is to support, within a realistic framework, the rights and humanity of the oppressed at all times and under all circumstances. Thank for being patient with me.

*This is an exaggerated figure; however, I will remain true to my statement at the time.

14. War to Entail Saddam's Downfall

Pars News Agency, Tehran, Oct. 18, 1979

A deputy from Tehran in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi today said in an interview with Pars that the Iraq-Iran war would eventually end in the downfall of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Yazdi said that the downfall of Saddam by itself would not mean the triumph of the people in Iraq, but that the eventual establishment of an Islamic government in that country would be solely dependent on the organizational capability of the Islamic Revolutionary forces in that country.

Asked about his view on the composition of the Iranian Parliament Yazdi said that there was "an independent majority of deputies who were primarily faithful to Islam and the Islamic Revolution". He said the Iranian Parliament had to tackle several problems but added that there were good prospects.

15. Ideals and realism in Iranian foreign relations

Talking to Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, Impact International Journal, Oct. 26-Nov 8, 1979

“The Government is One Thing and the Revolution is Another”

Almost all of Iran's problems today arise from one single fact: the determination of its people and leadership to make Iran an Islamic state. Clearly no one is going to admit it in so many words, but the fact remains that all that opprobrium which is nowadays showered on Iran from the erstwhile colonialist sectors is caused by a psychological fear of Islam.

In a world which is supposed to have grown so 'liberal' and 'tolerant' as to condone, even approve, whatever people may consent to do in their own private domains, and in a world which appears to be taking much pains to dig out and preserve ancient totems and fetishes, this peculiar state of mind about Islam defies any rational explanation. For no one is obliged to like, love or agree with whatever political, economic and social policies Muslims may want to adopt within their 'sovereign' domains, but there was no justification for being fanatically in-tolerant either.

Are some people really aggrieved because the Iranians want to lead a life of obedience to God as they may deem it to be the right way? Probably not insofar as it concerned more rites and rituals, but woe betide if this also meant a non-western social, economic and political order. The fear seems to be that if an Islamic Iran is allowed to be established, it may not mean the closure of just one imperialist grazing ground, Iran's opting out of the western dominated secular world order could trigger destabilization of the order itself. It is the anti-exploitation and liberation potential of Islam that seems to lie at the root of the phobia. Since that order controlled the information resources of the world, it is also able to impose its own fears over the unsuspecting Muslim and the Third Worlds by feeding their information and policy-making systems

with their own 'appreciation' of the situation. Thus while it is not surprising why the western powers – which connotation includes the Soviets too – are so uncomfortable about an Islamic Iran, even many Muslim states remain unsure and confused about a development which should normally be taken to be in their favor. It's a kind of double irony, as the Iranians too may be formulating their policies towards other Muslim countries on the basis of the same type of feedback originating from the same sources.

With a backdrop like this, the foreign ministry of Iran would appear to be one of the most challenging positions in the world, and so it is taken by the new foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi.

Dr Yazdi, now 48, was born in the small Iranian town of Qazvin on September 26, 1931. He took his PHD from Iran and went to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1961. From the MIT he moved to the Baylor University School of Medicine in Houston, Texas, where he worked on cancer research. In 1970 Dr Yazdi joined the Veteran's Administration Hospital (VAH) as a senior microbiologist, leaving it in July 1971 to lead the anti-Shah movement more actively.

Yazdi may be new to diplomacy 'as it is practiced today', but he is not new to the scene of Islamic foreign relations. As the head of the 'Iranian Liberation Movement Abroad' since the early sixties, he had been responsible not only for organizing and guiding the Islamic movement against the Shah regime outside Iran, but was also acting as the ambassador plenipotentiary of the movement.

Yazdi's anti-despotism and pro-Islamic credentials go as far back as 1943 when at the high school age he became a member of the Islamic society at Amir Kabir High School. The next phase was the underground 'Khoda Parastan Socialist' (God-worshipping Socialists) and from there to the discipleship of Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleghani until finally the formation of the 'Nehzat Azadi Iran' (Liberation Movement of Iran) with such savants as Bazargan, Taleghani, Dr. Sahabi and Dr Ali Shariati. The Nehzat Azadi movement had a vital role in the subsequent overthrow of the Shah regime.

Although Yazdi had always drawn inspiration from the thoughts and works of Ayatollah Khomeini, it was only in 1970

that his contacts with the Ayatollah became more active. A year later, Khomeini appointed him as his representative in North America. When Khomeini was given the expulsion order in Najaf, Iraq, in October last year, Yazdi was with the Ayatollah. He accompanied him to the Paris suburb of Neauphle-le-Chateau, which soon became the headquarters of the Iranian revolutionary movement. It is difficult to describe under one single title Yazdi's role at Neauphle-le-Chateau. He was something like the chief of staff and minister of foreign affairs combined together, maybe more.

Talking to Dr Yazdi, the very first question to crop up was about the foreign policy implications of Iran being an Islamic republic.

Dr Yazdi is very clear: 'If the state is based on the ideology and philosophy of Islam, then the foreign policy of such a state should also be derived from the Islamic ideology and its world-view. The Qur'an, the Sunnah and the teaching of the Imams provide clear guidance on relationship with governments and peoples, with Muslims and non-Muslims.

Yazdi visualizes a three-dimensional model of Iranian relationships with the western powers, with the Third World countries, and with the Muslim world.

'With the western countries, including the superpowers, we have one kind of relationship which is mainly revolving around mutual exchange of technology and natural resources. For example we have to deal with them on what they need from us, let's say oil and what we need from them that is technology'.

'With the Third World countries it is completely different, though not all the Third World countries are Muslim. Yet there are many areas of shared objectives and common concerns. Like Iran there are many Third World countries that are also fighting against imperialism, the domination of the West and the superpowers. So there is a large area of common or joint effort demanding special relations between the Muslim and the Third World countries'.

'As regards the Muslim countries, because of Islam, because of the historical ties, because of numerous other mutual ties and affinities and because of common goals and purpose of life there have to be close and deep relations between Iran and the rest of the Muslim world.

Did this concept of three-dimensional relationship imply a policy of partisanship that is supporting Muslim countries whether right or wrong and opposing non-Muslims whether wrong or right?

'No, the criteria are to be Islamic. When a Muslim is on the wrong side you support him by telling him that he is not doing the right thing. There are, we know, some Muslim governments that are far from being really Islamic. They may even be termed munafiqh (hypocrites).'

In general terms 'our foreign policy is based on friendship with whoever is willing to deal with us on the basis of mutual respect and of equality in our dealings'. This applied also to Iran's relationship with the US, the USSR, the EEC states and China. As to the superpower rivalries and the differences between China and the Soviet Union, 'we are trying to avoid getting involved in these controversies and are pursuing a policy of good relationship with all of them'.

However it is the Non-Aligned Movement that the Iranian foreign minister appears to be more enthusiastic about. Yazdi does not agree with the view that the non-aligned forum was and would remain 'a downstairs' United Nations Organization'.

'Firstly, non-alignment means that you are pursuing a policy independent of the superpowers, and as a Muslim, it is our obligation to show the other Third World countries the way to true liberation. I said at the Havana summit this September that true non-alignment and true in-dependence can not be achieved as long as Third World countries live under the cultural domination of the decadent western civilization. There is a clear cultural vacuum and if it is not filled by something which is healthy, moral, universal and revolutionary and if they continue to fight western imperialism in the traditional fashion, then they are liable to slip into the trap of the Eastern block ideology which was another kind of domination, another kind of alignment. We believe that Islam provides the middle path. The Qur'an describes Muslims as Ummatan wasta (the median community) and asks them to be a shahid (witness) of the Truth unto the people of the world. You can't be a shahid or the world cannot accept your witness if you sit in your own home. To take an active and constructive part in the affairs of the oppressed people of the world was an Islamic obligation'.

What about the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)? The Shah regime's participation in the organization had been token and formal. Generally Iran sent the lowest key delegations. It has never asked to host the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference and made very little financial contribution towards the projects of the OIC. So far, the Iranian Islamic republic too has not shown much enthusiasm about the organization. So what does Iran propose to do in order to promote and strengthen the functional unity of the Muslim world?

Apparently Dr Yazdi hadn't yet had time to have gone in to the precise specifics of the subject matter and probably the Iranian foreign office had still had to make do with a number of the 'old hands' who had been in the past dragging their feet on this question. This problem of the 'old hands' appears to be affecting Iranian foreign relations in some other spheres as well.

'Well, as you know, we are a newcomer. It is a Quranic guideline that whenever a Muslim wants to move in the way of Allah, he has first to 'make sure'. We want to know who is who in this conference. What are their objectives? What is their philosophy? What do they want to achieve? And who are the active elements in this body?

'The very first occasion after the revolution when a conference [of Islamic foreign ministers] was held in Fez, we sent a delegation. Our delegation actively participated in the conference but again we come to the same question. Morocco is a member of the Islamic Conference. The same Morocco hosted the conference in Fez and yet their King permits himself to go that far to attack the Islamic revolution in Iran and its leader Imam Khomeini, more vigorously than the Zionists and the Jews and yet there is no one from other members of the body to condemn that attack. Then you ask yourself what kind of Islamic conference is that? Of course, that does not mean that we should not participate'.

What does it mean then?

'It means that we should first try to understand who is who in this conference. Are there any progressive members that we can work with him in order to clean up the house a little bit'?

How can you clean up without participating?

'I didn't say that'.

Clearly Dr Yazdi was most unhappy about King Hassan's attack on the Iranian revolution and Khomeini and more unhappy that none of the member-states tried to 'respond to the unjustified and un-Islamic remarks of the King'. There is no doubt that Hassan's remarks were wrong and intemperate (not unlikely, the Moroccan ruler was only responding to the 'information' fed in to his own policy-making system). However apart from the Islamic Conference, whatever it is and whatever it is not, hasn't the Islamic Republic of Iran its own in-dependent obligation to promote Islamic solidarity?

'Solidarity per se cannot be our goal, solidarity and unity must serve the cause of Allah and the cause of Islam and that cannot be achieved unless and first we have a common understanding of Islam. Without having such basic and common understanding among the members we cannot create Islamic solidarity. I see the role of the Islamic Republic as to try to promote a common understanding of Islam, not only understanding but common practice as well. Only then it would be possible to bring about any meaningful unity'.

But common understanding is a process and not a matter of one single step. As a process it goes on and on, ideally and conceptually never reaching the final point. That's why the process and the struggle are in themselves an achievement in Islam.

'I agree that it is a process, but the process involves movement and I cannot imagine movement without defining the goal which only comes from a common understanding. Therefore, as though the development of solidarity and unity is a gradual process, it must be preceded by a common understanding of the final goal'.

Dr Yazdi's reservations and pre-requisites do raise serious questions worth examination and study in a more precise frame-work by Muslim political scientists and statesmen if the intrinsic unity of the Islamic world is to be translated into any functioning reality.

However there still remains Iran's own original commitment to just Muslim causes; for example Eritrea, Southern Philippines and Afghanistan. Would, Iran for instance, request Cuba not to be the Ethiopian mercenary in Eritrea? Could they tell the

Manila government that if they continue to kill and persecute the Muslims in Southern Philippines and deny them their cultural and political autonomy then this may affect oil and other economic relations?

'It is we in Iran who have called upon all to say that it is an obligation of a Muslim government to support all oppressed people, particularly oppressed Muslims, fighting for their rights and independence. Whether Eritrea or Southern Philippines, we know that for every action there is a price to be paid and if that price means that we have to stop the supply of oil we shall do so.

[The Iranian government subsequently announced that no oil will be supplied to the Philippines 'as long as the massacre of and pressure on the Muslims there continues'.]

About the conflict between the Muslim people of Afghanistan and its minority regime: Could not the Islamic Conference and the Non-aligned Movement jointly request the Soviet Union not to be a partisan in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and let its people freely decide the type of political system they want? Between Iran and the Soviet Union there are a few common friends; for example, Cuba. Perhaps Iran may request Castro to advise the Soviets not to spoil their relations with the Muslim world?

'I agree. I think we have to take both diplomatic initiatives and adopt other means in order to end foreign interference in Afghanistan and enable the people to decide what kind of political system they want'.

Moving to the deadlock over the Palestine and the Middle East problems, in what way does Iran propose to contribute to the solution of these problems?

'Well, moral support, political support, any other support that the Palestinians may ask for. They are to tell us what they need and then we will act accordingly'.

What exactly would be the point of objection in case Sadat is able to get the Sinai vacated and the problem reduced to just the question of the liberation of Palestine, to be achieved by the Palestinians and those who support their cause.

'Sadat is guilty of treason to the Egyptian people, treason to the Arabs, to the Palestinians and to the Muslims. He went on his own

to negotiate and sign a so-called peace treaty with the enemy in exchange of desert sand. He has sold out the aspirations of the Muslims and the Palestinians'.

The question was, if somehow, Sadat's 'treason' or 'treachery', helps to narrow down the size of the problem, then what technical or tactical objection can one have?

'The objection is that he would not be able to narrow it down, he will enlarge and compound the problem. Immediately after the signing of the treaty the Israelis intensified their attacks on Lebanon. Even at the time they were signing it, the Israelis were setting more Jews in the West Bank. In my view the Sadat government is a party to the crimes that are now being committed against Muslims in south Lebanon. The Israelis have found that they have a docile and well-controlled Egyptian border. So they are free to attack the Muslim in south Lebanon. And there is no word of protest from Sadat'.

The deposed Shah's Aryan chauvinism and ambition to dominate the Persian Gulf region and even beyond were always a matter of unease among the regional states who all happened to be Arab. It will therefore appear to be ironical that the Shah's departure from the scene does not seem to have mitigated the atmosphere of mutual mistrust in the region. An Islamic Iran is no less an anathema to some of them for it also denotes a pressure on them to Islamic the social and political order within their own domains. While the Iranian government and foreign ministry state and reiterate that Iran has no territorial ambitions, nor does it intend to export its revolution by sending armed men to other countries (if the people there derive some ideas or inspiration from the Iranian experience, then there is no way to prevent it), but matters do not get helped when some ayatollah who may also be a member of the revolutionary council expresses his opinion about the social or political system in a neighboring country. It doesn't matter if this was not an official view or that in Iran public leaders criticize their own government in no less stronger terms.

It is not known if the Iraqis are 'retaliating' or trying preempt the smuggling of Islamic ideas from across their eastern borders, but as against the conservative states, it is the

radical Ba'ath regime of Iraq which appears to be visibly scared of the Iranian revolution and, according to Iranian sources, very much behind the ethnic troubles in Iran.

So, much to the satisfaction of the powers interested in destabilizing the Iranian Islamic Republic, the 'Gulf' remains an area of tension and conflagration and the relationships more or less formal.

'What do you mean by the word Gulf'? Dr Yazdi asks.

Well, the Persian Gulf, but as a Muslim is it important whether it is called Persian or Arabian?

'Because it has been called Persian Gulf since centuries.

But does Iran need to make it an issue?

'We are not making it an issue. The issue is there. You don't solve it by running away from it... In any case our policy towards the different governments in the region is of friendship and friendliness. With some of them we are very friendly and close. We are trying to normalize our relations in the region.

Dr Yazdi also sees 'no justification for what the Iraqis are doing against the Islamic revolution in Iran. Our Arab brothers, particularly the Iraqis should be happy because they say they are fighting against Imperialism and Zionism. We told them in Havana that the triumph of the Iranian Islamic revolution was not only against the Shahanshahi system, but also against American imperialism and Zionism. The Iraqis however are involved in some kind of activities which cannot be tolerated and we will resist such activities'.

The Syrians too are Ba'athists and secular, so how does Iran differentiate between two un-Islamic regimes?

'The difference is in their attitudes. The Syrians have supported the Iranian revolution politically and diplomatically and have done nothing against us. We are aware of the Ba'ath philosophy'.

What was the agenda of Dr Yazdi's talks with President Assad during the latter's recent visit to Iran? Did he touch upon the killings and persecution of Muslims in Syria?

'We talked with President Hafiz-al-Assad in Havana and again when he came to Iran about southern Lebanon, Palestine, Imam Musa Sadr and the new relationships between Iran and Syria. [As

regards the persecution of Muslims] I am not really fully aware of what is going on in Syria. No we didn't talk about it.

The relationship between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey has been traditionally very close. In fact it was this existing closeness that was used by the Americans to knit first the Baghdad Pact and later the Cento (Central Treaty Organization) alliance into the then Dullesian system of western security in the Cold War days. Subsequently the three countries forged a parallel tripartite alliance RCD could not really evolve into an active and developing organization of economic and cultural cooperation. As the oil funds began to pour in, the Shah found the RCD too humble for his big power ambitions, and began to dream of a big Indian Ocean economic community – on the pattern of the European Economic Community – to preside over. Relations with Pakistan and Turkey continued to be friendly but with a shade of the patronizing on the part of the Shah. During the last years of the Shah, a certain distance could also be seen to be developing more so between Turkey and Iran. Although one was secular and the other Islamic, both Turkey and Pakistan took an inordinately long time to recognize the potential and the import of the Islamic movement in Iran. Not surprisingly, if we realize where and how the Muslim states, whether secular or Islamic, take their 'facts' from. Nevertheless the Muslim Iranians did have their own expectations (particularly from Pakistan) and some feeling as these expectations did not appear to be fulfilled. In the final phase Pakistan did make some moves to rectify things indeed it was the first country to recognize the new Islamic government of Iran. But inexplicably relations between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan do not appear to be as close and as warm as one would expect them to be now, after the emergence of an Islamic Iran.

Dr Yazdi does not agree with this last assumption. 'No, our relations with Turkey and Pakistan are very friendly and warm'.

But is he satisfied with the present state of the relationships?

'I am not satisfied in the sense that there is plenty of room for improvement and expansion'.

Any plans for improvement and expansion?

'I think we should do that because the bonds between the Pakistani brothers and the Iranians are very deep. The Pakistanis should know, and I think they know, that the Iranians have a great love for the Islamic devotion of their Pakistani brothers. Our foreign policy and economic and cultural relations should therefore reflect these deep bonds. There is plenty of room for expansion in our relationship'.

What has exactly gone wrong with the RCD?

'In my view all the by-products of Cento should be dissolved and a new relationship based on new criteria that the Islamic revolution of Iran has set up should be developed'.

Now, the RCD was not a by-product, rather it was an alternative to Cento.

'Well whatever it is, it is a by-product of the relations which the Shah had based on his own values and not on the Islamic revolutionary values. It does not reflect that sense of deep respect and friendship which must exist between Iranians and Pakistanis and Iranians and their Turkish brothers. We went to have something new based on new criteria. We hope to do that'.

The Shah had, at the behest of the Americans, put forward an idea to expand RCD in order to bring in India. Isn't it surprising that the Islamic government of Iran now wants to revive the very idea?

'No, I doubt it [that it had been an American idea]. We did not mention about enlarging the PCD, but we said that since the relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh are very friendly and brotherly and since also both Pakistan and India are pursuing a policy of resolving their differences and getting closer to each other, which to my estimate will help both the countries, I do not see any reason why Pakistan and India should not cooperate with each other. It is the design of foreign interests that Pakistan and India should continue to have problems between them'.

Very true! However, so far as Pakistan is concerned whatever normalization was possible it seems to have taken place already. It seems impossible to conceive of a true and proper normalization unless and until the problem of Jammu and Kashmir is settled on the basis of bilateral and

international commitments already made by the two parties. Does Dr Yazdi think that the Pakistanis can jump the block and develop relations while the question of the self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir remains unsettled?

'I did not say what the problems are in such normalization process. What I am saying is that there is every reason that relations between India and Pakistan should be normalized. They should cooperate and they must be friendly. They are two nations with centuries old common history. If we can help in this process of normalization we will do so. If we achieve this then why not have regional cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and other countries of the region? We have many common problems and we can benefit from this kind of cooperation'.

Exactly what does Iran think it can do about the problem of Jammu and Kashmir? What is Iran's policy regarding the right of self-determination of the people in that territory?

'I think that the people of Kashmir like any other people deserve to have the right of self-determination and I am sure no one can deny them this right'.

Would Iran help them to achieve that right just as it is trying to support the Muslims in Southern Philippines?

'Yes, I think we should help them to achieve what they want'.

Still on the question of normalization would Iran welcome the idea of reuniting Pakistan and Bangladesh?

'If that is what their people want; but unification should not be imposed, it should come through their free will'.

16. Yazdi Indirectly Admits Imam Unaware of Talks

Ali Asghar Tasslimi, Tehran Times, November 6, 1979

Tehran- Foreign Minister indirectly admitted last night that Imam Khomeini had not been informed of the Iranian delegations meeting with President Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Algiers.

Addressing a press conference Yazdi said, "before the Iranian delegation's departure to Algeria for the 25th anniversary celebration of that country's liberation movement last week, I called on the Imam and briefed him of the itinerary of our visit, but

no details of meetings with officials of other countries were discussed as we were not aware which nations would be represented at the celebrations."

However, when pressed by a reporter that the American Embassy's Charge d'Affairs in Tehran Bruce Laingen had presented a note to the Iranian foreign ministry two days before the delegation's visit to Algiers indicating Brzezinski too would attend the celebrations and was interested in meeting the Iranian delegation, Yazdi responded, "Yes, we did receive a note of that nature. However that is something you should ask Mr. Bazargan himself."

When asked his views of the American Embassy's seizure by the students Yazdi responded withanswers. He first said, "The students' action in fact is in support of moves previously made by the foreign ministry through diplomatic channels. Because as soon as we were informed of the deposed Shah's entry to the U.S. by the American Charge d'Affairs in Tehran, we sent a strong protest to Washington and that his admittance would further deteriorate the already cool relations between our two countries."

Another reporter asked Yazdi what he thought of the consequences of the students' actions and he replied, "I am not aware of the motivations of those who are responsible for the incident. They have probably evaluated the consequences."

Asked what he believed would happen to the hostages, the Foreign Minister indicated, "the American Embassy's Charge d'Affairs contacted me following the incident and expressed his displeasure at the takeover. I told him that although we are responsible for protection of life and property of Americans in Iran, we hold the Americans directly responsible for the seizure, because they ignored our numerous warnings about the ex-shah's admittance to the U.S. and also our appeals for the extradition of him and his wife."

However, he said the foreign ministry has been in constant contact with students at the embassy and they have promised "they are treating the hostages very well and on the basis of Islamic principles and no harm will come to them," and added his ministry is trying its best to end the matter satisfactorily.

Yazdi also pointed out that the ministry has done all in its power to have the ex-shah and his wife extradited to Iran and that action has been initiated through diplomatic channels to have the wealth illegally taken by him restored to the country.

Regarding theYazdi said all appeals by the foreign ministry for Iranian doctors to examine him have been ignored and ended, "they haven't allowed the physicians attending on the ex-shah to meet with our doctors who want to determine whether his illness is severe enough to warrant treatment in the United States."

"In the meeting I had with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations, he agreed to extradite Iranian criminals who fled to the U.S. after the victory of the revolution," Yazdi said. "On the basis of this agreement I asked for extradition of Brig. General Manuchehr Razmi who was responsible for the fire at Rex Cinema in Abadan."

Asked why he did not inform the nation of actions taken by the foreign ministry earlier, he said, "first of all we were waiting for a response to our protests to the U.S. and secondly some of the publications and mass media to censor news these days."

A reporter then asked Yazdi why Iran was not severing diplomatic ties with the U.S., as official Iranian protests to Washington have not produced results, to which he said, "I don't believe in taking such an action. However, if the Imam and Revolutionary Council make such a decision, we will conform to it."

On the possible cut off of Iranian crude oil to the U.S., Yazdi indicated it should be studied carefully, as it must be considered whether Iran would benefit from such a measure. "Moreover, other oil producing countries will then raise their production to make up the five per cent oil that the U.S. is importing from Iran and also we might unite all Western industrialized nations against us."

The foreign minister also indicated that the position he is assuming is a religious duty bestowed upon him by the Imam and anytime that the Imam is not satisfied with his performance he will leave.

Regarding the Iranian delegation's negotiations with Brzezinski, Yazdi explained, "we indicated to the U.S. President's national

security aide that until present problems between Iran and America is resolved, improvement of relations would not be possible."

Yazdi further said it was pointed out to Brzezinski that the U.S. cancelled sale of F-16 fighters to Iran a week prior to Bakhtiar's fall, but, "as the secretary of state indicated to me in the meeting I had with him at the United Nations, the US has sold spare parts to these planes enough to last 50 years. Therefore, we explained to him that they should buy these spares parts back from us."

On the four destroyers bought back from Iran by the U.S. he said, "We indicated to Brzezinski, the destroyers were repurchased by us based on the 1974 price. In this deal the U.S. profited by nearly \$800 million and we lost \$700 million, whereas if they were ordered now, the US would not be able to have these until 1982. Another thing we pointed out to Brzezinski was that the U.S. had not bought the rockets that go with the destroyers. What are we supposed to do with them?"

He said "Brzezinski responded by asking whether we were insinuating that the U.S. compensates Iran for its revolution. We indicated to him that the Was responsible, and bringing back the ex-shah who killed and to tortured thousands of our youth and plundered our only vital natural resource and now they had humanitarian groups And don't even permit our doctors to examine him."

17. Petty Squabbles Serve No Purpose

Tehran times, November 5, 1979

TEHRAN- The foreign ministry and the radio and television agency NIRT seem to be involved in a petty squabble over the delay caused in the broadcast of the foreign ministry's reply to statements made Wednesday by the Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon.

The foreign ministry blames NIRT by claiming that although the ministry's answer was released to Pars News Agency on Wednesday; it was not broadcast until midnight Thursday night.

The radio and television, on the other hand, denies ever having received the Pars News Agency telex until 10 p.m. on Thursday when it first came to know of the existence of such a communiqué from the foreign ministry's director general for information. Among other things, NIRT denied the allegation of the director

general of having deliberately killed the story to embarrass the foreign ministry.

Whatever the truth of the allegations and counter-allegations, incidents of this kind only show a lack of coordination of activity, while the foreign ministry should not jump to the conclusion that there was a deliberate attempt to discredit it by the radio and television, the latter should also not have come out with strong accusations against the foreign ministry.

The radio and television's assertions could have been checked out easily by looking at the dispatches of the Pars News Agency to ascertain at what time they had filed the story.

The incident would probably not have occurred had it not coincident with Eid Qurban holiday when the newspapers were closed for two days in a row. But this does not absolve Pars News Agency and NIRT to adjudge correctly the importance and priority of news items.

It is also strange that there should be a friction between the radio and television and the Pars News Agency, which the NIRT communiqué admits. A slight professional jealousy can be understandable - but not to the extent where an item of such vital importance as the reply of the foreign ministry to a foreign power should have been withheld or delayed, provided of course if such was the case. Frictions of this kind occur only when there are two independent organizations performing the same task, like the friction between Pars News Agency and the radio and television. The latter had its own sources of gathering news and seldom relies upon Pars News Agency. At one time this friction grew so strong that the government had to take notice by amalgamating the two organizations more or less under executed deputy NIRT chief Mahmoud Jafarian.

At that time, Pars News Agency was headed by a comparatively insignificant person while the NIRT boss Reza Qotbi, a cousin of Farah Pahlavi, was all-powerful. At present Pars News Agency is doing a terrific job and is seldom behind on any significant news item.

Perhaps a closer working cooperation could be established between Pars News Agency and the radio and television newsroom. A greater coordination must be brought about in the

activity of all government departments so that the administration may improve in efficiency.

Verbal duels between the various organizations must be avoided as far as possible because such a war of words would only lead to slackening of public confidence in the administration. If a department, in defending itself, has to make accusations against another it must first make sure of its facts.

In the present case duel is all the more surprising because the heads of the two organizations involved, Foreign Minister Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi and NIRT chief Sadeq Ghotbzadeh are close personal friends of long standing and are reported to entertain ideas.....view on almost all policies of national interest. The need for smooth operation of the government cannot be over-emphasized.

18. The Issue of the Shah is Part of Reconstruction

Interview of the Week - Ebrahim Yazdi The Iranian Magazine, December 15, 1979, Vol.1, No.23

Despite his exit from the government, former Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi remains an active political figure in the National Liberation Movement. Yazdi who was Khomeini's official representative in the U.S. for nine years, returned to Iran last February after an absence of fifteen years. He ardently pushed for Iran's membership in the non-aligned movement. Following are excerpts of an interview he had with Hamid Nazari and Rokhsan Manuchehri of the Iranian.

Q. Do you think the issue of the shah is the most pressing issue facing this country at the moment?

A. I don't believe the issue of the Shah is out of proportion. I do agree we should divert the potential energy of the people into reconstruction of the country. But the issue of the shah is part of the reconstruction. If one is to mobilize the masses and to correct their attitudes towards a consumer society you have to have a very strong motivating force. You want to rebuild an economy which is completely dependent on foreign countries. First you have to create a very strong sentiment against foreign domination. Then you have to say, all right, you cannot fight against the Americans without going and reconstructing the

country. On the other hand there are two things. On the one hand the Imam is capable of rallying the people and sending them to the fields. On the other hand people must feel this themselves, have this feeling for complete necessity. When the masses are completely mobilized against the Americans it is easier to tell them to go to the fields and do this and that. The Imam reflects only the feeling and attitude of the people. When we were fighting against the Shah, people felt the depths of the pressure. Everyone had had experience with the dictatorship of the shah and with SAVAK. So it was easy for the Imam to rally feeling against the Shah. With Americans it is different since they operated through the shah. The masses have to feel that the Americans are responsible. If this campaign against the American ends just by a trial of these Americans and their deportation, it will be a disaster. It has to go further – we have to divert this to the reconstruction of the country.

Q. Does this mean that we can expect in the future more rallying points like this one to be made artificially or otherwise both by the Imam and other groups to keep motivation of the masses high?

A. This is part of the mobilization of the masses. Sentiments, political or religious sentiments cannot remain always at the highest peak. In order to rally the masses this kind of thing should continue. You have to find excuses, just like journalists who make up headlines which are sensational in order draw the attention of the people.

Q. You were involved recently in the talks in Qom and Tabriz along with Ayatollah Lahouti. Do you think Ayatollah Shariat-Madari will tone down his dissenting opinions or do you think the system itself could become more moderate and accept Shariat-Madari's view-points?

A. The future is very difficult to predict. Those elements trying to agitate continuously against the Islamic Republic will use anything they can. Since we are getting close to solving the problem in Kurdistan, we see another issue cropping up. We are approaching elections for President and for the establishment, the fortification of the Republic. And anti-revolutionaries will intensify their activities in order to sabotage this. Now they

have found a point, someone else they can rally round. To neutralize that, communication with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari will be greater than before.

Q. Then what about Shariat-Madari's contention with Article 110 concerning the interpretation of valayate faqih?

A. These are matters of opinion. We don't believe that in an Islamic Republic everyone must think alike. People in Iran and abroad are used to the political atmosphere in Iran where only one person had the right to talk and that was the Shah, and no one could think and talk differently from him. And that was taken as a sign of stability. And they are surprised and don't understand when the Imam, who has all the power, appoints a Prime Minister who on certain issues has different opinions from the Imam. The Prime Minister, in a very relaxed way, comes on television and tells the people his opinions and people are shocked, and say this is democracy, this is the Islamic Republic. And the interesting thing which people often fail to recognize is that the Imam was not unhappy and did not show any unpleasant reactions to Bazargan's statement in areas in which he was critical. And in the same way, when I was minister I had my own opinions which were different from those of Bazargan. In many areas I did not agree with him. This is democracy, this is not one-man rule. It works the same way with the Marja' (high ayatollah). They have their own opinions and Ayatollah Khomeini has his. For example, Imam Khomeini felt certain articles in the Constitution should have been drawn up differently, but he accepted the majority rule. Ayatollah Shariat-Madari is a Marja', and he has his own ideas on some of the articles and this is fine. He has expressed this opinion. But there was an election of experts and they adopted the Constitution which the people have approved. This is real politics in a free society like any free society in the world where everyone has their own opinion and then the majority decides what to do.

Q. You don't think the agitation in Tabriz is due to Shariat-Madari's opinion on Article 110 being ignored?

A. No. The first draft of the Constitution was government prepared. It was approved by the Cabinet, then by the Revolutionary Council and finally by the Imam. The Imam went through the

draft Constitution and corrected a few points here and there. But the Assembly of Experts changed quite a few things which were different from the Imam's opinion, and the Imam said, well, these representatives have been elected by the people and we accept the people's power so we should not change it. And this is the same with everyone. So I don't think the source of the trouble was because Shariat-Madari's voice was not heard. His opinion was expressed but the majority has a different opinion.

Q. So we should not expect any changes in the Constitution after the use of this kind of tactic?

A. No, because the final authority lies with the people, and the people have elected representatives to the Assembly who adopted this Constitution, and whether one thinks it good or not one must accept it.

Q. So you feel the incident in Tabriz is a product of counter-revolutionary action rather than a movement by the people as a whole?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Why did you not announce that the U.S. was going to let the shah in right after you learned about it?

A. We issued a statement immediately informing the public of the American move. We also informed the public that we had protested to the United States and that the Americans were playing with fire. We expressed the view that this indicated the U.S. had not yet understood the depth of the Iranian Revolution and did not care about Iranian sentiment and feelings. Then I notified the people we had requested that at least two specialized and practicing Iranian physicians in the United States be allowed to visit the shah and check. We had two reasons for this. First, to see whether the shah was really sick or just politically sick, and second, to have two physicians whom we felt we could trust around to report to us what was going on. The following day the Americans informed the embassy in Washington, to which I had introduced two Iranian physicians that the latter could go and visit the shah. But later they refused to allow this, allowing them only to check some medical documents.

Again on October 27 or 29, I gave the Americans three official notices. The first protested the refusal to let the Iranian physicians visit the shah. The second protested statements by Goldwater and Henry Jackson. And I repeated my previous statement that the Americans did not understand the Iranian Revolution and did not care about Iranian feeling and warned that the Americans should only blame themselves if anything happened. I knew there was a storm in the air. I officially asked for the extradition of the shah on October 30th based on my discussions with Cyrus Vance in which he had accepted the idea of returning criminals.

Q. There is a gap between the time you knew from Laingen that the shah was ill and planning to go to the States and the time you announced it. Had this been announced earlier, Bazargan's credibility might not have been questioned.

A. On October 22, Bruce Laingen told me the shah was very sick and planning to go to the United States, but I was not told when he would go. The next day, Laingen told me that according to a wire he had received the shah was planning on going to the U.S. that night. Before we were even able to get in touch with our embassy in Washington to get some news, or with Mexico, the shah was there. And they said they wanted to keep this secret.

Q. How do you account for the gap of a week in the Iranian public reaction – between the time the hostages were seized and the announcement that the shah had arrived in the United States?

A. It took time for sentiment to rise. Protests were being made in various meetings, but to crystallize actions it takes time for planning and organization.

Q. Which politicians are independently emerging with strong public roots, who could continue the Islamic Republic after Imam Khomeini?

A. This is the question which any movement faces with a charismatic leader. I think there are two points here: the Revolution and Imam. I think that the relation between the two cannot be considered a one-way communication. The depth of the Revolution is such that it should and will overcome these problems. One of the reasons we insisted that the elections

should be held soon was because in an open forum, such as the Parliament individuals with potential will gradually come up and show themselves. And we will gradually go through this transitional phase of the Revolution.

Q. What are the criteria necessary for such individuals?

A. One of the most important criteria is communication with the masses.

Q. What about a person's links with the Imam?

A. Connection with the Imam brings only legitimacy, not popularity. Both are criteria: legitimacy and people's acceptance or popularity. There were many Marja' before the Imam but they did not have that popularity, only the legitimacy. If I have association with the Imam I have legitimacy, but I must communicate with the people on my own terms.

Q. This does not seem to have been a criterion for the members of the Revolutionary Council since their identity was kept secret for so long.

A. The members of the Revolutionary Council were in direct contact with the people but not as members of the Revolutionary Council.

Q. But people did not know who was making the leadership decisions of the country.

A. Yes. But, just as I am not in a leadership position now, do you think I should sit home and do nothing? No, the art of communication with the people does not come through one's title.

Q. Your trip to Tabriz and the provinces does imply that you plan to run in the upcoming elections?

A. I do not reject any such idea. However, my aim is not to run for any office. The people of Tabriz and Urumieh have been asking me for months to go, but because of engagements I could not go earlier. The first chance I had to go I went and it happened to be at the same time as these things happened and I got involved in them. So running after a position is one thing and accepting a position is another. It is a very delicate question because when my goal is to be president, for example, then I evaluate everything in that light and that I don't like, because I may do something to get to that point and that may hurt the country.

This is because I may have to say something to please people while I know that it is not correct.

Q. Why you were not seated on the Revolutionary Council after the fall of the Bazargan government?

A. Well, I resigned from all my official positions.

Q. Were you officially asked to be on the Revolutionary Council?

A. The Imam has told me a few times I have to accept the position. But until now I haven't done so.

Q. The word non-alignment has not been used since you left office. Why?

A. I don't know why there is no mention of the non-aligned movement. It must be that they are completely preoccupied with events in the American embassy and the shah's extradition.

19. Coup D'état in Turkey (Part 1)

Analysis by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, September 15, 1980

Once again the military have taken hold of power. At dawn on Friday, the Turkish Army set to work and after dissolving Parliament took control of all power. Martial law was proclaimed throughout Turkey and all freedoms were ended. The coup d'état in Turkey could be foreseen. People following Turkish affairs could see from some time back that events were going to take place there, especially after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The coup in Turkey is a movement against the revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore it should be followed closely. This coup was the last possible answer given by the Americans to the political, social, cultural and economic crises existing in Turkey. It is the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. Turkey suffers from chronic illnesses the roots of which are to be searched for in the past. These illnesses have made Turkey ailing for the last 50 to 60 years and which are the causes of the present crises.

Exploitation in Turkey especially in the field of cultural domination (which has alienated the Turkish from their own culture) has deep roots in that country. In the beginning of the twentieth century European exploiters, at the head of which were the British tried out many things in order to increase their interests

in that country. One of the things they did was the proliferation of nationalistic movements such as Pan-Turkish, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Kurdish and Pan-Aryanism. These movements had the effect of throwing Islamic nations (which more than other times needed unity and cohesion) at each other's throats. Chauvinistic tendencies among the Islamic countries, destroyed their unity and cooperation.

In Turkey the Pan-Turkish movement (the superiority of the Turkish race), headed by Kemal Ataturk separated the Turks from other Muslims. Not merely being satisfied with this, they denied that the Turks were "Asians" and made a claim that the Turks are really European. Pan-Turkism claimed that to be Asian is to be defective. They claimed that civilization is only to be found in Europe and the Turks (who are superior) are not Asian but European.

In Iran, Taghizadeh used to say that in order to survive we must become European "from head to toe". In Turkey Kemal Ataturk and the Pan-Turkish movement tried to Europeanize the life and thought of the people. But this "Europeanization" thesis was in reality a movement to turn people away from Islam. Turks were and still are deeply religious. The Turkish for long have been guardians of Islam. The Europeans have many times been defeated by the Turks, and this for Europeans who considered themselves superior was unbearable and thus a plan had to be made to put the Turks in their place. The only way to do this was to Europeanize the Turks. In another word to deprive Turkish people from Islam which was their moving force. The acceptance of the Turks being European was the beginning for the Europeanization of the Turks and of the uprooting of Islam in Turkey.

It was in relation with these thoughts that the script was forcefully changed. Religion and government were separated from each other. Religion was put down by all force in Turkey. Learning with the Turkish script became illegal. All books were changed and only that which was required to turn the people away from Islam and to Europeanize them was written. In this way Turkish youth were cut off from their rich cultural heritage. But Islam in Turkey never died; after a period of decline, it turned into a new force in Turkey. The support shown by young Turkish people to true Islam is a source of wonder to Western observers.

After the Second World War, the powerful and fresh American Imperialism established treaty organizations throughout the world in order to serve its purposes. In Europe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established. The rulers of Turkey, who were still trying to Europeanize the Turks, accepted membership of this treaty. Membership of Turkey made the Americans the dominating power in Turkish affairs especially in the army, which became dependent on America.

The domination of America over Turkey confronted that country with new crises, such as the exacerbating of the cultural crisis in Turkey. The economic crisis in Turkey became a cancerous illness in which the American aid did little to alleviate it.

With the coming to power of Kennedy, the strategy of America in relation the short term and long term dangers altered. In 1960 and 1961 we witnessed some of these changes in Iran. In Turkey, too, new plans were mobilized in which they were confronted with "an explosion" of the masses, such as the large scale demonstrations which ended in the death of Adnan Menderes. The Americans were hoping by opening safety valves in Turkey to alleviate the dangers of a political explosion and to cure the economic ills. Therefore an era in Turkish political life was started. This era was accompanied by economic growth, political awareness of the people, the beginning of political movements and especially the growth of the new Islamic movements.

After these changes in Turkey, the people who had become tired of the empty European culture and had striven to understand their own genuine culture started a new movement. In this new movement, the powerful Muslim clergy said one AP wire service report from Ankara.

However the coup follows closely a demonstration of 40,000 Turkish Muslims on Sept. 8 during which they carried placards reading "We want a classless Islamic state", "We are ready for Jihad (Holy War)", and "The Qur'an is our Constitution". Previous to the demonstration the Parliament's Muslim National Salvation Party (NSP), by a vote of "no confidence" ousted the government's Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen for failing to follow a more Muslim policy. Muslim diplomats at a recent rally in Konya, Central Turkey, insulted the national anthem and demanded instead Islamic prayers.

Islamic movements in particular have been fueled by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Necmettin Erbakan, the National Salvation party leader, cites Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a model leader. Erbakan has been placed under military custody by the perpetrators of the coup.

The U.S. State Department in one of its reports noted that the military, in its first announcement of the takeover took pains to assure all of Turkey's treaty partners, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that it will stand by all its international commitments.

News of the coup d'état was received with a measure of relief at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters here, stated a report from Brussels. It went on to say that previous military coups in Turkey had always been succeeded by a return to constitutional government. NATO sources said the risk of massive economic aid poured into the country by the Western allies falling into the wrong hands had been causing concern here. Turkey receives western cash aid on a scale unprecedented in recent years, amounting to more than six billion dollars, including some two billion dollars of aid postponed.

A New York Times editorial said that "the American stake in Ankara can hardly be minimized. Not only is Turkey a buffer between Europe and the Middle East, it is NATO's southeastern sentinel, sharing a frontier with the Soviet Union and facing Iran. Washington's interests go well beyond the restoration of Turkish democracy and the convalescence of a sick Turkish economy. On March 29, Turkey and the United States signed a defense cooperation agreement that entitles the U.S. Army to use Turkish military bases. The importance of these bases, which number 26, one at the Black Sea port of Sinopec and another in the south central town of Incirlik, has increased since the Iranian revolution forced the evacuation of two radar stations in that country. London's Daily Telegraph predictably opined that the coup in Turkey was an "enormous relief".

Turkey comprises the major military force on the east flank of NATO and its control over naval, air, and overland access to the Middle East and Africa is unmatched even by Iran. Turkey borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and U.S.S.R.

20. Coup D'état in Turkey (Part 2)

Analysis by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, September 16, 1980

In the last (yesterday's) article it was said that Turkey is facing a chronic crisis in various dimensions, with deep roots, stemming from the long years of exploitation. The growth and extension of these crises on the one hand and the revolutionary political and cultural development of the Turkish people on the other, (especially the Islamic movement and the effects of the Iranian revolution on them) faced America with immediate dangers to its interests in Turkey and in the region which it could not ignore and the events in Turkey, therefore, could be foreseen. The coup d'état in Turkey, directed by the Americans, was American's answer to the state of affairs prevailing there. Now we must review the situation.

The Iranian revolution affected Turkey in various ways, one series of which is in political and ideological arena. Turkish society is in search of its true identity. Long years of exploitation has turned the Turkish people – or at least the city dwellers – away from their true culture so much so that they are neither Turk nor European, but rather they exist in a cultural limbo.

Exploitation of the Turks was so successful that for a long time these groups of Turks really believed that they are not Asian but European and therefore they must think, live and behave in a European way. For them Mustafa Kemal was really the "Father" of the Turks, a genius and savior of the Turks. But gradually in the last twenty years the Turkish people have realized they have been tricked and are beginning to search for their true identity. The Iranian revolution has had a most dramatic effect on the political and cultural development of the Turkish people and they have shown a greater sensitivity than maybe the Arabs. There are various reasons for this, part of its going back to historical events. One of them is breaking off the historical connections of the Turkish people, who are Sunnites, from Arab Sunnis. They never had the contact, which other Sunnites had, with centers of Sunnite learning such as Al-Azhar. The isolation of the Turks in the Islamic world has special reasons.

Firstly, the nationalistic awakening in the region brought about the first political-military encounter with the Arabs. This encounter

left deep psychological and political effects on these two nations belonging to the Islamic ummat.

Secondly, the European orientated culture of the Turks resulted in the Turks following the west. This left them entirely in the American camp. This can be clearly seen in relation to the occupation of Palestine by the Zionists. Israel has had very close relations with the Turkish government. The Turkish government in the last 40 years has always maintained a position of support for the Israelis and has been counter to the Arabs. This policy has isolated Turkey in the Islamic and Arab world.

Thirdly, the policy of separating religion from government and their secularization policy resulted in them not being able to achieve close relations even with Arab government's dependant on America, or even to take part in the Islamic Conference set up by America to counter Nasser's influence.

Fourthly, the extensive and continuous propaganda of the Pan-Turkish Movement that Turks are not Asian, are European, and secular has lessened Turkish religious identity, especially among the intellectual and educated.

These problems have caused the Turkish common people to welcome the Islamic revolution. Another point is that in the last 20 years many events such as its membership of NATO have undermined Turkey's cooperation with the west. Of course the Turks were a member of CENTO but after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, in Iran (while I was the Foreign Minister) the Iranian Government decided to end its membership of CENTO. Iran leaving CENTO was the cause of its dissolution, and its dissolution left political marks in Turkey. These effects, added to their experiences of their membership caused people to again review their membership of this treaty; especially the problems associated with Cyprus were a very important issue.

The Turks have for many years been a member of NATO. It was through this treaty that the army, economics, and life of the country became dependant on America. Turks tolerated a large budget for many years for membership of this treaty... it was in relation with their membership that the Turks sent their troops to the Korean War. It was through this membership that for the past years they have supported Israel and have caused the enmity of the

Arabs. It was because of this treaty that Turkey gave permission to America to build bases against U.S.S.R. on its territory. But in spite of all this, during the Cyprus War, America and all its NATO allies withheld their support of Turkey and supported Greece. The unfriendly position that America adopted in the Cypriot issue was intolerable for the Turks and produced a deep reaction. The American government and the other European countries had no good reason for supporting Greece against Turkey in the Cypriot issue except for the fact that Greece was a Christian country and Turkey a Moslem country.

They showed that in the final analysis they will never support the Moslem people. Not only did Turkey's allies leave her unsupported but in international gatherings they even adopted a hostile attitude. The Cypriot problem, therefore, left in the balance the continued future membership of Turkey in NATO. The price of the Turkish people who had been hurt and thus the cancellation of its membership in the treaty had become a political need.

The defeat of the Americans in Iran and the victory of the Iranian revolution produced this political atmosphere. This was unacceptable to America.

Two other problems aggravated the relations between America and Turkey. They are as follows: First, the increase in relations between Turkey and Iran after the revolution and, secondly, the closing of American bases in Iran and its affects in the SALT 2 negotiations between Russia and America and the necessity for an increase in American presence in Turkey.

The fact is that Turkey was confronted with a great economic crisis. Therefore, after the revolution the needs of both countries were the cause of economic foodstuffs. In the shah's time, lack of food was compensated by purchases from America. At that time Iran used to purchase two thousand million dollars of foodstuffs per year from America. After the victory of the Iranian revolution these requirements had to be obtained from other sources and one of these countries was Turkey, economic dealings which were profitable. On the other hand, since the start of the economic crisis, the Turks had a great need for oil. Lack of oil in Turkey has produced, especially in rural village, political crises. The monetary crisis in Turkey left them unable to pay their energy bill. In such

prevailing conditions economic cooperation was profitable to both countries.

In addition to this, Turkish roads connect Europe to Iran. Everyday thousands of lorries and other transport bring Iranian imports from Eastern & Western Europe to the Iranian frontier. In the months of the revolution, due to the closure of the frontier, thousands of lorries were waiting to unload at the bazargan (economic) frontier. For the Iranian government, the opening of the frontiers, without any strings attached, was very important.

21. Coup D'état in Turkey (Part 3)

Analysis by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, September 22, 1980

In the last two articles it was said that the crises in Turkey stem from 50 - 60 years of cultural and economic exploitation which has caused an identity crisis in Turkey, in addition to which dependency on America and the cost of membership in NATO have brought a great burden on her economy. These two factors have brought about a political crisis. The Islamic Revolution, with its anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist posture, has exacerbated the crises in Turkey. Thus, America's answer was to create a coup in Turkey.

We have repeatedly said that the Islamic Revolution has disturbed the political balance in the world. This is not a mere slogan. One of the most important problems in Russo-American relations is the arms race. After the Second World War, both America and Russia embarked on an arms race. The life and the existence of both countries depends on this, because if one or the other of the countries fails either due to economic or technological reason to edge ahead, this will bring on its decline. But this race has disturbed the economics of both countries and thus they, on the pretext of world peace, have embarked on a reduction in the arms race. The negotiation connected with this reduction is known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). SALT II was able to reach some agreement.

However, the Iranian Revolution has destroyed the basis on which SALT II was made. Why? What relations exist between SALT II and the Iranian Revolution? What is the relation between these two questions and the coup in Turkey?

It is true that an agreement on arms reduction was signed, but what guarantee do the two parties have that the agreement will be carried out, if there is no way of controlling each other's activities?

In order to make sure that the agreement is being carried out America has embarked on building bases around the world in order to monitor Russian activities. America controls all activities related to production and experimentation of strategic weapons in Russia.

One of these monitoring stations was the Kabkan base in Iran in North Khorassan which was controlled directly by American specialists.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution and the consequent evacuation of this base have confronted Carter and the American administration with a dilemma, since Congress refuses to ratify this agreement as it has no guarantees that it will be carried out. This was a blow to Carter's election hopes.

After unsuccessful attempts to gain the provisional government's approval for restarting this base, America's attention turned towards Turkey. But it was faced, as far as we know, with a refusal due to anti-American feelings aroused because of the Cyprus issue and the need for political calm and a desire to cooperate with Iran.

This refusal of Turkey threw the future of SALT II into the balance. If SALT II fails there will be a great defeat for Carter and the American government cannot tolerate this. Thus, an end to this dilemma could only be produced by causing a coup in Turkey. The announcements of the coup leaders have left no doubt in anybody's mind about their determination to continue their cooperation with NATO and to follow Ataturk's Europeanization policy. This is the first shot in the war against the Islamic movement in Turkey.

Also, the coup in Turkey can be seen in relation with the other events in the Middle East. SALT II is beneficial to both America and Russia and the only way left for America to gain control of the bases in Turkey is by producing a coup d'état. Does this not indicate an agreement between the Russians and the Americans? Furthermore does this not indicate an agreement between the two countries to leave each other's hands open in Turkey and Afghanistan?

And in relation to Iraq's hostile policy towards Iran, the coup in Turkey could be the preparation of the way to create war on the Western borders of Iran.

Considering the above mentioned points, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must follow the events in Turkey very carefully.

It is still too early to determine the reaction of the Turkish people to the coup. But what is important is that this is the first test of the young Islamic movement in Turkey and whatever the outcome they will become all the more experienced and continue their way on more sure footing. Let our brothers in Turkey know that the Iranian nation will support them in their Jihad.

22. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion in Perspective (Part I)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 4, 1980

In recent Iraqi attacks, Russian MIGs and American Phantoms belonging to the Iraqi Ba'ath regime have attacked various centers in the west of Iran with their rockets, leaving some casualties and returning to their bases. Thus the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iraqi Ba'ath regime has entered into a new phase in which war efforts and politico-psychological warfare have escalated.

Why has the Ba'ath regime found itself forced to do such a thing?

The Iraqi Ba'ath regime, from the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, started quarreling with and making war on the Islamic Revolution. The enmity of Saddam Hussein's regime with the Islamic Revolution has deep roots in past history and has various and diverse reasons. Part goes back to the nature of Ba'athist ideology and part to the nature of the Islamic Revolution and the effects it has produced everywhere including Iraq.

The Iraqi Ba'ath party is a deviationist one. They possess a way of thinking which is the product of a period of cultural, economic and political exploitation of the Arabs by Western countries. In the cultural exploitative period, the West, in order to de-Islamize the native Islamic culture gave direction to and encouraged various Western thoughts in the region. Maybe one can with certainty say

that the founders of the Communist parties in the Arab region were mainly non-Muslims. Pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism, tribalism and nationalistic tendencies among the Arabs grew in this period and took the shape and form of a political phenomenon in the region.

The Ba'ath ideology stems from Marxism and Arab nationalism and works in the direction of the refection of Islamic thinking. The foundations of Ba'ath ideology were laid by a non-Muslim named Michel Aflaq.

Such thoughts in the Arab world are in constant and unavoidable war with any genuine Islamic thinking. There is no doubt that the growth of genuine Islamic thinking among the masses of the world, be they Arab or non-Arab, in the East or West, will automatically have the effect of curbing deviationist ideologies or doubtful religious sects. Therefore, it is natural that currents such as marxism, nationalism, Ba'athism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Kurdism, Pan-Iranism, and any other deviationist ideologies are constantly at war with genuine Islamic thinking and have tried with all their force to prevent the victory and of the forward movement of Islamic thinking. This is one root of the Iraqi-Iran war. But the Iraqi regime, because of its Ba'athist nature, is in close contact with the superpowers. It receives both military and economic aid from the U.S.S.R. and obtains patronizing help from America and Britain. It has both Russian MIGs and American Phantoms and also the newest British tanks.

Iraq has increased her oil production to the maximum and sells her oil to all customers regardless of ideology and nature. She buys the latest weaponry from the West and East with her oil revenues. Saddam claims that oil must be sold as quickly as possible and with its revenues arms bought to fight Israel. But all know that this is a deviationist thesis. It is the thesis of the Zionists and American militarists and their collaborators and by it, they want to get oil and in lieu of it to procure arms. But the purchase of arms needs an excuse. What is that excuse? The excuse for buying arms is to fight Israel. It can be seen that even the Fahd regime in Saudi Arabia on the one hand spends billions of dollars on buying arms and on the other, makes the proposal for making a new front against Israel. Who can doubt about the true nature of the Fahd regime. It is clear

that Saudi Arabia uses as a cover the "protection of Islamic holy places" and Iraq uses another cover.

But all Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians know that these excuses are invalid. Western countries, be it Russia or American or European government, never sell arms to a country which is going to use it against the Zionist regime of Israel. We have never heard of Iraqi MIGs being used in an attack against Israel centers, but we heard and saw these MIGs and Phantoms bombing centers in the Islamic Republic of Iran and border areas in Syria and Kuwait. We heard of their fight with the Palestinians, with the Shiite Muslims in South Lebanon and the Amal Organization. But we never saw or heard of an Iraqi attack on the Zionists. This is no accident. This stems from the true nature of the Ba'ath regime and of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, such a regime cannot tolerate the existence of the Islamic Republic as her neighbor. It is not without reason that from the very coming into existence of the Islamic Republic the Ba'ath Saddam regime has opposed it.

But it should not be imagined that the enmity of the Ba'athist Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein is solely because of the ideological nature of the Ba'ath Party and the political system in Iraq. No it is not. The nature and ideology of the Iraqi regime has come to be at the service of international imperialism. Iraq is the executor of American and Zionist plans against the Islamic Republic. The actions of the Iraqi regime, since the starting of the Islamic Revolution which resulted in the move by the Imam from Najaf to Paris, has been in the service of the policies of the United States aimed at the Islamic Republic of Iran.

What have the actions of Iraq against the Iranian revolution been so far, which by air attacks entered into a new phase and what is their nature; what aims are they pursuing; what have the Islamic Republic's reactions been to these actions; what aims is Iraq pursuing in air attacks, and how must we counter Iraqi plots? Why are we convinced that the joint Iraqi, Israeli, and American policy against the Islamic Republic is doomed to failure?

23. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 2)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 5, 1980

As was pointed out in the previous commentary the Ba'ath regime of Iraq could not tolerate the Islamic Republic of Iran in its vicinity; and it was further explained that the Iraqi Ba'athist regime is, by its very nature, anti-Islamic and a puppet of world-wide imperialism and Zionism.

The Ba'ath party led by Hassan al-Bakr toppled Abdulrahman Aref's regime in a bloodless coup and seized power in 1968, just a year after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Aref's regime had very close relations with Nasser's government. Both rulers, Aref and Nasser, endeavored to establish some kind of unity between the two countries. The cooperation between an independent Iraqi state and Nasser in Egypt was vitally important for holding political control over the region. Cairo and Baghdad are in fact, politically, ideologically and economically the principal backbone of the Arab world. Naturally, imperialist and colonizing powers could not stand close ties between the two countries. During the 1967 War Iraqi Armed Forces joined Arab forces against Israel and were deployed on the western borders of Jordan. The Iraqi troops in Jordan did not only threaten the Zionist occupier regime, but were also intolerable for King Hussein of Jordan. The concentration of Palestinian fighters in Jordan, the outbreak of guerrilla warfare against the enemy's occupying army and the attrition battles fought alongside the Iraqi army in Jordan were intolerable for the reactionary Arab regimes and Zionists.

It is easy to understand why imperialism and Zionism have been worrying so much about the affairs in this area, taking into consideration the heroic actions of the Palestinian freedom-fighters in Kerameh Valley which inflicted heavy blows on the Zionist enemy, an incident that was later known as "Asad's great heroic event". Of course it is natural on their part to try to thwart any actual or potential hazards on the side of Palestinians and Iraqis.

Though Egypt and Syria had suffered a severe military and mental blow in the 1967 War and were busy restoring war damages, the Iraqi forces had remained intact and were able to launch military maneuvers. It was not more than about one year after 1967 war that the Ba'ath party came into the picture.

Hassan al-Bakr seized power following a "peaceful coup" on June 17, 1968. The Iraqi regime, since then, fell under the control

of imperialism and Zionism. The Iraq policy, from 1968 on, has been constantly directed towards the interests of the enemies of Islam and the Arab people. The Kurds issue, for example, which had either been solved or was about to be solved, was restarted by Hassan al-Bakr. He severely attacked the Kurds. The fight with Kurds certainly served to divert people's attention from the Israeli war front. It also intensified the contradictions between the army and the people. Upon the Ba'ath regime's rise to power and the augmentation of frictions, serious conflicts ensued. A large scale purge campaign was launched throughout the country and many worthy resistant citizens were kept away from the public scene. Among the factors contributing to divert the public view from the real battle scenes in the occupied territories, was the Iran-Iraq battle during the shah's reign, the blaze of Kurdish battle in the north of Iraq following **The Ramdan War** between Egypt and Israel, and Israel's attacks on the south of Lebanon and the eruption of war with Lebanon. This distraction gave the Americans the chance to help **William Rogers** succeed in preparing the groundwork for reconciliation between Sadat and Israel. The **Saddam Hussein-shah** accord in **Algeria** is an important point to review. This point is directly related to fundamental issues in Iran and Iraq, such as the rapid growth of the Islamic movement in Iraq and the overwhelming weakness of the Iraqi Army which posed an explosive eminent danger within Iraq.

Following this accord and the subsiding of the Kurdish resistance in southern Iraq, the Ba'ath regime had spare time to look after its domestic problems. The Iraqi Ba'ath regime, ridding itself of the Kurdish movement which left thousands of Kurds dead or wandering, tried to win back the hearts of Kurds. The reason for such a stand towards the Kurds stemmed from the fact that the Shiites Islamic movement had reached a stage which could no longer be ignored by the government of Iraq. It was immediately after this accord that the Ba'athists mobilized all their forces to repress the Muslims. Suppressing any traces of Islamic movement, mass executions and torture much more cruel than those of SAVAK, became common practice.

In those days, I used to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Shrines once a year in order to visit Imam and to receive the necessary directives. In the meantime, I contacted my struggling Iraqi

brothers, most of whom I knew for years, and reflected their fighting achievements abroad. The most ferocious confrontation between the Ba'athists and the Shi'ites occurred on Ashura (10th of Muharram, the first month of lunar year) in 1967 or 1977. On this day the deprived people of Iraq living in Kufeh area and the neighboring tribes customarily gather in Kufeh, and then march barefooted towards Kufeh, while singing mournful songs in chorus. This practice has been a tradition for years. The Ba'athists raid on the Seyedoshohada (Shiites third Imam, Imam Hussein) pilgrims was much more atrocious than that of the massacre on 15 Khordad (5 June 1963) in Iran. To give a detailed account of the raid would require elaborations far greater than what this commentary could accommodate. The readers are therefore referred to read about those incidents in order to realize the extent of the Ba'athists hostility toward Islam and the brutality of Saddam Hussein. It must be pointed out that the Iraqi government did not force our beloved Imam to quit Iraq merely for the sake of the Shah and SAVAK. Saddam Hussein's fear of the Imam's presence in Iraq and its impact on the genuine Islamic movement in Iraq was a determining factor.

24. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 3)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 6, 1980

In the previous editorial, after a brief history of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, attention was called to Saddam Hussein's fear of the Imam's presence in Iraq as being a factor for his expulsion from Iraq.

Not only did the Iraqi regime serve the interests of imperialism and Zionism, but it even employed "Israeli-type" methods.

It is known that the forces occupying Palestine territory following the 1967 War gathered all the shelterless and unarmed Palestinians, men and woman, old and young, in the occupied territory on the west of Jordan River, and relentlessly released them at the gates in **Allenby bridge** towards the east bank of the **Jordan River** in Jordan. Saddam Hussein did exactly the same thing to the ones he expelled from Iraq. He brought thousands of men and women, young and old, healthy and sick, to the Iranian borders and stranded them without providing any facilities. The

Iraqi Air Force in its raid on Iran's airports last month used exactly the "Israeli-type" method. Saddam in fact mimicked **Moshe Dayan's** course of action without taking note of the qualitative and quantitative distinctions between his army and that of Israel. He even failed to note that after the Islamic Revolution, Iran was different from Egypt and that numerous obvious quantitative and qualitative differences existed between the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and those of Egypt. Saddam Hussein in fact is not able to realize what has happened in Iran; neither does he understand what the Islamic Revolution means. His strategy, however, is merely mimicry of Israeli tactics.

The Ba'athists were much more alarmed by the successful realization of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Iraqi Muslims, in general, and the Shiites in particular, were highly affected by the Islamic Revolution. Iraq's population is composed of 60% Shiites, 20% Kurds and Sunni Arabs who account for the remainder. The Ba'ath popularity among any of these religious or ethnic groups is not only very low, but strong resentment runs high. The Kurds have long been fighting with the Ba'ath regime; the Shiites have been growing more and more united and organized against them. The overwhelming majority of the minor Sunni Arab groups are adverse to Ba'ath party's ideology and practice. The Ba'ath party, on one hand, enjoys no popular support; on the other, the party is not an internally solid one. There are major discords within the party itself. First, the Iraqi Ba'ath party split from the Syrian Ba'ath party and then started to fight against Syria. There are dissenting groups within the Iraqi Ba'ath party. The pro-Syrian Ba'ath party is bitterly opposed to Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein, in an effort to consolidate his hegemony, has eliminated his adversaries in the party one after the other. Saddam's egoistic attitude has driven him into complete isolation; a fate to be experienced by all egoists. The Ba'ath party, like all other self-centered interest groups which use their own party as a touchstone to tell right from wrong, views itself as the sole guardian of Iraq's revolution. The Ba'athists label all other parties and groups as being deviant, compromising, liberal, or having packaged ideology. They consider only their own party as genuine, infallible, truthful and revolutionary, and reject all others. The Ba'athists think of themselves as the custodians, as well as the irrevocable and plenipotentiary attorneys of the nation.

Such a prevailing attitude in the Ba'ath party has induced each group within the party to consider itself as its pivot and to evaluate others accordingly. Following this trend, Saddam Hussein has proceeded to such extremities, as to wipe out his entire dissidents one after the other. He ruthlessly slew his closest comrades, those who had long been fighting side by side with him. Saddam is even said to have "cried" over the death of the friends he killed. But all these events within the Ba'ath party were not merely attributable to power plays; they were in fact directed towards confrontation with Iran, as well as the implementation of new schemes in the region. Therefore, it was necessary for the party's central administration to regain thorough internal cohesiveness. It was not, thus, more than a few months after the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution that Saddam Hussein threw Hassan al-Bakr aside and, seized absolute power in order to carry out the imperialist and Zionist schemes against Iran and the region.

The Americans, following the fall of the shah's regime in Iran, designated three countries to perform the functions formerly handled by the shah's regime. These three countries were Iraq, Egypt and Morocco. Iraq was instructed to play the shah's role in the Persian Gulf. Later, more details will be given on Iraq's role which is directly linked to Iran-Iraq relations and the on-going crisis. Egypt was assigned to serve as a base for CIA and MOSSD operations. Also a number of high SAVAK officials are presently in Egypt. Egypt is currently used as a center for the U.S. large-scale activities in the Middle East Arab region and Africa. Morocco undertook to perform the tasks previously done by the shah in certain African countries. Now several questions arise as to what the Iraqi Ba'ath regime has been doing since the victory of the revolution in Iran. What relationship did the Ba'ath regime have with the provisional government? What was our foreign policy at the time? What did we do and how far did we succeed? What policy changes occurred following the resignation of the provisional government? How were the issues in the west of Iran related to Iraq's policy and in what way were they linked to U.S. imperialism and Zionism and what is the position now? Why did Iraq's overt and direct military operations against Iran escalate subsequent to the failure of the U.S. rescue operations in Tabas? Why do we say that Iraq's military invasion against Iran is the

continuation of U.S. aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran? We must try to find logical, convincing and factual answers to these as well as other similar questions. Hopefully, I will discuss these issues in my future commentaries.

25. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 4)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 7, 1980

In previous articles, it was pointed out what the nature of the Ba'ath regime is and why and how this regime has come to be in the service of American imperialism and Zionism. We showed that the Ba'ath Party's coup d'état in 1968 was basically to serve Zionism and America. In addition, the coup d'état of Saddam Hussein against Hassan al-Bakr, at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, was analyzed in terms of Ba'athists plots against the Islamic Republic. Now we must analyze the reaction of the Ba'ath regime after the victory of the Islamic Republic. We must also look at the Iraqi reaction in the face of the struggle of the Islamic Republic with internal suppression and foreign exploitation. Iraq claims to be revolutionary, and the Ba'athist party claims to be anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist, anti-American and anti-reactionary. But what behavior have they shown to the Islamic Republic after the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty and the pathetic defeat of the Americans and Zionists in Iran? If they are truthful and are really struggling against American Imperialism and the aggressor Zionists, and are not in league with other reactionary Arab governments, then they should have naturally been happy with the Islamic Revolution, welcomed it and tried to help it. But they neither made any claims and certainty in practice did they make any effort to help the Revolution.

From the start of the Islamic Revolution, Iraq opposed the Revolution with all force. Iraq plotted on four fronts against Iran.

The first front consisted in causing disturbances in Kurdistan and the Kurdish frontier region. The second front consisted in causing trouble in Khuzestan and the third front consisted in anti-Iran propaganda in Arab mass-media. The fourth front consisted in propaganda against Iran in the Arab world and partaking in plots by imperialistic and reactionary circles and cooperating with counter-revolutionary elements who had fled from Iran.

The first front was to cause troubles in the Western frontier regions. The Iraqi government, by cooperation with mercenaries such as Palizban, started to provoke the nomads living in that region against the Islamic Republic. They supported the worst enemies of the newly created Islamic Republic; they had cooperated with counter-Revolutionary groups in Kurdistan and even provided shelter and support within Iraqi territory for them. In order to be able to have a free hand in suppressing the Islamic movement in Iraq, they befriended the Kurds within their own territory. The support Iraq showed for deviationist and counter-revolutionary groups in Kurdistan was an attempt by Saddam to use them.

The lure shown by nomads for the preservation of their native culture is neither unnatural nor new. The insistence by nomads to be "masters of their own destinies" is also desirable and acceptable, but history shows that the "Pan-Kurdish" movement and Kurdish nationalism has been, from the beginning of the twentieth century, repeatedly misused by imperialists, without any benefit for the Kurds themselves. An analysis of the history of Kurdish Nationalism is outside the scope of this article, but I will briefly mention some points in order to show that, as in the past, these tendencies are being misused by imperialists. At the beginning of the twentieth century, British imperialism, in order to destroy the Ottoman Empire which they greatly feared, supported nationalistic tendencies among the Kurds aimed at separating the Kurds and the Turks. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the Kurdish problem was forgotten. Again at the end of the Second World War, when the allies occupied Iran, the Russians supported independence in Azerbaijan and in the North and West of Kurdistan. For instance, the Mahabad Republic was set up. But as soon as the oil agreement between Gavam-ul-Saltaneh and the Russians was signed (Sachiko was the signatory) and the Russians withdrew their army from Iran and their support could not reach the Kurds, the Mahabad Republic collapsed and the shah's army began harassing the Kurds. The third time that misuse of the Kurds took place was at the time of the deposed shah. This time, the CIA and Zionists provoked the Kurds to fight the central Iraqi government, hoping to set up an independent Kurdish republic. With the meeting of the Shah and Saddam in Algiers, again the

Kurdish problem was forgotten. It was then the fourth time that the nationalistic feelings of the Kurds, which are admirable in themselves, were being misused by America and Zionism.

The second front consisted of strengthening counter-revolutionary operations in Khuzestan province. What is the nature of these groups? What are their roots?

The roots of these movements go back to the time of Nasser. Nasser first fought with the shah. The shah had established relations with Occupied Palestine and was selling her oil, and thus Nasser wanted by any means possible to overthrow the shah. For this purpose, a group of Iranians living in Khuzestan were assembled and organized, so as to produce a political headache for the shah in Khuzestan. This group called a large territory from Khuzestan to Fars "Arabistan" and "considered it" part of the Arab nation. Following in the steps of Egypt, Syria also adapted this policy and extended it. They made a point of it in their school texts. Not only did they name the Persian Gulf the Arabian Gulf, but they called Khuzestan "Arabistan". At a time when we, accompanied by other compatriots, were in Egypt we brought this subject up with Nasser and suggested that this was not the correct way to counter the shah. In line with Nasser and Syria's policy, Iraq also entered into the issue. Later, Libya joined them. These groups, under the banner of "Al-Ahwaz" or "Arabistan", opened offices in various Arab capitals and socialist countries.

At the "Arabic Umma" Congress, which was held in Libya eight to nine months before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, certain people representing these groups took part. After the collapse of the shah's regime and the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Syria and Libya withdrew their support from these groups, but Iraq maintained and furthered her support for these groups. And in the name of these groups, it sent its own people to Iran for sabotage purposes. In this case, we have documents which we have published.

What goals did the Iraqis have in Khuzestan and Kurdistan and what benefits did they gain from these goals? **(To be continued)**

26. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 5)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 8, 1980

The Zionists and their American friends have a plan for the region known as the Lewis Plan. According to this plan, the geopolitical map of the region must be changed; A Kurdish government, an Arab government in Khuzestan, a Baluchi government in Baluchistan, a Turkish government in Azerbaijan, an Armenian government in Turkey... The Zionists are especially insistent on the Kurdish government since an independent government in the region would support the Zionist government. The efforts of Saddam to put into operation these plans, as seen by their actions in Kurdistan and Khuzestan, are an indicator of their support of Zionists. If in the shah's time there were certain reasons that we have not the space in which to discuss, which prevented operation of this plan, now after the victory of the Islamic Revolution they think they have every reason to put it into operation, and Iraq is the executor of this plan.

The third front consisted of creating rumors, lies and direct attacks on the Islamic Republic in the mass-media of Iraq and other Arabic countries. In this program, they set about slandering the Islamic Republic and its leader. Of course this was no surprise to us. We have said before in previous articles what affects the Islamic Revolution has had on Iraq and its Muslim people, and why Saddam is afraid of the Islamic Republic.

The fourth front, which is also very important, is the adoption of the role of policeman in the Persian Gulf by Iraq, also becoming a spokesman for the neighboring Sheikdoms. The Ba'ath regime claims that any Arab problem is also its problem, and for this reason it has laid claim to the three islands at the head of the Strait of Hormuz. These islands have no connection whatsoever with Iraq, and if these islands had any problems at all, they would be related to the Arab Emirates and Sharjah, but by bringing up the issue about the three islands, Iraq wants to show that it is a "defender" of Arab interests in the region.

The problems that were discussed here are the fronts adopted by Iraq in its aggressive policy towards the Islamic Republic. Of course, Iraq has brought up the problem of the 1975 treaty signed by Saddam and the shah. It did so a few days after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Iraq did not want to abrogate this treaty. But in its recent attack, it chose to use it as an excuse. In the past, it has always desired to confirm this treaty with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

What was the policy of the provisional government of Iran and Iraq's reaction in the region? Did Iraq have an aggressive policy, or, as critics of Iran's provisional government are apt to say, none. Has Iraq adopted a non-hostile policy?

As we noted earlier, the reason the Ba'ath regime of Iraq has attacked the Islamic Republic of Iran stems from the nature and character of the Ba'ath Party and the regime of Iraq, on one hand, and the essence and quality of the Islamic Revolution of Iran on the other. The existence and perpetuation of the Islamic Revolution and Republic of Iran has never been tolerable for Saddam Hussein and his American and Zionist masters. For this reason he (Saddam) has instigated various conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran since the Islamic Revolution achieved victory. The common plots of Iraq, Zionism, and imperialism against the Islamic Revolution of Iran were launched along four main axes, namely in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, the Persian Gulf, and a propaganda war throughout the West and the Islamic world.

We will examine and analyze these conspiracies next, and review the foreign policy adopted by the provisional (Mehdi Bazargan) government in Iran to counter these conspiracies.

27. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 6)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 9, 1980

The foreign policy of the Provisional Government (of Mehdi Bazargan) was pursued on the following lines after an analysis and careful understanding of the conspiracies by the Saddam regime, Zionism and imperialism against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1. The appointment of an Ambassador who had sufficient knowledge of the situation in Iraq, and who was able to establish necessary, coherent and secret connections with the anti-Saddam Muslim groups inside Iraq. It was imperative for us to perform this task. In previous analyses we pointed out that Saddam's regime did not have the smallest (popular) base among the Iraqi people. Helping the Muslims who are striving to achieve freedom and the independence of Iraq is a duty which we can perform. We know our Iraqi brothers very well and are familiar with their activities.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, these Muslim groups augmented their activities, although the pressure

and suppression by the Iraqi regime had also been intensified even more than before. Nonetheless, this was one part of the operations. The late Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr was the ideological and political leader of these movements.

2. Our government's efforts were to push Iraq into isolation in the Arab region. We adopted an active policy vis-à-vis the Arab countries, while analyzing the situation in these states. We established very close and friendly relations with Algeria and Syria. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was among the first groups invited to Iran. The Provisional Government set up positive and conclusive relations with the PLO. Contrary to the rumors spread by some rather malicious people who brought groundless and futile accusations against our policy and who are still doing so, our foreign policy was quite active, clear, subtle, and decisive. In the Persian Gulf region, by analyzing the circumstances in Kuwait following the trip of the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to Iran and adopting a sound and incontrovertible policy between the two countries, we succeeded in isolating Kuwait from Iraq in relation to Iran and the Persian Gulf.

Such a policy was beneficial and imperative for the two countries of Iran and Kuwait. Following these programs, despite much sabotage, we succeeded in adopting a policy towards various sheikhdoms such as Bahrain, to prevent them from being entangled in Iraq's policies. Iraq, instead, was following the policy whereby it was trying to present itself as the custodian and defender of the sheikhdoms and as the Persian Gulf gendarme. It was trying hard to make the sheikhdoms fear Iran and then to bring them under its protection as being merely their supporter. To carry out this plan, Iraq became a close friend of the most reactionary Arab government, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, North Yemen, and Egypt. Saddam Hussein concluded a bilateral treaty with Saudi Arabia, following which Iraq's ties with North Yemen and Jordan were strengthened, and his relations with South Yemen were cooled down. Why did Iraq and Saudi Arabia reach an accord? Such transitory agreements are reached for certain reasons. As opposition to the occupier regime of Palestine, Iraq should have concentrated its forces on the borders of the occupied lands of Palestine rather than along the Iranian frontiers. The Iraq-Saudi Arabia pact signed shortly after the victory of the Iranian

Revolution was undoubtedly directed against Iran. Nevertheless, our policy in establishing closer ties with Syria, Algeria and Palestine and later with Kuwait, Bahrain, and South Yemen, and finally with Libya (after resolving some problems with this country) was going to fully isolate Iraq. The signs of such isolation were quite evident in the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Cuba and in the 34th Assembly of the United Nations. In these conferences, Iran enjoyed the unanimous support of many Arab and African governments and that of the liberation and revolutionary movements. As a matter of fact, it was this solidarity and harmony of purpose of Iran with Syria, Libya, Algeria, Palestine, South Yemen, and Kuwait in such assemblies that rendered Jordan and some other sheikhdoms of the south Persian Gulf uncertain in approaching Iraq and in establishing closer ties with the Iraqi government.

This feeling of isolation forced Iraq to propose direct and face-to-face negotiations with Iran. Since the two countries maintained diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level and since the two ambassadors were in regular contact with their countries' officials, Iran agreed to Iraq's proposal for direct talks. When these talks were once held with Saddam Hussein and twice with the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Cuba we resolutely announced our stand and declared very clearly that the only way to improve relations between the two countries was that Iraq should stop its aggressions and hostilities towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.

28. Saddam Hussein's Military Invasion (Part 7)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 10, 1980

As explained earlier, we had explicitly stated to Iraq in three meetings that the only way to improve relations between our two countries was for Iraq to stop its hostile behavior towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following our resolute stand, Iraq had become ready to retreat with particular regard to its political isolation due to the pressure imposed on it by Algeria and Libya. In this way destructive activities in Kurdistan and Khuzestan diminished for a short period. Obviously a successful diplomacy should be conducted in conformity with our policies regarding internal problems and politics, but unfortunately we lacked and are

still lacking complementary domestic and foreign policies. This is indeed a great obstacle in successfully implementing any programs in the foreign policy sphere.

3. There were vigorous military confrontations with Iraqi incursion and conspiracies in the west and south of the country; but unfortunately this task was not carried out properly. There were numerous reasons whereby our military and security forces could not, under the specific circumstances of the post revolutionary period, strongly react against the instigating attacks launched by Iraq. Anyone knowing the problems of Iran and the position of the Army and security forces during the post revolutionary period could easily understand the origins of this deficiency. On the other hand, because of the anarchy prevailing within various organs of the country, and due to the lack of sufficient cohesion of the new forces and institutions, we did not succeed in decisively utilizing our Armed Forces to deal with Iraqi aggression in Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iraq, supported by the imperialists and Zionists, was well aware of the situation in Iran. In fact, Iraq was the agent through which imperialism and Zionism were enforcing their plans. Being completely aware of our weak points and shortcomings, they put us under pressure. In order to carry out 'purges', reorganize the military and security forces, and expand revolutionary institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, the country was in need of time. Our diplomacy vis-à-vis Iraq and other Arab countries could have provided Iran with this opportunity. These same programs did succeed in preventing the untimely and wide confrontation of Iran with Iraq. Today we see the extraordinary movement of all these forces. With regard to the internal developments in the army at that time, was it in the internal developments to combat Iraq or any other foreign enemy in the early months following our victory?

4. The carrying out of widespread propaganda in Arabic: Many meetings were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate these plans with the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In these meetings, particularly those on Iraq; which were also attended by the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad the basic policy was studied and adjusted. However, conspiracies and instigations against the provisional government had so intensified that it was impossible to step forward; for this reason, the government had no

alternative but to give up. Thus the said programs were put to a halt.

But now that war has started, we should study our political and military situation inside the country and in the region. We should see what the situation in Iraq is. What consequences will this conflict have?

There is no doubt that we will succeed. Our revolution is a revolution towards God. God has promised us victory. He has said He would help us if we helped him. In the hearts of most of our people there is nothing but love for God and faith in Islam. Many people have welcomed martyrdom in advance. We do not have the least doubt that our nation will achieve success. Nonetheless, despite this faith we can learn through an identical analysis why Iraq will be defeated and why Iran will win the war. The study of these issues will help us to identify the circumstances of this war and its future route. God willing, we will inspect into this in future articles.

29. Topic of the Day: Iran- Iraq War (Part 1)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 12, 1980

The war between Iran and Iraq is a fateful one. War is now raging between the two countries in the airports, sky, mountains and plains. Whatever the outcome and consequences, it is a fateful war. We are not at war against Iraq only; it is not that country that is fighting against Iran. In this war, all satanic forces, world imperialism, Zionism as well as forces of reaction in the region are deployed behind Saddam Hussein. They have closed their ranks, joined forces and resorted to military invasion to exterminate the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Islamic Revolution in Iran and the successful establishment of Islamic Republic has never been palatable for our numerous enemies. It is natural, therefore, that they would resort to an all-embracing invasion. Prior to the victory of Islamic Revolution of Iran, American imperialism and Zionism did their best and exerted a great deal of effort to deviate the revolution. But it was all in vain and the revolution achieved success. From the beginning of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, our enemies have used various means and tricks to prevent the revolution from coming to fruition

and to bring us to standstill. It was stipulated in Brzezinski's famous plan that all forces should be used to bring about failure of the government to be formed under Khomeini after Bakhtiar's collapse. We see, therefore, that various plots, strikes, clashes, instigations and rumor-mongering were initiated throughout the country since the inception of the provisional government. The defeated and wounded imperialism and Zionism, as well as the remnants of the past regime that were unable to achieve their aims by military plots necessarily resorted to a politico-psychological war of attrition. Those who had accepted the heaviest responsibility with the least expectations and the lowest publicity under the harshest, the most sensitive and the most critical days of the history of Iran were subjected to the ugliest and the most cruel accusations, slander and rumors. The main objective of the politico-psychological war was to make the nation despair, dumbfounded, bewildered and indifferent. Unfortunately many internal and friendly forces could not see and discern this perilous game of the enemy and each, for its particular reason, aggravated matters and extended people's confusion. Although this politico-psychological war dealt some blows to the revolution and created difficulties, it could not deviate it from its main course or bring it to the point of stagnation. Despite the war of attrition, the Iranian nation managed to achieve great victories. The constitution was drafted and ratified; the new political order was established with election of the President, the deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, (Majlis) and with the appointment of the Prime Minister. All these testify to the futility of the politico-psychological war of attrition and enemy plots.

On the other hand, together with politico-psychological war America also resorted to economic blockade as a weapon in order to bring Iran to its knees. In a previous article for this occasion, we showed how America was making a futile effort, as the economic blockade was doomed to failure and would not be able to make us succumb.

Inefficiency and the insignificant effect of economic blockade forced the U.S. to devise and implement another plan. The military doctrine in the U.S which regards resorting to force as the immediate and final solution of any problem, led that country to military attack and adventurism in Tabas, but here the U.S. was

even more disgraced than before. It conceded to a more shameful defeat than in Vietnam; suffered a heavier blow to its morale and prestige, hence it was forced to take to its heels and retreat. American defeat in Tabas showed that possession of power is never the same as its use. While in every respect America is militarily capable to get involved in a war against Iran, for various reasons it cannot use all its might against Iran directly to defeats us; it would never be a glory and honor, and it would not gain any prestige in this regard. That is because the war of a superpower equipped with the latest military and economic arms against a nation lacking these elements is not something to be proud of; but what would happen if in such an invasion Iran defeats America? Would any vestige of honor and prestige be left for U.S.? Even now, American prestige and credibility have suffered a severe setback at the world level as the result of the collapse of the shah's regime, which is in effect the collapse and defeat of the U.S. Can you imagine what prestige will be left for America if it attacks Iran and gets defeated, as it certainly will? Then which Emir or Sheikdom will listen to the US any longer? Therefore, America cannot entangle herself in direct, attacks against Iran, and a "third party" must fulfill this mission.

On the other hand, America has been in a pretty dire situation now during the presidential election year. According to traditional strategies prevalent in the U.S., during an election year a president who is unsure of his reelection does not generally deal with any international problems that might entail insecure long-term involvement, unless under very special and dangerous conditions where the very existence of American is at stake. Under the present conditions, the Carter administration could not entangle itself in a doubtful war against Iran, the outcome of which (from American point of view) would be unpredictable, or at best would turn out to be another Vietnam, leading all world Muslims to an entanglement against the U.S.

On the other hand, the U.S. cannot remain idle without doing anything and witness establishment and consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the development and growth of an Islamic movement in other parts of the globe, as well as gradual severance of all the U.S.'s interests.

The question of American hostages has, of course, to be taken into account, but this is not a fundamental factor, since the fate of 50 or 60 people is not very important for it. America has sacrificed a multitude of people to safeguard her own interests. America could not remain idle and not take any action for release of the hostages, especially during an election year. So something had to be done, but what, considering the many elements of uncertainty? It was clear therefore that an Iraqi invasion put the best situation at the disposal of U.S.

30. Topic of the Day: Iran- Iraq War (Part 2)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 13, 1980

Yesterday, we reviewed how the U.S, in its presidential election year after an abortive Tabas invasion similar to its humiliations in Vietnam, has had to pin its hopes for the failure of the Islamic Revolution in the Iraqi invasion of Iran. If in this military attack against Iran Iraq emerges victorious, it would undoubtedly be a great victory for U.S, the West and for the reactionary countries in the region, but if Iraq is defeated it would apparently be construed in the world as the defeat of Iraq, and there would be no reason to think that it is an American defeat.

But, in fact, this is not so. An Iraqi defeat by Iran would be a severe setback for America, her Western friends, for reactionary states in the region... as well as for Russians. An Iraqi defeat and Iranian victory would be the first signal of strong blows administered by the Iranian Revolution.

The victory of Iran over Iraq and Saddam Hussein's collapse would greatly enhance the prestige of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in the world, kindle rays of hope in the hearts of millions of downtrodden and toiling mortals, and generate real fear and panic in the black hearts of the stooges of colonialism and Zionists and will plunge the East and West into an irrevocable sorrow. A victory of Iran over Iraq would be taken as an ultimatum to the downtrodden world, an appeal to those who are disenchanted and frightened by the satanic superpowers to come to their senses, to have faith and to realize that it is not necessary to take refuge in the East and West in order to save themselves, since if they succeed in discovering the internal forces and the enormous power

of their masses, they would not need any superpower. If they fail however to secure their people's support then the assistance of superpowers and other big powers would not be able to bring about their "freedom" and "independence".

That is why all reactionary states in the region openly and with all their forces support Saddam Hussein's aggression. Can you imagine what will happen in the region if Saddam Hussein falls? Where will the next step be? Therefore, according to any criterion the war between Iraq and Iran is a fateful and historical war. It is a great mission for the Iranian nation. All of us, the entire nation, are ready for and engaged in extensive efforts with all our forces to fulfill this mission.

With wishes for success, prayers for even better health of the Imam, with salutations to the frontier guards of Islam, the Army, the Revolutionary Guards, gendarmerie, police and thousands of unknown individuals in the streets. May we comprehend this God's message? "I will make a distressing punishment overtake him, Surely he reflected and guessed, But may he be cursed how he plotted, Again, may he be cursed how he plotted. (Muddassir 17-20)

31. Safeguarding the Constitution (Part 1)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 15, 1980

Without any doubt the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the biggest and the most precious achievement of this revolution and has been bought by the blood of thousands of martyrs who, by deciding upon martyrdom, have blazed the path of victory. This victory (the drawing up and passing of the Constitution) is a special feature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In the majority of revolutions in the world, after its victory the people never had the chance and opportunity to take an active part in determining their destinies. Usually in most cases, a single organization would lead the revolution to victory and after their victory the organization would take absolute power and would consider it the guardian of the people and proceed to take care of the day to day affairs of the country. As the organization leads the revolution to victory over the common enemy of the masses, its leadership of the country is accepted by the people after the victory of the revolution.

Therefore in these countries, for many years the organization, without a constitution which has been put to a referendum or voted on by members elected by the people, usually takes care of the affairs of state. In Iran, due to a lack of a united organization to lead the revolution such a leadership after victory was not possible, although certain groups, by using monopolistic tactics and Stalinist grouping methods which neither in form nor in substance have any relation of Islam have tried and are still trying to establish their hegemony over the revolution. But, since these groups, organizations and elements, came into existence and began their work only in the last months before the revolution (when the course of the revolution was clear to many people) and not having any deep roots, were not able and are still not able to bring to a conclusion their hegemony over the revolution. The roots of many of the present conflicts must be sought after in the programs and actions of these groups.

By any event the intelligence and the deep insight of the Imam in his leadership of the revolution and the political program drawn up while Imam was in Paris comprising of plans for a referendum, founding assembly and the drawing up of a new constitution, brought the best for the nation. The coming to power of the provisional government, and the acceptance and putting into operation of basic human rights, brought about a free atmosphere and an open society. Following the Imam's political program, the Iranian nation and the Islamic revolution of Iran, in a few months, were able to draw up a constitution and pass it by the Majlis and so the Iranian revolution achieved unparalleled victories. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regardless of some criticisms, in comparison to that of other countries, whether they are eastern or western, Muslim or non-Muslim, is the most advanced and progressive of them all. The constitution of the Islamic Republic, among the different philosophies, prevalent during the revolution, has made the first principle of the three principles of Freedom, Independence and the Islamic Republic, its foundation.

What do we mean by a free society? Why does the Islamic Constitution stipulate with care and extraordinary exactness matters relating to freedom? We must take notice of this problem that in revolutionary theories, after the victory of revolution, two

kinds of political philosophies are discussed and talked about. One political philosophy believes that after the victory of the revolution for transforming the society from the old and decadent ways of the past into a progressive society the society must be "closed". This means that society must be governed by repression and dictatorship so that the revolutionary forces can quickly transform the society and put its programs into operation. This philosophy believes that after the victory of the revolution, counter-revolutionary forces will not sit still. Previous cultural habits, groups and classes who have suffered from the revolution, but who still are not annihilated, will not sit still. On the other hand, if the society is 'open' and free, all groups will try to return to the old situation with all force. Therefore, all the day to day affairs of the state, all the mass media, all news agencies and sources, must be brought under severe revolutionary control.

The thesis regarding the imposition of a **proletarian dictatorship** after the victory of the revolution as discussed by Marxists - Leninists is the best example of this political philosophy. Regardless of the fact that this thesis is incorrect and brutally anti-humanistic and counter-revolutionary, we must generally accept that this thesis is feasible only if a single united organization leads the revolution so as to be able to seize power and exert overall control after the revolution; more important than its monopoly of power is the ability to run the country. The acceptance and implementation of this political philosophy could never have taken place without the presence of a united legitimate and accepted political organization which has gathered revolutionary experience for many years.

This political philosophy basically regards the revolution as a means of change in ownership of means of production and distribution, in the economic condition of the people and if there is a need in changing other aspects of society, they are given a lower priority to the economic fundamentals. Therefore all the endeavors in these philosophies are to create and impose the power of a political party on the society to bring about these changes.

This thought is miles away from genuine Islamic thinking. Those who knowingly or unknowingly are affected by such thinking are thinking in an eclectic manner. The thought, thesis and philosophy of the dictatorship of the party (or any united group),

whether it is named as the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the oppressed (Mostazaffin), of the benevolent or by any other name, is basically counter to the world view of monotheism and Islamic thinking. Islam is opposed to and will fight any form of monopoly whether it be by a group, class or strata.

The political philosophy in Islamic thinking is "free or open society". The party of Allah (Hezbollah) does not mean that a party or a political organization with defined views and a number of fixed members separate from other members of society is ruling the country. The party of Allah (Hezbollah) means that the party is ruled by Islamic thinking and monotheism. The nature of such thinking in counters to hegemony or dominance of a group or party and follows the creation of an "open or free society".

32. Safeguarding the Constitution (Part 2)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 16, 1980

Why does Islam believe in the establishment of an "open and free society?" Why is the aim of the Iranian Islamic Revolution the creation of a new and free society? And why has the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran guaranteed and promised a "free and open" society? Why do we say that the endeavors of a group, party, a political grouping, class, a strata or a distinct group to rule the society is anti-Islamic and, in the final analysis, counter-revolutionary?

The tireless Mujahid Taleghani said that Islam is neither capitalism nor Socialism. Islam is Islam. The Islamic revolution neither wants the establishment of a socialist order, in which the hegemony of a dominant class is established, nor a capitalist order with democracy in the western form existing with the dominance of capital. Since the foundation of both system, whether capitalism or socialism, are based on economic values, the growth, development and evolution of society are measured by economic parameters. It is enough to turn to the statistics given the independent Tudeh Party of the progress in Russia. All the figures and statistics are based on production figures for instance of electricity, or number of vehicles produced, coal, and steel... A similar comparison can be made in a capitalist system such as America.

The foundations of thought are similar. Only this distinction exists that in America, capitalism is private or controlled by a group, whereas in Russia, capitalism is state run. Anyway, it is related to production, the means of production, and the amount consumed.

In Islamic thinking, the foundations are based on changing man's nature. Islam describes man so as to show the way for improving himself and the world surrounding him. The Islamic revolution is a cultural revolution in the sense (that its purpose is) a fundamental change in man's identity. Economic changes and a fundamental revolution in exploitative economic relations are the only means of ensuring man's freedom. Islam considers such a change in the identity of man only possible in an open and free society. Basic changes in such an open and free society will not occur as fast as in a closed society (even if they are governed by regimes by the people and for the people). The aims of the Islamic revolution are changes in man from what he is to what he should be, and this cannot be done by force or hegemony.

The only way possible for the growth of society is the creation of an open society and not a closed or subservient one. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic has rightly and correctly adopted the path for creating such a society. What distinguishes our revolution from other revolutions in other countries is not that we rigorously insist on its Islamic nature. Look at the situation in other Islamic countries. Scrutinize their laws. The best feature and achievement of the Islamic Revolution is this constitution. It is the acceptance of freedoms and the necessity for creating an open society and the negation of hegemony. It is the acceptance of the participation of the people and the masses in determining their own destinies. It is by following such a principle in our constitution that the biggest elections in our country occurred after the revolution. If society was closed and the running of society was in the hands of a select few, what need would there be for a constitution, the election of a president or Majlis or a creation of a government which is responsible for answering for its actions to the Majlis? What need is there for the members of the Majlis to swear to safeguard the constitution? All these are so that society can travel along a path of growth and evolution. At the moment are we on this path? Is the arrest and transfer of Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the former foreign

minister, member of the Revolutionary Council, the first director of the Voice and Vision of Iran (IRIB), and a fighter against the previous regime, to Evin Prison consistent with Islamic thinking? Does the constitution give such powers to any officials?

Can the Iran-Iraq war serve as a justification for such an act, by using the sensitive and critical times as a pretext for pulling under foot all laws and to produce a "closed" society?

Are our officials not mistaken? Do they consider themselves innocent? If not, where is the borderline between criticism and suggestion? All these points must be discussed. Fundamentals must be cleared up. The ability to criticize officials must be discussed. We believe that without any bitterness, we must bring up such problems. We consider them useful to the Revolution.

Hitherto, it was said that there are two kinds of political philosophies and views for the control of society after the victory of a revolution. One view believes that a party or organization must rule society and all power and means, etc, must be put under its control in order to produce the maximum harmonizing effect and progress. The other political philosophy and view maintains that after the fall of the regime and the victory of the revolution, for transforming the society from a sacrilegious non-monotheistic and repressive one to a new society with a revolutionary culture and monotheistic nature, the only way is the establishment of an open and free society free from any hegemony or monopolizing tendencies.

The Iranian revolution which resulted in the fall of the Shah's regime and the ending of 2000 years of rule by the shah and foreign domination was revolutionary and Islamic.

Thus the constitution of our Islamic country was derived from and inspired by the thoughts and world views of the revolution, which was Islamic and monotheistic. This constitution in principle has accepted the free and open society within the framework of the rule of Allah.

The rule of Allah over a society means the establishment of a free and open society in which the people are not prisoners of idols and can return to their divine nature and to act according to it. Such a return is not possible without freedom of thought, and action and judgment. Human nature will not accept anything else.

33. Safeguarding the Constitution (Part 3)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 17, 1980

The introduction of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic regarding the manner of government in Islam says: "The aim of government is the development of man towards achieving the divine order. This is in order to prepare the basis for growing talents in the direction manifesting Godly dimensions in man. This is not possible without the active and extensive participation of all social elements in the evolutionary process of society. With regard to the direction to be taken, the Constitution has prepared the framework for the participation of all the members of society, in all levels of political decision-making, so as to enable man to travel on the path of his evolution (completeness). Thus, for this to occur, every person is made responsible for growth, promotion, and leadership".

Such an insight and introduction in the Constitution clearly negates the political philosophy of the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the oppressed (Mostazafin) or a benevolent dictatorship. It is on the basis of this view that in the third principle of the "General Principles of the Constitution" appears the clause: "The elimination of any type of repression, autocratic tendencies or monopolizing". (6th clause, 3rd principle).

The ninth principle, in order to prevent any illegal benefits occurring says, "No official is allowed, in the name of independence and territorial integrity of the country, to curtail legal freedoms".

Or in other words, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which is really the blood of our martyrs, under no circumstances allows the deprivation of freedoms. Even under war conditions like the present situation, when the territorial integrity of the nation is being attacked by the hostile Iraqis, the Constitution does not allow the negation of freedoms. Where can one see more frankness and articulateness!

In addition to these, in principles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 37, 38 and 39, all legal freedoms are described and the protection of these freedoms is made a duty for all citizens of the Islamic Republic.

We have a deep and unbending faith in this way of thinking in which a free and open society is envisaged in the Constitution. This is the will of the nation. This is a great and priceless document which the nation has drawn up and under no circumstances will allow it to be forgotten or under various pretexts for it not to be implemented.

The people are prepared to defend this great achievement with all force. They will condemn any irregularities in its discharge.

The sense of worry in people, especially noticeable in the last few days, stems from this. This worry by people is possibly an unfounded worry, but in any event it is real. We must take it seriously. There is a feeling that the Constitution is not being implemented in full and that some irregularities have been noticed in its operation. The present conditions- stemming from the Iraqi-imposed war- have resulted in some irregularities being committed in some of its principles. It is possible for our officials to say that this feeling of worry among the populace is unfounded and it should be of no concern. Maybe they are right but still people are genuinely worried. These anxieties and surprises have various reasons. We must take them seriously, not comfortably saying, "It is nothing". People are rightly worried, since their experiences of the first constitutional revolution showed them how easily the repressions of Reza Pahlavi and his son burdened the country. Was the end of the first constitution sudden? No. From the very first days everyone who came to power commuted oppression and irregularities and these gradually piled up till only a meaningless and ridiculous caricature was left of this constitution. If so quickly, before the ink on the Constitution has dried and before a year has passed, irregularities are to appear under various pretexts or an article is not to be carried out, then these are a source of worry. The continuation of this situation will cause people to act with full force, as is expected, and to prevent irregularities in the execution of the Constitution. This is very useful and within itself a victory. If not, these worries will cause apathy among the people and cause them to not show their presence in politics, committing irreparable damage against the revolution and allowing counter-revolutionaries to succeed.

Thus we must, with all our force, defend the Constitution, since it is the blood of our martyrs and one of man's greatest achievements.

To carry out this program, what must be done? Are we to shut our eyes to deviations and irregularities or are we to discuss them? How are we to discuss our problems with the officials? Are we supposed to bring them up or not?

On various levels the present confrontation among people believing in the revolution are not separate from the effects, methods, and behavior inherited from the exploitative period. The Imam has said the root of our difficulties is to be searched for in the "self". This is the inclination of two distinct views in the running of the country. Are these differences of opinions unnatural and against our principles? Is it the people's knowledge of such differences of opinion among officials damaging society, or the differences themselves?

In the last editorials it was said that the defeat of counter-revolutionaries and the collapse of the decadent and old regime and the victory of the revolution, in another words, the changing of society and its transformation to an acceptable society is never sudden; changes occur slowly. The passage of society through an intermediary state is unavoidable. To manage society after the revolution and in order to extinguish all the economic cultural and social roots of the previous regime and to give direction and enlighten society towards the best conditions, two political philosophies or views exist.

34. Safeguarding the Constitution (Part 4)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 23, 1980

One political philosophy believes in the hegemony of a party of organization over society and the other political philosophy believes in the "open and free" society in which the active participation of the people to whom the revolution belongs is considered necessary.

The Constitution of our country, due to its special features and also the nature of the leadership of the revolution in which there is no single leading party- is opposed to and condemns any form of monopolizing and hegemony over the society.

These days' differences of opinion between people believing in the Islamic Revolution have increased. Some of these differences

stem from the nature, imaginations, and the soul of these effects; the confrontations are the result of differences of opinions over the running of the country in the context of the two political philosophies mentioned above.

The first way of thinking believes in the closed society. It believes in the control of all events and the directing of society from above towards socialism by creating a dictatorship of the proletariat or that of the oppressed (Mostazafin) or the creation of a "benevolent dictatorship". This is basically inspired and derived from a Marxist way of thinking and has no place in Islamic thinking. The acceptance of the rule of Allah is never meant to be a "repressive dictatorship" either of the proletarian, oppressed or "benevolent" variety. The rule of Allah means following the most natural laws that rule man or a return to the divine nature. This means acting on nature and freeing man from all obstacles which make him "not himself". According to our beloved martyred, Brother Ali Shariati, Islam believes in the return of man to his true nature, finding himself or following his divine nature and never is meant to be repressive. The acceptance of an open society with all its ensuing problems in which people can think and judge freely are bestowed by divine blessing and will occur through the establishment of an Islamic society.

The acceptance of either of these two political philosophies mentioned above and how to set about making society acceptable and satisfying depends on your world view and which revolutionary theory you believe. What is your revolutionary nature?

In the past half century movements based on Marxist thinking have been able to bring about a radical change in society. These were based on three revolutionary theories, and events after the revolution were precisely dependent on their revolution's nature and theory.

In the first theory, it is not the majority who revolt. It is the minority who with exceptional effort obtain power and according to Lenin establish the "hegemony of the party of the so-called working class". In such an interpretation of a revolution, the ruling party, after obtaining power, for its defense, can only operate through the establishment of a dictatorship. Communists, since they consider themselves from the working class, decorate the

revolution by the name of dictatorship of the proletariat. Such thinking and such a revolution with this type of nature cannot continue without the establishment of a party which considers itself the sole caretaker of the condition of the working classes. Thus, in the name of the working class it takes all power and obliterates any opposition. In Soviet Russia, according to Lenin, revolution is a "leap". For this reason it is known as the "Leninist leap" theory. In the Leninist description of a revolution, Communists are not the people who revolt. The "leap" or revolution only occurs when the internal situation and dissidence within society has reached such a degree whereby the ruling elite is no longer able to govern the people and the people are not prepared to listen any longer to the rulers. Under such conditions, a revolution change will occur and the Communist party must be ready to enter the scene and with a revolutionary "leap" to secure power. This is in order to prevent the "national bourgeoisie and liberals" from obtaining power and distorting the true course of the revolution.

35. Safeguarding the Constitution (Part 5)

Editorial by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Keyhan International, November 24, 1980

In such an order (i.e. a communist regime) political and social freedoms are crushed. All necessary human freedoms are referred to as undesirable and named western-style freedom, democracy or western liberalism and destroyed. On the pretext of the defense of the revolution and the unity of the masses the opposition, one after the other are obliterated. The extent of this new political repression in the name of the masses or the working classes is covered and hidden. At first, this includes anyone within the party but it does not stop there.

The nature of "augmentation of power" is such that, soon words are converted to force and find their way within and outside of the party and to the theory of the hegemony of a group or of a person. This is the famous and denounced method of Stalinism. People, who unknowingly resort to follow such a theory, be it even under the mask of Islam, consider it the best for an Islamic society. Look at what happened to the leadership of the party. Study the events befallen the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia. Stalin by his methods was able to destroy each and

every one of them by his stooges like Beria. The people paid a heavy price for this augmentation of power of the party and that of Stalin.

Nonetheless, Marxist thinking of the Stalinist type today unknowingly has filled the minds of some people. Not only the methods but even the expressions are borrowed from Marxism-Leninism.

The word liberalism which these days have become very fashionable is used by people who don't even know its meaning, as a stick with which to wield over the opposition. This is a Marxist-Leninist expression which only has a meaning and relevance within the context of their world view.

In our Islamic culture such a meaning does not exist. In the Marxist movement and the Communist Party of Russia such expressions as liberalism, democracy and the negation of "specialty" only became a stick of hegemony and monopolizing tactics against the opposition who was not prepared to accept dictatorship. The ruling clique of the Party brought the stick of "liberalism" upon their heads. They have become known as liberals, which according to Lenin and Marx are the remnants of the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisies, who being western democratic want to prevent the establishment of the working classes (or hegemony of the communists).

Those Muslims who knowingly or unknowingly use these expressions like candy in their political discussions are hitting their brother Muslims, regardless of years of service, with a liberal "stick". They should know that they are suffering from communist thinking.

What a sorry state it is that unwittingly Islamic groups are affected by these Marxist expressions. It is interesting to note that a writer in one Islamic daily even used the expression "Islamic liberal" in order to attack opposition groups. The people who run this paper claim to have a monopoly of Islamic understanding and consider no one but themselves as Muslims and in the line of Imam; and are so self-seeking that apart from themselves they consider the rest as having either Eastern or Western tendencies. For example, where has this expression "Islamic liberal" come from? The writer of this article is so intoxicated with western

(Marxist and such like) thought that even in writing he thinks in a western and Marxist manner. He resorts to western meanings which have filled up his mind.

After the celebrated revolutionary victory of Iran the provisional government, on the basis of the Imam's political program took over the running of the country. The head of the provisional government and the majority of his cabinet were among the most experienced and convicted fighters thinking within the framework of Islamic school of thought. The provisional government based its political philosophy upon an open society principle. Bazargan and his colleagues saw the solution to the problems of transforming society from a repressed one into an acceptable Islamic society only in the acceptance of political freedoms and its utilization in society. Every basic freedom was accepted in the Constitution. Every trouble encountered by the Provisional Government stems from these outside devious political views.

Now it is not the aim of this article to dwell upon the analysis carried out within the provisional government, which is in itself necessary and must be discussed at another time. But to understand the differences of opinion and the complexity of the present political encounters among the various groups believing in the Islamic revolution it is necessary to pay attention to some points which were prominent from the start of the revolution.

For example, the Provisional Government is accused of having liberal tendencies. This accusation first came from leftist groups, pseudo left and the ultra left, including those supporting Russia, China, or America. Before the ink of the Imam's command for the formation of the provisional government had dried, and while all the members of the government had not yet been decided upon, these Marxist accusations started and the provisional government was called liberal, accommodating and in the "line" of America. This political show was managed on the one hand with the instigation of America by the left and on the other by the counter-revolutionaries, the remnants of the previous regime, remnants of SAVAK, capitalists and people who had fled. With this propaganda campaign they gave strength to their politico-psychological war and unfortunately our officials fell for this.

Why did the Communists attack the first government after the revolution so vigorously? What were their aims, and why, at the same time, while performing their successful programs, did they suddenly about-face, with most of all the Tudeh Party, the People's Fedayeen and Trotskyist groups becoming supporters of the Islamic Revolution and all in the line with the Imam. Why did the supporters of America and the Zionists come to oppose the provisional government?

Why do all these other groups still attack the provisional government a year after it gave up all power, accusing it of liberalism, being accommodating or in the "line" of America. What is the plot and where is the real danger?

What political order in Iran really scares the Americans? These questions are the most basic problems which have to be answered in present political debates. If the opportunity should arise God will we shall answer these questions.

36. The Shah' Entrance to US

Interview with Dr. Yazdi, The Iranian Magazine, Date?

Q. Why did you not announce that the U.S. was going to let the Shah in right after you learned about it, as had you done so it might have avoided the fall of Bazargan's government and the ensuing crisis?

A. We issued the statement immediately and we warned the public of the American move. We also informed the public we had protested against the United States and that the Americans had not yet understood the depth of the Iranian Revolution. Furthermore by accepting the shah (we understood that) they don't care about Iranian sentiment and feelings. Then I informed the public we had requested that at least two qualified practicing Iranian physicians in the States be allowed to visit him and check him. We had two reasons for this. One, to see whether the shah was really sick or just politically sick, second, to have two physicians which we felt we could trust be around to report to us what was going on. The following day the Americans informed the embassy in Washington, to which I had introduced two Iranian physicians practicing in the States, that they could go and visit, but later they refused and allowed them only to check some medical documents.

Again on October 27 or 29, I gave the Americans three official notices. The first protested the refusal for allowing the Iranian physicians to visit the Shah. The second protested statements by Goldwater and Henry Jackson. And I repeated my previous statement that the Americans did not understand the Iranian Revolution and did not care about Iranian feelings, warning that the Americans could only blame themselves if anything should happen. I knew there was a storm in the Shah in a second notice based on my discussions with Cyrus Vance. When I met Cyrus Vance on October 3 in the United Nations Building, I brought up the question of the extradition of Iranian criminals taking refuge from the United States, such as Razmi.

I had some information that he was responsible for the burning of the Rex Theatre in Abadan. He went to the United States during Sharif-Emami's government. I requested Interpol and the United States government to send Razmi back to Iran. There were also a few other individuals wanted by the Ministry of Justice. When I talked to Vance he said there is not a treaty of extradition between the two countries. I insisted that since they are criminals and these are political issues not judiciary issues, there is no need for such a treaty. I mentioned that it would be helpful if they extradited Razmi, because when people found out that the United States was giving shelter to such criminals it would definitely be a blow to U.S. relations with Iran. He accepted the idea and said he would talk with the Department of Justice. A few days later he informed our embassy in Washington that he had talked with the Attorney General and asked to be provided with the names, which we provided a list of. When they accepted the Shah in the United States, based on my discussion with Vance in which he accepted the idea that those criminals should be sent back, furthermore himself mentioning that although we had no extradition treaty, there was no law prohibiting the Americans from doing so, I asked why he did not do so. On the 8th of Aban based on the discussion with Vance, in an official notice we requested the extradition of both the Shah and Farah. The night before our trip to Algeria we officially made the request for the Shah's extradition and the confiscation of Shah's assets, as well as transferring them to Iran.

Q. There is a gap between the time you knew from Laingen that the Shah was ill and planning to go to the States and the time you

announced it. Had this been announced earlier, the credibility of Bazargan might not have been questioned.

A. On October 22, Bruce Laingen told me the Shah was very sick and planning to go to the United States, but I was not told when he would go. The next day, Laingen informed us that according to a wire he had received, the Shah was planning on going to the U.S. that night. Before we were even able to get in touch with our embassy in Washington or with Mexico to get some news, the Shah was there, and they said they wanted to keep this secret. I asked how they hoped they could do that; that the Shah is not a bird or a pencil one can put in one's pocket. Immediately upon the Shah's departure from Mexico the news was on the wire.

Q. How do you account for the gap of a week in reaction of the Iranian public between the time of the taking of hostages and the announcement that the Shah had arrived in the United States?

A. It took time for public sentiment to rise and to manifest. Protests were being made in various meetings, but to crystallize actions it took time for planning and organization.

Q. Do you think that the issue of the Shah is the most pressing issue facing this country at the moment? Do you not think that much of the energy should be spent on trying to solve major problems such as unemployment, autonomy and inflation?

A. I don't believe the issue of the Shah is out of proportion. I do agree we should divert the potential energy of the people into reconstruction of the country, but the issue of the Shah is part of the reconstruction. If one is to mobilize the masses and to correct their attitudes towards a consumer society you have to have a very strong motivation force. You want to rebuild an economy which is completely independent on foreign countries. First you have to create a very strong sentiment against foreign domination. Then you have to say, all right, you cannot fight against the Americans without going and reconstructing the country. On the other hand there are two other issues. First, the Imam is capable and has the power to rally the people and send them to the fields. Second, people must feel this themselves, have this feeling for necessary reconstruction. When the masses are completely mobilized against the Americans it is easier to direct people on how to use their power and energy. When we were fighting against the Shah, people

felt the depths of the pressure. Everyone had experience with the dictatorship of the Shah and with SAVAK, so it was easy for the Imam to rally feeling against the Shah. With the Americans it is different since they operated through the shah. The masses have to feel that the Americans are responsible. If this campaign against the Americans ends by just a trial of these Americans and their exportation it will be a disaster. It has to go further -- we have to divert this to the reconstruction of the country.

Q. Does this mean that we can expect in the future more rallying points like this one to be made artificially or otherwise both by the Imam and other groups to a keep motivation of the masses high?

A. This is a part of the mobilization of the masses. Political or religious sentiments and/or enthusiasm cannot always stay at the highest peak. In order to rally the masses this kind of thing should continue. You have to find excuses, just like journalists who make up headlines which are sensational in order to draw the attention of the people.

Q. You were involved recently in the talks in Qom and Tabriz along with Ayatollah Lahouti. Do you think Ayatollah Shariat-Madari will turn down his dissenting opinions or do you think the system itself could become more moderate and accept Shariat-Madari's viewpoints?

A. The future is very difficult to predict. Those elements trying to agitate continuously against the Islamic Republic will use anything they can. Since we are getting close to solving the problem with Kurdistan, we see another issue cropping up. We are approaching presidential and parliamentary elections which are very important for the establishment and fortification of the Republic. Anti-revolutionaries will intensify their activities in order to sabotage these elections. Now they have found a point, someone that can rally round. To neutralize that, close contact and communication with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari will be more than before.

Q. So you feel the incident in Tabriz is product of counter-revolutionary elements rather than a movement by the people as a whole?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Then what about Shariat-Madari's contention with Article 110 concerning the interpretation of velayate faqih?

A. These are matters of opinion. We don't believe that in an Islamic Republic everyone must think alike. People in Iran and abroad are used to the political atmosphere in Iran where only one person had the right to talk and that was the Shah, and no one could think and talk different than him. More than that, it was taken as a sign of political stability. Now they are surprised and don't understand when the Imam, who has all the power, appoints a Prime Minister who has different opinions than the Imam on certain issues. The Prime Minister, in a very relaxed way, comes on television and expresses his opinions which might be different from that of Imam and people are shocked. Well this is democracy, this is the Islamic Republic. The interesting thing which people often fail to recognize is that the Imam was not unhappy and did not show any unpleasant reactions to Bazargan's statements in areas in which he was critical. In the same way, when I was minister I had my own opinions which were different than those of Bazargan.

In many areas I did not agree with him. This is democracy; this is not one-man rule. It works the same way with the Marja (high ayatollahs). They have their own opinions and Ayatollah Khomeini has his own opinion. For example, Imam Khomeini felt certain articles in the Constitution should have been drawn up differently, but he accepted the majority rule. So Ayatollah Shariat-Madari is a big Marja, he has his own independent opinion on some of the articles and this is fine. He has expressed this opinion, but there was election of experts who adopted the Constitution and people are going to approve it. This is real politics in a free society like any free society in the world, where everyone gives their own opinion and then the majority decides what to do.

Q. But the problem with this system is that there is no agreement which the Marja are not only consulted and listened to but also heeded. So when Shariat-Madari has a different opinion on Article 110 of the constitution which the Imam considers one of the pillars of the whole Constitution, there is no way by which this difference of opinion can be channeled in order to modify the Constitution. Since no modification occurred in this instance, the people in Tabriz were agitated and demonstrated in the streets.

A. No. The first draft of the Constitution was prepared by the Provisional Government. It was ratified by the cabinet, then the Revolutionary Council and finally by the people. The Imam went through the draft Constitution and corrected a few points here and there, but the Assembly of Experts changed quite a few things which were different from the Imam's opinion and the Imam said, well, the representatives were elected by the people and we respect the peoples' power so we should not change it. This is the same with everyone, so I don't think the source of the trouble was because Shariat-Madari's voice was not heard. His opinion was expressed but the majority has a different opinion.

Q. So we should not expect any changes in the Constitution after the use of this kind of tactic?

A. No, because the final authority lies with the people, who have elected representatives to the Assembly which adopted this Constitution, and whether one thinks it good or not one must accept it.

Q. So you do not find the Tabriz incident particularly significant?

A. It is significant. It shows that anti-revolutionaries do not hesitate to grasp any opportunity to agitate people.

Q. What politicians are independently emerging with strong public roots who could continue the Islamic Republic after Imam Khomeini?

A. This is the question which any movement faces with a charismatic leader. I think there are two points here: the Revolution and the Imam. I think that the relation of the two cannot be considered a one-way communication. The depth of the revolution is such that it should and will overcome these problems. One of the reasons we insisted that elections should be held soon was because in the Parliament as an open forum individuals will gradually come up and show themselves, and we will gradually go through this transition phase of the Revolution.

Q. What are the criteria necessary for such individuals?

A. The most important criteria are communication with the masses.

Q. What about a person with a links to the Imam?

A. Connection with the Imam brings only legitimacy, not popularity. Both are criteria. There were many Marja before the Imam but they did not have that popularity, only the legitimacy. If I have an association with the Imam I have legitimacy, but I must communicate with the people on my own terms.

Q. This does not seem to have been a criterion for the members of the Revolutionary Council since their identity was kept secret for so long.

A. The members of the Revolutionary Council were in direct contact with people but not as members of the Revolutionary Council. They were all independently giving lectures.

Q. But people did not recognize who was making the leadership decisions of the country.

A. Yes, but just as I am not in a leadership position now, should sit home and do nothing? No, the art of communication with the people does not come through one's title.

Q. Does your trip to Tabriz and the provinces imply you plan to run in the upcoming elections?

A. I do not reject any such idea. However, my aim is not to run for any office. The people of Tabriz and Urumieh have been asking me for months to go, but because of many engagements I could not go earlier. The first chance I had I went, which happened to be at the same time as these things happened and I got involved. So running after a position is one thing and to accepting a position is another. It is a very delicate question because when my goal is to be president, for example, then I evaluate everything in that light. This I don't like, because I may do something to get to that point that may hurt the country, because I may have to do something to please people which I know that is not correct.

Q. How do you explain why you did not get placed on the Revolutionary Council after the fall of the Bazargan government?

A. Well, I resigned from all my official positions.

Q. Were you officially asked to be on the Revolutionary Council?

A. The Imam told me a few times I have to accept the position, but until now I haven't accepted.

Q. The word non-alignment has not been used since you left office. Why?

A. I don't know why there is no mention of the non-aligned movement. It must be that they are completely preoccupied with events in the American embassy and the Shah's extradition, but once stability returns in our foreign policy, I think one of the forums in which we can function is the non-aligned movement.

Q. Is Iran succeeding in legitimatizing the embassy takeover in its policy towards the Gulf?

A. No. I see no sign of this.

37. A Day or Two in the Majlis

Seminar on the Subject of Freedom, 5 Aban 1362 –October 27, 1983

The Majlis opens with Speaker Hashimi Rafsanjani in chair ... Fifty one members submit a letter. They want the Minister of Interior to answer several questions to the house:

1. Why the act on the foundation for the war-affected areas is not being implemented and why the people affected by war are being denied their rights;
2. Why thousands of plots of land belonging to the Tehran municipality have been transferred illegally and despite warnings by the Housing Ministry;
3. Why corrupt officials were given protection and why the head of the foundation for war-affected reappointed a certain member of the reconstruction brigade who had been dismissed;
4. Why has the ministry failed to stop violations of rules and laws within its attached institutions;
5. Why has it slighted and humiliated members of the Majlis as well as insulted Muhammad Ghafari, Sadiq Khalkhali and Samad Shojaiyan.

8. Aban 1362 – 30 October 1983

The first speaker after the opening of the session is Hashim Sabaghian, former Deputy Prime Minister. He salutes the martyrs and mujahidin, condemns 'Saddam Aflaqi' and his Eastern and Western supporters and decries foreign plots. Besides foreign pots, he says, there are problems which have roots inside Iran. Sabbaghian then narrates an incident that he and his friends experienced on Friday 6 Aban (October 28, 1983).

He says he wants to report the incident for the record of the Majlis and it is not his intention to make a petition against oppression. He then goes on:

After the recent speeches by Ayatullah Montazeri and the President about the forthcoming elections to the Majlis, *Nehzat Azadi Iran* (Iran Freedom Movement) decided to hold a public meeting on October 27 on the subject of freedom of the polls. This was duly notified to the Minister of Interior. Four days after our application and one day before the meeting, both the Minister and police sent us a telegram that the seminar cannot be held. We were asked to cooperate with the central committee of Tehran and see that no kind of gathering took place.

It was decided not to hold the seminar and that I, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi and Engineer Tavassoli should go to the meeting place and announce that the seminar had been cancelled, as well as to put up a notice of cancellation in front of the building.

Nevertheless, the newspaper *Jumhoori Islami*, a TV program (Ma Va Shoma – Us and You) and the Khutba in the Friday prayers accused us of calling for a procession.

Despite the fact that we requested the central committee for help three times in the presence of its officers and the officers of the prosecutor's office and the municipality, a group of about 20 persons broke into the building and swore at us and beat and injured us. I was punched and kicked until I collapsed and fainted. Then they laid me under a steel table where, after a while, they brought Tavassoli as well.

Then one of them jumped a top the table and announced that 'the brothers' from the committee and the prosecutor's office should stay and the rest leave the room.

Among the officers from the committee in the presidential polls, Beheshti was unable to offer his own candidature. Instead he put his protégé, Jalaluddin Farsi. However, another Ayatullah, Sadiq Khalkhali came to discover that Farsi was not a 'pure' Iranian as one of his parents had come from Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic's constitution states that a candidate for the office of president should be a pure Iranian.

With Farsi so disqualified, one of the three most prominent exile-returnees - the other two being Ebrahim Yazdi and Sadeqh

Ghotbzadeh - Bani Sadr was elected president with a resounding majority. Reserving his future ambitions, Bani Sadr had chosen to stay out of the cabinet and colluded with Beheshti and Ghotbzadeh to destabilize and eventually force out the Bazargan government, but now he was a Beheshti rival.

It is interesting that at that stage of contest, Ayatollah Khomeini's blessings were with Bani Sadr and not with Beheshti's candidate. However, with the majority in the Majlis controlled by Beheshti and his IRP, Bani Sadr was unable to appoint a prime minister of his choice. Paradoxically, in spite of the big majority of votes obtained by him, the President was still politically rootless and incapable of dealing with the problems of the diarchy. Eventually when the crunch came, the Vali-e-Faqih withdrew his blessing and Bani Sadr had to run for his life to Paris, whence he had come from after the revolution.

The man to succeed Bani Sadr was Muhammad Ali Raja'i, whom the deposed president had been made to take as his prime minister by the Majlis. The next Prime Minister was, however, a "maktabi", Dr Javad Bahonar and generally regarded quite highly. By now there was a definite 'Maktabi' input into the government and it seemed that perhaps certain equilibrium of power will come to be established. But before the new dispensation could even settle down it was literally blown up. First the IRP headquarters were exploded by a time-bomb planted by some insider, taking a toll of about 70 prominent officials of the party, including its strongman, Ayatollah Beheshti. Two months later both Raja'i and Bahonar fell victim to a fire-bomb explosion in the latter's office.

Since those fateful and tragic events in the middle of 1981, Iran has enjoyed continuity in having a president, a prime minister and a council of ministers. The war situation with Iraq has helped to impose a large measure of internal solidity, but outside the area of war and exporting revolution, the structural tensions are showing themselves in many ways: in the quality of policies, in the efficiency of their implementation and in the increasingly nagging relationship between the Majlis which holds the brakes and the cabinet which is required to drive the bus of the revolution.

Under the constitution, the President is 'the highest official authority in the country ... next to the leader of the Revolution',

Ayatollah Khomeini. He is ‘the chief executive’ and the Prime Minister is supposed to be ‘an individual of his choice’ (section 9, principle 124). In practice, however, President Khamenei reigns rather than rules, not because of any conflict with Prime Minister Mousavi who is a relation of Khamenei, but the person who was actually next to the Leader of the Revolution was the speaker of the Majlis, Hojjatul-Islam Rafsanjani.

All eyes are now set on the next Majlis. Who is going to dominate it? Would it reflect the influence of Hojjatul Islam Rafsanjani or that of Hojjatul-Islam Khamenei” what are the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, or more exactly, the people who surround him? There is much visible jockeying to find a place in the new Majlis.

The Islamic Republic Party is not exactly a party with membership and discipline, and if elections are truly free then it is very much possible for the next Majlis to throw up an entirely different configuration of power, but it depends on the conditions under which elections are held, and the prospects for an open contest do not look at all bright.

The Friday imams are asserting that ‘the sources of duality and contradiction should be removed by bringing them into the Majlis and appointing them as governors of the provinces (actually it was the other way round: the governors used to lead Friday prayers). The other point is that the Friday imams were the representatives of the Imam, Ayatollah Khomeini, and, therefore, most qualified to be entrusted with power.

The Imam’s heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri however believes that ‘we still have a long way to go until we reach’ that level of early Islamic history and while ‘there is no religious objection to honorable Friday imams declaring their candidacy, but as far as possible, they should refrain from announcing their candidacy and should send good people to the Majlis. He said, ‘only when it is feared that an unqualified person might otherwise be elected, then it is alright for them to go to the Majlis.’

38. Letter to Time Magazine

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi to Mr. Henry Anatole Grunewald, Editor-In-Chief, Time Magazine, December 24, 1984

Time's statement concerning my involvement in recent secret US-Iran negotiations, arms dealing and a McFarlane and North trip to Tehran (Time, December 8, 1986) is totally unfounded, fictitious and offensive.

On my last trip to the US, I arrived on April 17th and departed on July 8th, 1986 both ways by Swissair. I never meet nor spoke with McFarlane and North or any other US authorities concerning US-Iran relations and arm transfer or any other matters. I have never worked nor had contact or cooperation with any US governmental agencies including the CIA (except for the V.A. Hospital in Houston). I consider this claim to be a serious offense against my honor and dignity, which should be repudiated and corrected promptly by Time. To publish the claims of an anonymous so-called anti-Khomeini organization without substations is discredit to Time's reputation.

I am in opposition to the policies and action of present Iranian authorities, and consider them, particularly with respect to the basic rights and liberties of our people, a clear deviation from the goals of our revolution and a violation of our constitution. Therefore, so long as the situation remains unchanged, our opposition will continue, and cooperation on my part with the present government will be in contradiction with my principles and thus unacceptable.

Ebrahim Yazdi,
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran.
35 Masjid Lane, Ekhtarieh, Tehran, 1984 - Iran.

39. Oil in Muslim World

*Presented by Ebrahim Yazdi at the International Conference:
Economic Integrating of the Muslim World, October 10-12, 1986
(7-8 Safer 1407) Istanbul-Turkey.*

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الحمد لله والصلوة والسلام على سيدنا محمد(ص) و على اصحابه و على آله الطيبين الطاهرين و
على جميع الانبياء والمرسلين، قال الله تبارك و تعالى: «الله خالق كل شيء و هو على كل شيء
وكيل له مقاليد السموات والارض (الزمر ٦٢ و ٦٣)

Mr. Chairman, Dear Brothers and Guests, Sallam-un Alaikom
Before starting I would like to ask all of you to observe one minute

of silence while reciting Surah Fatiha in memory of our beloved late Brother Alshahid Dr. Ismail Faroughi and his wife who were murdered last Ramadan in their residence in the U.S.A

The Muslim countries in the contemporary world are endowed with three important means to influence and/or play a decisive role on the international scene:

1. Islamic monotheistic view of the world,
2. Geopolitical status, and
3. Primary and vital natural resources namely oil and gas.

Recognition of Islam as a dynamic ideology is increasing and it is gaining a loftier stance almost daily. The proper and effective propagation of Islam is the obligation of all Muslims. This is perhaps more important than oil and deserves special consideration. However it is not a subject to be discussed in this conference. Another international gathering of Muslim scholars is needed to discuss this issue.

The geo-political situation of Muslim states is unique. They are stretched like a belt between North and South, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, connecting four continents. The Muslim population is estimated to be 1.158 billion, or 25 % of the total world population. Although in most Muslim countries the climate is intransigent and unfriendly as compared to the northern hemisphere, however, they have abundant natural resources, to the extent that they may be considered potentially among the richest countries of the world. Oil and gas are the most significant God-given wealth in Muslim countries.

Today my talk will focus only on the richness of the petroleum reserves in Muslim countries, the way it has been exploited and the extent to which it has benefited the people of these countries as well as the Muslim world. Since oil exports are the largest part of the world community trade, around 40%, it is still the key issue in contemporary world geopolitics.

In this presentation first the proven crude oil and natural gas reserves and the total oil production and revenues of Muslim countries will be discussed. Then we will turn to an analysis of the basic indicators for development, i.e. GNP/CAPITA, health and education related indicators in Muslim countries. Military expenditures by Muslim countries will be reviewed and compared with health and education expenditures. Finally the future outlook

for oil on the international market and a new chance for the Oil Producing Muslim Countries (OPMCs) will be considered briefly.

The Owners of Oil

Let us first see what do we mean by “Muslim World”? Should we view it purely nationalistically or rather ideologically in accordance with Islamic principles?

In reality 80% of Muslims form the majority population in 55 countries and territories. The rest are living as minorities in other countries of the world. The Muslim countries are sovereign states with divergent political systems and political and economic priorities at domestic and international levels. The political and/or economic infrastructure of most of the Muslim countries is neither compatible with Islamic principles nor it is democratic or popular. The people do not have a chance to play a role in their own destiny or can say a word in defiance of their governments. Hence the oil and gas reserves of these countries are controlled by the national governments according to the universally accepted principle of national sovereignty of an independent state with recognized boundaries.

According to Islamic principles all Muslims are brothers and citizens of the “Ummat”, with a common belief, goals and destiny, the suffering of one is the concern of all, whatever God has given of his bounties to one group should be shared by all. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is reported to say: “Whoever should pass his day, and does not strive to serve the cause of Muslims, is not a Muslim”.

«من اصبح و لم يهتم بامور المسلمين فليس بمسلم»

According to this view the oil in the Muslim world belongs to all Muslims or the “Ummat”. Although the Holy Quran says: “Oh, mankind! We created you from single (pair) of a male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you is he who is the most righteous of you.” XLIX-13

«يا ايهاالناس انا خلقناكم من ذكر و أنثى و جعلناكم شعوبا و قبائل لتعارفوا ان اكرمكم عندالله

اتفاكم»

And thus the Holy Qur’an recognizes the reality of various

nations and tribes. Nevertheless, it does not consider, or accept this as a source or an excuse for chauvinistic sentiments and separation among the Muslims, or the sense of indifference towards each other. It is with this ideological approach that we study the oil in Muslim world.

Table I shows the population, GNP and GNP/Capita of oil producing Muslim countries (OPMCs), and non-OPMC. According to the reported data, the distribution of population in Muslim countries with or without oil is quite uneven, ranging from 100,000 to 185 million. In 12 Muslim countries the population is less than a million, and in 25, from 1 to 10 million; only in 4 Muslim countries is the population more than 50 million. Thus there is a sharp difference in the GNP of OPMCs with that of the non-OPMC. The average GNP/Capita in 1984, for OPMCs and non-OPMC was 1530 and 388 dollars, respectively. On the other hand 80% of the GNP in Muslim world belongs to 38% of Muslims. Thus the GNP in U.A.E an OPMC with 1.2 million people, is 200 times higher than that in Bangladesh, a non-OPMC with 98 million people. Even among the OPMCs there is a wide range in GNP/capita, e.g. the GNP/capita in U.A.E is 41 times higher than that in Indonesia with 160 million people. This data clearly indicates a severe inequality among Muslims and the division of the Muslim world into two distinct groups, the poor, deprived and the rich, affluent. However one must be aware that there is also pronounced social injustice and discrepancy in the distribution of wealth in almost all Muslim countries.

In some non-Muslim countries where the GNP/capita is also low, e.g. India with \$269 GNP/capita, and where Muslims are not only a minority, but also socio-economically at the lowest level, the suffering is more drastic. *Can these cases of injustices among Muslims be justified and tolerated?*

An Estimate of the Wealth

The utilization of oil and gas for industrial purposes is a recent development in Muslim countries. The first oil exploration was in 1893 in Indonesia, 1911 in Malaysia and then gradually in other Muslim countries. However in a short span of time and very rapidly the oil of the Muslim world became strategically very important. This cheap source of energy for industrialized countries

has been the subject of numerous political disputes, cold and hot wars in Muslim countries and the world over.

The estimated crude oil and natural gas reserves in Muslim countries are given in Table II. Saudi Arabia with 170 billion barrels and Bahrain with 155 million barrels have the highest and lowest reserves, respectively. Iran has the highest and Gabon the lowest natural gas reserves. As shown in Table III, the total proven recoverable oil and gas of the Muslim world is 66% and 37% of the world totals respectively. Since the population of OPMCs comprises only 9% of world population and the share of oil in world export is high, the unique and exceptional potential the Muslim countries have and may use to influence the north-south relations becomes obvious.

These figures however should not be considered as final and ultimate. Recent reports suggests that 191 and 18 billion barrels of oil should be added to the reported oil reserves of Arab countries in M.E. and North Africa, respectively ⁽¹⁾. Furthermore in some Muslim countries, such as Iran, some known oil reserves have not been yet accounted for. Finally the existence of oil reserves in recoverable amounts in other Muslim countries could not be neglected totally.

Production

New let us see how this precious, but perishable wealth has been exploited, and what the Muslim countries have gained from it. Based on data presented in Table IV, the OPMCs have extracted 193 billion barrels of oil from commencement to 1985.

The real figure is probably higher than that. For years the British and American oil companies were exclusively controlling the oil extraction in OPMCs. Because of the weakness of central government in these countries, what the oil companies were reporting officially to governments was not necessarily reflecting the actual volume of production and export. Reported data however indicates that 75% of oil extracted by OPMCs, were exported. During the period of 1960-73, the oil production by OPMCs gradually but significantly increased. Then at the onset of the Ramadan war in 1973, demand for Muslim oil went up sharply.

As war erupted, the partial embargo reduced supply and

consequently prices spiraled according to the law of scarcity. This forced the oil consumer countries to adopt and implement their conservation and replacement policies. From then on the share of OPMCs in the world market gradually went down, e.g. from 50% in 1979 to 39% in 1984. Under no circumstances were the extractions of oil in OPMCs in accordance with internal economic demand. The high oil extraction on the one hand was accelerating exhaustion of this valuable resource of Muslim countries. On the other hand the OPMCs did not internalize energy consumption, thus producing merely on the basis of the policies and strategies of

industrialized countries as the main consumers of the oil. The improper extraction of the oil by OPMCs without implementing the technical requirements, such as gas or water injection for second or enhanced

1. Lababidi, M.Mukhtar: "Undiscovered Oil Reserves in the Arab Oil Producing Countries and the Cost of Discovering Them." Oil and Arab Cooperation, Vol. II, No1, 1985.

recovery, reduced the recoverability of the oil reserve to a great extent. Then what the OPMCs actually did was to convert their natural wealth into a liquid asset.

Petro Dollars

The OPMCs total oil revenues from 1963-84, according to Table V, is close to \$1700 billion in current dollar, of which 92% belongs to the period of 1975-84. After the commencement of oil in Muslim countries, the general pricing policies of oil companies were based on two considerations: First, the economic and engineering concepts, which involve the cost and capacity of production in a given country, and second, to guarantee the supremacy of the British naval force in the first half of the 20th century. After World War II, continuation of the same policy was a crucial factor in the reconstruction of Western Europe. Putting it in a different way, for many years the precious oil of Muslims was sold at a price which was next to nothing for the sake of prosperity of industrialized countries, without any significant fundamental benefit to the OPMCs.

Although the oil price went up to \$30/bb by 1970, however the price received by the OPMCs for their oil during 1947-70 declined

in real terms. Furthermore what the OPMC governments were receiving was less than what was realized in the market before the process of price adjustment started in 1973. After price adjustment OPMC revenues went up unprecedentedly. In spite of decline in oil demand from 1980 and a drop in OPMC shares of the oil market, their revenues were still remarkably high.

There were two shocks in the oil market during 1973-79 and 1980-85, which the OPMCs could have used to their own benefit. They were not prepared to do so. They just followed the imposed trend. Since the OPMCs were not in a position to absorb the high volume of foreign exchange, three major patterns in handling petrodollars were adopted by most of the OPMCs: Rapid and significant increase in import of manufacturing goods; military expenditures, and foreign investments

Since the infrastructure and technical expertise of OPMCs was inadequate, the oil revenues could not be internalized sufficiently to improve their economic structure. Therefore, a large portion of surplus petrodollars was allocated to the import of consumer and capital goods and the expansion of domestic industries. Total import of OPMCs increased almost 20 fold in 10 years. The major portion of imports in most OPMCs was consumer goods. Only very few OPMCs were, however, relatively successful in the utilization of high oil revenues for economic development.

The political instability and continuous crisis in most of the poor and deprived Muslim countries, along with the lack of any sound economic order and/or planning, prevented the OPMCs from investing directly in these countries, although some of non-OPMCs have the required technical abilities.

The second pattern of recycling petrodollars took place as external reserves in form of portfolio investment in the West, mainly in international banking systems, namely American and European. The accumulated surplus dollars of only OPEC countries went up from \$67 billion in 1974 to \$345 billion in 1980. Through this pattern of capital flow another large portion of oil revenues of OPMCs found its way back to the industrialized countries. It is true that OPMCs are benefitting from their capital return; but the return is so low that it is not even in line with the rate of inflation. Thus the value of the external liquid assets of

OPMCs is continuously eroding. Furthermore the security of the investment of OPMCs under present international circumstances and inequality of partners is not reliable.

It is even worse at the time of confrontation between the partners. In 1979 the U.S government froze all Iranian assets deposited with American monetary institutions. Also due to the indigenous barrier in the present patterns the transfer, conversion and repatriation of the assets or their return are neither easy nor guaranteed.

Accumulation of the OPMCs external assets in international banking systems give these systems and those who control them tremendous power to manipulate the socio-economic situation of non-oil producing third world countries, including Muslims. No doubt considerable part of the OPMCs invested capital has found its way into the economic systems of non-OPMCs, through international agencies such as World Bank and western private institutions, and will continue to do so in the future. A close examination of the existing trade and monetary patterns shows that the financial machinery of industrialized countries of the north is the actual gainer of this process or the flow of capital. It is helping the maintenance of the world banking system. Besides, there are many political and economic conditions attached to this kind of capital flow, which are in conflict with the national interest of recipient countries.

Under the present trade pattern, this kind of recycling petrodollars and capital flow is beneficial neither to OPMCs nor to non-OPMCs. Furthermore this system did not bring together the OPMCs and non-OPMCs, although some of the Muslim countries have technical abilities to be considered in an economic cooperation. Considering all these points, it may be concluded that keeping the oil in the underground reservoir is preferred to extracting it, above and beyond the internal economic capacity.

Military Expenditure

The third means explored for recycling surplus petrodollars of OPMCs and redirecting it towards industrialized countries of the North is through the arms bazaar. Since the issue is complex and the security of subject countries is involved, comprehensive reliable data is not easy to obtain. The reported figures by no

means reflect a complete picture. Nonetheless, a glance through the available data is sufficient to make our point clear.

Table VI shows the accumulated military expenditures by Muslim countries during the period of 1975-84, its percentage of GNP and per capita for 1983. During this period, Muslim countries spent \$506 billion in military expenditures, which is 32% of the world total, minus NATO and WTO. The share of OPMCs is 84% of total Muslim countries and 27% of world total. During this period OPMCs received \$1530 billion as oil revenues of which 28% has been spent in military expenditures among the OPMCs. Algeria and Iraq have the lowest and highest military expenditure based on the percentage of their GNP. On the basis of per capita, however, Cameroon has the lowest and Saudi Arabia, the highest military expenditure.

The military expenditure in most of OPMCs was many folds higher than that allocated to health and education. In non-OPMCs, although the total military expenditure is less than that in OPMCs, as the percentage of the GNP it is still high in many of them. In most of the non-OPMC the military expenditure is also higher than that for health and education.

What is the purpose of this tremendous military expenditure? These military preparations are for confrontation with which real or fictional enemy?

It is true that Muslim must prepare themselves in accordance with the command of Allah where He says: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into hearts of enemies of God and your enemies."

«وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهَبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ»

But could Muslims, instead of developing themselves, buy arms from their enemies and the enemies of Allah to frighten them? Are the arm manufacturers and traders friends of Muslims and Islam? Besides there are a few points to be considered here:

The arm producers and traders do not permit Muslims to have access to strategic weapons and will stop sending them the same weapons, and/or their spare parts at the time of any crucial confrontation.¹ The nature of contemporary weapon systems is a dynamic one. They are being changed continuously, the new ones

replacing the old ones. Thus regardless of the amount the OPMCs spend for armaments, they are continuously confronted with the obsolescence of the toys they buy. The last point, but by no means the least one, is that most of the Muslim countries including the oil producing ones lack the technical capability required for the effective handling and maintenance of the complex weapon systems they are buying. Therefore their inefficient utilization in time of danger and war will prove counterproductive.

It may be argued that the high rate of military expenditure by the Muslim countries is meant for internal security, stability and order. No doubt every Muslim country must have security and stability and should maintain law and order. The crucial point here is definition of stability, the question is how far the people are honestly and truly enjoying relative freedom in political activities including the election of their government of choice, and to what extent the state is a true representative of its own people.

One must be naïve to undermine numerous internal and external enemies of the Muslims. But Muslims in general and leaders in particular should remember that to overcome our enemies we must let our people develop their God-given potentialities and master their own destiny. Without that all military expenditures and preparations will not be of any help at the time of crisis. Did all military expenditures help Muslims to recover one inch of their lands occupied by the enemy? During the past 20 years the Muslim world experienced three major military expeditions: The Egyptian involvement in North Yemen; the numerous confrontations with the Zionist enemy and the most recently Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980. In all of these cases, the outcome has been disastrous for Muslims: one of the immediate consequences has been the near total exhaustion of their national revenues.

From the time of the Iraq's premeditated military attack of Iran in 1980, the amount of military expenditures increased in both countries significantly. A substantial portion of their oil revenues and external reserves, as well as a large percentage of their GNP, was spent in the war. In addition, the impact of the war on neighboring Arab states has generated a sudden rise in their military expenditure. After the fall of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, there was a genuine effort by the new Iranian government to reduce military expenditure and

instead concentrate towards a new economic order and development. The war, however, interrupted such efforts; the ratio of military expenditure to oil revenue by Iran was 63% in 1978, which dropped to 29% after the revolution in 1979. After the war it went up to 80% in 1981 and declined to 29% in 1983. The same ratio by Iraq was 39% in 1978 which went up uninterruptedly and reached 142% by 1983⁽¹⁾. The total cost of war is estimated at \$310 billion

1. One example is the case of Turkey and Cyprus, as Mr. Recai Kutan reported in his presentation.

for Iran² and \$176 billion for Iraq. The total oil revenues for both countries from commencement to 1985 amounted to \$364 billion. Thus the cost of war already exceeded by \$122 billion the entire oil revenues of both countries. Who benefited from this war, obviously arm producers and traders in industrialized countries in both eastern socialist countries and western capitalists? They are the only beneficiaries, both during the war by selling weapons to both sides, and after the war from the reconstruction of war damages.

To conclude, one may say that the nature of the existing pattern of oil extraction and flow of surplus capital is such that an inequality has resulted between the OPMCs and industrialized countries and the dominance of non-Muslims over Muslims, a phenomenon in contradiction with Islamic principles. This pattern must either be changed or the Muslim countries refrain from it and create their own pattern.

Now, let us see whether the oil revenues have helped the development of the Muslim world and if it so, in what way and to what extent. For this purpose, the analysis of a few economic and social development indicators will be adequate. I have already commented on some of the basic indicators such as population, GNP in Muslim countries.

Now I turn to some other development indicators.

Table VII shows central government expenditures in Muslim countries as a percentage of the total expenditures in 1983. The figures indicate that in most Muslim countries, with few exceptions, defense expenditure is higher than that appropriated for education and health.

Table VIII shows health related indicators such as mortality rate

and population per physician, nurses and hospital beds in Muslim countries. During the past 20 years the health indicators in many Muslim countries have relatively improved, but in all Muslim countries are still below the World Health Organization (WHO) standards. The infant mortality rate is an indication of hygiene, nutrition, maternal health and access to medical care. Among the OPMCs, Brunei, Kuwait, and Malaysia have the lowest and Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have the highest infant mortality rates.

1. Al Nasrawi, Abbas, "Economic Consequences of Iraq-Iran War", Third World Quarterly, Vol 8, No3, 1986

2. Keyhan Daily Newspaper (Persian), No.12840, 30 Shahrivar 1365 (September 21, 1986)

In some of the OPMCs the estimated population per physician, nursing person, and hospital bed improved, in some others such as Cameroon, Indonesia and Nigeria the ratio is very high. In non-OPMCs the figures indicate a very gloomy medical picture. The sad part of the reality is not that millions of Muslims do not have access to proper medical care, but whether there is any plan for change in the foreseeable future?

In a religion that considers hygiene as a part of faith

«النظافة من الإيمان»

And says that a healthy mind is in healthy body,

«عقل سالم در بدن سالم است»

How are these unacceptable conditions tolerated?

A general view of basic education in the Muslim world is given in Table I. According to this data more than 50% of Muslims are illiterate. The ratio is much higher among Muslim females. Among the OPMCs, Nigeria with 58% has the highest rate among both males and females. Egypt has the highest number of illiterate females (70%). In most non-OPMC the illiteracy rate is higher than that in OPMCs. It may be of interest to mention that in Venezuela and Ecuador, the two non-Muslim members of OPEC, the illiteracy rate is 13% and 17%, respectively. In many Muslim countries the illiteracy rate among females is more than 90% (North Yemen with 97% has the highest) considering the value of family in Islam and the sensitive position and role of women in family and in raising children, the high illiteracy of Muslim

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females must be considered a public disaster in the Muslim world.

Table IX also shows that in most of the OPMCs the number of males or females of primary school age enrolled in primary school has improved during the past 20 years.

Thus in 1983, with the exception of two countries, almost all Muslim children in OPMCs had enrolled in primary school. In non-OPMC's however a large percent of Muslim children could not enroll in primary school. In all Muslim countries the number enrolled in secondary school drops sharply. In OPMCs only 50% of Muslim youngsters find their way to schooling. In non-OPMC the situation is worse. In a number of Muslim countries 80% of Muslim youth is not able to attend secondary school.

The enrollment for higher education in most of the OPMCs is less than 10% of the age group. In Nigeria it is 2%, and in Qatar 19%. In most of the non-OPMCs, the rate of enrollment is less than 5%.

The education related indicators clearly show that the present situation of science, knowledge and education in the Muslim world is far from acceptable. The first revelation to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was: recite «اقرأ».

Allah S.T. is the one who taught (the use of) the pen:

(علم الذي بقلم) and swore by the pen: “Noon, by the pen and by the(record) which (men) write. «ن والقلم و ما يسطرون»

And God states clearly: “Say: Those who know and those who do not know, are those equal?”

«قل هل يستوى الذين يعملون و الذين لا يعلمون»:

And the prophet (PBUH) said: “Seek knowledge from cradle to grave”

«اطلبوا العلم من المهد الى اللحد»؛ «طلب العلم فريضة على كل مسلم و مسلمة»

To seek knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim men and women.

Thus the ta'lim (تعليم) teaching and ta'alum (تَعَلُّم) learning has a very high value in Islam.

The early Muslims, by following the Islamic values concerning education and knowledge, created one of the great civilizations of

the world and founded a number of basic sciences. Then what has happened to Muslims and why is it, that despite all our God-given wealth and contrary to Islamic teaching and historical experiences, contemporary Muslims are far behind in education and science? Are the quantity and quality of health and education facilities in the Muslim world acceptable, tolerable or defensible?

Allah (s.t.) did not deprive Muslims from his bounties. During the 1963-84 period the Muslim world received \$1700 billion as oil revenue. How was it spent? Was not a great part of it wasted? Did we use it wisely in the way Allah may be pleased with us? Allah S.T says: "Oh, ye who believe! Eat not your property among yourselves in vanities." IV-29

«يا ايهاالذين آمنوا لا تاكلوا اموالكم بينكم بالباطل، ولا توتوا السفهاء اموالكم التي جعل الله لكم قياما»

"To those weak of understanding make not over your property which God hath made a means of support for you".IV-5

A Glimpe into the Future of the Oil Market

Despite the present gloom in the oil market, the future is promising. The future outlook indicates an inevitable increase in global oil demands and upward adjustment in oil prices. It is predicted that in the early 90's the demands of non-communist market for oil will go up from today's 44 million barrels /d and the price will go up to probably \$25/barrel. If this happens it means another chance for the Muslims. Considering the depleting nature of oil reserves, one day, sooner or later, oil will lose its top position among energy sources. Therefore the predicted change in the oil market probably will be the last chance the Muslims will have.

During the two previous "shocks" in the oil market during 1974-79 and 1980-85, the OPMCs were not prepared to use it for the wellbeing of either themselves or the Muslim Ummat. They almost wasted the opportunity totally. Now they have a few years' time to think and correct the past policies and prepare themselves. If they learn from the failure of the unscrupulous and lavish practice and policy of the past and if they consider to harmonize their actions in according with the best interests of the Muslim Ummat of which they are a members, then there will be reason to

be hopeful for the future development; at least to exchange one barrel of oil with one barrel of technology and industrial development. Instead of buying and compiling weapons, they should build schools, universities, and hospitals, create learning facilities and eradicate illiteracy. Let Muslims develop their God given potential.

Against such a dark background, it would be encouraging to organize an international conference on the economic integration of the Muslim world and seriously examine and discuss issues of high priority, to consider topics such as the Islamic common market, common industrial planning, Islamic monetary systems, world Muslim economic blocs and oil in the Muslim world; that would indeed be a healthy indication of a sense of direction in the Muslim world. In other words it would be a trend towards realization of the ultimate goal: the Ummat. This means that despite the divergence among Muslims in the form of national entities, practical and suitable devices can be formulated to integrate the Muslim world, and begin the process of unity. This is a challenge as well as a mission confronting Muslim scholars and intellectuals. The time to act is now.

Dear Brothers: Finally we should know that no matter what course of action we may take, we should not follow East or West blindfolded, or use them as criteria. Otherwise we will very soon be as corrupt and brutal as they are. We should remember that ultimate salvation is to submit to the will of Allah and follow His command. And be sure that:

«ان الله لا يغير ما يقوم حتى يغيروا ما بانفسهم»

May Allah S.T include us all in His mercy and help us to do what will please Him and benefit Muslims throughout the world.

Was's alamu Alaikum wa Rahmatollah

Table I – 1984⁽¹⁾ Estimated World Muslim population,
GNP and GNP Per capita in Muslim Countries

Country ⁽²⁾	Population (million)	GNP (million)	\$ GNP per capita
Algeria	21.265	50.680	2380
Bahrain	0.407	4.260	10480

Brunei	0.216	n.a ⁽³⁾	n.a ⁽³⁾
Cameroon	9.868	8.000	810
Egypt	46.172	33.340	720
Gabon	0.812	2.830	4100
<i>Country</i>	<i>Population (million)</i>	<i>GNP (million)</i>	<i>GNP per capita</i>
Indonesia	158.907	82.400	540
Iran	43.815	114.920 ⁽⁴⁾	2650 ⁽⁴⁾
Iraq	15.164	33.190 ⁽⁴⁾	2185 ⁽⁴⁾
Kuwait	1.790	27.670	15410
Libya	3.620	29.790	8230
Malaysia	15.206	30.280	1.990
Nigeria	96.816	74.120	770
Oman	1.186	7.380	6230
Qatar	0.292	6.020	20600
Saudi Arabia	10.833	116.380	10740
Syria	9.927	18.460	1870
Tunisia	7.068	8.840	1250
U.A.E.	1.277	28.480	22300
TOTAL	444.641	679.930	1530
Afghanistan	17.222	n.a	n.a
Albania	2.900	n.a	n.a
Bangladesh	98.012	12.360	130
Benin(Dahomy)	3.921	1.060	270
Central AFR.REP	2.534	680	270
Chad	4.900	n.a	n.a
Ethiopia	42.019	4.780	110
Gambia	0.712	180	260
Guinea	5.948	1.810	300
Guinea Bissau	0.877	160	180
Ivory Coast	9.876	6.030	610
Jordan	3.372	4.340	1.710
Lebanon	2.635	n.a	n.a
Madagascar	9.712	2.600	270
Mali	7.341	1.060	140
Mauritania	1.664	750	450
Morocco	21.347	14.340	670

Niger	6.252	1.190	190
Pakistan	92.411	35.420	380
Senegal	6.393	2.440	380
Sierra Leon	3.668	1.120	300
<i>Country</i>	<i>Population (million)</i>	<i>GNP (million)</i>	<i>GNP per capita</i>
Somalia	5.231	1.360	260
Sudan	21.467	7.360	340
Tanzania	21.489	4.460	210
Togo	2.928	730	250
Turkey	48.266	57.810	1200
Uganda	14.325	3.290	230
Yemen,N.	7.790	3.940	510
Yemen,S.	2.021	1.130	560
Macao, Madives, Afras &Issas, Seychelles, Federal Cyprus, Timor,& Comoros territories:	1.328	n.a	n.a
Muslim Minorities in Asia, Africa & Europe	245.000	n.a	n.a
Total	713.561	170.400	388

- Total Muslims: 1.158.202.000
- Percent of oil producing: 38.4; Percent non-oil producing: 61.6
- Total World : 4.700
- Percent of Muslims: 24.6

Notes:

1. The population and GNP's are from Bank Atlas, 1986.
2. Muslim countries are listed according to: Monzer Kahf, International Trade Patterns of the Muslim Countries in the Muslim World and the Future Economic Order, Islamic Council of Europe, 1979.

M. Kahf has used the following criteria to define a Muslim country:

a. The distribution of population according to their religion as published by the Muslim Students Association “The Muslim Population of the World, 1969, U.S.A.”

b. Countries whose majority are Muslims are included although the government may not be in the hands of Muslims.

c. Muslim countries whose economics are integral parts of other countries are not included, such as Turkistan, Kashmir and Etc.

3. OPEC ASB, 1984

*Table II- Estimated Proven Crude Oil
and Gas Reserves of Muslim Countries by 1-1-1986*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Oil 10⁶ bbl</i>	<i>Gas 10⁹ cuft</i>
Algeria	8820	107080
Bahrain	155	7103
Brunei	1480	7400
Cameroon	555	3880
Egypt	3850	7060
Gabon	520	420
Indonesia	8500	35600
Iran	47876	470000
Iraq	44110	29000
Kuwait	89774	32500
Libya	21300	21390
Malaysia	3100	52700
Nigeria	16600	47000
Oman	4000	6000
Qatar	3300	14800
Saudi Arabia	168800	121000
Syria	1440	1240
Tunisia	1800	4200
U.A.E.	32990	146300
Neutral Zone	5380	8210
Others	1009 ⁽²⁾	28490 ⁽³⁾
TOTAL	460080	1281573

Notes:

1) Source: Worldwide Oil and Gas at a Glance 1986, all reserve figures are reported as proved reserved recoverable with

present technology and prices.

2) Figure is for Pakistan, Turkey, N. Yemen, Benin Morocco and Sudan.

3) Figure is for Pakistan, Turkey, Tanzania and Bangladesh

Table III-Proven Crude Oil and Gas Reserve of Muslim Countries as Compared with other Countries and World total (1986)

	<i>Oil 10⁶bbl</i>	<i>percent</i>	<i>Gas (10⁹cuft)</i>	<i>percent</i>
Muslim countries	460080	65.7	1.281.573	36.7
Communist	81370	11.6	1.546.000	44.5
Other	158691	22.7	656.487	18.8
World total	700141	100	3.484.060	100

Source: World Wide Oil and Gas at a Glance. 1986

Table IV-Crude Oil Production and Export in Muslim Countries:

Country	Com mence ment year	Cumulative bbl to July 1, 1985 ⁽¹⁾ 10 ⁶	Production Ave. First 6 mo. 1985 ⁽¹⁾ bbl/d	Export 1984 ⁽²⁾ bbl/d
Algeria	1958	6953.7	647.000	181.600
Bahrain	1932	750.0	418.000	n.a ⁽³⁾
Brunei	1928	1831.1	126.947	160.000
Cameron	1976	219.4	133.000	n.a
Egypt	1954	3491.6	876.000	229.800
Gabon	1957	1097.8	150.000	139.200
Indonesia	1893	11229.5	1.234.000	876.300
Iran	1913	33915.3	2.198.000	1.487.800
Iraq	1927	17230.9	1.298.000	856.000
Kuwait	1938	21630.6	857.000	606.200
Libya	1959	15163.1	1.046.000	912.200
Malaysia	1911	1252.3	458.000	307.400
Nigeria	1958	10512.0	1.487.748	1.094.100
Oman	1962	2100.1	484.000	394.300
Qatar	1940	764.9	294.000	356.800
Saudi Arabia	1938	50296.1	3.227.000	3.155.100

Syria	1959	830.1	161.683	120.000
Tunisia	1964	831.1	110.585	n.a
U.A.E.	1962	9256.1	1.128.364	1.036.700
Neutral zone	1953	3983.0	396.500	
Others		538.2	78.751	
TOTAL		192.921.9	29.824.128	11.753.500

Notes:

- 1) Worldwide Oil and Gas at a Glance(1986)
- 2) OPEC ASB, 1984

*Table V – Oil Producing Muslim Countries Revenues from Oil ⁽¹⁾
Million \$*

Country	1963-84	1975-84
Algeria	80,942.6	74454
Bahrain	n.a. ⁽²⁾	n.a.
Brunei	n.a.	n.a.
Cameroon	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt	n.a.	n.a.
Gabon	11,331.0	11257
Indonesia	90,956.0	87070
Iran	205,602.0	194608
Iraq	134,803.4	127622
Kuwait	119,996.2	115213
Libya	134,978.3	124873
Malaysia	n.a.	n.a.
Nigeria	135,570.8	130,895
Oman	n.a.	n.a.
Qatar	38,570.0	32566
Saudi Arabia	603,404.0	518113
Syria	n.a.	n.a.
Tunisia	n.a.	n.a.
U.A.E.	129,748.5	128628
TOTAL	1,674,527.8	1.545,299.

Notes:

- 1) OPEC ASB, 1983 and 1984

*Table VI – Military Expenditure in Muslim Countries
(in constant price figures)*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total 1975-84 (\$10⁶)</i>	<i>Percent 1983 GNP</i>	<i>Annual per person (\$)</i>	
Algeria	8052.0	1.8	37.9	
Bahrain	1476.6	6.1	362.8	
Brunei	1607.7	n.a.	744.3	
Cameroon	879.9	1.4	8.9	
Egypt	24565.0	8.7	53.2	
Gabon	615.3	2.9	75.8	
Indonesia	22205.0	3.5	14.0	
Iran	79828.0	13.3	202.4	1975-83
Iraq	14953.0	33.7	142.0	1975-81
Kuwait	10356.0	6.7	719.0	1975-81
Libya	21004.0	7.3	729.2	1975-82
Malaysia	14525.0	7.1	95.6	
Nigeria	24273.0	2.1	25.1	
Oman	10662.0	25.60	888.5	
Qatar	n.a	2.6	535.6	
Saudi Arabia	163551.0	18.2	1533.0	
Syria	18341.0	14.3	185.2	
Tunisia	2078.7	5.3	27.0	
U.A.E.	8046.6	8.9	787.6	1975-82
TOTAL	427,016.8	-	-	

A-Oil Producing

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total 1975-84 (\$10⁶)</i>	<i>Percent 1983 GNP</i>	<i>Annual Per Person</i>
Afghanistan	414.6	n.a	5.0
Albania	1092.3	n.a	41.8
Bangladesh	1897.3	2.0	1.9
Benin (Dahomy)	151.6	n.a.	4.8
Central AFR.REP	103.0	n.a.	5.8
Chad	124.8	n.a	-
Ethiopia	2391.0	10.4	7.11

Gambia	n.a.	n.a.	-
Guinea	n.a.	-	-
Guinea Bissau	n.a.	-	-
Ivory Coast	n.a.	-	-
Jordan	4759.0	13.7	141.1
Lebanon	2048.1	13.3	86.4
Madagascar	525.5	2.3	7.7
Mali	331.4	n.a.	5.6
Mauritania	534.1	n.a.	53.5
Morocco	10550.0	9.8	49.4
Niger	72.6	n.a.	11.7
Pakistan	14756.0	6.9	16.0
Senegal	589.1	n.a.	10.2
Sierra Leon	87.1	n.a.	3.5
Somalia	851.4	9.7	18.2
Sudan	2149.0	3.4	10.0
Tanzania	1862.0	n.a.	12.4
Togo	180.4	n.a.	7.2
Turkey	29798.0	4.9	61.7
Uganda	953.0	n.a.	16.3
Yemen,N.	2457.0	17.9	39.4
Yemen,S.	843.4	n.a.	51.6
Total	79502.9	170.400	388

- World Armaments and Disarmament. Sipri year Book 1985
- Britannica, Book of the year 1986
Total Muslims (A+B) 506519.7
World Total (Minus NATO+WTO) =1595050
Muslims as % of world total 31.8%

C- Non Muslims

Notes: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1985

Table VII-Central Government Expenditure in Muslim Countries as Percentage of the Total Expenditure in 1983 ⁽¹⁾

A-Oil Producing

Country	Education	Health	Defense
Algeria	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Bahrain	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Brunei	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Cameroon	3.2	3.7	9.6
Egypt	10.7	2.8	15.7
Gabon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Indonesia	9.4	2.2	11.7
Iran	13.9	5.7	8.7
Iraq	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Kuwait	10.1	6.2	13.3
Libya	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Malaysia	23.4	6.8	18.5
Nigeria	4.5	3.6	40.2
Oman	7.4	3.5	51.3
Qatar	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Saudi Arabia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Syria	11.3	1.4	37.2
Tunisia	30.5	7.4	4.9
U.A.E.	9.8	7.7	43.2

B- Non- Oil Producing

<i>Country</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Defense</i>
Afghanistan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Albania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bangladesh ⁽²⁾	14.9	5.0	5.1
Benin (Dahomy)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Central AFR.REP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Chad	14.8	4.4	24.6
Ethiopia	14.4	5.7	14.3
Gambia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Guinea	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Guinea Bissau	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ivory Coast	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Jordan	11.5	3.6	25.6
Lebanon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Madagascar ⁽²⁾	9.1	4.2	3.6
Mali	10.1	2.5	7.9
Mauritania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Morocco	18.6	2.9	14.6
Niger	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Pakistan	3.1	1.0	34.8
Senegal	17.6	4.7	9.7
Sierra Leon	14.8	6.2	4.2
Somalia ⁽²⁾	5.5	7.2	23.3
Sudan	6.1	1.3	9.5
Tanzania	17.3	7.2	11.9
Togo	19.6	5.7	6.8
Turkey	12.5	1.8	13.2
Uganda	12.9	4.6	17.0
Yemen,N.	16.6	4.9	36.7
Yemen,S.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

C- Non Muslims

<i>Country</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Defense</i>
India	1.9	2.4	20.0
Venezuela	19.1	8.6	5.2
Ecuador	26.0	7.5	10.6
U.K.	2.6	12.2	16.7
U.S.A	1.9	10.7	23.7

Notes:

1. World Development Report 1986
2. Figures are for 1972

Table VIII: Health Related Indicators in Muslim Countries

A-Oil Producing

<i>Country</i>	<i>Infant Mortality Rate(1983)⁽¹⁾</i>	<i>Population per⁽²⁾</i>		
		<i>Physician</i>	<i>Nurse</i>	<i>Hospital bed</i>

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Algeria	107	2780	1182	406
Bahrain	36	991	397	329
Brunei	17	390	455	390
Cameroon	116	13681	2284	372
Egypt	102	815	790	500
Gabon	111	2560	n.a.	129
Indonesia	101	11320	2554	1787
Iran	100	2630	1160	640
Iraq	71	1790	2250	532
Kuwait	29	600	180	238
Libya	91	660	360	201
Malaysia	29	3920	1390	370
Nigeria	113	10540	2420	1251
Oman	121	1680	440	492
Qatar	36	1333	644	733
Saudi Arabia	101	1800	730	645
Syria	56	2160	1370	904
Tunisia	83	3620	950	469
U.A.E.	44	720	390	234

B-Non oil producing

Country	Infant Mortality	Population per		
		Physician	Nurse	Hospital bed
Afghanistan	n.a.	13467	18243	3798
Albania	42	966	426	156
Bangladesh	132	9010	19400	4545
Benin	148	16980	1669	704
Central AFR.REP	142	23090	5.8	616
Chad	142	47889	-	1278
Ethiopia	142	88120	7.11	2787
Gambia	191	11632	-	815
Guinea	158	8100	-	592
Guinea Bissau	158	7316	-	529
Ivory Coast	121	15234	-	589

Jordan	62	1170	141.1	1230
Lebanon	n.a.	260	86.4	260
Madagascar	66	9940	7.7	505
Mali	148	25380	5.6	1743
Mauritania	136	19737	53.5	2752
Morocco	98	17230	49.4	848
Niger	139	37238	11.7	1576
Pakistan	119	3320	16.0	1746
Senegal	140	13060	10.2	901
Sierra Leon	198	17670	3.5	884
Somalia	142	15360	2550	569
Sudan	117	9070	1440	1091
Tanzania	97	19016	2754	562
Togo	112	18550	1640	739
Turkey	82	1500	1240	474
Uganda	109	22180	2000	689
Yemen,N.	152	7070	3440	1838
Yemen,S.	137	7120	820	711

- World Development Report 1986
- 1982 Statistical Year Book, United Nations, New York 1985

Table IX: Education Related Indicators in Muslim Countries
A- Oil Producing

Country	Percent Illiteracy 1985			No. of Enrolled as % of Age Group					
	M/F	M	F	Primary		Secondary		Higher Ed.	
				65	83	65	83	65	83
Algeria	50.4	37.0	63.1	68	94	7	43	1	5.0
Bahrain	27.3	20.7	35.9	-	100	-	77	-	5.9
Brunei	-	-	-	n.a.		n.a.	-	-	-
Cameron	43.8	31.6	55.3	-	108	n.a.	21	-	n.a.
Egypt	55.5	41.4	69.8	75	88	26	58	7	16.0
Gabon	38.4	29.8	46.6	-	118	-	23	-	3.3
Indonesia	25.9	17.0	34.6	72	115	12	37	1	4.0
Iran	49.2	37.7	61.0	63	101	18	40	2	4.0
Iraq	10.7	9.8	12.5	74	106	28	53	4	10.0

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Kuwait	30.0	13.4	36.9	116	95	52	83	-	14.0
Libya	33.1	18.6	50.2	78	-	14	-	1	11.0
Malaysia	26.6	19.1	34.0	-	99	-	49	-	4.5
Nigeria	57.6	46.2	68.5	32	98	5	-	-	2.0
Oman	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	83	-	28	-	-
Qatar	48.9*	48.8*	49.1*	-	103	-	72	-	18.7
Saudi Arabia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	24	69	4	36	1	9
Syria	40.0	24.1	56.7	78	105	28	56	8	16
Tunisia	45.8	32.2	59.4	91	113	16	33	2	5.0
U.A.E.	46.5	41.6	61.9**	-	95	22	54	-	6

B-Non oil Producing

Country	Percent Illiteracy 1985			No. of Enrolled as % of Age Group					
	MF	M	F	primery		secondary		Higher Ed.	
				65	83	65	83	65	83
Afghanistan	76.3	61.6	92.2	16	14*	2	8	-	1.5
Albania	n.a.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bangladesh	66.9	56.7	77.8	49	62	13	19	1	4
Benin	74.1	63.3	84.3	-	67	-	22	-	2.0
Ethiopia	63.0	n.a.	n.a.	-	46	-	13	-	0.6
Central AFR.REP	59.8	46.7	71.4	-	74	-	16	-	1.1
Chad	74.4	59.5	89.1	-	38	-	6	-	-
Gambia	74.9	64.4	84.9	-	68	-	19	-	-
Guinea	71.7	60.3	82.8	-	36	-	-	-	-
Guinea Bissau	68.6	53.8	82.7	-	63	-	10	-	-
Ivory Coast	57.3	46.9	68.9	-	79	-	19	-	-
Jordan	25.0	13.4	36.9	95	100	38	78	2	33.0
Lebanon	23.0	14.3	31.1	106	111*	26	62*	14	28.9
Madagascar	32.5	26.3	38.4	-	-	-	-	-	4.2
Mali	83.2	77.1	89.0	-	24	-	7	-	0.9
Mauritania	82.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	37	n.a.	12	-	n.a.
Morocco	66.9	55.2	78.3	57	79	11	29	1	6
Niger	86.1	80.6	91.4	-	27	-	6	-	0.4
Pakistan	70.4	60.1	81.4	40	49	12	16	2	2.0
Senegal	71.9	62.8	80.9	-	53	-	12	-	2.2

Sierra Leon	70.9	62.2	78.7	-	45	-	14	-	0.6
Somalia	88.4	81.6	98.5	-	21	-	14	-	-
Sudan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	50	-	18	-	-
Tanzania				-	87	-	3	-	0.4
Togo	59.3	46.5	71.5	-	102	-	24	-	1.7
Turkey	25.8	14.1	37.5	101	112	16	38	4	7.0
Uganda	42.7	30.3	54.7	-	57	-	8	-	0.6
Yemen,N.	86.3	73.1	96.9	9	65	1	9	-	1.0
Yemen,S.	58.6	41.4	74.8	23	67	11	19	-	-

C- Non Muslims

	Illiteracy	No.of enrolled as % of age group								
				prim e				Secon.	Hig.	Ed.
		1985								
		MF	M	F	65	83	6 5	83	65	83
India	56.5	42.8	71.7	74	85	2 7	34	5	9	
Japan	None	None	None	100	100	8 2	94	13	30	
China	30.7	17.6	44.5	89	104	2 4	35	-	1	
Hungary	1.1	0.7	1.5	101	101	6 3	74	13	15	
Venezuela	13.1	11.6	14.5	94	105	2 7	43	10	17	
Ecuador	17.6	15.0	20.2	91	115	1 7	53	3	35	
U.K.	n.a.	-	-	92	101	6 6	85	12	20	
U.S.A	0.5	-	-	-	100	-	-	40	56	
U.S.S.R	0.2	-	-	103	106	7 2	99	30	21	

Notes: 1- UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1985

40. Difficult Choices Ahead

Inquiry Magazine, November 1986

To realize the goal of a united Ummah, economic integration is essential. M. Iqbal Asaria reports on a conference held in Istanbul under this theme.

The choice of Istanbul and of the Middle East Trade and Export Centre (OTIM) for the Islamic Council's Conference on Economic

Integration of the Muslim World held from 11-12 October was an apt one. Turkey, at the moment is torn between two worlds. Westernization and the legacy of Ataturk draw it towards Europe, whilst the desires of its Muslim population and trade realities make it bend towards the Muslim east.

The first session was opened by Salem Azzam of the London-based Islamic Council, introducing the theme of the conference and calling for Turkey to take its rightful place amongst the community of Muslim states. Referring to President Evren he said, "As chairman of the Organization of Islamic Conference's Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation, President Evren has stressed his interest in creating a self-reliant and prosperous Islamic community."

The rest of the first session was devoted to addresses by Sayyid Sadiq al-Mahdi of Sudan, Rauf Denktash of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar of the Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan. Sayyid Sadiq al-Mahdi alluded to the theme of the conference and stressed the need for working out a practical and realistic strategy for achieving economic integration. Mere emotions were not sufficient. Taking the example of the introduction of the Shar'a, he said that the implementation of it without modifications to take account of changed realities was a sure recipe for disaster. Indeed, he said Islam's enemies might consider it the best way to abort the movement for the restoration of the Shari'a in Muslim countries. He then referred to the food shortage in the Sudan, and said that was one area where cooperation between Muslim countries would obviate the need for Muslim leaders to go with a begging bowl to non-Muslims and also sacrifice their sovereignty in the process.

Both Rauf Denktash and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar drew the biggest cheers from the crowd, clearly giving a clue to the emotional attachment of the Turkish Muslims to the Turkish Cypriot and Afghan issues. Both strayed from the theme but argued that the cold shoulder given to them by Muslim countries did not augur well for cooperation of any kind let alone economic integration.

Professor Mohammed Hashim Awad, of Khartoum University analyzed the pros and cons of economic cooperation and called for

caution and gradualism in trying to realize this worthy sentiment. Dr Abdul Aziz Jalloh, reading a paper on behalf of Dr A O Abodu of the Islamic Development Bank, gave a wealth of detail on the work of Bilateral and Multilateral Financing Schemes and Institutions in the Muslim World. He argued that for greater economic unity, these institutions should be strengthened and their funds better distributed.

Perhaps the most moving paper was presented by Professor Beshir Hamitogullari of the Faculty of Political Science, of Ankara University, towards the end of the first day. Professor Beshir argued that both the EEC (European Economic Community) and the COMECON were primarily ideological units, and their formation was inspired by ideological considerations. He outlined the role of the Vatican in the formation of the EEC and the Communist ideology in that of the COMECON. As such, he argued, any Muslim country desiring to join either would have to make ideological compromises. Since Islam was a comprehensive doctrine, this would be a path strewn with pitfalls. Very subtly and very ably Professor Beshir had questioned Turkey's application for full-scale membership of the EEC. The audience, some 2000 strong, was left in no doubt that the choice between a Muslim bloc and the EEC was mutually exclusive.

Cevat Ayhan and Recai Kutan, both office holders during the Melli Selamat Party's participation in the coalition government, examined Muslim attitudes to heavy industry and planning. Drawing on their experiences, they showed how a Muslim bloc could excel in these fields. They also questioned the wisdom of Turkey's joining the EEC, especially as it would preclude any meaningful cooperation with the Muslim world.

In a well researched and ably delivered paper, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, one time Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, analyzed the question of oil in the Muslim World. He showed that the Muslim world was well-endowed with natural and mineral resources. It had the highest oil and gas resources still to be tapped. Dr Yazdi then analyzed the extent of the oil wealth accruing to the Muslims. He followed this up by examining the distribution of wealth between Muslim countries, pointing out the obvious disparities between poor countries like Bangladesh and rich ones like Saudi Arabia. This spoke volumes for the realities of unity in

the Ummah, he argued, the utilization of the oil wealth also came under scrutiny. Dr Yazdi showed with ample figures that expenditure on health and education lagged seriously behind that on military hardware. In this context, talking of Iraq's premeditated invasion of Iran in 1980, he stated that the estimated losses to both sides amounted to US \$480 billion, whilst their total oil revenues from inception amounted to US \$360 billion! Examining infant mortality and literacy rates in Muslim countries, Dr Yazdi showed how this lagged behind even some poorer non-Muslim countries. As an example, the illiteracy rate amongst females in Egypt was put at 97%. Clearly, argued Dr Yazdi, Muslims had very little to be complacent about. He ended by forecasting that oil revenues would increase once more as supply and demand came back into balance, and Muslims would have one more chance to redress these shortcomings. He expressed the hope that they would not yet again fritter away Allah's bounties, as in the past.

The last session began by a talk by Dr Ziauddin Ahmad of the International Institute of Islamic Economics in Islamabad. Dr Ziauddin spoke on the Role of Islamic banks in the economic integration of the Muslim world. He concentrated on devising practical measures and institutions to overcome basic hurdles in the path of economic integration. He also argued for a more forthright approach by the Islamic banks in this context.

The final submission was by Professor Khurshid Ahmad. He tried to summarize the proceedings of the seminar under the title, *Can the Muslim World Emerge as an Economic Bloc?* Professor Khurshid argued that the geographical continuity of the Muslim world and its strategic placement between the North and the South, placed it in a unique position of strength were it to act as a unified bloc. Emotionally as well, the unifying sentiment was strong amongst Muslims. Thus the Muslim world met the criteria of desirability and capability for economic integration. He then argued for serious efforts to be made to realize this goal, and ably synthesized the views of the distinguished speakers over the previous two days. The Turkish co-hosts of the seminar were ESAM (Economic and Social Research Centre), a unit of the Refah Party. Sometimes the desire of the Party members and patrons like former party members and patrons including former NSP leader Professor Necemettin Erbakan to promote their cause became

uncontrollable and much good-will was lost. In a press conference held to brief members of the media on the conference, Professor Erbakan made what amounted to a party political statement, stating that his group would take Turkey out of the EEC should it come to power. Sheikh Umar Abdul Rahman asked an out of context question on Egypt castigated all repressive regimes. Needless to say, these were the prominent headlines in the following day's press. The basic theme of the conference and its enormous implications for the future of Turkey went by default.

The conference nevertheless succeeded in opening debate in Turkey on an issue which was taboo until recently. It was a bit short on practical studies needed for realizing economic integration, and perhaps this is an area where Muslim economists have major contributions to make if they want to capitalize on the genuine sentiments of the Muslim peoples.

41. Movement for the Liberation of Iran

"The deviations of the present rulers in Iran from the path of Islam under the

Name of Islam has definitely hurt Islam"

Islamic World Review/ July 1987

Drs Mehdi Bazargan and Ebrahim Yazdi were influential figures in the Islamic revolution in Iran and still continue to participate in politics of the Republic, albeit from the position of loyal dissidence. Gulshan and Wilhelm Dietl talked to them in Tehran on behalf of the Islamic World Review and report here on the fortunes of their movement, Nehzat-e Azad-e Iran

"Before the Revolution, there were several mourning groups in our town whose leaders would be arrested by the police before the month of Muharram every year to avoid troubles, among these leaders was one called Ahmad Dadash whose arrest the police chief believed to be ineffective; as a result he decided not to arrest him one year. This was bad for Ahmad Dadash's prestige. He kept strolling outside the police office. The police chief called him in one day and told him that it was useless and that the police would not arrest him." The May 18, 1987 issue of the militant Tehran daily *Jumhuriyeh Islami* ("Islamic Republic") carried the above story, with a thinly-veiled reference to Dr Mehdi Bazargan and his party *Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran* (Iran Freedom Movement).

When asked to comment on the story, Bazargan smiled. "It is neither an implicit threat to us nor is it meant to ridicule us. I think the leaders are seeking to stall the pressures to arrest us coming from within their own ranks by belittling our role in Iranian politics and society".

From Mossadegh to Khomeini

Dr Bazargan has had a long political career that predates the Mossadegh Revolution (April 29, 1951 –August 19, 1953) in which he played a prominent role, becoming the first managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company. After the downfall of Mossadegh, he spent several years in jail until his release in 1961, and established *the Nehzat –e -Azadi-e Iran* in the same year. The Islamic Student Society, sponsored by the party, operated from the United States of America and Europe and coordinated its activities with Khomeini during his exile in Najaf and Paris. Dr Ebrahim Yazdi was one of its activists. Dr Bazargan became the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 5, 1979 and Dr Yazdi the first Foreign Minister.

Their resignations on November 6, 1979 marked the final victory of the ullema over the modern-educated elite. The absolute personal integrity and impeccable anti-Shah credentials of Dr Bazargan and Yazdi have stood them in good stead over the turbulent, post-revolutionary years in Iran. Today, Nehzat is the only opposition party in the country whose constitution, charter, bylaws, membership, as well as funding, are officially notified to the Interior Minister.

As a dominant partner in the ruling coalition of forces in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the party contributed toward laying the foundation of the present political structure and has, therefore, continued to remain committed to the idea of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian constitution. It has scrupulously avoided contact with opposition groups like the Mujahideen-e khalg or the Fadayeen-e khalg who oppose the system per se. Rather it has consistently sought to project itself as a corrector of the deviations in the Revolution in a spirit of *amr bi-marouf wa nahyu ani munkar* (enjoining that which is Right and denying that which is Wrong.)

Dissidents

The concept of *Vilayete-e Faqih* and the war with Iraq have been the two major issues on which the party has articulated its opinions that are boldly at variance with the ruling ideology. *Nehzat* has no dispute with the concept of Velayat-e Faqih as a constitutional institution in full accord with (Shi'ite) Islamic precepts. What it questions is the usurpation of powers and functions invested in the office of *the Vali* (Governor). "Despite the fact that the Noble Apostle was the perfect man in his own infallibility and divine revelation, he, in accord with the command of the Quran which says, "and consult them in affairs the Muslims of all races and persuasions in matters of administration and warfare," it argues. We are interested to know if Velayat-e Faqih is a phenomenon and claim above prophet hood.

Islam in Iran needs to be revitalized, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi insists. He explains, prayers and fasting are Islamic but they alone do not constitute Islam. The government cannot and should not enforce Islamic rituals. It cannot stop a person on the road and ask him if he had performed his prayers before he left his home.

Letter to Khomeini

On the issue of Iran's war with Iraq, *Nehzat* addressed an open letter to Khomeini in September 1986. It spells out the Party's position in detail. The two significant points that emerge are:

"It is not a war between Islam and Kufr (infidelity) but between two oppressed Muslim nations against each other in which both are acting like the Jews of Banu Qaynaqa and Banu Nadir of whom the Quran says, 'they destroy their houses with their own hands and the hands of the believers. Take warning then, O ye who have insight.'"

"Continuation of the war is contrary to the Quran, the Sunna and the manner of the Imams. It says in the Quran, 'If the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God for He is one that hearth and knoweth.'"

In the present circumstances in Iran, the overt political activities of our party are severely restricted. It is only through discrete shows of strength that the party has been able to demonstrate its popular base. One such opportunity was provided when Ostad

Shariati, Ali Shariati's father, died in Mashhad in late April. The funeral ceremony in Mashhad and the commemoration services in Tehran turned into covert political rallies. In the meanwhile the party has already launched a move for the implementation of the fundamental rights of the citizens as enshrined in chapter three of the Constitution as a prerequisite towards free and fair elections which are due this year.

Interviews

The following is the transcript of an interview with Dr Mehdi Bazargan and Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, which was conducted over two long sessions in Tehran in May 1987.

What are the present positions of Nehzat-e-Azadi-e Iran on ideological, political and war issues in the country?

In a message to Khomeini a few months back, we elaborated our political and ideological reasons for opposing the continuation of the war. Since then we have repeatedly declared our viewpoint on the Iran- Iraq war.

As for the ideological issue, we believe that the basic crisis of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic is the domination of the so-called *Islam-e Feqihat* which claims that clerics are the authentic deputies of the Prophet and thinks that with traditional faqih (jurisprudence) they can solve present-day problems. We accept the concept of Velayat-e Faqih as a part of the Constitution (Article 110), but not as a message of the prophet.

Kindly elaborate on the activities of the party in the country.

The activities of our party, as a result of the present censorship, the atmosphere of political monopoly, and the lack of facilities and absence of legal freedoms are obviously limited. There is no security. Members, supporters and anyone opposing the present ruling groups are under pressure. In our universities, schools, industries and government offices any tendency toward opposition groups is severely suppressed. Nonetheless, we accept the risk and dare to say, write and distribute what we feel necessary and beneficial to our people, and our people in general welcome our party's positions.

Article 64 of the Constitution accords separate representation to the religious minorities like Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians.

Do you think similar provisions could be made for the ethnic minorities like Kurds, Azerbaijanis and Baluchis?

It is true that Article 64 has allocated separate representatives to all religious minorities. However, in Iran we have never had ethnic minorities that could be separated on the basis of civil rights or national advantage. According to the constitution our brothers in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan can participate in the elections for the local shuras and national parliament like all other citizens of the country.

How do you envision the development of the Iran-Iraq war in the immediate future?

The war has reached a deadlock of 'No war, No peace'. There could be extended military operations and important gains – but with no decision. The war is detrimental to Iran's future and will hurt Iran more than Iraq. The Iraqi regime is more stabilized, has been in power longer and has adopted socialism as its economy. Iran on the other hand is in a state of revolution and we have not yet decided on the kind of economy we want. The war accelerates uncertainty.



How do you assess the present and future relationships between Iran, Syria and Libya?

To the extent that Syria receives free and cheap oil from Iran the relationship is good. Iran's relations with Libya are no longer as warm as they were in the past. The future of these relations depends on the fate of the war. Libya and Syria have both announced that they will not tolerate an Iranian advance towards Basra. Indications of the strained relationship between Iran and Libya are:


Last year (1986), when the Americans attacked Libya, it was exactly the time when Robert MacFarlane came to Tehran and that seems to have angered Libya tremendously.

Qaddafi has called the war *harb almajaneen* ("lunatics' war") and has clearly denounced a future Iranian attack on Basra as a threat to Arab land.

The Russia policy toward the war is accepted and supported by the Libyans, which is to end the war.

How do you see the present relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union?

Iran is trying to attract a positive policy and improved relations with Russia by according them certain advantage like the Caspian Sea oil, the resumption of natural gas supplies and also the non-activation of the trials of the leaders of the Tudeh Party (pro-Moscow Communists). On the other hand, the Russians are continuing to support Iraq and to



provide it with the largest part of its military requirements. The announced Soviet positions on the war are different from the Iranian positions. The Soviets have repeatedly asked Iran to negotiate with Iraq to end the war - regardless of who originated it.

Could you imagine some kind of reconciliation with the US?

Apparently both have shown their readiness to improve relations. A few days ago Rafsanjani called upon the US not to support the Israeli government so much. To us it seems that he is giving repeated signals of friendship to the Americans.

Could you throw some fresh light on the power struggle between Ayatollah Montazeri and the speaker of parliament Rafsanjani?

You may ask this question to them directly.

How do you foresee the role of Islam, popular participation in politics, and the liberalization of the economy in Iran after Khomeini?

The deviation of the present rulers in Iran from the path of Islam under the name of Islam has definitely hurt Islam. One must

not forget that Islam has had confrontations all through its history and successfully overcome them. Islam will continue to play a role in Iran. The question is not the role of Islam in Iran or the Islam of feqihat. After Khomeini there will be a departure from that to a more revitalized Islam. The basic fundamentals of Islam will not be changed but will certainly be adapted to the times. For example, hijab is Islamic but hijab by itself is not Islamic. It is not an obligation of the government to make Islamic duties like fasting or praying compulsory and enforceable.

As for popular participation, it will be extended and made more effective so that people can contribute towards shaping their own destiny. The future of Iran's economic situation in depends on our political institutions. If the political atmosphere is liberalized and all the political groups participate in the political processes according to the Constitution, we believe that the way to control the current economic crisis will be paved.

Will you participate in the upcoming parliamentary election which must be held this year?

It depends, if from now on the mass media are released from monopoly and censorship, and freedom and security of the gatherings and political marches, and freedom of speech – which are all clearly elaborated in the Constitution – are guaranteed for all opposition groups, we will definitely participate in the coming elections. If, however, the present censorship and monopoly of power continues, the execution of a truly free election will be impossible. Under such circumstances, we believe, the election will be illegitimate and our party will not participate in such an election.

**42. Conference on Iranian – Lebanese Relations:
Anti-Shah Opposition in Lebanon, Presence and activities
prior to Islamic revolution**

Dr Ebrahim Yazdi

Introduction

Since the constitutional revolution of Iran in 1908, many Iranians voluntarily or otherwise were forced to migrate or to go to exile in either the neighboring countries, i.e. India, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon or other Arab or European countries. These Iranians have played

an important role in the struggle against despotic and tyrannical regimes in Iran. The socio-economic characteristics of these Iranian immigrants varied greatly according to the host country and changed from time to time. They may be categorized into two major groups. One group consisted mainly from ordinary uneducated people with very low or no income from the home country. They migrated mainly for job opportunities, and the majority of them were on one hand simple religious minded individuals, on the other hand were quite apolitical. The other group, however, were from middle and upper class, educated and to a large extent political activists, supporting the struggle for freedom, justice and equality in Iran. Most of them were actually escaping the brutality of the regime and/or finding a shelter to continue their struggle. Beginning in the 1930's when the first group of Iranian students was sent to Europe for advance studies, a new category of Iranian immigrants and new opposition groups emerged. From that time until the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iranian students abroad have been a most fluent and effective force abroad in the political struggle against the Shah's dictatorial regime.

The neighboring Arab countries, Turkey, Iran and the Indian subcontinent were among the first havens where Iranians migrated.

For years, however, most Iranian immigrants in the Arab Middle East, as well as other neighboring countries, were mainly ordinary uneducated religious people, with the exception of those who went to Najaf theological seminary in Iraq for educational purposes, and had little or no political orientation. Furthermore, since they were mostly Shiites in majority Sunni societies, they kept to their own enclosed communities with strong ties to the Shiite's clerics in either Qum in Iran or Najaf in Iraq. This particular situation proved to be very important in the later political development in the area.

As far as the political and ideological orientation is concerned, Iranians abroad may be categorized in three main groups, namely the leftist Marxists, secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists. Each one of these groups has had their own particular professional and political organization. Many of the Iranian immigrants, particularly educated ones, were influenced by the culture of their respective host country as well as by her political and ideological

movements. Each one of these categories also established political as well as organizational ties with sister movements and organizations in their host countries. As a result, they contributed to a diversity of the political and ideological orientation of the Iranian situation.

II. Iranians in Lebanon

The presence of Iranians in Lebanon is as the history of Shiites itself. The Shiite population in the Middle East has historically been concentrated mainly in four regions: Iran, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, but have spread to other countries, i.e. Pakistan in recent times. The central connecting place for Iranians and Lebanese as well as other Shiite communities, however, has been the Najaf theological school in Iraq, which is probably 900-1000 years old. For centuries, many religious motivated young men from all over Muslim-Shiite communities have been going to Najaf for the purpose of religious learning. After graduation, they dispersed to various communities either in their home countries or in new places. On the other hand, Muslim devotees from various communities have been going to Najaf to find, choose and invite a suitably religious educated clergy person for religious services in their communities. It was through this process that many Iranians landed in Lebanon and interaction between the two cultures started. After the foundation of the Qum theological school in Iran, the relation between two Shiite communities became even more pronounced.

Many Iranian clergy became prominent community leaders in Lebanon and played a very important role, not only in Shiite and/or Sunni communities in Lebanon, but rather in the history of Lebanon at large. As far as the political games in Middle East are concerned, Iranians in Lebanon have always played a role in such games, either before or after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

The Shiites were a minority in a large Sunni community, who were for the most part hostile to them. They looked to Iran where the majority is Shiites for help and support. This was true not only for Lebanese Shiites but also for their minority in all neighboring countries. On the other hand Iranian authorities, in most instances and for their own interest, responded positively to such Shiite political attitudes.

During the rise of Arab nationalism, particularly at the time of G.A. Nasser and the dispute between Iran and Egypt when Iranian minorities in Arab countries were put under political pressure, they looked to Iran for help and protection.

For example, the Shah tried very hard to play a protectorate role for Iranian communities in Arab countries as well as for Shiites in Lebanon for his own political influence in the region. The outcome of this kind of relationship was that the Shiites in Lebanon as well as other neighboring countries to a great extent became pro-Shah, at least on the surface and at the time. The situation, however, changed gradually from June of 1963. The presence and activities of Iranian political groups in Lebanon who seriously opposed the Shah's regime only intensified after the June 5th, 1963 uprising in Iran.

The June 5th, 1953 uprising, or "Giam 15 Khordad (1342) – 12 Muharram 138", as it is known in Iran, and its brutal suppression, drastically changed the attitudes and strategies of many Iranian opposition groups inside and outside of Iran. It became a turning point in the history of the Iranian struggle against the despotic regime of the Shah and western political and economical domination. Consequently Lebanon became a focal point in their activities. From 1953 to 1963, the anti-despotic movement in Iran was mainly a non-violent political movement which was trying only to restore national sovereignty, to force the Shah to implement the Constitution and to resist foreign domination. In August 1953, a joint U.S. and British military coup succeeded in overthrowing the national and popularly elected government of the late Dr M. Mossadegh who had successfully nationalized the British Oil Co. in Iran, and reinstalled the Shah's authoritarian regime. Thereafter, the Iranian freedom fighters and anti-despot forces organized the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Iran. The Free Officer's revolution in Egypt with Nasser's leadership, and later A. K. Qasem's military coup in Iraq captured the attention of many Iranian freedom fighters. Many Iranians raised their voices in support of the new regimes in Iraq and Egypt as well as in Syria. When Egypt and Syria merged together, the NRM sent a welcoming greeting to Nasser. When the British, French and Israeli armies attacked Egypt in 1957, NRM demonstrated in support of Egypt. Iranians' deep emotional attachment to the Egyptians was

such that during the 5th June uprising, the Shah directly attacked Nasser and accused Iranian anti-Shah forces of being Nasser agents. A prominent by-product of the June uprising in Iran was that many anti-Shah political groups reached the conclusion that the only way to overthrow the Shah was through armed struggle. The 5th June uprising proved that ordinary political struggle is not effective and could bear fruit, as far as the aims of struggle are concerned.

On the other hand, many political groups changed their political strategies to armed struggle and looked outside for training and necessary logistics. Leftist groups obviously considered China, Cuba and Vietnam as suitable sources. The nationalist-religious groups looked towards Muslim countries such as Egypt and Algeria. The Liberation Movement of Iran in abroad was the first group to set up training camp in Egypt for preparation of armed struggle in Iran. In the summer of 1964, members of LMI's leadership abroad, including myself, moved first to Egypt and then to Lebanon and extended our organizational network in Lebanon and Iraq.

In 1964, when I moved to Lebanon as the results of LMI's decision, Imam Musa al Sadr was leading the Shiite community in Lebanon. We were very close since both of us were students at the University of Tehran during the time of Dr Mossadegh's National Movement. He was student in Law School following graduation from Qum Theological School, while I was a student at the College of Pharmacy. He was an active member of Maktab-e-Islam, a monthly publication from Qum, and I was member of Forough-e-Elm, a monthly publication from the Muslim Students Association at the University of Tehran. After graduation, our contact was lost and I did not hear from him until my visit to Lebanon in 1964. Imam Musa Sadr belongs to one of the biggest scholarly families of Mujtaheds in not only Iran, but in the Shia world. Although he only went to Lebanon in 1959 to lead the Shiite community after the death of Sayyid Abdul Hussein Sharaf al-Din, his ancestors were from Lebanon. They had left Lebanon when Turkish oppression reached an all-time high.

Imam Musa Sadr was a true representative of the new generation of clergy who were acquainted with the particularity of the changes in Muslim societies, and were trying to find ways to

update religious thought in order to answer the new challenges and to fit the contemporary Muslim world. Since he also studied at Teheran University during the very turbulent period of time of Dr Mossadegh's national and anti-British movement and the apex of pro-Soviet communist Tudeh Party activities, he was well aware of the impotency and shortcomings of traditionalist clergy to meet these challenges. His cooperation with Maktab-e-Islam, was actually a response to new circumstances and efforts to find contemporary embodiments for original Islamic values. He was very well influenced on the one hand by the nationalist movement and on the other hand by intellectual Islamists such as the late Mehdi Bazargan, then later by Dr. Ali Shariati. When he moved to Lebanon he found an opportunity to introduce and implement his new ideas in a rather dynamic evolutionary society. Although he was the head of Shiites in Lebanon however, he very quickly showed his talent and competency in gaining the confidence and trust of all religious and political groups. He became a prominent political figure in many Muslim Middle East countries. Being in such an influential position, he was able to play a decisive role in many political events in the region. He played a very important role in reconciliation between the Shiites, Sunnis, Druze and various Christian sects. As far as the Iranian political situation was concerned, despite the fact that many Shia clergy were looking to the Shah and Iran as a source of support, he basically supported the Islamic anti-shah movement of Iran. After the arrest of Imam Khomeini in 1963, and later his exile to Turkey, the Shiite community in Lebanon along with clergy from Qum and Najaf and intellectual Muslim activists, went to Lebanon in order to either continue their fight against the Shah or just to take refuge. Imam Musa Sadr never hesitated to help and support them whenever they were in trouble with Lebanese authorities. In the summer of 1964 I moved to Lebanon with my family. At that time the LMI, Liberation Movement of Iran, abroad founded by Dr Ali Shariati, Dr Mostafa Chamran, Mr. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and myself, was very active in Europe and America. The LMI set up the Sazeman-e- Makhsous Ittehad va Amal, SAMA, or Special Organization for Unity and Action, SOUA, as an armed branch for it.

A training camp was established in a suburb of Cairo, Egypt where dedicated Muslim youth from inside Iran as well as abroad

were covertly send to be trained in guerrilla warfare and covert political organization and activity. After a year or so, we decided to leave Egypt and moved to Beirut. After many years in Lebanon, I again met Imam Musa Sadr, who was at that time leader of the Shiite community in Lebanon and was stationed in Tyr, south of Beirut. He was working very hard to unite Shiites and to gain state recognition and legal status for the High Council of Shiites. The building of a technical school in Tyr and a medical center in Beirut was being considered. I found him to be a very energetic, enlightened, unique and broad-minded example of a charismatic leader. I travelled with him to many villages south as well as in north of Lebanon. I found that many non-Shiites and non-Muslims respect him deeply as well.

In Beirut I also became acquainted with a young clergy from Najaf, Mr. S. Sajjadi. He was a supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini's anti-Shah movement. He was living in Shai'ah, a district in Beirut, with a dominant Shiite population. Being a clergy and religious orator, he was effective in the politicization of the Shiites. In Beirut, although I was involved in LMI's covert activities, I was nonetheless able to establish contact with many Iranian residents or immigrants, as well as students in Lebanese universities. There were about 120 Iranian students at AUB many of them supported by various departments of the Iranian Government and AID, the Agency for International Development, thus politically very conservative or even pro-Shah. However, a weekly Islamic meeting was organized very soon. Imam Musa Sadr's nephew, Mr. K. Sadr and Ayatollahi, Rajaii Khorasani, Korani, and Fuzat, undergraduate students in AUB were amongst the first to join. Some Iraqi students also participated, and some of the members of the MSA of AUB, after graduation, continued their education in American and European universities and received Ph.D.s, then returned to Iran. After the revolution, they became very prominent academic or political figures. One of them, Fakhri Saleh, an Iranian who finished his graduate work in England, was later arrested and executed by Saddam.

In the summer of 1966 due to some disagreements with the Egyptian government, we left Egypt. Furthermore, there was political chaos in Lebanon and Iraq, to the extent that we were forced to leave the area. The late Dr Mostafa Chamran went back

to the US. Imam Musa Sadr tried to secure a Lebanese permanent visa and teaching position for me, in order to enable me to stay in Lebanon. He was planning on building a new hospital in Beirut and hoped that by staying in Beirut I would help him in this project. He was also perusing building a technical school in Sur (Tyre), a Mediterranean port south of Beirut. Because of the political turmoil in Lebanon I left Lebanon, and went back to N.J. Later however, Imam Musa Sadr informed me that the construction of the Jabal Amil Technical School (JATS) in Tyr was finished and functioning. The management of the school was not to his satisfaction and asked me if I could introduce someone capable of properly managing the school. I recommended Dr M. Chamran. He accepted without any hesitation. Later I found out that Mr. Mehdi Bazargan had made the same recommendation. So in 1970, Chamran left the US and went to Tyre. As the head of JATS, Chamran did a fantastic job. The policy was to give services to all Shiite communities throughout Lebanon. Therefore student's enrolment was such that from each one of the villages with a dominant Shiite population, 2 or 3 students were enrolled in JATS. Soon after, political as well as ideological teachings were added to the regular technical vocational courses. The intimate cooperation between Imam Musa Sadr and Chamran however, found new dimensions. A very strong link was established between Imam Musa Sadr, with the leadership of LMI abroad, the anti-Shah clergy in Najaf, and the Muslim Students Associations in Europe and the US. Considering the political situation in Lebanon at that time, this cooperation gave anti-Shah groups access many facilities in Lebanon. Among these facilities in Lebanon were the military training camps in the south for Iranian volunteers. Furthermore, many anti-Shah Iranian groups established close links with different Palestinian organizations, including the PLO. One of the by-products of such intimate cooperation was the foundation of Al Harakat el Mahroumin HM, the movement of the deprived ones. The joint efforts between the HM and PLO became very crucial, because, as Imam Musa Sadr once said, most Shiites are deprived *in* their home, while the Palestinians are deprived *of* their home. When in 1975 the internal war erupted in Lebanon and the Israelis attacks in south Lebanon escalated, military training of students was added to the other courses in JATS, and thus the Amvaj al-

moghavemat al-Lebananieh, AMAL, or the “Waves of Lebanese Resistance”, was born.

During the Lebanon civil war, many militant Iranian Muslim groups rush to help their Shiite brothers in Lebanon and gave them all kinds of support, including financial. When a public clinic was founded by Imam Musa Sadr in Beirut during the civil war, he appealed to LMI for a physician to run the clinic. One of the members of LMI's leadership, Dr Jalil Zarrabi (pennname, Dr Hassan Wafa), a practicing physician in Chicago, left his job and went to Beirut to head the clinic. He remained until the Iranian revolution. Members of LMI's leadership abroad were not the only group that was active in Lebanon. From 1970 when several underground organizations devoted to the armed struggle to overthrow the Shah' regime became very active inside Iran, they established close contact with various Palestinian groups, amongst them Marxist-oriented groups. They held headquarters and training camps in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq as well as South Yemen.

The presence and activities of anti-Shah Iranians in Lebanon was not unknown to the Shah's secret forces, SAVAK. One of the strongest branches of the SAVAK outside the country was in Lebanon, headed by the Shah's ambassador in Lebanon.

The presence and activities of various Iranian groups in Lebanon did strongly and deeply influence the religious and political thinking of both Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims. The first translation of Shariati's books from Farsi into a foreign language was into Arabic in Lebanon (Ari Inchenin Bood Baradar: Kana ha Kaza ya Akhi). Imam Musa Sadr was himself influenced by Dr Shariati's thinking, which was reflected in his public speeches.

43. A Letter to Pope John Paul II

Written by Mehdi Bazargan and Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Nov. 20, 1992

To His Holiness Pope John Paul II

The tragedy of human suffering in Bosnia-Herzegovina has reached a level unheard of in recent history, rivaling that of Nazi Germany. Entire communities are being systematically eliminated in an overt act of genocide, based solely on their ethnic and religious identity, yet international institutions show indifference and apathy.

On behalf of the Liberation Movement of Iran and the people of Iran, we condemn these crimes committed by Serbs in the name of protecting Christianity, and also the lack of effective action by international institutions.

We request that your holiness exert all power invested in the Papal office to stop these shameful acts. Jesus Christ, may God's peace and blessings be upon him, is the messenger of God's peace and Love for all mankind. As we approach the season celebrating his miraculous birth, let us work to end the suffering of God's innocent servants and make this for them a season of peace.

Mehdi Bazargan, Former Prime Minister

Ebrahim Yazdi, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Islamic Republic of Iran

November 20, 1992

81 Ghazzali Street, Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

44. The Impact of Islamic Revolution of Iran on the Muslim World

Ebrahim Yazdi, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, January 11th, 1993

Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1979 represents popular mass uprisings in the modern history of the world. By overthrowing the Shah, Iranians ended two thousand five hundred years of absolute monarchy and two hundred years of foreign domination. This revolution also had a far-reaching national as well as international impact, which can be studied on three levels. The first level involves the effects of the revolution on Iran itself, the second on the Muslim world, and third on the world at large.

The main purpose of this presentation is to elaborate on the impact of Iran's revolution in other Muslim countries, giving due attention to certain aspects of the revolution's impact on Iran and the world as well.

I. The Revolution's Impact on Iran

Iran is experiencing historical changes. Despite deviations in its ideals and aspirations, the Revolution has yet to reach its final conclusion. In evaluation of the consequences of the Revolution one must separate the negative and undesirable political, social,

and economic deeds of the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran from that of the Revolution itself. Furthermore, a comprehension of the fundamental changes in Iran's political and social infrastructure is indispensable to any analysis of the Revolution's impact on Iran's current state.

Two institutions underwent notable changes directly brought on by the Islamic revolution. One was the complete eradication of the monarchy in Iran. The second was the change in the clerical structure and their political status. Since the pre-Islamic era, Iranian monarchs coupled with clerics formed the two major power institutions of the country. The monarchy controlled the temporal power while the clerics controlled the so-called "non-temporal" power. No monarch could survive without the support of the clerics, and any dispute between the two would end against the monarch's interest. Furthermore, the clerics seldom ruled directly.

The coming of Islam brought about a dramatic change to the traditional power structure in Iran. The collaboration between the monarch and clerics, however, continued through the Bani-Ummaya and Bani-Abbassid dynasties. In Iran, the cleric-monarch relationship was institutionalized during the Safavid Dynasty. For the first time Shia Islam became the official religion of the country. Furthermore, the monarchy became quite intimate with the Shi'ite clerics, yet the clerics never ruled directly.

As early as in 1960s a dispute between the clerics and the Shah developed. The issues of dispute were land distribution and women's political rights. The Shah not only rejected compromise with the clerics, he arrogantly attacked them as black reactionaries. On the other hand, the Shah did not pay attention to the history of the cleric-monarch relationship and the fact that in any dispute between the two, the Shah would lose and clerics win. The clerics joined the anti-despot movement of Iran and the end was the abolishment of monarchy altogether. Thus the Islamic revolution abolished one major institution that had governed Iran since its inception. The clerics, however, undermined the history that they should never rule directly. The revolution allowed Iranian clerics to assume total control of the state. The direct assumption of power by the clerics has gradually but pronouncedly eroded the institution's political and historical social influence. While this does not imply an eventual end of the clergy in individual religious

affairs, it did drastically impair clerical influence among the masses and maneuverability both politically and socially. Thus, the Revolution fundamentally changed both institutions.

Another important by-product of the Revolution is the disappearance of a single monopolizing power institution and the emergence of various diversified political and institutional structures. The Iranian revolution caused a new socio-political phenomenon to appear within post-revolutionary society, one that is a key factor in initiating a new era in Iran; which permits democratic development in Iran.

II. The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Muslim World

The Islamic revolution had a multidimensional impact on the Muslim world. Yet I will limit myself to discussing this impact in three areas. One is the impact on ordinary Muslim citizens, two is the impact on the governments of Muslim nations, and three is the impact on Islamic thought.

a. The Impact on Muslim Masses:

The Islamic revolution further expanded an awakening in the Muslim population and created a new religious consciousness, a sense of self-confidence, self-reliance, and a new sense of collective or universal Muslim identity.

For many centuries Muslims were either subjected under the unjust and despotic monarchs and rulers, or suffered from the domination of European colonial power. In both cases, the social, political and cultural circumstances created a sort of social psychology among the Muslim masses which was characterized by passiveness and indifference to social environment, alienation and self-negation, sense of helplessness and lack of self-esteem. Such social and psychological conditions, while favored and intensified by despotic rulers and colonial powers, were always a serious obstacle in the way of development of these societies.

The Iranian Revolution as an independent movement neither relied on the West nor East, yet succeeded in overthrowing one of the strongest regimes in the Muslim world. The Shah's regime was fully supported by the major superpowers, had a large and well-trained, well-equipped army and had an efficient secret police, known as Savak. Thus the Iranian revolution was an outstanding

example to be followed by other Muslim nations. The Islamic revolution, particularly when the leadership was stationed temporarily in Paris, captured the eyes and hearts of millions of Muslims throughout the world. The impact even surpassed the Muslim world and reached many oppressed people in third world countries. In Mexico, for example, a Christian priest followed the Iranian example and led a non-violent mass demonstration and gained the title of "ayatollah".

b. Politicization of Islamic Movements

The consequence in Muslim countries was the emergence of a new consciousness, a new awakening, and self- assurance among the masses. The Revolution gave them a new sense of direction; if the Iranians have done it, then we can do it too. The Islamic movements in many countries became highly politicized and radicalized. Political actions under the banner of Islam became a widespread phenomenon, shared by many actors in Muslim communities. Even some nationalist and/or leftist movements adopted the Islamic movement discourse, e.g. Al-Shab Party of Egypt.

The sudden growth and expansion of Islamic political movements in the Muslim world frightened many unpopular rulers and caused their immediate reactions in the shape of a hasty artificial Islamization. While it is true that during the last days of the Revolution street demonstrators attacked liquor shops, movie houses, night clubs, prostitute houses and large corporations representing western interests, however, the fundamental character of the Revolution was against despotism and foreign domination and for the restoration of people's sovereignty. The behavior of some street demonstrators was just a radical way of expressing their deep anger towards the regime. In some Muslim countries, e.g. Bahrain, the frustrated masses also attacked the symbols of non-Islamic social phenomena and western decadency.

c. The Impact on Muslim Governments

The Islamic Revolution of Iran definitely influenced some of the governments of Muslim countries. Some were frightened of similar events and reacted by adopting and implementing Islamic laws and Sharia. The implementation of Sharia, however, was very

superficial, limited and temporary. Some heads of governments tried to visit Iran and identify themselves with the Iranian revolution and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Although satisfying some Muslim groups, these measures did not convince the highly motivated Islamists and was considered as a sign of weakness as well as hypocrisy of the rulers. The result was more pressure by the political Islamists on the government for participation in the state machinery and Islamization of the whole government system, whatever that may mean. In a reaction to these demands, authorities in some Muslim countries rejected the idea of people's sovereignty and made an explicit claim that: "Sovereignty belong to Allah alone - La hokm va la siyadat illa lillah." Their interpretation of the sovereignty of Allah was rejection of people's sovereignty. They claimed that democracy is anti-Islamic and blasphemy. Their interpretation, however, was a way to justify their absolute rule. It is true that according to the Holy Quran absolute sovereignty belongs to none but Allah. By absolute sovereignty of Allah, it means to rule out the sovereignty of any self-appointed despot. What these ruler claim is an example of a very famous idiom that says: "Kalematul haq, yorado behal batil - The word of truth being used for the justification of a wrong idea."

Two pages are missing.

C. The Impact on the Revivalism of Islamic Thoughts:

Two events at the turn of century shocked the Muslim world. The first one was the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 in Iran. The second one was the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. Both events created tremendous debate amongst Muslim scholars, with various religious orientations on the nature of Islamic governance and of the people's sovereignty.

The aims and goals of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran became a very hot issue among clerics. Issues such as legitimacy of governance in the absence of the infallible Imam, the sovereignty of people, the concept of majority rule, and law-making by the representatives of the people were all debated among the Ullema or religious scholars. Some religious scholars seriously challenged the concept of equality of citizens and the right of ordinary layman to elect members of a lawmaking parliament. Some even claimed that since we have all laws and regulations in the Qur'an, we do not

need a legislative council. There were, nonetheless, scholars who strongly opposed absolute despotism, supported the people's sovereignty, universal suffrage and a constitutional monarchy. The same kind of debate came to surface after the Iranian revolution and some religious scholars objected to the basic concepts of republicanism. They were, however, in the minority and the political circumstances as well as the revolution's leader, Khomeini did not allow them to influence and/or stop new political developments.

The abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate of Turkey, however, mostly affected the Sunni Muslims. To many Sunni Muslims the Ottoman Caliphate was the continuation of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates. The end of Ottoman rule initiated a serious debate among Sunni scholars on the necessity of the creation of a new legitimate Islamic government and resumption of the caliphates. The old ideas, either from the Holy Qur'an and tradition of Prophet Muhammad or merely Arab traditions such as Shura or consultation and beyat or pledges, were considered or debated. According to tradition the head of state must be from among the tribe of Ghureysh or must be endorsed by them. Also these scholars insisted that Mecca should be the capital of a new caliphate. Very soon they had to discard this presumption altogether. There were no remaining members of the Ghureysh tribe. Mecca was under the control of the Saudis. The traditional concept of Shura was the assembly of trustees of community or "ahle halo val aqd", which were chosen by the Caliph. These issues have occupied the mind of many contemporary Muslim scholars throughout the Muslim world. Many contemporary Sunni scholars found these traditional practices unacceptable and unrealistic. Instead, some concluded that the modern assembly of people's representatives is an acceptable replacement for the old tradition.

As I mentioned earlier, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has enhanced the politicization of Islamic movements and as such, the issues have become more urgent. In Iran the revolution succeeded and concluded these issues in the form of a new constitution, acceptable to all factions involved. The notion of Velayat Faqih, which was advocated by the late Ayatollah Khomeini in his teaching in Najaf, was not incorporated into the first constitution drafted and approved by the Provisional Government of Mehdi

Bazargan, adopted by the Revolutionary Council and endorsed by Khomeini and other religious scholars. Although the first draft of the Constitution was revised and Velayat Faqih was incorporated into it, the basic articles reflecting the right and liberties of people and democratic nature of the Constitution remained intact. In these articles the fundamental concepts such as sovereignty of Allah and people, basic human rights of citizens, modes of establishing government and ways to remove or replace it, interactions between civil laws and religious laws were all incorporated into a new modality acceptable, feasible, and practical in a contemporary modern complicated society. As far as the institution of Velayat Faqih is concerned, post revolutionary and post Khomeini experiences clearly indicate the impracticality of such notion. It may have been practical and acceptable to many for a charismatic leader such as Khomeini himself, but charismatic leaders cannot be elected or selected. Their emergence is spontaneous as they gain their status, no one gives it to them. Although there are some discrepancies and antagonistic articles in the Constitution, the incorporation of many basic concepts of democracy in a working model has influenced political Islamists all over the world.

There are, however, some negative impacts generated by the post revolutionary events in Iran. I would limit myself to only one of these events. In Iran, similar to other Muslim countries, the Islamic revivalist movement consists mainly of two forces and/ or two distinct schools or trends. One mainly concerns intellectual Islamists. The other one concerns old-fashioned clerics. Each one has their specific characteristic way of Islamic readings, their particular audience and sphere of influence and a different interpretation and understanding of contemporary social circumstances. The clerics were capable of mobilizing the masses, while the intellectuals were the engineers of the Revolution. The Revolution succeeded only because of the close cooperation of these two forces. After the Revolution, however, the clerics, who were politicized, had ways and means to intimidate the masses, and thus no longer felt any need to cooperate with intellectual Muslims. Through political maneuvering they succeeded to monopolize power in their favor and took it exclusively in their hands, then ousted the intellectuals altogether. Such events, being far from just a relation between the two, created a very profound negative

consequence among the political Islamists and jeopardized the needed cooperation between the two in other Islamic movements.

II. The Impact of the Islamic Revolution at the World Level

Once there was a wide spread belief among western social scientists that the Islamic resurgence would die away very soon and disappear. Even after the revolution, Marxist-oriented social scientists, in accordance with Soviet views, insisted on the inevitability of a progressive Marxist revolution in Muslim countries. The Iranian revolution proved otherwise. Thus as E.F Dole puts it, "The events of the Iranian Revolution pointed up an urgent need to understand Muslim social and political movements, and how they contribute to redefining boundaries of sect, languages and nations". Many western scholars admit that traditional views towards Islam are unrealistic and should be changed. Many of them share the conclusion that, "The Iranian Revolution brought home to western policymakers and to the general public the weaknesses of conventional organization frameworks and to understanding the Middle East and Muslim societies."

Although it is true that the Iranian Revolution has stimulated interest in Islamic studies, however, as Esposito has noted, "Few observers paid attention to the modern ideas that accompanied the Revolution."

Furthermore he states, "The superficial television coverage of the Gulf War reinforced negative public perceptions of Islam to the extent that many US citizens believe that Muslims can not be dealt with rationally, so military action is needed to protect U.S. interest." Such misunderstanding was not limited to ordinary U.S. citizens, even at very high levels of policy making; distortion of Islam and misconception is still frequent.

Thus one may conclude that although the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent spread of Islamic political movements in the Muslim world has generated a genuine interest in the West and more and more fundamental studies are being pursued, however ignorance prevails. Unfortunately ignorance of Islam is now being replaced by fear of Islam. Thus Red Phobia, which is no longer justifiable, is being replaced by "Islamophobia". It is sad that many

Muslim extremists feed such false notions. Nothing is more distance from true Islam than the ugly painted picture in the west.

As Dunn, an America scholar of Islam and Muslims has stated, "Americans in particular are susceptible to this fallacy that Islam is somehow the new post-communist enemy."

45. Interview

Ms Anbarin, Senior Editor Zaman Daily Newspaper, Turkey, November 6, 1993

1. With the present economic crisis and resulting pressure on the government both from the people and the Majlis, how do you see the position of Mr. Rafsanjani is evolving? Is he getting weaker?
2. Is there an alternative to Mr. Rafsanjani? How do you evaluate his power? Does US refusal to release all Iranian assets mean undermining Mr. Rafsanjani?
3. Isn't it important for you as the opposition to ensure that Mr. Rafsanjani remains?

Answers: The failure of the government to reduce or even to contain the ever-growing economic crisis and its consequent pressure on ordinary people has drastically weakened the government position and will continue to do so.

American refusal to release Iranian assets lacks legal grounds and lawful justification. I don't know for sure the reasons for such a refusal. However it does reflect how the American attitude can influence Iranian government policy and stance towards the U.S. government.

There is an urgent need, more than ever for a drastic reduction of the social and political tension, a sort of national reconciliation, as a prerequisite for the President's plan for economic development. Implementation of such a reconciliatory policy will get the support of the main political groups. Now is the time for this.

46. A Seminar with Ebrahim Yazdi

Article by Anne Joyce, Middle East Policy, Vol. 3, 1995 (1374)

Journal Article Excerpt

A SEMINAR WITH EBRAHIM YAZDI

*Dr. Yazdi, a pharmacologist, university professor and political activist, served as deputy prime minister and foreign minister under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, resigning in protest during the hostage crisis of November 1979. He served in the Majlis (parliament) 1980-84 and is now secretary general in the opposition political party, the **Liberation Movement of Iran**. He shared his views with the Middle East Policy Council as a private citizen. His interlocutor was **Geoffrey Kemp** of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.*

DR. YAZDI: It is indeed my pleasure and honor to be here and share some of my views concerning Islamic resurgence, or Islamic revivalism and the challenges and crises confronting the Islamic movements today. Being an activist -- an Islamist, in a sense -- I have always been concerned with interaction between the West and Islam, particularly being in America and active in Islamic activities. Here in America I appreciated the necessity of healthy interaction between the world of Islam and the West. So this kind of dialogue is very important to us, and I am glad to be here. All of a sudden, the relationship between the West and Islam has come to the surface. The West must interact with the Muslim world, and the Muslims do not have any other choice but to interact with the West. I have been traveling in Muslim countries and talking with scholars, and I know that to many of us, the future of human civilization depends on healthy, normal relations between the West and Islam. There was a time when Western civilization was isolated -- in art, language, medicine -- atrophying, encapsulated and almost dying. With the impact of Islam, all of a sudden Western ci.....

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47. Science and Religion - A letter to Nature magazine

Submitted by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Nature, V 373, February 9, 1995

Sir,

The report "A Line in the Sea" by J.A. Yoder et al. (Nature 371, 689; 1994) not only attempts to explain the open ocean front phenomenon, but it also sheds light on a religious issue concerning a revealed natural phenomenon.

The Holy Book of Islam, al-Qur'an, has explained in two verses (XXV; 53 and LV; 19) the natural phenomenon call the "two adjacent seas" (Maraj al-Bahrain). According to the verses in the Qur'an, these two seas exist side by side with a boundary preventing them from mixing. Indeed, it specifies that the composition of water in these seas, especiall the salt concentrations, are quite different.

For years, Islamic scholars have had difficulty in interpreting the concept of Maraj al Bahrain. Although diverse interpretations have been offered by different scholars and a variety of natural phenomena have been used to exemplify this revealed concept, none has been satisfactory from a scholarly perspective. It seems that the advancement of knowledge and technology and recent scientific achievements have made it possible for a better understanding of this natural phenomenon brought to the attention of man through the Qur'an.

Ebrahim Yazdi
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48. Legitimacy and Governance

Transformation of Societies and Political Systems in the Middle East and North Africa: "The Peace Process and the Prospects for Democratization in the Middle East"

By: Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Secretary-General, Liberation Movement of Iran,

Bertelsmann Foundation Middle East Conference, Paris July 11-13, 1995 (21 Tyr 1374)

The topic may actually be elaborated in three parts: the peace process in the Middle East, the prospects for democratization in the Middle East, and any possible relation between the two.

Science and religion

Sir — The report "A Line in the Sea", by J. A. Yoder *et al.* (*Nature* 371, 689; 1994) not only attempts to explain the open ocean front phenomenon, but it also sheds light on a religious issue concerning a revealed natural phenomenon.

The Holy Book of Islam, al-Qur'an, has explained in two verses (XXV: 53 and LV: 19), the natural phenomenon called the "two adjacent seas" (Maraj al-Bahrain). According to the verses in the Qur'an, these two seas exist side by side with a boundary preventing them from mixing. Indeed, it specifies that the composition of water in these seas, especially the salt concentrations, are quite different.

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As for the first issue, peace, I must say, every Muslim as a matter of principle would say Salam (Welcome) to Salam (peace). But what kind of peace do we have in mind? And what price for a just and lasting peace? Nevertheless, peace without justice would not be cherished and shall not last.

In introductory remarks to the Declaration of Peace (DOP) between PLO and Israel, the hope for a just and lasting peace has been expressed. The DOP and its implementation, however, suffer from major shortcomings. It is ambiguous on such critical issues as Jerusalem, the future of a Palestinian State, or settlements and refugees. In the opinion of many of its critics, DOP promotes only the interests and power of Israel; it does not seem just, as it neglected the right of all Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. The future of Ghods-e-Sharif or East Jerusalem is left unaddressed. This city is holy for all three of the major monotheistic religions of the world: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For the Muslims, it is the site of the Farthest Mosque (Masjid-ul-Aqsa), their first Kiblah and the site of the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) ascent to heaven. To Muslims, it is the second most sacred city, after the holy city of Mecca. Therefore the fate of this city is a serious Muslim concern. Another grave obstacle in the way of a lasting peace is the continuation of Jewish settlement in the occupied area, Gaza Strip and West Bank. Consequently, as it now stands, it is doubtful that the DOP will survive. Declaration of peace between the political leaders of two fighting parties is one thing; the acceptance of peace by their people is another matter. Lasting peace will only be realized when people heart fully acknowledge that peace. DOP is mostly accepted by the Middle Eastern governments and the PLO. The DOP however lacks deep popular support in the region as well as in the Muslim world. The PLO has accepted the DOP out of frustration. Opposition to DOP, however, has not been tolerated by its main supporters. The Palestinians feel betrayed. The Muslims are very angry. On the other hand Israel has signed the DOP under international pressure. From the Israeli's behavior it appears that they are not yet ready for a just and lasting peace. The roots of their hesitation must be sought in 2000 years of a Jewish Diaspora and centuries of persecution. While for the Palestinians the future could not be worse than that they have now, the Israelis are not

sure of the future. Deep down in their psyche they are afraid that they may lose everything they have gained so far. Thus they have given the least, while gaining the most. The future of Israel, however, to a great extent depends on what she will do now and in the near future. There is a historical opportunity for peace, a just and lasting one. Many Arab and Muslim governments have accepted UN resolution 242, have recognized Israel as a reality and are willing to live with Israel in peace. According to even the Jewish historians, history testifies that the golden age of Jewish history was during the Islamic dominance. Such historical religious tolerance could be used in building a new era of religious interaction and social and economic development. That is possible. The ball is Israel's court. If and when Israel genuinely recognizes the Palestinian right to a homeland and sovereign Palestine state, and honestly implements Resolution 242, then a new era in the Middle East will commence. Israel could show its genuine desire for peace, for example, by stopping new settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, by immediate full implementation of the DOP contents, such as general elections in the occupied areas, and the formation of a new Palestinian Administration. The election is a practical and sure way for the participation of all concerned Palestinians. It seems that even those who oppose the DOP will have no choice but to participate in the election. The failure of the peace efforts will only help extremist groups.

Now let us turn our attention to the prospects for democratization in the Middle East.

Two categories or parameters, namely internal and external, are involved and must be considered. As far as the internal parameters are concerned, Middle Eastern societies, like other societies, are subject to continuous evolutionary cultural, economic, social and political changes. The old habits, norms of life, ideas, and social habits will gradually disappear and give room to new ones. These changes sometimes take place peacefully and sometimes with violence. No one, however, can stop them. Despite all these changes, the basic identity of a given society will remain intact. They are the products of clashes, confrontations and/or interaction between the forces from within as well as from without the society. Since the turn of the century, people in Middle Eastern countries have come out of their long hibernation and entered into a new era

of awakening and social consciousness. They now demand social and political changes in the area of rights and liberties of people and political participation in the government. Although the ruling class and traditionalist forces usually resist these changes, nonetheless progressive forces are gaining ground; the net result has been internal turmoil. If these societies were left alone, and external forces did not intervene in the internal clashes of two groups, progressive forces, without any doubt, would have won the battle. As far as the external parameters are concerned, three distinct periods can be isolated in the relationship between Middle Eastern societies and external forces, from the beginning¹ of this century. During the first period, the interaction between Western countries and Muslim as well as Middle Eastern countries, went far beyond confrontation and turned into complete domination of Muslim countries by Western colonial powers. As a result, Western colonial powers took the side of reactionary forces, changing the balance of internal power in their favor and suppressing progressive forces. Thus the normal and natural processes of transformation were disturbed, or at least impeded. Those internal progressive forces were forced to fight on two fronts: against local corruption and despotism, and against Western colonialism.² The Second World War was a blessing in disguise for the people in Muslim countries as well as the Middle East. Many countries were able to gain their independence, and progressive nationalist movements hoped to march forward towards establishing independent democratic states, with the urgent task of social and economic development. By the end of the Second World War, however, the Cold War started and relationships between Western powers and Middle East countries entered a new period. The Cold War confrontation between the two blocs was not only unfavorable to the growth of democracy in many Third World countries, including Middle Eastern ones, but was suppressed and hindered as well. In the name of war against Communism and fear of the 'Reds', the Western block suppressed every nationalist movement. Consider, for example, the 1953 military coup against the national and popular government of the late Dr Mossadegh in

1. the first period is during colonialization

2. The second period started after the W.W.II.

Iran. During this period, it was deemed necessary that Middle Eastern countries remain within the so-called free world, which is where they remained. Middle Eastern countries, however, paid a dear price: the process of democratization was impaired and interrupted.¹

Now the Cold War is over. The basic rules of international relationships are gradually changing. Although no new world order has taken shape yet however, the basic question for Middle Easterners is whether a new period of relationships will develop between the Middle East and the West based on mutual respect and reciprocal benefit or not. I will come to this later on.

Now let us assess the international situation in Middle East countries. Although the Cold War is over, that mentality still hangs on. During the Cold War, political stability was meant to keep the status quo by any means, in most cases with an iron fist. This is no longer possible. Modern and advanced electronic technology has revolutionized the circulation of information. The Iron Curtain was built on the monopoly of information. It was the electronic revolution which finally lifted the curtain and removed the Berlin Wall. To keep a society politically closed is now impossible. Many governments in the Middle East as well as other former Third World countries do not want to accept the new reality of our world that the age of open society has begun. The Cold War being over, these governments can not play the 'Red phobia' game any more. As a matter of fact, the definition of political stability has been changed and replaced with a new one. Democracy is, now, the only reliable source of long term political stability. There are also social and political changes within these societies. Many of these nations are, relatively speaking, very young. In Iran, for example, 75% of the population is under 25 years of age. This phenomenon has its own social and sometimes political impact. New systems of education are well established in almost all Muslim and Middle East countries, and the number of educated people, professionals and technocrats continuously increases. Furthermore, there are also changes in political attitudes within the popular forces. There was a time when not too many people had a clear idea about democracy and participatory kind of government. Many Muslims were as

1. The 3rd period: Post-cold war era.

misinformed about democracy as many Western scholars were in understanding Islam. But today, one can observe remarkable improvements in reciprocal understanding. For many Muslims, democracy is quite compatible with Islam and accepting and adopting democracy does not necessary mean following a Western way of life and/or culture. In addition, many religious and non-religious political movements, particularly after the Cold War, have abandoned violent armed struggle, and adopted instead parliamentary means of struggle to achieve their goals. In many Middle Eastern countries, for example Egypt, there is a sharp increase in the number of various civil organizations independent of the government. Even the attitudes and policies of the so called progressive governments are evolving. There is a pronounced move from state-centered economies towards market economies.

Considering all these internal parameters, it seems that the ground is conducive for democracy and a participatory kind of government in Middle East countries. What role can or should the Western powers now play in the processes of democratization in the Middle East? Although since the beginning of the 20th century the overall goals and purposes of popular movements in the area were in direct conflict with the Western powers' interests and policies, must future relations be the same? Here we may consider two points. The first point is that internal social and political development in Middle East societies and the emergence of powerful popular political forces will no longer permit the continuation of many in the political establishment, as well as the traditional relationships with external powers. The demand for radical changes in these political systems and for a participatory kind of government is very strong and indeed irresistible. Point two is that, as I mentioned earlier, indeed the age of Red phobia and the confrontation between communism and the West is over. Nonetheless it does not mean that the fight against despotism, social injustice, poverty and hunger is also over. Therefore, as long as there are social, economic and political ills, there will be a struggle to remedy these ills, and consequently there will be political turmoil as well. Once upon a time Marx predicted the destruction of capitalism on the basis of its exploitation of workers. But since capitalism adopted liberal democracy and freedom of expression, gradual changes were possible and applied whenever it

became necessary. Freedom of expression permitted continuous self assessment and self criticism. The result was that capitalism became wise and shared part of the profits with the working class, thus preventing Marx's predicted explosion. Could the same wisdom be applied at the global level?

The western powers can no longer be indifferent to the plight of the masses in the southern hemisphere. In the new "Global Village" the suffering of the deprived directly affects remedy, of course, is not direct or indirect intervention and/or manipulation of the southern hemisphere by the west. The acceptable solution is to part from the traditional attitudes of interventional policies. That means many of the Middle East governments will lose their foreign support and be compelled to make either a compromise with their own people, come to terms with them, or be replaced by their people. Either way the end result will be helpful to the cause of democratization in these societies.

Point three is that the democratization of these societies is in accordance and harmony with future global government. If it is true that in the post-cold war era: 1- political priorities have given way to economic ones, 2- a new global economy is developing, 3- as the result of political and economic changes in Eastern Europe, there is a unification in political and economic systems in the Northern Hemisphere. Meaningful changes and improvements in relationships between the developed and underdeveloped countries should be accompanied by the democratization of political systems in the South. A long term economic cooperation and development between the North and the South requires political stability. This kind of stability would be achieved only through political liberalization and democratization of governments. The more participatory the government, the more stable it is in the long run. The more stable the government, the better the chance for meaningful long range planning for social and economic development. On the other hand, economic development in these countries could be achieved only through healthy cooperation between these countries and the West. The West is in as much need of such cooperation as are these countries.

So in conclusion, one may say that for the first time in recent history, particularly in the post-Cold War era, the goals and interests of national movements in many Third World countries,

including those in the Middle East, may not be in contradiction and conflict with Western interests. It seems that the time is ripe for defining new kinds of relations, beneficiary for both sides.

III. Now let us examine the third part of the question: the possible relation between peace in the Middle East and the prospects for democratization. Democratization in the Middle East is not solely determined by the peace process. As I said before, a host of internal as well as external factors will affect the scope and pace of democratization in the Middle East; among other things, it will be conditioned by time and proximity. The peace process will have a differential impact on democratization in the region. A true and just peace, when and if such peace is found, would turn a new page in the history of relations between Israel and the Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular. The immediate consequence of such a historical development is (or one may expect it to be) a change in the social and civil status of the Palestinian population in Israel and perchance its elevation to full citizenship. This change, however, will only be the manifestation of a deeper understanding between various races and religions, a necessary condition for lasting peace and tranquility in the region. A genuinely just peace will also generate drastic political and economic changes in the other Middle Eastern countries. Some of the regional governments have used the Arab-Israeli conflict as an excuse for internal suppression and masking their political and economic failures. As a result of peace, these governments can no longer hide behind the current conflict and must respond to popular demands for basic rights and liberties of their people.

49. An Interview with Politiken Daily

An Interview with Dr Ebrahim Yazdi by Mrs. Pernille Bramming, Middle East Correspondent for the Politiken Daily, Denmark, December 2, 1995.

Question 1: What importance do you attribute to the upcoming elections?

- How would you characterize the present political situation?
- What are the major discussions: e.g. the role of the cleric in politics, and the question of political participation?

Answer 1: The upcoming elections are going to be held at a very critical moment of our history since the 1979 Islamic

Revolution. After 16 years of clergy's exclusive and absolute rule, the political and economic situation, as well as foreign relationships is still in a "crisis phase". Almost all parties involved have come to the conclusion that the unavoidable, necessary and immediate remedy is political reform within the system, towards the opening of the political atmosphere and political tolerance. Nowadays even prominent authorities propagate such a step as a necessity. The upcoming election, however, provides a valuable opportunity for our people to test the sincerity of the authorities and to see if they would tolerate opposition parties. The present political situation, however, is far from what is propagated. Although opposition groups are being tolerated to some degree, no such parties are permitted to operate properly. For example, opposition parties such as the Freedom Movement of Iran are not permitted to use their own facilities or publish their independent paper, which has been banned since 1981. Also, the local newspapers are not allowed to publish anything about the FMI, except to abuse it.

Despite such restrictions and limitations imposed on the activities of opposition parties, there is a lot of debate and discussion on the participation of political parties in the upcoming election. Various statements by the authorities give the impression that they are responding to political pressure, or that they may have realized the value of participation of political parties in the parliamentary election; nonetheless they are not ready to pay the price. The result is the obvious contradiction between their deeds and claims.

The debate on the role of the clergy in politics, however, is a natural consequence of people's reaction to the post-revolution experiences. Since the clergy are the exclusive rulers, ordinary people hold them responsible for the economic hardships they are experiencing. The general dissatisfaction obviously is being reflected in the negative public opinion concerning the ruling clergy. The concern is that if they do not remedy this situation rationally, the historical relation between the clergy and the ordinary masses will change drastically, to the extent that if they have not already lost their popular support, they may lose it very soon.

Question 2: How would you evaluate the post-revolutionary period in Iran? What were the major problems to be solved? Were they solved? Which new problems have developed?

Answer 2: At the time of the Shah's rule, there were two major problems: the total domination of foreign powers and the complete disregard for the rights and liberties of our people. Thus the two major goals of our revolution were independence (freedom from foreign domination) and liberty (sovereignty of the people). The first goal of independence has been achieved. The fate of our country is no longer being decided by the foreign powers. Whatever change is necessary must come from within. As far as the second goal is concerned, despite many changes, it is unfortunate that we have not yet achieved what our people strived for. There are complex cultural as well as political obstacles.

Question 3: What is your concept of society?

Answer 3: To me society is a group of people bound together for self-maintenance and self-perpetuation through a common history, culture and institutions.

Question 4: What is your concept of the state?

Answer 4: Again this is a complex question in social and political sciences. Nonetheless, one may consider the state as a political organization of the society, the body politics, or the institutions of government. In any case, the structure and power, as well as the legitimacy of the state may be defined power, state legitimacy may be defined through a constitution adopted by all citizens of the society.

Question 5: How do you evaluate the foreign policy of Iran since 1979 and what is your opinion of the Salman Rushdie affair?

Answer 5: The overall rating is not high. Foreign policy and diplomatic activities, however, are a reflection of the internal situation, and tools for the purpose of achieving the goals and priorities in a defined national plan. There are two points in the Salman Rushdie affair. The first one, the very important one, is that civilized people have respect for each other's beliefs, particularly religious ones. Critical analysis and evaluation of people's beliefs is one thing, slandering them is another matter. Freedom of expression should not be interpreted as freedom to slander the beliefs of other people. Mr. Rushdie has definitely slandered the

Holy Prophet of Islam and has offended Muslims throughout the world. Europeans in general and the British in particular should have stopped him. Rushdie's book is a clear violation of "The Blasphemy Act" in the U.K. British authorities, however, refused to enforce the said law in Rushdie's case. The second point is the issued Fatwa against Rushdie's life. Well, if one expands the scope of the freedom of expression to the extent of justifying Rushdie's slanderous book, then one must also accept the freedom of personally, I neither believe in that kind of expanded freedom of expression, nor subscribe to the fatwa. Practical solutions may be sought to resolve this problem.

50. Seminar on Human Rights: Some Discrepancies in the Opinion between East and West Concerning Human Rights Issues

Given by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Olaf Palme International Center, Stockholm, Sweden, October 13, 1998

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

May I greet you in our own tradition and say, "Salamo Alikom; Peace be upon you all."

First I would like to express my deep appreciation for inviting me to this noble gathering and for having the opportunity for exchange of our views concerning one of the crucial issues of our times, that of human rights, particularly in my country.

I also want to express my personal feelings of gratification for the warm hospitality extended to us by your lovely people during our stay in your beautiful country.

Mr. Hans Beckman, from the Swedish Iran Committee, recommended I talk about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the current situation in Iran.

To address the issue properly, it seems to me that one may look at it from two different prospective: international obligations and national commitments.

First approach; consider the fact that Iran is a signatory of many international covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Charter, which are legally binding on the UN Member-States. This signifies the fact that the

Iranian government has the international commitment and obligation to fully implement the articles of these covenants. However since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and in response to international pressure to fulfill their commitments and obligations, Iranian authorities argue that some of the articles of the UDHR and related covenants are in conflict with Islamic regulations. This could be true in some cases. (e.g. Articles 16 and 18 of UDHR concerning inter-religious marriage and free conversion of one's religion, respectively). Generally speaking, nonetheless, there are many similarities in the opinion of Western and Muslim scholars concerning the human rights issues and some genuine differences, as well. One must also think over the fact that at the same time, there are very pronounced differences of opinion among Muslim scholars as well. The important question here, however, is to what extent the argument of the Iranian authorities in their continuous disregard of human rights and articles of the UDHR could be accepted and is justifiable?

Since my audience here is mainly from the west, I would like to present the following points:

1- Islam and Muslims are as much misunderstood and misrepresented in the West, as are Western culture, democracy and human rights issues in Muslim countries.

2- After the downfall of communism, the disintegration of the former USSR, and the end of the cold war, the relation between Western powers and Western Civilization with Muslims and Muslim countries is changing rapidly and becoming one of the most crucial issues in international relations and in the interactions between the two cultures and civilizations. The future of peace and progress in our universal village, in the age of the electronic revolution and information explosion, depends on the better understanding of all differing cultures and civilizations.

3- To understand Muslims and the present day Muslim World, one must keep in mind that there are 46 Muslim States representing more than one billion Muslims, i.e. 1/5th of the world population. The Muslim States have various political systems, ranging from autocratic monarchies, sacerdotal or hierocratic (government of priests), to participatory parliamentary systems. As far as the orientation of governments is concerned some are secular, such as Turkey, some claim to be Islamic, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan,

Pakistan, and Iran and yet the political, legal and social order of a large number of Muslim countries is merely based on Western models. The majority of Muslim countries have a written constitution in which some of the basic rights and liberties of their citizens are pronounced, but have seldom been implemented. Although all Muslim countries are Member-States of the UN, thus signatories of UDHR and other pertinent covenants, nonetheless, in most cases, they neglect their respective international obligations.

4- Muslim societies all over the world are in a historical transitional state. There are various Islamic movements with differing Islamic orientations. While all of them are striving for social, economic and political changes in their respective countries, two main groups can be identified. There are Muslim groups and movements which are quite traditionalist, indifferent and/or incapable of understanding the complicated contemporary world. They practically live in the past. Their answers to the present ills of Muslims are a return to early Islam and they dream of the revival and restoration of old Islamic Caliphate. Muslim traditionalists, namely the clergy, however, for one reason or another have strong ties with the masses and are capable of mobilizing them very effectively. This capability, based on mere religious sentiment of Muslim masses and deep rooted social traditions, when applied in a political realm, gives them very strong political power as compared to any other group. This explains why Muslim traditionalist movements, compared to their Muslim intellectual counterparts, have a better chance to obtain power. This, of course, is true only for the first phase of the power game. Since they are not familiar with the complexity of existing social, national and international political and economic systems, they fail to provide the expected social and economic services to the masses. The consequence is the disillusion and disappointment of the same masses and loosening of their traditional ties with their supporters.

There are, however, Muslim intellectuals, who do not have the kind of social ties with the masses that the traditionalists have. They do, nonetheless, understand the contemporary world, are aware of it and try to respond to the new challenges confronting the Muslim world as a consequence of interactions between Western and Islamic cultures. In response to these challenges, intellectual Muslim scholars are trying to reexamine Islamic understanding,

reinterpret the basic Islamic values and find a new framework or embodiment for the original Islamic values which would be capable of resolving the complicated political, social and economic situations in their respective societies.

Thus in dealing with and judging Muslims one must keep in mind the fact that there is a wide spectrum of differing opinions concerning the Islamic as well as extra-religious issues, not only among traditionalists and intellectual Muslims, but also among the members of each group as well. Therefore, there is no one single authoritative Islamic interpretation of issues such as human rights, participatory types of government and economic systems among the Muslim scholars. This is the most profound characteristic of contemporary Muslim transitional societies.

5-Some intellectual Muslim scholars approach to the human rights issues from outside of the realm of religious thought and consider it to be a scholastic theological (Kalami) issue, thus extending the argument beyond the religious debate. In such a debate, there is a presumption that a unique nature or essence for man exists, shared by all human beings, regardless of sex, color, race, etc. Based on the nature of human beings, what we call 'rights' of man, are actually not rights from a legal point of view, but rather are humane needs. Thus, freedom of expression, as an example, is not a debatable subject; it is as much a humane need as food and shelter. Man is gifted with some noble qualities which distinguish him from other beings. For humane development, man is in dire need to satisfy fully and properly all his physical as well as spiritual needs. Since all men are equal, they have equal right to satisfy all their needs. Then justice here means equal chance for all human beings to develop their innate qualities. Since both justice and humaneness have extra-religious characteristics, they should, therefore, be used as criteria to measure the humane characters of various religions. Thus an innate religion is the one which is just and humane.

Islam could be considered an innate religion, because it is just and humane. In Islamic world view, there is an essence or a nature (fitrah) for man. Thus Islam is a humane religion design in accordance with human nature. Free will and the faculty of thinking are the two main characteristics of human nature, which are considered to be the attributes of God to Man. Thus man is the

vicegerent of God on the earth. The humane development of man depends on the free expression of these attributes. Even the authentic revelation of God should not be imposed upon man. The Holy Qur'an clearly states that; "There is no compulsion in religion (II.256)". With these two qualities come the responsibilities and obligations of man.

According to this interpretation of Islam, there is no fundamental conflict between Islam and the articles of UDHR. In implementation of the articles of the UDHR in each one of the UN Member-States, however, the national, native and local beliefs, traditions and cultures should be considered. Although primary rights must always prevail, we recognize, however the necessity and permissibility of the legitimate limitations on some human rights, with definite exception for some rights such as freedom from torture and slavery.

6-There are, however, other Muslim scholars, namely the traditionalists, who argue against the modern concepts of human rights, participatory kind of government and the articles of the UDHR, from two different angles. One argument is theological and is based on the assumption that since democracy and human rights are essentially anthropocentric, and Islam is theocentric, therefore they are not compatible. Democracy puts man vis-à-vis God. Sovereignty of God is opposite to the sovereignty of man. Power descends from God, not ascend from the community. As Sir Robert Filmer, in the 17th century put it; "God has bestowed power on certain persons, and that these persons and their heirs constitute the legitimate government, rebellion against which is not only treason, but impiety. " In our case, the logic of Muslim traditionalists is that God has chosen Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), as His apostle and has entrusted him with some of His power. Man must obey the prophet of God in the same way he obeys God. The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), by the instruction of God, has designated the infallible Imams, they in turn have designated the Vali-Faqih as their successors. Thus Muslims must obey the Vali-Faqih as they obey God. People do not elect a Leader, they discover him, and accept his commandership. His power is absolute, thus limitless and his above all the laws.

Here I must, nevertheless, remind you that not all Muslim traditionalists, Sunni and Shiite alike, agree with such a political-theological notion.

The traditionalists, however, argue against the human rights issue and articles of the UDHR, from the legal (fiqhi - jurisprudence) point of view. The word fiqh in Quranic and Islamic legal terminology has differing meaning, which I am not going to get into at this time. One definition, which is related to our discussion, however, is that fiqh is the application of Shariah, basic principles, in the form of the collection of Islamic laws and regulations. Since the interpretation of Shariah could be different, therefore, as far as the fiqh is concerned, there are at least 4 accredited schools of thought among Sunnis and one among Shiites. Part of laws and regulations in fiqh are derived directly from the Holy Qur'an, with little room for modification. The large part of it, however, is the product of interaction between the religious teaching and social, economic and political circumstances. Because of the evolution of Muslim societies and radical changes in their social, economic and political situations, this part of traditional fiqh is outdated and incapable of coping with our present time and circumstances. The traditionalists nevertheless judge the contemporary modern issues, such as human rights and the articles of UDHR, by the old laws and regulations, and find some articles to be non-Islamic.

7- But it surely would be a gross mistake to accept such theoretical, theological or fiqh arguments to justify continued violation of articles of the UDHR by contemporary Muslim governments, including the Iranian authorities. Most Muslim countries have a written constitution. In almost all of these constitutions, one way or another, the majority of articles of the UDHR are incorporated. For example chapters three, five and seven of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution very clearly specify the basic rights and liberties of our people. Therefore, there is another way to examine the human rights situation in Iran, without dwelling on such arguments. The Iranian authorities, whenever confronted with charges of a violation of human rights brought against them by the UN Commission on Human Rights has responded repeatedly that Western type human rights is not compatible with Islam and thus, some of the articles of UDHR are not compatible with Islam. These kinds of excuses might be a good way to escape international pressure, but our argument with the Iranian authorities is that the constitution of the Islamic Republic

of Iran was drafted and adopted by an Iranian council, the majority of who were clergy approved by the late leader of the revolution and contains no articles in conflict with Islam. Yet some articles of the constitution are being violated. To give some examples;

Article 22: People's life, property, rights, dwellings, jobs, and reputation are protected from any intrusion except where allowed by law.

Article 23: Inquisition into one's beliefs is forbidden. No charges can be brought against anyone for having a certain belief.

Article 24: Publications and the press shall have freedom of expression unless they violate the essentials of Islam or public rights. Its details shall be set forth by law.

Article 25: Inspection of mail and hindrance of its delivery, bugging, recording and disclosure of telephone conversations, refusal of cabling or hindering its delivery, censoring the text of, and/or making public private telegrams and telexes, and any other type of spying on people are prohibited, unless otherwise prescribed by law.

Article 26: The formation of political parties, societies and associations, religious associations, Islamic or recognized minority religions are free, provided they do not violate the principles of the country's independence, the liberty of people, national unity, Islamic standards and the foundations of the Islamic Republic. No one could be forced or prevented to participate in any one of them.

Article 27: Public assemblies, gatherings and marches without carrying arms, are free provided that would not disturb the foundation of Islam.

Article 32: No one may be arrested, except according to the procedures prescribed in law. In case of arrest, the detainee must be informed immediately of the charges, with the clear reference to legal grounds of one's arrest, and the case should be referred to a competent judiciary tribunal (Forum competence) within maximum 24 hours after the arrest (Habeas corpus) for speedy trial. The violators of this article shall be punished in accordance with the provision of law.

Article 33: No one may be exiled from one's place of domicile, or prohibited to take up domicile where one so wishes, or forced to take up domicile at certain place, except according to the provision of law.

Article 34: Pleas for justice are an established right for everyone. Every person may refer to competent courts to seek justice. All citizens have the right of access to such courts. No one can be denied an appeal to the court, to which one has a lawful right to appeal.

Article 36: Penal verdict can only be passed by and enforced through a competent forum in accordance with the law.

Article 37: The basic presumption is innocence, thus no one shall be regarded guilty in the eye of law unless one's guilt is proved in a competent forum.

Article 38: Application of torture, in any form, to extract information and /or confession is prohibited. To force a person to give testimony, make a confession or take an oath is not permissible, such testimony, confession, and oath is worthless and unreliable. The violator of this article is subject to punishment by the law.

Article 39: Derogation (slandering dignity and credit) of a person, duly and lawfully arrested, detained, jailed or exiled, in any form or manner is prohibited and violation is punishable.

All these articles of our constitution, which are in complete concordance with the articles of UDHR, are continuously either violated or discarded altogether. Furthermore, all articles of chapter 7 of the I.R. of Iran's Constitution dealing with the election of local councils, i.e. village, county, city and provincial councils, have not yet been put into effect. Recently President Khatami has promised to hold election of such local councils.

Article 168 of our constitution, clearly states that trials of political parties and member of the press accused of offenses shall be in open forum, in the presence of a jury (jurists), in ordinary judicial courts. The procedure of election and qualification of jurymen, the authorities of the jury and the definition of a political offense shall be laid down by the law, on the basis of Islamic precepts. This article, except in some cases of press offenses, has not been implemented. The present authorities in Iran claim that they do not have and never had any political prisoner, at all.

Chapter 5 of our constitution has recognized the sovereignty of people and that no one can deprive man from this divine right. Many articles in this chapter and others are devoted to the ways

and means people can exercise this God-given right, such as by election of a national parliament, presidential elections and the election of the Council of Experts, through universal suffrage. People, however, cannot exercise their sovereign rights without fully enjoying their basic rights and liberties, as are laid down in the articles of chapter 3 of our constitution. On the other hand, democracy or the republic component of the Islamic Republic is only a mean for people to exercise their sovereign rights. Political development and the establishment of civil society can be achieved only through political liberalization by the full and unconditional implementation of basic rights and liberties of our people, not only in accordance with the UDHR, but also by our own constitution.

8- In summary, we may conclude that basically there is a fundamental agreement between Islamic concepts of man and the essentials of human rights, with that in the West. There are, however, some discrepancies in the opinion of Western and Muslim scholars concerning human rights issues.

Thank you for being patient with me.

51. Political Developments in Iran

Speech Delivered by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Red Lion Hotel, Houston, TX, USA, March 16, 2000

You may think to yourselves that I am enduring due to the fact that despite all the pressure I am still standing in this manner. Democracy, freedom, popular rule are not things that one can come by without a price. They have a price and that price must be paid. If you live here in the West and you feel that some of these Western societies' political problems have been solved, you should be aware that this political development has not been achieved without its own costs. They have paid a heavy price. Two world wars with heavy casualties originated in the West. They too have paid their share. There is no other way. That is why as the late Mr. Bazargan use to say democracy is neither given, nor obtained; it is learned.

We too must learn how to live together in a civil society. The subject of our discussion tonight is a look at political developments in Iran- what the Iranian people have been fighting for, for over one hundred years. If we would like to determine the point in

history that is to be considered the dawn of this movement, we must look back to the Tobacco Rebellion. Within the last one hundred years our people have fought against internal oppression. Their resistance has simultaneously served as a rejection of and opposition to despotism and an affirmation of the desire for popular rule and the securing and realization of fundamental civil freedoms. The second dimension of this movement encompasses the struggle against foreign domination and colonialism. It is exemplified by the message that was sent to the world in the form of the revolutionary slogan “freedom and independence”. These struggles continue to this day.

When we say political development, what do we mean? Why pay so much attention to political development? Contemporary Iranian society and the Islamic Republic of Iran are faced with five major crises. We have a crisis of management. It has multiple dimensions that we cannot adequately address in this discussion. We have an economic crisis. In this, there is no doubt. We have an ideological crisis, a crisis in beliefs, a crisis in which two decade have passed since the creation of a religious government and we are still unable to determine whether democracy, freedom and republicanism are compatible with Islam or not. Twenty years after the revolution, we still have Friday prayer leaders say in their sermons that freedom is un-Islamic, tolerance is un-Islamic.

The struggle for power is just one dimension of the situation; another dimension that should not be overlooked is that some religious Iranians believe that there is no place for tolerance in our Islamic beliefs. The tolerance of non-conforming views is contrary to religion and its dictates. It is not simply a political matter; it is their belief system. Even within your daily interactions, you too, encounter people who are unwilling to tolerate your thoughts and your beliefs.

We also have a cultural crisis, an identity crisis. We have a generation of Iranian youth who are caught up in an identity crisis. For this generation, the crisis is more than cultural, it is an identity crisis. For them, history is dispersed. Once you cut off the cultural roots of a people, the new generation is inevitably gripped by an identity crisis. Once you create a political climate in which Dr. Mossadegh is portrayed as a traitor and the members of parliament - who purportedly represent the will of the people - cancel the

official holiday in commemoration of nationalization of the Iranian oil industry despite the importance of this historical event and Dr. Mossadegh's service. Once in our history books, today our people's history begins with the 15th of Khordad, so this generation is afflicted by a historic rapture, an identity crisis.

But the fifth crisis is even more important than the other four I have already mentioned. It is a political crisis. Until we have effectively solved our political crisis, we can not attend to any of the other crises, because when we begin to ask why are our youth in crisis, we become entangled in the elephant's trunk. The issue becomes political. When we investigate the economic crisis, naturally we look at the economic decisions that were made within the last twenty years, and once again we enter political territory. Consequently, the most important crisis facing Iran today is political and until it is overcome, we can not even begin to address any of the other issues.

What is the political crisis? It can be described as one party's breach of a contract. In our daily interactions, whenever there is a breach of a contract, a crisis in relations results. Today, no modern society exists without a constitution. One of the most beautiful fruits of the revolution, for which we are indebted to a group who had long contemplated its creation, is the Iranian Constitution. Despite all of its faults, problems, shortcomings, and incorporation of principles that you and I may not accept, it is still a social contract. It is based on this contract that the Islamic Republic was built. Once the terms of this contract are breached, the crisis begins.

In Article 3 of the constitution it is stated that the inquisition and scrutiny of private beliefs is illegal. The scrutiny of private beliefs means that when you go to enroll in the university, you are asked to identify your faith. When I go to register as a candidate, I must attest to my commitment to Islam, both in practice and in my heart. These examples all fall within the category of public scrutiny of private beliefs. What business is it of the government's what my private beliefs are? The Constitution has stipulated that scrutiny of private beliefs is illegal, but the party in possession of power, unilaterally and unmistakably breaches its obligation in this regard. Today there is no application or questionnaire related to obtaining education and employment that does not ask you such questions,

not to mention the interviews and exams in which your religious knowledge is tested. This all falls under the definition of the scrutiny of private beliefs and is illegal.

The Constitution clearly states that there is freedom to form and participate in political parties. It furthermore plainly states that any individual who is taken into custody should be immediately notified of the charges being filed against him and his file should be heard before a court within twenty-four hours. We see that none of this exists in practice in Iran today. One party to the contract has breached its obligations, and has created a crisis in relations.

So the importance of this predicament is fundamental and it is indicative of why we must be so sensitive to the fostering of political development. Despite the serious nature of economic problems Iranians face, in the 2nd of Khordad elections they voted for President Khatami, not because he promised to create jobs and improve economic performance, but because he stated that the priority was political development over economic development. It is interesting to note that 70% of the people, urban and rural, were cognizant of the importance of the proposition and they voted for a platform of political development.

So it is only natural that the most important issue for people in Iran today is where this political development is heading. What is the outlook for us? You who are far from your country - although with the electronic revolution that has taken shape you are not so far and sometimes news even reaches you faster, you may wonder what has sparked the reactions we are currently witnessing in Iran.

What is political development? **Political development and economic development are components of human development.** I do not compare political development in Iran with political development in the United States, European countries or any other countries. I compare it to the goals and ideals of the people's revolution, in other words an analysis of the roots of the revolution, a look at why our people brought about this revolution. This is no doubt that the Islamic revolution was a popular revolution. Millions of Iranians participated. What were they seeking? They sought the right to popular rule, the protection and realization of their rights and liberties. The accusations sometimes made against us of yearning for Western freedoms and decadence is baseless. We had these types of freedoms under the Shah's rule, and we

were even rewarded if we exercised them. So people did not lead an uprising for those freedoms. People revolted in order to obtain popular rule and their rights, and these aspirations are still salient today.

The second element of political development is the realization of the rule of law. No society can progress without the rule of law. A bad law is better than lawlessness. If the law is upheld at the very least you know where you stand. But with lawlessness, you do not know where you stand. The result of lawlessness is autocracy, rule by the whim of the rulers.

When we speak of the law we are not referring to something that is abstract. We have a constitution and we have statutory law that has been passed by parliament. The Constitution says that the scrutiny of private beliefs is illegal, but it is done. You do not have the right to bug telephone lines, but it is done. You cannot use tapes of our phone conversations as incriminatory evidence, but it is done. Newspapers are shut down at will. So when we speak of a politically developed society, we mean one in which the constitution is upheld. There is no democracy in the world that exists without a constitution. There was a time when it was said that the democracies of the world were divided into liberal democracies and radical democracies. But today, there is only constitutional democracy - that is, democracy in accordance with the law. I call this republican constitutionalism in which a republic, a democracy, is based on the rule of law. The constitution is a social contract. The people define and institute it and they have the right to amend it through legal mechanisms whenever they deem necessary. Statutory law works much the same way. For example the Election Code specifies that the Council of Guardians which oversees elections must provide legal reasons for rejecting an individual's candidacy qualifications. So when they reject my candidacy application, they must indicate why in writing. They must document how they have come to the conclusion that I do not possess the necessary commitment to Islam. Instead, they have only indicated that I do not possess the requisite post-secondary education, despite the fact that I had provided documentation of my PhD. So, when we speak of political development, a fundamental element is respect for the rule of law. That means that everyone from a high ranking politician to an ordinary citizen must

be subject to the law. I must stop at a traffic light and the leader must do so as well. I do not have the right to insult another Iranians and neither does the ruler. This is the rule of law. In a politically developed society, the laws are enforced, everyone is law-abiding; they do not escape from the law. Everyone is equal before the law.

Third, civil society is one in which its members are willing to compromise. It is impossible to have democracy without compromise. By compromise we do not mean sacrificing our principles and will; rather, we mean establishing a society based on concord, pluralism, and the co-existence of varying views and agendas. We can compromise with each other, live together, partake in debates, and consider opinions and views contrary to our own and at the same time stand up for our own positions. Compromise does not mean you must disregard the standards in which you believe. Democracy does not mean you must suppress your values. In other words, human society is a pluralistic society. Human beings possess varying genetic backgrounds, family backgrounds, differing viewpoints. They have distinct histories. They enter society through varying channels. We have differences in philosophic, artistic, scientific and every other type of view. To the same extent that we each have a distinct appearance and fingerprints, we can have differing views and beliefs.

As a Muslim I see that in the Quran, God says I created you to be different. So, we simply cannot have a society with a unitary voice. It is not possible. In a civil society, an advanced society, we must accept the variety and multiplicity of beliefs and opinions. Even the Book of God does not have simply one interpretation. You see that 1,400 years have passed from the advent of Islam. This has nothing to do with global arrogance and colonialism; it is a fact. In these 1,400 years varying Islamic scholars have posited varying interpretations. No one has the right to say that my reading of religion is absolute. It is inevitable that we have a pluralistic society. In essence, this is the reality of human society.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary Iranian society is that it is a society in transition. I would submit that it is even something more than a society in transition. It is a society undergoing a metamorphosis - to borrow a term from biology. A large number of our social norms are undergoing a historic transformation. Those who wish to investigate the 1979

Islamic revolution must examine the effects of this revolution on the depths of Iranian society in the long run. I will allude to a few of these effects tonight.

The defining characteristic of a society undergoing transition and transformation is diversity in ideas and beliefs, and not just diversity in ideas, but also diversity in group and individual paths, behavior, and norms. For example one hundred years ago in Iran, there was only one manner of establishing a family. After a son had reached puberty, a mother would go into the community in search of an appropriate wife for her son. Society, including the young men and women, had accepted the social convention that they would not even see each other until they reached the bridal chamber. They did not stage opposition of this accepted norm. But today this norm is no longer adhered to. Those who still advocate the segregation of males and females in the university are oblivious of the fact those conventions of the past have disappeared. The question is what will replace them. So if we do not even allow two youths who are mature to sit together and discuss their lives over tea, we are being insensitive to the needs of this transition that is taking place.

Today in Iran there are organizations dedicated to helping socially troubled individuals. You may have read about the number of young girls aged 10, 11 and 13 who run away from their homes. They are not from upper class families in the north of Tehran; they are from middle and lower class families in small towns. They leave towns like Khorramabad and Kermanshah to come to Tehran, where they become vulnerable to a variety of social ills. This is a society undergoing transformation. In a society undergoing transformation, we must accept the principles of the co-existence of alternative views and pluralism. Each one of us wants to create a different solution. We are all concerned. No one has the right to say it must be as I say and no other way. So, political development means creating a society in which there is a place for the nurturing of multiple views and beliefs. Newspapers should be able to discuss and reflect these views.

You know that last Parliament passed legislation which forbids discussions of Islamic beliefs in a manner which may result in “doubt” or “denial” of the religion. What is meant by Islamic beliefs? Our traditional jurisprudence states that a woman cannot

be a judge, but nothing in the Qur'an states that women cannot be a judge. Why can't a woman be a judge? When we speak of political development, we mean creating an atmosphere in which experts can openly discuss such an issue. Before Ayatollah Montazeri was put under house arrest, I asked him why a woman could not be a judge independent of the *hadiths*. This is merely a tradition of patriarchal Iranian society. He answered that the reason was that men should not hear the voice of a woman who is not their kin or spouse. I said, but you are living in a time when women are parliamentary representatives and university professors. They are doctors, they drive, and they are involved in all fields of economic and political life. So why is it that in these situations it is acceptable for an unrelated man to hear a woman's voice, but her voice should not be heard within a courtroom? This shows that we have taken traditional norms and equated them with religion and further, that we are unwilling to change them. These issues must be addressed in a society undergoing a metamorphosis.

When we speak of diversity and metamorphosis, we must inevitably also discuss tolerance. You know that this is another major issue addressed within Iranian newspapers today. Traditionalists oppose the concept of tolerance and view it as in opposition to religion, but political development necessitates our ability to sit together as mature and rational human beings and discuss our varying views with each other. If we want to make a decision, we utilize democratic means such as the vote of the majority. The political system that was developed after the revolution was one of popular participation. Until we have reached this point, we cannot begin to address any of our other concerns.

The second major question I would like to look at is how did we get to this point? What are the roots of the recent parliamentary elections, the city council elections, and the 2nd of Khordad presidential elections? We cannot project future outlooks without understanding these roots. In 1372, presidential elections were held in which Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected for his second term as president. According to government statistics, 16 million people participated in that election and Mr. Hashemi received about 10 million votes and a little known candidate by the name of Ahmad Tavakoli received four million votes.

How can we analyze these results? People, in many instances were obliged to vote. As in past elections there was an official candidate, Mr. Rafsanjani, and there were one or two other candidates whose primary function was to create a façade of democratic elections. In the past the unofficial candidates were given 200,000 votes, so that the officials could say there was political competition, but in 1372 Ahmad Tavakoli received 4 million votes. Why? Who was Ahmad Tavakoli? According to Western standards of judging such results, one would say that Ahmad Tavakoli was, after Rafsanjani, a popular and powerful man in Iranian politics because he received 4 million votes. But in fact this was not the case. In some parts of Iran, such as Kurdistan, Mr. Ahmad Tavakoli received more votes than Rafsanjani. Does this mean that Ahmad Tavakoli was more popular in Kurdistan or that he had a base of support there? No, this is not the case. This is what you call a protest vote. The people who voted for Ahmad Tavakoli only knew that he was not Hashemi Rafsanjani. In order to protest Hashemi Rafsanjani, they voted for him. In Kurdistan, people felt obliged to vote or they wanted to vote and they knew who Hashemi Rafsanjani was. They went and voted for the candidate who was not him. This was a new phenomenon in Iran. As intellectuals who possessed a sincere concern for Iran's future, we could not be inattentive to this new phenomenon. We recognized that the people were sending us a message. They understood something better than intellectuals and are trying to express it, and that message is that we are no longer looking for revolution. We regret having gone after revolution in the first place. Let me remind you that you were all there (in the revolution). I was in a meeting in Isfahan where some blamed us for our role in the revolution. I said, "I accept that it was my fault, but weren't you there along with us as well?" They all denied having participated. I said "Then Afshari was right, that the revolution was all just tapes". No, we were all there, all of us were there together and this is where we have arrived. It is alright, many of the world's revolutions have been hijacked. It is not the end of the world. You must stand and fix it. We have been standing and we hope to fix it.

My proposition is this; the people told us intellectuals that they did not want another revolution. We want change to occur with

peace and security. This vote that I cast in the ballot-box encompasses no danger or risks. I will speak with this vote, and this is what is unfolding. Taking this into consideration, in the steering committee meeting of the Freedom Movement of Iran of 1972 held in the presence of Mr. Bazargan, we proposed that we cease our boycott and participate in the upcoming fifth parliamentary elections. But this trend was not recognized by many of the internal opposition forces who saw such participation as a validation of the regime. Of course there was logic in this line of thought, but in my opinion it was not a correct logic. We found ourselves alone on this position and did not participate in the elections as an organization.

In the 1376 2nd of Khordad presidential elections what had occurred in the 1372 elections reached a climax. Unexpectedly, 90% of eligible went to the polling stations and 70% voted for Khatami. Why? Well, Khatami is a charismatic and likable man, but there is another explanation. The more state propaganda pressured people to vote for the official candidate Nateq-Noori, the more determined people became to vote against him. When you compare urban and rural voters in various parts of Iran you see that almost across the board, the vote was approximately 70% for Khatami. On a trip with a friend, I traveled through the mountains of Northern Iran and came across a secluded village in the province of Mazandaran called Esh'kevarat. There was no road, no electricity and no signs of civilization. When we sat down and asked the villagers who they voted for, they said they voted for Khatami. In the small town of Noor where the official candidate Nateq-Noori was from, people stated that they also voted for Khatami. When asked why, they responded, "Well, he is just another villager like us".

The elections took place and Khatami won by a wide margin. This was a momentous occurrence. It was an indication that something in our society had ripened. A form of resistance was surfacing. It is said that the bugle of revolution is heard from the depths of the masses. The people are sounding the bugle. When the Iranian football team qualified for the world cup in Melbourne, Australia, it was 11 p.m. and people spontaneously poured into the streets to celebrate. The same thing happened when people stayed up all night to watch the Iran - USA game and then poured into the

streets after the victory. What does this signify? What are the sociological, psychological, analytical explanations for this behavior?

Something has taken place within the depths of our society. In sociology, we speak of the collective subconscious. Every society has a collective subconscious, a collective identity. Under the Shah's regime, attempts were made to discredit Mossadegh. They said that supporters of Mossadegh were even more dangerous than the Communists. The use of Mossadegh's character made some in the rank and file tremble. The same has been true during the last twenty years. Nonetheless you see that on the 14th of Esfand students once again display Mossadegh's picture. What does this tell you? In our society's collective subconscious, Dr. Mossadegh is someone who dutifully served his nation. It is this subconscious that tells people to go and vote and who to vote for. It tells Iranians, young and old, to spontaneously pour into the streets at 11:00 o'clock at night to celebrate the Iranian team's victory in Melbourne and sing the "Ay Iran" anthem.

Where did the 2nd of Khordad movement come from? We generally divide the history of post-revolutionary Iran into three periods. The first republic is the period from the realization of the revolution to the death of Mr. Khomeini. The second period spans from after Mr. Khomeini's death to the 2nd of Khordad elections. The third stage of the republic began with Mr. Khatami's presidency. This is a new period and we should recognize its distinguishing characteristics. In this period, the desire for freedom and democracy is at the same level it was at the time of the revolution. Yet no one wants another revolution.

Today our youth have many self-organized gatherings in which they engage in political discussions. Often they come to us and ask for our views. In one of these meetings, a young woman made a very interesting statement to me. She said "the difference between us is that you were concerned with who must go; for us it doesn't matter who must go. What is important to us is who is coming." This point is of utmost importance. We made the mistake of emphasizing "who must go", but the new generation has learned from this mistake.

The desire for change and transformation is tremendous. From where does it originate? What is the origin of this reform

movement? It is the youth. You know that Iran has the youngest population in the world. Some 75% of our population is below the age of 25. In statistics from the last presidential elections, it is estimated that 13 to 15 million Iranian youths ranging in age from 16 to 25 years voted for Khatami. Our youth are the ones who can determine the future of Iran. Many of them were born after the revolution. They were brainwashed for two decades - at home, at school, from the radio and television. So where did they learn what we are currently witnessing? Where did the 10 year old boy who just spoke to me learn these ideas? Both in the 2nd of Khordad presidential elections and in the recent parliamentary elections, it was 14 and 15 year old youths who persuaded their parents to vote.

Where is all of this coming from? This is the product of the efforts of Iranian women, and the stance taken by our women is the product of our revolution. The Iranian revolution changed the traditional social order by bringing women out of their homes and into the streets to participate in the revolution. In the street demonstrations held in Tehran squares, women stood alongside men. I am sure many of the women in this audience participated in these demonstrations. This served to highly politicize women. In the Constitutional Revolution women participated, but they were few in number. They were present in the movement for the nationalization of oil, but not to this extent. In the Islamic Revolution, however, the role played by women was substantial and they were politicized.

Following the revolution, once Islamic traditionalists obtained political power, in addition to the political problems that materialized a variety of social pressures were also created. "Committees for the Promotion of Virtue and the Abolition of Evil" were created and their definition of what constituted "evil" was superficial and subjective. If there was embezzlement of public funds, it was not considered evil, but heaven forbid if a few strands of a women's hair were seen from under her hijab. In fact, behavior such as hijab became the focus of the attention of these groups. Because women and youth were the primary subjects of the conservatives' social pressures, slowly an unannounced war between these conservative forces and our women and youth developed. So, women were politicized in the revolution and they were the first victims of conservative revolutionary policies. As a

Muslim I believe in the hijab, but I also believe that hijab that is forced does not please God. You can force women to neither take off their hijab nor force them to put it on. If one believes in it, she can adopt it. Thus our women continued to be politicized and they transferred this politicization to the new generation within the home.

At first glance, there is patriarchy in our society, but if you look into the depths of our families, you see that there is actually matriarchy. If you disagree, look at your own situation. Why? It is simple. In Iranian literature we say that men are like the mind and women are like the heart, and we Iranians are sentimental; the heart always has the last word. Thus although our society is patriarchal in appearance, the family is a strong institution and within the family the women always has the last word - employing its own language, the language of love, the language of the heart.

Even the most pious women in our society do not agree with the system of mandatory hijab. Why? Because they see how it affects their 13 or 14 years old daughters to be harassed in the streets by patrols. They see how contradictory the approach is and how it only serves to disillusion and distance daughters from religion. Hence a wave originating from within the family was created. The roots of the movement you now see in Iran began there and thus the movement cannot be suppressed. What started on the 2nd of Khordad continues. But it is not sudden, it is incremental.

In order to get an idea of the outlook for Iran, we must be attentive to the composition of its contemporary forces. If you try to apply an analysis of 10 years ago to Iran's situation today, you are mistaken. Today, the power positions of political forces in Iran have been dislocated. "The Second Republic"- from the war's end and the return of our fighting forces, (sentence not completed). You should note that many of today's leaders of the reform movement were people who participated in the war. Now they have come to the other side. A process of the falling out of members of the forces of centralized power has been initiated and a new composition of power is beginning to surface. This process began in the "Second Republic". We must recognize these forces. They have been transformed. We can no longer judge them based on our prior perception.

We can divide these forces into two groups: those who are within the system of rule and those who fall outside of it. Those who fall outside of the systems are like us; they are still considered outsiders. We still do not have permission to participate in elections. You saw that they rejected all of our candidacies. The forces within the system of rule can be subdivided into two primary groups. For purposes of convenience we call them reformists and conservatives. The reformist movement consists of organizations which previously existed such as Mojaheddin-e Enghelab-e Eslami (Crusaders of the Islamic Revolution), and other which developed with the last year such as Jebhe-ye Mosharekat (Participation Front) or Hezb-e Islami-ye Kar (Worker's Islamic Party). They are reformists in the sense that they believe that the revolution has deviated from its course, there have been deviations from the principles outlined in the Constitution and they must be revised so as to enable society to function within the framework of the law. Within the reformists there is also a spectrum of vies. Some believe that we should do away with the division between "insiders" and "outsiders". They do not believe in the hierarchy of citizens. They believe that all citizens have equal rights and that all parties which are willing to work within the confines of the constitution should be able to do so, even the Communist Party. On the other hand there is a group of reformists would like to maintain the insider/outsider distinction. The definition of who is an insider and who is an outsider is based on whether one believes in the concept of Velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudence). They reason that because the regime's foundation is based on the concept of Velayat-e faqih, then those would do not believe in the concept, must be considered "outsiders". Since the Freedom Movement of Iran does not accept the concept, then it should be considered an "outsider". Of course this delineation is not static and the situation may improve as reforms progress.

The principle force remaining within the system of rule is that of the conservatives. As you know, in the First Republic conservatives...when between Mussavi as Prime Minister and Askar-olladi as a representative of the Mo'talefe there were disagreements with Mahdavi Kani and others, there was an expression used; they said we will intercept the grains of dirt one by one. That is really what they did: they gathered all the grains of

dirt one by one, to the extent that when Khatami won the 2nd of Khordad election he won only the Presidency. All of the instruments of power were in the hands of the right. They had the majority in parliament, the offices of the Leader, the armed forces, the Basij, the Committees, major economic institutions like the Foundation for the Dispossessed and the 15th of Khordad Foundation, the state run television and radio and the Intelligence Ministry. These were all in the hands of the conservatives. When Khatami spoke of the rule of law, Mr. Askarolladi responded, “from now on we will speak to you through the law”. They began passing laws furthering their own agenda in the parliament, one after the other. This is the situation of the conservative current. They are standing firmly and defiantly.

There is a parenthesis I would like to open here. Concurrent to all of this there is another current which is more deeply rooted. From the time of Amir Kabir, Iran entered the modern era. This was concurrent with the rise of the Migi Emperor in Japan. Japan has reached the point where it is today, yet Iran has not reached the same point; it has not entered the age of development. Why? Why has it ensued in Japan, and not in Iran? One reason is that in Japan, subjects of modernity were domesticated or were Japanicized. This means that they took elements of modernity and Japanized them in a way that was compatible with their culture. Then these elements were no longer Western; these elements of modernity were now their own. They are part of Japanese culture, not foreign culture. We were unable to do this in Iran for a number of reasons.

The Islamic revolution has altered the state of the clash between tradition and modernity in favor of modernity. Consequently, in conjunction with the political struggle we are all witnessing is a key contradiction between traditionalism and modernity. Until we are able to do as Japan and other societies have done and Iranicize and Islamicize elements of modernity, modernity cannot flourish in Iran. The Islamic Revolution has helped in the process of Islamicization and Iranicization. Conservatives are strictly traditionalists. They oppose anything modern. There was a time when they opposed the replacement of public baths (a source of the spread of disease) by showers and there was a time they opposed the use of microphones in Mosques. Today the subjects and issues their focus has changed, but generally they oppose any form of innovation.

This is the reason that you see a speaker like Mr. Mesbah-Yazdi say there is only one interpretation of religion and anyone who says there are varying interpretations is an apostate. In Friday Prayers he roars, “where are the followers of Navab Safavi, where is their pride so that they can target those with alternative views in the same manner that Kasravi was targeted?” This is the primary conflict.

Conservatives have a presence in Iran and they are strong. You should not think that the conservative will be eliminated by the reform movement. Conservatives are the strongest and most rooted current in contemporary Iran. Though this is a current that is on its way out, how long that process will take I do not know, but in a society undergoing transition and the conflict between traditionalism and modernity, conservatism is a reality. They will continue to have a presence, and they can play a key role in political and social affairs, but under one condition: under the condition that they are rational and they cease resorting to violence as they are now.

The primary concern has been that if the conservative lose in the Parliamentary election, this would be the dawn of a number of changes. I should also note here that conservatism is not monolithic either. After the chain murders that took place last year and the attack on positions of conservatives that followed, conservatives have faced instability within their own camp. From within the conservatives a rational force is emerging, conservatives who are conservative yet choose to resist within the framework of the law and reason. This is great. We welcome this. We say: good, you must exist, but you must also follow the rules of the game.

The analogy that we draw is we say that in Iran today we have a political soccer game. You know that in different games there are different rules. In wrestling there is one person wrestling another. The same is true in boxing. But throughout the world soccer is a civil sport. This is because it has specified rules in which there is a confrontation between two fronts. There is a winning team and there is a losing team. The losing team knows that if it were to practice harder, there exists the chance that it will win in the future. Sometimes, you may recall from your primary school days, that when you saw that you were losing you would try to end or disrupt the game. This is the problem we have in the political soccer game

being played in Iran. There is a strand of conservatives who want to disrupt the game. This cannot be. The person who attempts to assassinate is trying to disrupt the game. The person who repeatedly stabbed the Forouhars in their home - there are many cleaner ways of murdering someone for example firing a couple of shots. Why did they choose to so brutally stab the Forouhars? Since some conservatives believe in the use of force and victory through the spread of fear, this method of murder was chosen in order to scare the opposition. Only, we were not scared. We were of course disturbed, but nobody was so scared that they decided to retreat. No, the contrary materialized. Instead, a current of rational conservatives emerged and this is positive. We welcome this. Not that we agree with what they are saying, but to the extent that we recognize that this civil game must continue, we welcome it. We say, why bullets. Let us sit down and discuss our differences. Express your ideas in newspapers.

These forces are in motion right now. On the one hand, rational conservatives are gaining power. Second, many want to disrupt the game, but they are unable to do so. There are many reasons for this. In political science we say that acquiring power is not always the same as the ability to exercise power. Sometimes you have the power to do something but circumstances inhibit you from doing so. It is not that you do not want to exercise power; you are unable to exercise power. The current Iranian climate is such that some people wish to see others beheaded, but cannot do it. Each time they take a step in this direction, they must pay a heavy toll. An example is the assassination attempt of Mr. Hajarian. You see that conservatives are paying and will continue to pay a heavy toll for this move.

On the other hand the reformists are transforming. The same reformists who prior to the 2nd of Khordad elections would say that the Freedom Movement of Iran should not be able to participate in elections because it is an “outsider” are now forced to say, no, the Freedom Movement also has a right to participate in elections. You may know that there was a poll regarding political parties in Iran. The Freedom Movement came in first, second the Office for the Consolidation of Unity and third the Participation Front. The Freedom Movement announced that if all of its candidates were disqualified, we would come up with a list of the best candidates

relative to our options. We told people this. Democracy is not a choice between good and bad. It is a choice between bad and worse. If this is accepted, we can achieve much success, if they understand that they should not be looking for the ideal or perfect candidates which they will not find. We are all human and have weaknesses and shortcomings. Thus you must choose between bad and worse. We told people that we would put out a list based on the candidates who were deemed most acceptable. We did this. We put out a list of sixteen people and eleven of them were chosen. This policy of even if you disqualify me I will support you, has slowly lead to a transformation even within the reformist camp.

Juxtaposed to all of this, what are the obstacles with which we are faced and what should we expect from the future? First, Mr. Khatami is confronted with a historic challenge. To this point, people have believed that Mr. Khatami wants to implement certain policies, but they will not allow him to do so. But now we have a Parliament in which the majority is with him. This time, Mr. Khatami will be forced to introduce a more acceptable cabinet. The last time around, he was restricted. If his appointees did not meet certain criteria, the parliament would reject them. This time, the reformists have the majority. Thus, Mr. Khatami should be able to choose whoever he wants to be on his cabinet. This is a challenge. He cannot bring in the same people who have held these positions for the last twenty years. Whatever miracles these people wanted to bring about, they have already brought about. He can no longer do this. Second, Mr. Khatami must do something to shake the economy. If he cannot shake the economy - and I do not mean a miracle or an earthquake - there are only a few policies which would get the economy moving. He must do this. He is faced with this challenge.

The new Parliament will take office on 7th of Khordad (May 28th) and it will take it 3 or 4 months to determine the various positions and committee memberships within the Parliament. The 4 to 5 months that will follow, this Parliament will be faced with a number of challenges. They must revoke all of the anti-populist laws that currently exist. They must determine the state of institutions such as the Special Court for the Clergy. The future of organizations parallel to the government and the judiciary must be determined. There are tremendous challenges facing the new

Parliament. It must select members to the Article 10 Commission of Political Parties Law, and it follows that those members will be reformists. Then we will wait to see if the new Article 10 Commission of Political Parties Law will classify so-called “outsider” parties such as the Freedom Movement as legal or not. The new Parliament must appoint representative to the Media Oversight Committee. How will they prevent appointments such as the representative from Isfahan who entered on a popular vote and instead worked to close door newspapers? These are some of the challenges the next parliament faces.

In addition, how will it deal with the parallel institutions that have been formed? Sixty percent of Iran’s GNP rests with the economic activities of the so-called revolutionary foundations like the Foundation for the Dispossessed, the 15th of Khordad Foundation, the Headquarters for the Pursuance of the Imam’s Eight Commands. Sixty percent of our GNP is in their hands and they are neither subject to the law nor accountable to the government. How can the government implement an effective economic policy when 60% of the economy falls outside of its control? These are all illegal. Perhaps they were created in response to special circumstances present at the beginning of the revolution, but the constitution specifies only three legal forms of economic entities: public, private, and cooperative. These institutions fall within none of these categories. Their fate must be determined. A significant amount of the funding for the conservative vigilante groups comes from these institutions because they are subject to no oversight. Such oversight must be established.

We project that there will be adverse relations between the new Parliament and the Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians may veto much of the Parliament’s legislation. If they do veto legislation, it will go to the Expediency Council and since all of the members of the Expediency Council are appointed by the Leader, these members are all from the right. We project that the Expediency Council will vote with the Council of Guardians. This means that while the Parliament attends to its business, the Reform movement will find its efforts directed towards another rank, because the rank that determines the members of the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, and even the Special Court for Clergy..., the challenges and battles are now in a different place.

Will the reform movement be able to successfully meet these challenges? It is natural for us to be optimistic and say yes. In my opinion yes, it is inevitable. As I submitted, the roots are not from above, they are from below. Within the last 50 years of contemporary Iranian history, in Shahrivar 1320, it was not the Iranian people who expelled Reza Shah, despite the disdain they had for him. It was the Allied forces who did it. In other words, it was a foreign force that disturbed the status quo. The Coup d'état of the 28th of Mordad was another foreign intervention. It did not originate from the depths of our society. In 1338 and 1339, it was Kennedy who pressured the Shah by saying well you've devastated the nationalist and communist opposition, so now give a little more freedom and bring about a little opening.

The Shah could not tolerate anyone; he could not tolerate the representative from Kashan that was elected. Three steps forward and four steps back led to the occurrences of the 15th of Khordad. In 1356 and 1357 when Carter came, once again there was pressure from the outside for change - pressure from 'above', and internal social forces made use of these opportunities, so what had to be done was done. Today however the pressure is not coming externally.

This is a new phenomenon; the pressure is internal and independent of any external force it is mounting. This pressure is headed in one direction: political development, the rule of law, civil society etc., and because it originates from the depths of our society, there is nothing those in power can do about it. There is nothing they can do about our youth. In addition, their supporting forces are not monolithic. For all of these reasons along with our understanding of the nature of this movement, we believe that the movement will continue. We will have ups and downs. We will have tolls to pay. Neither we nor they are kidding. This is a process headed in one direction. There is no going back. The mistake that the conservatives and extremist elements make is that they are under the false impression that they are up against individuals. They are not up against individuals; they are up against a tremendously profound and widespread popular current.

I did not intend to go on for this long, but it is a habit that is hard to break. I hate to leave these issues unfinished in this historic opportunity that has arisen. There are other issues left to discuss.

What was the effect of the revolution on structures of power in Iran? What is the fate of the clergy in Iran? Are today's clergy the same clergy of the beginning of the revolution? Do they have the same characteristics? Do they have the same status? Do they have the same power? The product that materializes from the process currently taking place will be effective.

Thank you for your patience. I apologize, as my speech was not supposed to be so long. I will be happy to take your questions.

52. What Went Wrong on November 4th, 1979

Presented by Ebrahim Yazdi, PhD., Secretary General, Freedom Movement of Iran, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Iran, at Columbus, Ohio State University, November 3rd, 2000

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

Let me greet you in our own tradition and say *salaam allaikum*, peace be upon you all. It is indeed my honor to be here and to address this distinguished audience. The organizers of this meeting have asked me to discuss the causes and consequences of the hostage crisis with suggestions for changing the current state of affairs between Iran and the United States. Among the reasons that made me accept participating in your meeting is the conviction that discussing the hostage crisis is still important because:

- It has always been a controversial subject and has created major debates in Iran and within the US;
- It has been among the historical legacies of our two nations which has to be addressed because it had inadvertent consequences and was costly and risky for both countries;
- It could provide important historical lessons; and
- The debates on the question of hostage crisis may contribute to a better understanding between Iran and the United States and to the study of conflict resolution in general.

Considering that the hostage crisis is a very complicated issue, important information are still classified in Iran as well as the United States, and our time is limited, I have only dealt with certain aspects of the hostage crisis. In my remarks, I try to present seven major propositions:

1. The hostage crisis has to be seen in the historical context of Iran's struggle against foreign domination and of Iranian-American relations;
2. The historical experience of the Anglo-American coup against Dr. Mossadegh in 1953 and American support for the Shah had a great impact on Iranian perceptions of American threats;
3. There were diverging opinions among the American policy-makers on how to deal with the Shah and his opponents throughout the revolution and after his fall;
4. The hostage crisis was partly the byproduct of the American government overlooking the intensity of domestic opposition to the Shah and to the American government because of its relations with him;
5. The Iranian authorities warned American officials in advance about the adverse effects of allowing the Shah to come to this country for medical treatment;
6. The American decision to admit the Shah to the United States was perceived as a hostile act and a threat in Iran and was partly responsible for the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979 and the prolonged hostage crisis; and
7. Dealing with the American government was and has remained a divisive issue in post- revolutionary Iran.

Let me start with my argument that the hostage crisis has to be seen in the historical context of Iran's struggle against foreign domination and of Iranian-American relations. The twentieth century has been named as the people's century because of the great popular revolutions that took place during that century. The first revolution of this century took place in 1906 and the last one in 1979, both in Iran.

The *Constitutional Revolution* of 1906 was against absolute monarchy and foreign domination. The tobacco concession given to foreigners by Naseruddin *Shah*, the king of Iran, led to a widespread uprising in 1891-92, known as the *Tobacco Protest*, since Iranians considered the concession as an overt attempt by Great Britain to colonize Iran. The religious edict which banded the cultivation, selling or buying and usage of tobacco in any form was effective to the extent that it forced the Shah to retreat and cancel the concession. This was the first collective popular political

action in Iran against both foreign domination and the absolute rule of the king, and was the beginning of a new era in Iran.

The essence of the tobacco protest was against foreign domination. It was based on anti-foreign sentiment in the Iranian psyche and the collective memory of our culture. This deeply rooted sentiment has been an active and a constant player in shaping the history of Iran. Two factors have contributed to the emergence of an anti-foreign element in our culture.

One is derived from our historical experiences. Iran is located at a very important geographical crossroads. In the past Iran has been invaded, plundered and dominated forcefully by foreign powers. These invasions caused widespread devastation and bloodshed. The lasting impregnation was a deeply rooted sensitivity to foreign domination.

The second contributing factor is the teaching of Islam. The *Holy Qur'an*, in various verses has categorically prohibited and denounced the economic and/or political domination of non-Muslims over Muslims. Islam has been in Iran for more than 1400 years. Ninety seven per cent of Iranians are Muslim and Islam is an inseparable part of the Iranian identity, which consists of two basic elements. One is nationalism or Iranian-ness, and the other is religiousness or Islamicity. The anti-foreign sentiment is actually nourished by both elements. Such a combination makes any political movement against foreign domination very popular and strong.

The success of the Tobacco Uprising had important results. One was the start of a very strong anti-despotic movement which precipitated the constitutional revolution and establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The other long-term consequence of the success in the Tobacco Uprising and constitutional revolution was, however, the emergence of new kind of colonialism in Iran, the invisible one.

Iran for years was a victim of foreign rivalry. The Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907 divided Iran into two zones of influence, the Russians in the north, the British in the south, and a neutral zone in between. This was an overt attempt for a direct and visible colonization of Iran. There was strong public opposition to the Anglo-Russian agreement in Iran. The British were left to act

open-handedly after the Russian Revolution in 1917. Then in 1919, a secret Anglo-Persian agreement was signed which gave Great Britain major political, military and economic control over Iran.

This agreement was the last attempt by Great Britain for direct and visible colonization of Iran. It was only after its failure that Great Britain changed its direct colonization policy in Iran and through the 1921 military coup brought to power the surrogate government of Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The result was a ruthless dictator and a suppressive, brutal, and corrupt regime lasting for twenty years.

Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah in September 1941. A period of relative political openness followed. It was during this time that a new sort of political awareness developed, and a national movement under the leadership of late Dr Mossadegh emerged which dominated the Iranian political scene for 12 years till 1953.

During this period, no oil concessions were granted despite the heavy pressure exerted on Iran by the Soviet Union as well as the United States for oil concessions. The nationalist movement of Dr. Mossadegh succeeded in nationalizing the British oil company to protect the independence of Iran. The motivating force behind the oil nationalization movement was the same anti-foreign sentiment in the Iranian collective psyche.

The late Dr Mossadegh succeeded in introducing democracy to Iranian society. For the first time after so many years, a popular government was in power in Iran. For the first time the traditional gap and rift between government and public was disappearing. In the eyes of many freedom fighters in Iran, this was an historical step forward for the realization of the sovereignty of the people and the restoration of basic rights and liberties of our people.

Era of Goodwill

Let me briefly elaborate how the Iranian public perception of the United States as a friendly power changed to a hostile and threatening state. In 1883 the first diplomatic representatives were exchanged between Iran and the United States. From that time until the Second World War, the impressive activities of individual Americans who were living and working in Iran had created a friendly, healthy and humane picture of Americans. Many Iranian

authorities viewed the United States as one of the solutions in dealing with aggressive Russian and British policies against Iran.

In reacting to the influence of Great Britain and Imperial Russia, Iranian leaders had developed two policies known in Iran as positive and negative balance. The adherents to positive balance strongly advocated that since Iran cannot effectively resist the foreign powers' expectations and pressure it should keep a balance between the two, Britain and Russia, by giving them equal privileges. This attitude, however, was considered by many Iranian nationalist leaders to be harmful to Iran's national interests and independence and thus not acceptable. They promoted the concept of negative balance which meant that the interests of Iran were not to give any privilege to any of the two competing powers but rather to try to annul any concession given to either one of them.

Considering that Iran needed military and economic development which could not be achieved without foreign assistance, the nationalists looked for help from countries with no interventionist policies, neutral in the competition between the two rival powers in Iran. Iran's nationalist leaders tried to develop and expand diplomatic relations with countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and America. Therefore diplomatic relations between Iran and America were established and welcomed.

These positive views about the United State were reinforced by the activities of those individual Americans such as *Howard C. Baskerville*, a 21-year-old Princeton graduate and a young teacher at American Memorial School in Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan in Northwest Iran. Baskerville, while working in Tabriz, like many of his colleagues sympathized with the constitutionalists. He was so inspired by the revolutionaries that he resigned from his school to join the constitutionalist forces in their fight against monarchist and was killed in the battle of 1909. The people of Tabriz buried him in the same city with great honor. For years, in annual celebration of the victory of the constitutional revolution, thousands of people gathered around his grave and praised his bravery. Baskerville and Morgan W. Shuster were among those Americans who contributed to the goodwill developed amongst the Iranians prior to the 1940's.

After WWII, however, American policy in Iran gradually changed. During WWII, allied forces occupied Iran, and were

supposed to leave six months after the surrender of Japanese forces. The Soviets however, refused and kept their forces in Azerbaijan, northwestern Iran. President Truman's ultimatum to the Soviet Union is seen as one of the factors that brought about the evacuation of its forces from Iran.

New Entanglements

In 1942 an American Army advisory mission to the Iranian gendarmerie, *GENMISH* began, and expanded the *Armish Agreement* of 1949. The American government was increasing its activities in Iran and strengthening its relation with the Shah. The presence and activities of American military advisors in Iran's armed forces gave them tremendous leverage in the internal policies of Iran, to the extent that together with Great Britain by a joint military coup, they were able to topple the national government of Dr Mossadegh in August 1953.

The popular movement for the nationalization of oil was one of the highlights of the Iranian struggle for liberty and independence and was considered a continuation of the struggle started by both the Tobacco Uprising and Constitutional Revolution. High tides of hope for building a free and prosperous Iran became prevalent. Then the Anglo-American coup of 1953 overthrew Dr. Mossadegh's popular national government and returned the fugitive Shah to power. Once again the process of democratization in Iran was interrupted, but this time by the active participation of the American government.

Among the most adverse impacts of the 1953 military coup was the suffocation of the process of democratization in Iran at the embryonic stage. The Shah of Iran who had fled the country under public political pressure was brought back to power from abroad. He ruled Iran for 25 years with an iron fist and became one of the most brutal and suppressive government of our time. The historical Iranian view of America changed dramatically from democratic and peace-loving to aggressive interventionist and transgressor of international laws and regulations, including the United Nations Charter.

After the military coup, the American oil companies got their lion share of Iranian oil in a newly established Oil Consortium. Later the *Armish agreement* was expanded, with a new *American*

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) which became known as the *ARMISH-MAAG* mission. Since then, the American presence in Iran gradually became more and more noticeable. Meanwhile, the anti-American feelings among Iranians were intensifying and expanding. In the early 1960s, under American pressure, the hand picked Iranian parliament adopted the Capitulation Agreement granting judicial immunity for American subjects in Iran. Then in June 1963 an uprising took place against the Shah and his foreign supporters, particularly the USA. The American authorities responsible for USA diplomacy in Iran not only did not understand and/or pay any attention to the anti-foreign sentiments in Iranians' collective memory, but rather, intensified them and expanded their presence in Iran.

The number of American citizens working in Iran increased from a handful to close to 48,000 at the time of the Revolution. The *ARMISH-MAAG* became the greatest American military mission outside of the US. A special American radio station aired from Tehran. Many Americans residing in Iran were not aware of, interested in, or respectful of Iranian beliefs and feelings. The behavior of American military advisors towards the Iranian armed forces counterpart was injurious to their pride. Thus even among the Iranian army officers, anti-American feelings and resentment grew remarkably. Disregard of Iranian religious ideas was such that in Isfahan, a central province in Iran where the International Bell Helicopter Co. was active, clashes developed. In one instance an American employee of International Bell Co. entered a mosque with his motorcycle while he was drunk.

A quotation from an American advisor who served in Iran in the early 1940s may be helpful to Americans interested in understanding critical events such as the hostage crisis: *"Our failures in Persia may be explained by poor organization; by defective or inadequate informational services; by lack of coordination among the departments in Washington; by disagreements among officials of the State Department, causing confusion of purpose, delay, compromises, or total paralysis; by personal jealousies and intrigues; and by incapacity or laziness. (A.C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia)*

The military coup of 1953 and the continuous support of the Shah's regime for 25 year till the Islamic Revolution of 1979

shattered the historical goodwill. A deep and persistent enmity, hostility, hatred and antagonism towards US had developed. The United States was perceived as a threat and the opposition to the Shah extended to the American government. Among the greatest miscalculations committed by Washington was the underestimation of anti-foreign sentiment in our culture and Iranian's deep enmity towards the Shah and his foreign supporters, including the American government.

Islamic Revolution

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was aimed at the same fundamental national goals and inspirations as the 1891 Tobacco Uprising, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the 1950 National Movement. It was the continuation of the same tradition. The Islamic Revolution was against internal despotism as well as the domination and continuous intervention of foreign powers in our internal affairs. The Shah was subservient to foreign powers such as Great Britain and the US, and as such he completely lost his traditional legitimacy. The goal of the Revolution was not only to restore sovereignty, basic rights and liberty of our people but also to ensure complete independence of the homeland.

After the revolution the United States joined other countries and recognized the new revolutionary government of Iran. The new authorities, including the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Council of Revolution and the Provisional Government of Mehdi Bazargan all wanted to keep normal diplomatic relations with foreign countries, including the USA. A great revolution had taken place in Iran. A new foreign policy with new priorities was to be adopted based on the objectives and inspirations of the revolution. The old economic, political and military relations could not be continued. The critical question was whether the United States was willing to accept the new reality and make the necessary changes in its attitude and actions toward Iran.

Twenty-five years of close military, economic and political relations between the United States and Shah's regime created major problems and questions for the authorities in both countries in the aftermath of revolution. The past relations were not acceptable to Iran. To adopt a new attitude and working policy towards Iran was not easy for US authorities either. Key strategic

issues and billions of dollars, both government and private funds, were at stake. While the provisional government of Iran was under tremendous internal pressure to make foreign policy changes, the American authorities were not serious in considering Iran's request for a quick and just solution. Both countries were captives of their past relations. The Americans could not adapt themselves to the new situation and forgo their past interests. The Iranians, on the other hand, could not disregard the past record and trust Americans. Mr. Henry Precht, Iran desk officer at the State Department, came to Iran in early October of 1979 and had several meetings with myself as well as the members of the Revolutionary Council. Through these meetings he informed us that the American government had given the Shah the permission to enter the United States for treatment of terminal cancer. We all cautioned him of the grave consequences of such an action. I told him that US government was playing with fire and opening a Pandora's box. We considered the US decision an invitation to a direct confrontation between the two countries. He and Mr. Laingen were in full agreement with our assessment. Mr. Precht was among very few individuals in the State Department who as early as 1978 realized that the Pahlavi regime was in deep trouble and was actually collapsing. However, on behalf of Washington he had to emphasize that admitting the Shah was purely humanistic and not political whatsoever. He had a hard time convincing even the most moderate members of the new Iranian government. The Shah arrived in the United States while Mr. Precht was in Iran, trying to convince Iranians concerning the American decision. In two or three official notes to the American embassy in Iran, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested the Shah's entry to the US and considered it a belligerent act, holding Washington responsible for any consequences. Anticipating strong public suspicion and reaction in Iran, the Provisional government submitted several official and unofficial notices to the American authorities requesting that some Iranian physicians working in the US be allowed to examine the Shah and check his medical records. The American officials refused that request. Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister in an unofficial letter to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi asked him publicly and officially to abdicate the crown. The American authorities refused to even take the letter to hand over to him. In

their reports, officials of the American embassy in Tehran repeatedly had warned officials in Washington, predicting an attack on the embassy if the Shah was given entry to the US. Was there a powerful pressure group in the US behind the Shah's entry for the sake of their vested interests?

When all the Provisional Government's warnings were completely ignored by the Americans and the Shah was permitted to come to the United States, the expected explosion - hostage taking, took place. The Shah's entry to the US immediately rejuvenated in the collective memory of Iranians the bitter American intervention of 1953. The Provisional Government felt responsible for the safety of all foreign subjects, including the American diplomats working at the American embassy, and thus could not agree with the hostage taking. Furthermore we saw the hostage-taking contrary to Iran's national interests. On the other hand, the American justification for their decision was not acceptable at all. The Iranian authorities and people were highly suspicious of American intentions and felt threatened. It was 9:30 AM, November 4th, 1979 when my deputy for international and economic affairs called me and said that the American Charge D'affaires, Mr. Bruce Laingen was in his office with an urgent matter and wanted to see me. A few minutes later Mr. Laingen and his aid, Mr. Swift were in my office to inform me that a group of young people had invaded the US embassy compound. Mr. Tomset was, through his wireless phone, in touch with someone inside the embassy and was receiving a minute-by-minute report. Within a short span of time the embassy was completely under the full control of the students and the Americans working in the embassy were taken hostage. Both Mr. Laingen and Mr. Tomset had to stay in the Ministry's building for their safety.

Mr. Bazargan, then the prime minister and I, the minister of foreign affairs felt responsible for the safety of foreign subjects as members of government. We could not approve of the hostage-taking and thus enacted our already submitted resignations.

The consequences of the hostage-taking were grave and heavy for both sides. Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, and the following 8 years of bloody and devastating war were just one of the fruits of the hostage-taking. US support of Iraq's aggression and invasion further aggravated its diplomatic dispute with Iran.

The Future Prospective

Though the hostage crisis was costly and risky for both countries, neither have to remain hostage to our past relations. The past differences should not prevent us from cooperating to achieve our common interests. Historical mistakes don't have to be recycled. Taking Americans as hostage in 1979 by Iranian students however has shattered the relations between the two countries far deeper and greater than just a break in diplomatic relations between the two states. Not only the American government, but also its people considered this an insult to their pride similar to the injuries incurred at the end of Vietnam war.

Improving public opinions on both sides should be considered to replace enmity with amity. President Khatami's remarks in his interview with CNN, regretting the consequences of the hostage-taking of Americans by Iranian students, had a positive effect on American public opinion towards Iran. Recent remarks made by President Clinton and his Secretary of State, although not quite adequate as far as Iranians are concerned, nonetheless were positive steps in the right direction. The United States government however could express a willingness to compensate for the Iranian suffering incurred as the results of the 1953 military coup.

Many Iranians also welcomed the partial lifting of sanctions for items including carpets, caviar and pistachios. Although the road towards restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries is not as direct and paved as one may want, but recent events in New York showed that it is not impossible. My own proposition for the Iranian government is that it should accept the principle of official, direct and overt negotiations with the American government. After all, there are some financial and economic issues to be resolved so such negotiations are needed.

The US government could take some preliminary steps to pave the way. The huge American military presence in the Persian Gulf, only a few miles from our sea border, is perceived as a direct threat to our national security. All other countries in the Persian Gulf region seem to be in danger as well. Any human error and/or miscalculation may lead to a human tragedy in this region. No country with an average sense of security would tolerate such a potentially dangerous situation. As a first step of showing its goodwill, the US government should make a public statement about moving to reduce its military presence in the Persian Gulf.

American unilateral sanctions against Iran have proven to be of no remarkable effect. Maybe the time has come to unconditionally lift the sanctions altogether. Any other issues could be resolved through negotiations. They may or may not lead to the restoration of diplomatic relations. Even if they are restored, one may not be optimistic and expect just more than normal diplomatic relations. Thank you for being patient with me.

**53. From the First to the Last Revolution of the 20th Century
Delivered by Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi before the Denver Council on
World Affairs, Denver, Colorado, October 18, 2000**

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

Let me greet you in our own tradition and say salaam allaikum, peace be upon you all.

It is indeed my honor to be here and address this distinguished meeting. The twentieth century has been named as the people's century, because of so many great revolutions that have taken place during this century. It is, however, interesting to note that the first revolution of this century took place in 1906 and the last one in 1979, both in Iran. The first one, known as Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was against the absolute monarchy. Iran has a long record of 2500 years of absolute monarchy. The revolution was ignited when then king of Iran Naseruddin Shah (1848-1896) signed many concessions with foreign countries, namely the British government as well as private business enterprises, granting them a variety of privileges and access to Iran's natural resources and agricultural products. Among them was the tobacco concession. The tobacco concession, however, ignited a widespread uprising known as *Tobacco Protest* of 1891. A religious verdict was issued by top religious clerics who banned the cultivation, selling, buying and usage of tobacco in any form. Many among the Iranian elite were in touch with Iranian colonies in India and were familiar with the reputation of British companies and the Indian government. The Tobacco Concession, therefore, was considered by Iranians as an overt attempt by Great Britain to colonize Iran. It was effective to such a degree that Naseruddin Shah was forced to retreat and cancel the concession. This was the first collective popular political action in Iran against both the absolute rule of the king and foreign domination, and the beginning

of a new era in Iran. The essence of the tobacco protest, sociologically, politically and ideologically speaking, was against foreign domination. Its core and roots was anti-foreign sentiment within the Iranian psych and collective memory, which is very deep in Iranian culture. Many later events in Iran have been initiated or influenced by this deep routed sentiment. Two factors have contributed to the anti-foreign element in our culture. One is derived from historical experiences. Iran is located at a very important geographical crossroad, so Iran has been invaded, plundered and dominated forcefully by many foreign invaders. These invasions brought to Iran a wide range of devastation and bloodshed. The lasting impregnation was a deep-routed sensitivity to foreign domination. The second contributing factor is the teaching of Islam. The Holy Qur'an in various verses has categorically prohibited the economic and/or political domination of non-Muslims over Muslims. Islam has been in Iran for more than 1400 years. Ninety seven per cent of Iranians are Muslim and Islam is an inseparable part of our Iranian identity. The Iranian identity as a matter of fact is bipolar, consisting of two basic elements. One is nationality or Iranian, and the other is religiosity or 'Islamicity'. The anti-foreign sentiment in the Iranian psycho-cultural state of mind actually nourishes by both elements of nationalism and Islamicity. Such a combination makes any political movement aiming against foreign domination very popular and strong, which is why the tobacco protest was so successful. The success of the tobacco uprising brought about two very important results. One was the initiation of a very strong anti-despotic movement which precipitated the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of constitutional monarchy. During the tobacco protests Iranian elite, consisting of intellectuals, merchants, and Ullema, following closely the events in the Indian peninsula, realized the danger of European colonialism. They objected to the Shah's absolute rule and his subservience to the pressure of foreign powers. Together they began the Constitutional Revolution, an anti-despotic movement which succeeded in drafting the first constitution and forced the Shah to sign it. The major goal of the revolution was, nonetheless, liberty, justice and equality, after the French revolution. The other long-term consequence of the successes of the Tobacco Uprising and

Constitutional Revolution was the immergence of a new kind of colonialism in Iran, an invisible one. For years Iran had been caught between the two rival foreign powers, Imperial Russia in the north and Great British in the south. Although Britain lost the tobacco concession, it did not give up Iran all together. First in 1906 the British succeeded in securing an oil concession in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, which was granted to D'Arcy. In 1907 the two rival forces came to an understanding and signed the Anglo-Russian agreement, actually dividing Iran into two zones of influence, the Russian in the north, the British in the south, and a neutral zone in between. This was an overt attempt for a direct and visible colonization of Iran. But only one year after the Constitutional Revolution it also failed. The public uproar and the opposition to the Anglo-Russian agreement were very loud and strong. In 1917 the Bolshevik revolution in Russia succeeded in overthrowing the Tsarist regime, which left Britain to act openly in Iran. Then in 1919 a secret Anglo-Persian agreement was signed which gave Great Britain enormous political, military and economic control over Iran. This agreement was the last attempt by Great Britain for direct and visible colonization of Iran, which again failed. It was only after this failure that the British changed their direct colonization policy in Iran. Instead, the surrogate government of Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, was installed through a 1921 military coup. The result was a ruthless dictator and suppressive, brutal and corrupt regime which lasted for twenty years. In September 1941 British forces entered Iran and forced Reza Shah to abdicate, transferring him from Iran to South Africa, allowing his son Mohammad Reza Shah to be crowned. A period of relative political openness followed. It was during this time that a new sort of political awareness developed and a national movement under the leadership of Dr Mossadegh emerged, which dominated the Iranian political scene for 12 years until 1953. During this period, despite heavy pressure exerted on Iran by the Soviet Union and US for oil concessions, no oil concession was granted. Furthermore, the National Movement succeeded in nationalizing the British oil company. In this way one of the main goals of Iranian struggle since the 1891 Tobacco Uprising to safeguard the independence of the motherland was fulfilled. The motivating force behind the oil

nationalization movement was the same anti-foreign sentiment in the Iranian collective psyche. After so many years Dr Mossadegh succeeded in introducing democracy in Iranian society. For the first time a popular government was in power in Iran. The traditional rift between government and public, nation – state, disappeared. In the eyes of many freedom fighters in Iran this was a historical step forward for the realization of the sovereignty of people and the restoration of the basic rights and liberties of our people. The popular movement for nationalization of oil, on the other hand, was one of the highlights of the Iranian struggle for liberty and independence, and as such was considered to be the continuation of the same struggle started by the Tobacco Uprising and the Constitutional Revolution. High tides of hope for building a free and prosperous Iran prevailed.

New Entanglements

In August 1953 Great Britain and the US toppled the lawful national government of Dr Mossadegh through a military coup and brought back the fugitive Shah. Once again the process of democratization in Iran was interrupted, this time by the active involvement of the American government. The military coup of 1953 generated many internal and external consequences. The most dramatic ones were the following:

1. By all practical measures the military coup suffocated the process of democratization in Iran at the embryonic stage. The Shah who had fled the country under public political pressure, was returned from abroad and crowned again. He then ruled Iran for 25 years with an iron fist and became one of the most brutal and suppressive governments at the time.

2. Iranians' historical image of America changed dramatically from a democratic peace loving ally to an aggressive interventionist and transgressor of international laws and regulations, including the United Nations Charter.

The Seeds of Enmity

Official diplomatic contacts between Iran and US were established in 1851. Several moderate treaties were negotiated in 1851 and 1856. In 1883 the first diplomatic representatives were exchanged. From that time until World War II, the impressive activities of

individual Americans who lived and worked in Iran created a healthy, humanist picture of Americans. To many Iranian authorities, the Americans were considered one alternative solution to distance themselves from Russian and British aggressive policies against Iran.

As mentioned earlier, the influence of Great Britain and Imperial Russia in Iran was deep and persistent for decades before and after 1900. As the results of such political circumstances, Iranian leaders developed two sorts of attitudes, known in Iran as positive and negative balance. The adherents of positive balance strongly argued that Iran cannot effectively resist foreign powers expectations and pressure, so Iran should keep a balance between the two, Britain and Russia, by giving them equal privileges. This attitude was considered by many Iranian nationalist leaders to be in contravention to Iran's national interest and independence, thus unacceptable. They advocated the concept of negative balance, which means that the interests of Iran was to not give any privileges to either of the two competing powers, but rather to annul any concessions given to either one of them.

On the other hand, there was an urgent need for military and economic development which could not be achieved without help and support from more developed countries. Nationalists then were looking to get needed help from those developed countries which did not have interventional policies in Iran and were neutral in the competition between the two rival powers. It was within such a frame of mind that many nationalist leaders of Iran tried to develop and expand diplomatic relations with such countries as Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and America. Therefore when diplomatic relations between Iran and America were established, it was welcomed.

This attitude was particularly fortified by the activities of individual Americans such as Howard C. Baskerville, a 21-year-old Princeton graduate and young teacher at American Memorial School in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan province in Northwest Iran. While working in Tabriz, Baskerville, like many of his colleagues, sympathized with constitutionalists. He was so inspired by the revolutionaries that he resigned from his school and joined the constitutionalist forces in their fight against the monarchists and was killed in the battle of 1909. He was buried with great

honor by the people of Tabriz. For years, in annual celebration of the victory of the Constitutional Revolution of August 4th, thousands of people gathered around his grave to honor his bravery. People like Baskerville and Morgan W. Shuster were among those Americans who contributed to the goodwill towards Americans developed amongst Iranians prior to the 1940's.

After WWII, however, the American policy in Iran gradually changed. During the War allied forces occupied Iran. They were supposed to leave Iran 6 months after the surrender of Japan's forces. The Soviet Union refused to do so and kept their forces in Azerbaijan province, northwest Iran. It was then President Truman's ultimatum to Russia that eventually forced them to evacuate Iran and thus safeguarded Iran's territorial integrity.

After the defeat of the Soviets, the US began to increase its activities in Iran and strengthen its relations with the Shah. In 1942 the first American military advisory mission to the Iranian gendarmerie GENMISH started, followed by the U.S. Army Mission through the Armish Agreement of 1949. The presence and the activities of American military advisors in Iranian armed forces gradually gave US government tremendous influence in the Iranian military, to the extent that a military coup against the national government of Dr Mossadegh in August 1953 by US government and Great Britain was successful.

The mission expanded later to the new American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and became known as the ARMISH-MAAG mission. From the time of the US military coup of 1953 a deep persistent enmity, hostility, and hatred towards the American government has existed. In addition, the continuous support of the Shah's regime for 25 years until the Islamic Revolution of 1979 shattered any historical goodwill. After the military coup, American oil companies got their lion share of Iranian oil in a newly established Oil Consortium. Since then, American presence in Iran gradually became more and more overt and obvious. The more pronounced American presence became, the stronger became anti-American feeling among Iranians.

When in early 1960s, under American pressure or otherwise, a hand picked Iranian parliament adopted the Capitulations Agreement giving judicial immunity for American subjects in Iran, an explosion, the June 1963 uprising against the Shah and his

foreign supporters, particularly USA, took place. The American authorities responsible for US diplomacy in Iran not only did not understand and/or pay any attention to the anti-foreign sentiment in Iranians collective memory; contrarily they intensified and expanded their physical presence in Iran. The number of American citizens working in Iran increased from a few to close to 48000 at time of Revolution. In the eyes of the majority of Iranians the US government became responsible for the brutality of the Shah's tyrannical and despotic regime.

The aims of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 were the same fundamental national goals and inspirations as the 1884 Tobacco Uprising, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the 1950 National Movement. It was the continuation of the same tradition. The Islamic Revolution also intended to eliminate internal despotism as well as the domination and continuous intervention of foreign powers in our country's internal affairs. The Shah was completely subservient to alien powers, such as Great Britain and USA. The goal of the Revolution, therefore, was not only to restore the sovereignty, basic rights and liberties of our people, but also to guarantee the complete independence of the homeland.

Thus a significant part of the revolution was to eliminate the abuse of foreign powers such as the US government. That was unavoidable. The greatest miscalculation committed by the authorities of the US government at the time was an underestimation of the anti-foreign sentiment in our culture and Iranian's deep enmity towards the Shah and American government. When they completely disregarded all the Provisional Government's warnings and permitted the Shah's entry into the US, the predicted explosion took place as a hostage taking. In the mind of Iranians the Shah's entry to the US immediately revived the bitter memory of American intervention in 1953.

54. A Letter to the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan

From Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi to the Secretary General, United Nations, February 10, 2002

Your Excellency

The RFE/RL Iran Report in its latest issue (February 4, 2002, V5, No.4) reported that Iranian State Television in January 27 quoted

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you as saying, *“I was really astonished to see the degree of freedom of expression the people (of Iran) enjoy.”*

Many Iranians were shocked when they heard or read this narration. I am not sure if this is an accurate reflection of your statement. This statement, at best is in direct conflict with the reports given by the UNHC and several other well credible international human rights organizations. According to these reports Iran has a very bad record on human rights. Iranians from all walks of life are routinely and arbitrarily arrested and kept incommunicado in military garrison tried beyond the closed forums and convicted for just expressing their views. There are indeed inquisition courts.

Your Excellency

Did your staff inform you that on the same day, Saturday January 27, when you were in Tehran, several families of political detainees, including leading members of the FMI, and other religious nationalist groups, journalists, students, and writers had gathered in front of the United Nations Office in Tehran with the hopes that they may present to you their grievances and appeal to your good offices to take effective action to remedy their sufferings and the sufferings of their loved ones. Unfortunately, within minutes after their peaceful gathering, which was within their Constitutional rights, and despite advance notice to the Ministry of Interior, the police and security forces brutally attacked them and injured several of them. Some required emergency medical care. They did not deserve such harsh treatment for just trying to reach you.

Your Excellency

In your Nobel Lecture on December 10, 2001 in Oslo you addressed several very interesting and important issues. Among them you have said, *“Over the past five years, I have often recalled that the United Nations’ charter begins with the words: ‘we the people.’ What is not always recognized is that ‘we the people’ are made up of individuals whose claims to the most fundamental rights have too often been sacrificed in the supposed interests of the state of the nation.”*

This indeed is a very noble interpretation and the true meaning of the United Nations. Based on this understanding of the meaning of the United Nations, you then said, *“Throughout my term as Secretary-General, I have sought to place human beings at the centre of everything we do – from conflict prevention to development to human rights. Securing real and lasting improvement in the lives of individual men and women is the measure of all we do at the United Nations.”*

Then you clearly stated the guidelines for strategic planning of UN functions, *“Only where individual rights are respected can differences be channeled politically and resolved peacefully. Only in a democratic environment, based on respect for diversity and dialogue, can individual self-expression and self-government be secured, and freedom of association upheld. Only by understanding and addressing the needs of individuals for peace, for dignity, and for security can we at the United Nations hope to live up to the honor conferred today, and fulfill the vision of our founders. This is the broad mission of peace that United Nations staff members carry out every day in every part of the world”*.

The aim and goals of Iranian people’s struggle is just what you have said. But unfortunately our people are denied their basic rights and liberties. The families of our loved ones considered what you had said and came just to see you and reduce their anguish and pain, but they were denied.

The crimes, and the only crimes, of those who are detained under very harsh conditions is nothing but believing and pursuing your clear statement that, *“ Indeed, the lesson of the past century has been that where the dignity of the individual has been trampled or threatened – where citizens have not enjoyed the basic right to choose their government, or the right to change it regularly – conflict has too often followed, with innocent civilians paying the price, in lives cut short and communities destroyed”*.

You and your predecessors at UN, however, have concentrated mainly on prevention and resolving the threatening conflicts between the states and nations. But what about the disastrous conflicts between people and their rulers? You acknowledged that, *“When states undermine the rule of law and violate the rights of their individual citizens, they become a menace not only to their own people, but also to their neighbors, and indeed the world,*

what we need today is better governance – legitimate, democratic governance that allows each individual to flourish, and each State to thrive.”

“Today, no walls can separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in another. The principle is known as the “Butterfly Effect.” Today, we realize, perhaps more than ever, that the world of human activity also has its own “Butterfly Effect” – for better or for worse.”

It was based on this worldview that you stated, *“In the twenty-first century I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound, awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface of nations or communities. We must focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the State or nation its richness and character”.*

*“Thus, **the sovereignty of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights.**”*

You can prevent this. This is why I am writing to you.

Your Excellency

In your lecture you quoted from the Holy Qur’an. The same holy book commands believers to raise their voice loud and clear when they are oppressed. I am the raised voice of our oppressed people. In Tehran you were barred from hearing the voices of the families of detainees. This is their voice. Would you please listen to their appeal?

I believe on your sincerity and dedication and have hope in you, as millions of people do. So I humbly request you to fulfill your statements by using all power of your office and take serious steps to reduce the injustices done to our people.

As you are well aware the problem in my country is not generated from the elected government institutions. It is coming from non-elective extreme rightist bodies. Using the power of your office to remedy the political conflict in Iran, you first of all could help the non-violent, law abiding reform movement and popularly elected institutions. Secondly you could prevent a disastrous

explosion, which could create wider regional turmoil. I remain sincerely yours.

Ebrahim Yazdi, Ph.D., Secretary General, Freedom Movement of Iran Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Iran

55 "Guest of the Ayatollah": Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi

Wild Eyes Productions, November 11, 2003

Question: Ok sir; tell us a little about your self and who you are?

Response: My name is Ebrahim Yazdi and I am the Secretary General of the Freedom Movement of Iran.

Question: We're talking about, the main purpose of our program is the hostage taking, well it did not start with that, but it started with the coup, which I do not know much about. Can you tell me more about it?

Response: Well, the military coup of 1953 which was designed and engineered by the Americans and the British against the National Government of the late Dr. Mossadegh who nationalized the British oil company in Iran and initiated the process of democratization in Iran. Unfortunately due to the military coup, democratization was suffocated at a very embryonic stage. This is one of the main complaints of Iranians against American intervention in Iranian internal affairs.

Question: How did the Americans engineer it? What did they do to bring about this coup?

Response: A few days earlier the military started the coup against the government, but they failed and it was foiled. The Shah fled the country. However, underground military activity led by Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of the late President Roosevelt and a CIA officer, continued. He was able to recruit military units, bring them into the street and attack the prime minister's office and overthrow him and install a military government.

Question: Ok and then what happened after that? When did the Shah come into the country?

Response: Then a new military government was installed and few days later the Shah and queen returned back to Iran and for twenty five years their tyrannical and despotic regime was imposed

on the Iranian people. The military government granted the exclusive operation of Iran's oil to a coalition of Americans and British oil companies. The Shah ruled with an iron fist as American and British support continued.

Question: What was it like living under the Shah? What was it for you personally?

Response: It was like many other despotic regimes. Suppression of political activities and lack of freedom and security of the individual citizens was the law of land. During Mossadegh's time I was a student at the university and was elected as student's representative to the central council of the student organization. We organized many protest demonstrations for which many of us were arrested. On one occasion, a few days before Richard Nixon, vice president at that time was coming to Iran; three students were shot to death at the school of engineering, right on the spot.

Question: So, at some point you left the country and went to the United States?

Response: In September 1960 I left Iran for a short visit to the United States. Because of my involvement with the anti- Shah movement and the continuation of my activities, particularly after the June 5th 1963 uprising in Iran which was brutally crushed, I was not able to return to my country. After that uprising, many leaders of the Freedom Movement, National Front were arrested and detained. Some of these leaders like Professor Bazargan, Professor Sahabi and Reverend Taleghani were court marshaled. So the situation was such that I was unable to return to Iran. I was forced to remain in exile until the revolution.

Question: When did you first meet or come into contact with the Ayatollah Khomeini?

Response: After the June 5th uprising Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested and exiled to Turkey. A year later in 1965, he was transferred from Turkey to Najaf, Iraq where he could be a little freer. So I went to Iraq and met him at that time.

Question: Describe the meeting him? Do you remember the details?

Response: Well, at that time our organization had a political party cell in Baghdad involving underground activities. I was stationed in Beirut. I was informed by the organization that

Ayatollah Khomeini had been transferred to Baghdad, so we went there. We met him for the first time. We exchanged our views. He explained to us what had happened to him during a year of exile in Turkey. He also explained to us that several personalities had come from Iran to visit and negotiate with him on behalf of the Shah for reconciliation. Apparently according to his narration, several proposals were made for reconciliation and he refused. We also briefed him on the situation of the Iranian opposition groups abroad and what they were doing for Iran. From there on some sort of cooperation between the Ayatollah and the anti-despotic movement abroad took place.

Question: It is said that the theory of the Islamic Republic at that time, 1965, was advocated by you or by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Is that true?

Response: No it is not true. What you said was not in 1965 it was in 1979, when we were in Paris. I drafted a political program and schedule for the Ayatollah, and outlined what (position) he should be in and what he should not do, and what should be done (generally). Many people knew what they didn't want but they did not know what they wanted. They did not want the Shah; they wanted to overthrow him, but what should he be replaced with? It was not clear. So I wrote down the political schedule and step wise I wrote down what we should do. Finally we agreed on the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the necessity of drafting a new constitution and how we should go step by step forward to reach our goals.

Question: When you first met the Ayatollah how did he strike you? What was he like? Was he friendly, was he warm or was he cold?

Response: Well, I found him to be a very serious man. He led a very simple life, but at the same time I found him very persuasive in getting what he wanted. He was determined to do whatever could be done to overthrow the regime of the Shah.

Question: Now when you made these plans, was that in Paris or in Najaf?

Response: No it was in 1979, in Paris, in Neauphle Chateau.

Question: Can you mention that place again? Where were you in Paris? Was Banisadr part of the group? Who was in that group?

Response: A few weeks before we went to Paris, I was informed by a colleague of Khomeini in Najaf that the Ayatollah wanted to leave Najaf, because Saddam's government had put a lot of pressure on him to either silence him or to neutralize him and stop his activities against the Shah, or else leave the country. He decided that he would leave the country, but he was not sure where to go. I was told that Ayatollah wanted me to go there, so I went to Najaf and there I proposed that we go to Paris. He said he wanted to go to Kuwait for a few days and then Syria, and stay in Syria instead of Iraq. I explained to him that if the Syrian political situation was not worse than Iraq, it was not better either, and if he wanted to continue his struggle he should go to Paris. This is how we flew to and stationed in Neauphle Chateau a suburb of Paris.

Questions: How did he continue to influence the events in Iran from Paris?

Response: He was issuing political statements, addressing the Iranian people, telling them what to do.

Questions: How did he do that? How does a man do that?

Response: On each occasion after he wrote down his statements, there were individuals in Paris who read his political statements through the telephone line to his people in Iran. They recorded the text of the statement and then transcribed it, then typed, published and distributed it.

Questions: Ok great. And then how did you react as things unfolded in Iran, when you got the news that the revolution was happening?

Response: Well the impact of retreat to Neauphle Chateau was such that all of a sudden the Iranian revolution and the leadership became internationalized. More than a hundred Western reporters, Americans, Europeans, all came to Paris. That by itself expedited the revolution in Iran, encouraged people inside Iran. More and more reporters were eager to hear what he wanted to say and release it. Actually there was a competition between Paris international media to reflect the news about the Iranian revolution. There were groups inside Iran following matters. There were groups in Paris coordinating the news. So gradually the Iranian revolution became an international issue.

Questions: Do you remember the day or the moment when you found out that the Shah was leaving? Or did you anticipate that? Do you remember the exact moment where you were, what you were doing, when you heard this?

Response: Yes definitely I remember it. Of course we were expecting that he was going to leave and we knew that he was preparing to leave the country any day or any minute. So one early morning in Neauphle Chateau I was informed that the Shah had left Iran, and then many reporters came to record the reaction of the Ayatollah and many of us.

Questions: Who informed you? What were you doing at that moment?

Response: I don't remember exactly which one of the international media reporters got there first and informed me, but it was through the media, not a call from Iran, that they informed me.

Question: What was the Ayatollah's reaction? Did he want to hop on a plane and fly straight back to Iran?

Response: Well the only thing he said, he thanked God for what had happened. My own reaction as a reporter, I do not remember which one of them, if it was a French or English or American one, I told him or her, I have the same feeling as when I visited my wife in the hospital where she had delivered a baby boy and the nurse handed me over the newly born baby. The reporter did not ask me what I meant by that. Later on, however, when we came back to Iran an Iranian reporter asked me to explain what I meant by that example and I said, "Well it is the same. The victory of the revolution is like a new birth in Iran's history. All parents are happy with a new birth; they congratulate each other and exchange gifts. But they all know that for the baby to grow and become a full grown human being there are hundreds of problems. Now he is a baby, then he has an ear infection, a throat and tooth infection and this and that. There is a long way to go." So in this allegory I express my concerns and my awareness of the problems that we are going to face after the revolution.

Questions: Describe the return of the Ayatollah? Were you with him in the airplane? Do you remember that? As many details as you can explain, remember.

Response: Yes I was with the Ayatollah in the plane. When the Shah left, the Ayatollah announced he would return to Iran as soon as possible. However, the prime minister designated by the Shah said the Ayatollah could not come to Iran. To prevent the Ayatollah's return to Iran he closed the airports. However, the Ayatollah was not in a rush to come back to Iran. We knew that we were in a winning position. No government could close down the airports forever. It's maybe ok for the time being, but how long can Prime Minister Bakhtiar keep the airports closed? Bakhtiar was not sure what to do, sometimes saying, "Ok, the Ayatollah can come back," but later said, "No, he cannot come back." Finally the internal pressure in Tehran, the mass demonstrations in Iran and the harsh reaction by the people in the streets forced Bakhtiar to open the airport and let the Ayatollah come back. Iranian pilots announced that they would fly a so-called 'revolutionary flight' from Tehran to Paris to bring the Ayatollah back, but the military did not permit such a flight. So we chartered a plane to fly to Tehran. Air France authorities, upon our recommendation, got enough gas so that in case the Iranian Army did not permit our landing, we would be able to return back to Paris. Of course there were rumors that the military may either hit the plane or force plane to land in a remote area and arrest the Ayatollah and his colleagues. That was one of our concerns. In order to prevent and increase the costs of such military action, we did not board too many Iranians, instead boarded more than a hundred international reporters, from all over the world. From every major newspaper, French, Europeans, Americans, practically all of the major American TV station reps were on that plane. All the newspapers were on the plane, so we thought the military would not dare to do (anything), if not for the Ayatollah, at least for all of the Americans and European citizens on the plane. Fortunately, we were able to land in Tehran with no accidents.

Questions: Who paid for the charter?

Response: We paid it.

Questions: I mean it is said one of the merchants in Tehran apparently paid for it?

Response: There were a few Iranian merchants including Dastmalchi and Anvarizadeh who actually paid cash for our return.

Questions: What was it like when you touched down? When the Ayatollah got off the plane?

Response: I cannot explain my own feeling. It was a moment of great excitement for me. After eighteen years of forced exile, I was now returning back to my own country. It was a moment of historical excitement for me and my family.

Questions: Did you have chills? Do you remember?

Response: As I said I cannot explain my own feeling. When I walked down the steps I saw my father first then my brothers, I saw my relatives, I saw many of my old friends , then I saw the late Ayatollah Taleghani, whom I had known for more than fifty years. Then I saw Bazargan and Sahabi, all of them were at the airport. Without a word being exchanged, I was weeping, they were all crying, all the tears were coming from their faces. I was the same. (It was) the moment of excitement, the moment of joy, the moment of refreshing the good memories of the old days, and the moment that we felt the victory of the Revolution. Now we had the fruits of our efforts, years of fighting against the tyranny of the Shah.

Question: But that was not actually the end. The Ayatollah, now there has to be, has to have the revolution after the revolution? Tell me a little bit about that.

Response: Well, yes that was the beginning of an end. No, we did not consider it the end. It was the end of the Shah, but the beginning of the Revolution. (Even today,) the beginning has not ended yet. I don't believe that the Revolution in Iran has ended yet. No one in the world is capable of making any meaningful conclusion of the Iranian revolution, because it is still going on. This chapter of our history is not concluded yet. We have to wait. It is early to judge the outcome of the 1979 revolution. Through my own reading and experience, however, the Revolution would be confronted with many problems, as I expressed my view on the analogy that I mentioned before. I knew that thesis. Through the history of other revolutions I knew what could be expected and what the new authorities, coming into power through revolution would do in the name of revolution. I knew from the written story of other revolutions that the children of the revolution would be eaten by the revolution. And yet I was, and am very optimistic for the final outcome of our revolution. This is a great chapter in the history of our country.

Questions: There were some very brutal things that had to be done right away after the Revolution, after the Ayatollah returned?

Response: After the return of the Ayatollah, there were two completely separate and distinct attitudes about what should be done after the revolution? One group provoked or propagated violence against the eminence of the Shah: Kill, Kill and Kill. There was, however another attitude and opinion, asking for a general amnesty. People like Bazargan, Taleghani and I advocating such ideas. But the Ayatollah did not accept this view. He was of the opinion that if we are not firm with anti-revolutionaries and those who cooperated with the Shah, they may come back and create problems for us. Well, he and many others were influenced by history; for example the memory of the 1953 coup was very vivid in our minds. We knew that the Revolution had succeeded, the Shah had fled the country, many of his colleagues had left the country, the American were defeated, the British were defeated, foreign domination had now ended, but we also knew that the anti-revolutionary forces were not uprooted. Therefore the Ayatollah believed that they should be treated harshly in order to completely annihilate them so there would be no danger of their return. His idea was not shared with some other people like Bazargan. We believe that revolution has two phases, namely the destruction and construction phases. By overthrowing the Shah's regime the destructive phase is over and now is the time for reconstruction of the country. The first phase of the revolution, the Shah's regime is over. So we have to start a new page and rebuild the country. Building the country, rebuilding the country requires many other things including being patient and planning all of it.

Questions: At this time there was a lot of chaos in the streets. The Americans started to evacuating citizens, it reduced its embassy staff from 1000 to about 100. Why do you suppose they did that?

Response: The Americans started to evacuate their personnel from Iran not only their staff at their embassy but also all other American citizens working in Iran in various branches, various firms and activities a month before the Revolution. They ordered them to leave the country. So the number of staff in the American embassy in Iran was reduced tremendously before the Revolution. However, the chaos was a product of the Revolution. In all revolutions you see this period of a chaotic situation. Well remember the American Revolution and what happened. The Civil War in the United States, which was one of the longest and bloodiest in human history, was a

product of Revolution. In the case of Iran however, after the Revolution, a new provisional government was installed, headed by the late Bazargan. He was a distinguished, well-known liberal minded individual, with an excellent record in management. He strongly believed that reconstruction is a gradual step by step process. When he took office he asked me to join him. I accepted his invitation and became the deputy prime minister in charge of revolutionary affairs. We were confronted with a lot of agitation and disturbances in various parts of the country - in Khuzestan, Baluchistan, in Kurdistan, and in Azerbaijan (provinces). Part of the chaos was a natural product of the Revolution and part of it resulted from external agitation and provocation against the new government.

Questions: And what about the students. Like, the students following in the line of the Imam. Did you have any dialogue with any of them? Did you have any inkling of what they were doing?

Response: In November 1979, students took over the American embassy compound to show an Iranian protest to the United States government for permitting Shah to enter into the US. Of course this was not the first attack to the US Embassy in Tehran. This was the second time that the American embassy was taken over. The first time was the day after the Revolution. At that time as the Deputy Prime Minister and member of the Revolutionary Council, I went to the American compound and talked with the group that attacked and took over the embassy, and convinced them to leave the compound, and I actually forced them to leave. Then I appointed a group of armed volunteers to protect the American embassy. We believed that the new government should show the world that we respect and abide by international law. We knew that the government (operated) according to international law, (and was) responsible for the safety of foreign diplomats in their host country. The second takeover however was actually engineered by some students supported by influential pressure groups within the clergy. We didn't agree with this (act) too, and as a protest against it we resigned.

Questions: Well if you put armed personnel to guard the embassy after the first time, how come they did not stop the students the second time?

Response: Between the first take over and the second one, it took about seven to eight months. The armed volunteers we assigned to protect the Embassy became a source of some problems with the

personnel there. The American authorities in the embassy requested we remove them, and we did.

Question: Think back if you can, and try to remember where you were, what you were doing, and what it was like the moment you heard that the American embassy had been taken. Maybe it was not a big deal because it had happened before and you thought it was an insignificant event. Do you remember the details of that moment?

Response: Well I had just come back from Algeria. We were invited to participate in the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. We were with Prime Minister Bazargan and the Minister of Defense, the late Chamran in Algeria. We had a meeting with Brzezinski, President Carter's advisor for security matters at the National Security Council. On Sunday November 5, I was in my office at the foreign ministry when my deputy in charge of economic affairs called and informed me that the head of the American embassy was in his office and wanted to see me immediately because there is an emergency situation. Mr. Bruce Laingen and his companion came to my office and informed me that while they were in the Iranian Foreign Ministry to attend to some business students had taken over the Embassy. I remember very well the moment. Mr. Laingen asked me if he could use my direct phone number to get in touch with his people in Washington. I said fine; I let him to use my direct phone line in my office and he got in touch with people in Washington and informed them of the details of events at the Embassy compound. Apparently they had more information from the inside of the compound that he or I had. Apparently the people in Washington had some sort of direct contact with the people who attacked the Embassy compound. They were well informed, minute by minute of what was going on inside the compound. Then Mr. Laingen said that he and his colleague wanted to go back to the US Embassy. I said, "The situation outside in the streets was very volatile. If you want to go, fine, but be informed of the situation." The government would not accept responsibility. I suggested he stay in the ministry building until we find out if it would be safe for him to go to the Embassy or not. His driver was outside the ministry and was taken over by the students, who took him to the Embassy compound. So Mr. Laingen with his companion, Mr. Victor L. Tomseth remained in the Iranian Foreign Ministry during all the 444 days. Two days later I resigned and left the Ministry. After that I

don't know what happened to them in the Ministry, but they remained in the building for 444 days, separate from the rest of the hostages in the Embassy compound.

Question: So Victor Tomseth and Bruce Laingen were both in your office on the phone with the State Department?

Response: Not to the state department, I guess he called the central command office at the White House.

Questions: So they were both in your office. What were they like? What was their state of being? Were they agitated...?

Response: No, they were very calm. Mr. Tomseth actually had a walkie-talkie wireless. He was talking with someone in the Embassy compound and he was receiving reports, minute by minute reports of the developments within the compound. Mr. Laingen was quiet and talking with his superior in the command office in Washington.

Question: While Tomseth was talking on the radio with the Embassy, what did he, do you remember anything that he said to the embassy? Do you know what that conversation was?

Response: Oh yes, it was very surprising for me. It created a lot of suspicion in my own mind. While Mr. Tomseth was in my office, he was receiving minute by minute of what was going inside the compound. You know that there were some marines inside the compound. According to international law they were entitled to defend the compound, but they didn't do anything. They retreated and let the students enter the Embassy. I realized that somebody from inside the American Embassy was giving details of the situation, of any immediate development over there to Mr. Tomseth. More than that I was quite surprised to hear that the commanding office in Washington knew about what's going on inside the American Embassy. Apparently someone within that crowd was cooperating and working with the Americans. It was not my imagination; I don't want to have any second guess...this was my own observation. I was very astonished. Still I don't know how this could have happened. The American Embassy was taken over; there were individuals giving information directly to Mr. Tomseth and to Washington. Serious questions came to my mind: was anybody actually behind this operation? Did anybody plan to do this for a certain outcome? Were the students only an instrument of implementing this, or not? I don't know.

Questions: Well that does not surprise me, they knew the situation was very volatile, as did Washington. They would have communication with Washington and if he was just on the radio with the marines?

Response: No, at that time the marines were completely neutralized, there was no marine in sight. He was in communication with people inside after the takeover was completed. That was at about eleven o'clock.

Questions: Do you remember hearing him giving exact instruction to people?

Response: No, he was just receiving. I don't know what the other side was telling. I was just hearing some part of the conversation. I did not know that, no I don't know.

Question: So did they both get in the car and try to go back to the embassy?

Response: No they came with their own car and driver, but the car and the driver were outside in the street waiting for them. They didn't come to the Ministry to report the situation at the Embassy, just attending to some business related to the American Embassy activity in Tehran, unrelated to the hostage crisis. They were in the Iranian Foreign Ministry when they were informed of the events at the compound.

Questions: Roughly at the same time you heard the news?

Response: No, I was informed later, and then I didn't know nobody in the Ministry knew what had happened, until my deputy in charge of economic affairs informed me that Bruce Laingen wanted to see me and that something had happened.

Questions: So they never left at that point? They stayed in the foreign affairs building?

Response: As I mentioned they wanted to leave, but I advised them not to do so, because we could not guarantee their safety. The streets were crowded by excited people and I was afraid that something may happen to them. It was my responsibility to inform them that it is not safe for them to leave the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Questions: Bruce Laingen stayed there for the duration, but Victor Tomseth eventually was taken back into the embassy, correct?

Response: No. Mr. Laingen and Mr. Tomseth both stayed in the Ministry for the 444 days. When the Iranian government wanted to release all the hostages, they also left the building and joined the other hostages at the airport.

Questions: Were they considered hostages or where they guests?

Response: They were not hostages, they were sort of guests in the building, but they could not go out because the government was afraid for their safety. The ministry provided them some facilities to stay in the building.

Questions: Do you remember talking to the students directly and saying why are doing this? You should let them go. Do you remember the dialogue with the students?

Response: No, I did not talk with the students, but that afternoon, I went to Qum and talked to the Ayatollah. His first reaction was who they are? Why you didn't you kick them out? Why they have done that? He was against such action. However, later on something happened and he changed his mind. I knew very well that the students, twelve of them, decided to take such action. They consulted with one of the clergy, Mousavi Khomeini, who was very close to Ahmad the son of Khomeini. The students themselves have said that too. He advised them not to say anything to anybody, "If you go and take over Khomeini will back you up." Therefore the whole operation was something which could be considered a plot against the Islamic Republic. There was a revolution, the revolution had a leader, the leader had appointed the revolutionary council and then there was a legitimate government and yet a dozen of students secretly and covertly planned and executed the takeover and hostage taking that was against our national interests. I could not accept such action; I could not go along with them. I was accused of being pro-American, but it had nothing to do with that; I considered it against the national interests of my country.

Questions: When you saw the Ayatollah Khomeini at home what exactly did you say to him and what exactly did he, do you remember word for word what exactly that you and he said? Do you remember exactly what he was doing?

Response: Yes, I reported to him that a group of students had attacked the American Embassy in Tehran and have been able to overtake it. The American staff was now taken as hostage and the

students had announced that they wanted the Shah to be sent back to Iran and the Shah's assets outside of the country transferred to Iran. He was very astonished and he told me as I said, 'go and kick them out.'

Questions: What were really... sorry...What was the reason for the change of his reactions?

Response: That afternoon, after the students' action, thousands of people poured into the streets, gathered around the Embassy and gradually their numbers were increasing. Many leftist and well-know clergymen came and supported the student's actions. By evening thousands of people were gathered around the Embassy. When the television showed these scenes and the excitement of the people, the support of the people, then Khomeini said this is a second revolution greater than the first one.

Questions: Going back to when you met with him, what was he was doing when you came in? Was he eating lunch? What was he doing?

Response: Usually he rested in the afternoon and then around four o'clock in the afternoon he came from his private sector to a room for receiving people. So he was not in the position to eat or drink anything.

Questions: Was he sitting on the floor?

Response: Yes, as usual he was sitting on the floor and listening to me.

Questions: And you were standing up or were you sitting?

Response: No I was sitting too.

Questions: I am just curious of all of the details

Response: I was sitting; we were very close. I did not have to stand. Our relation was very close and friendly. I was sitting right by his side and exchanging my views on the report. He was the leader of the revolution, I was the foreign minister, and I had to report to him. I had to brief him on what was happening and ask him what we should do?

Questions: And what other remarks did he make? Did he ask for detail?

Response: That was the only remark.

Questions: He didn't ask for any details, like how many students, who were the students?

Response: He asked me who they are, and I said don't know. I didn't even know who they are; nobody knew who they were.

Questions: Ok, so what after that, did you go back and try to kick them out?

Response: No, the next evening he said this was a revolution greater than the first one, so I did not see any reason to go and do that. It was not possible.

Question: So you weren't going there immediately. You waited there at home. So when were you going to kick them out?

Response: I did nothing.

Questions: So how come you didn't do anything?

Response: It was impossible.

Questions: I would have thought if he told you to kick them out you would have already been there on your way to kick them out?

Response: No, the first time that the Embassy was taken over, it was by groups that nobody knew and we were quite suspicious. When I went there, three groups of armed volunteers from revolutionary committees joined me. I ordered them to surround the Embassy; nobody could leave until I identified who they were. After that the invaders did not want us to recognize their identity and started to escape the compound. Through my own talks with some of the attackers, I realized that they did not come from any of the known revolutionary groups and that was one of the reasons I was able to kick them out. Later the American magazine Espionage wrote a report on that event pointing fingers towards Mr. Ross Perot, the candidate for the presidency from Dallas; that he actually engineered the attack on the American Embassy so on and so forth. But the second time it came from within the revolutionary ranks and was a completely different story.

Question: Let me just ask you, I hate to sound like a lawyer, but I am just trying to get all of the details accurately for our documentary. He told you to kick them out and then you waited there? And then later he said no, no don't go kick them out?

Response: You must take into consideration the distance between Qum and Tehran. By the time I came back to Tehran it was in the evening, there was no time to do anything. Next day, as I said earlier, thousands of people filled the streets around the Embassy,

and then Prime Minister Bazargan told me he was going to resign. The night after I saw what the Ayatollah said on television. At that point it was meaningless for me to do anything. The next day was Monday; we had a cabinet meeting. I gave my report to the cabinet and the cabinet and the ministers decided to resign. So from that moment on everything took a different shape and different direction.

Questions: So what did you do after that?

Response: Mr. Bazargan wrote a letter to Khomeini and resigned. A member of the Prime Minister's office took the letter to Qum and handed it to Khomeini. He did not accept the resignation and he said, "Ok let me talk to some people." Then he summoned some members of the Revolutionary Council, Beheshti, Hashemi and Ardabili and asked them to talk with Bazargan and convince him not to resign. Since Bazargan and the members of his cabinet had decided to resign, the resignation letter was sent to the news media and was broadcast from Iranian radio on the early morning news. The three clerics, members of the Revolutionary Council were on their way back to Tehran and heard the news announcement on the radio; they went back to Qum and informed Khomeini that the information had been broadcasted, so everybody was now informed that the government has resigned. Khomeini told them to take charge of the government. We start to arrange the transformation of power to the Revolutionary Council. I stayed for a few more days at the ministry. Hashemi came and on behalf of Khomeini and asked me not to resign and remain in office, but I didn't accept. I told him that as Foreign Minister I could not accept as it was contrary to our national interest.

Question: So, what was your next position and what did you have for yourself after that?

Response: They asked me to remain on the Revolutionary Council. I refused and I said I could not work with them any longer.

Questions: And what did you do then?

Response: Nothing! I became a private citizen.

Question: In Iran?

Response: Sure, I remained in Iran, I didn't leave. I was one of the ruling members of the Freedom Movement of Iran. We decided to devote more time to reorganize our own party

Questions: Member of the Parliament?

Response: Well, later we participated in the first parliamentary elections. As I mentioned before, one of the items in the Ayatollah's political plan was to draft a new constitution.

Response: It was very important for us because nobody was sure what the definition of Islamic Republic was. Everybody has his own opinion. So, even before we came back to Iran when we were in Paris, we were continuously asked what we mean by Islamic Republic. What kind of republic is it? We had only two choices - either arrange a seminar or invite all the, religious and political experts, sociologists, lawyers to come together and hypothetically describe and define what an Islamic Republic is.

Questions: As the takeover went on, you were also victimized, you and the late Bazargan, were victimized by the students based on the documents.

Response: I will come to that. Another choice that we had, which we took, was more or less a pragmatic approach. I told Khomeini that we draft a new constitution; this constitution, will define the Islamic Republic. Whoever signs the constitution will agree with that definition. This practical approach worked. The Provisional Government drafted and adopted the first constitution. It was endorsed by the revolutionary council and Mr. Khomeini signed it. After that came the implementation of the constitution; the first step was the presidential election and then the election of the general assembly and the end of transitional period and the establishment of a more or less permanent government and institution. The hostage taking and the resignation of the Provisional Government's actually interrupted the ordinary process of development of new system.

Now coming to your earlier question, the hostage taking immediately served as an instrument for the political fighting between various factions within the revolutionary rank. The Revolution succeeded because two major factions within the anti-despotic movement were working together, the clerics, as Muslim traditionalists and the intellectual Muslims, such as Bazargan and his colleagues, the Freedom Movement of Iran. The Revolution succeeded only because we were all cooperating with each other. It was a very convenient co-operation.

Clerics had the power of inciting and recruiting the masses. Intellectuals in general, Muslim intellectuals in particular, such as

the Freedom Movement of Iran, Bazargan and I, knew the contemporary situation. We knew how to engineer the Revolution; we knew how to organize the country in order to reconstruct it. As the consequence of the hostage taking, the first drift came between the clerics and Muslim intellectuals. Our understanding from the Revolution was that people wanted an Islamic Republic, not a government of the clerics. But many prominent clergy such as Beheshti, however, believed that since the Revolution was led by Khomeini it was their natural right to have total power and the rest should work for them. Of course Khomeini was the leader of the revolution and the masses supported the clerics. The Revolution was a classic and popular uprising. Numerically speaking intellectuals were and still are in the minority. So what else could we do? We could not continue, and we resigned. When they took over the Embassy, a political campaign against intellectual Muslims and nationalist liberal minded political figures started. If you look at the content of those so called documents, it is nothing. Every embassy in every country gathers such information. It's a part of the job description for diplomats in any host country; to gather information about political groups, their influence and position, all of it. The students and those who took over, however, wanted to use that as an instrument to discredit and to eliminate the intellectuals, particularly the Muslim intellectuals, and they did it very nicely with the backing of leftists groups.

Questions: Tell me how did they eliminate? Who was eliminated, and how? Were some of them executed?

Response: Well, when we resigned, the newspapers were controlled by many leftists, they started to attack us. When they found out that we had been negotiating with Americans, they bitterly attacked us. As foreign minister it was my job to talk with the Americans. Besides, neither Ayatollah nor Revolutionary Council ever decided that we should cut our relations with the United States. When the Americans appointed a new ambassador to Iran, Cutler, I studied his background and for reasons I decided he was not qualified to come to Iran. As you know, protocol says that the host country should accept the credentials of appointees. So I took the matter to the cabinet meeting and asked to cancel our acceptance. They approved it, and I informed the American Embassy, Mr. Nass, who was at that time in charge of embassy

affairs that Cutler cannot come. When I went to Qum and reported to Khomeini what we had done and very openly asked him, “Do you believe that we should cut off our diplomatic relations with the United States?” He said no, but keep it low profile. So, it was ordinary diplomatic relations at low level. We had several problems to solve with American. The American military equipment in Iran involved billions of dollars. There was an Iran Fund in the US Defense Department in which Iran had deposited more than \$23 billion and the transactions were not clear to us. We had to clear up many other problems too, such as the maintenance of very expensive US sold military equipment to Iran, such as helicopters and 14 planes. So we had to talk to the Americans. In addition there were several issues we have to clear up with the United States government, with respect to the military contracts. Therefore it was very natural that we had to talk in order to come to a conclusion and clear matters, but the students didn't understand these problems and they did not want to understand. They used these as a means of misinformation against us by saying that we were talking to the Americans. They were ignorant as well as narrow minded.

Questions: And so the students found this information and to them you were probably very naive, they thought well they're talking to the Americans, they are spies and found this information and put this information on television as an exposure. And what did they do to some of these people, specifically?

Response: The revolutionary atmosphere, particularly the contribution of leftists towards this political vocabulary and political discourse in Iran was such that even a simple correspondence was used against individuals. For example, the Ambassador of the United States in Iran had written a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister Amir Entezam with respect to some of the American staff in Iran. The letter was a very simple one and according to etiquette addressed him as: Dear Abbas Amir Entezam. The students said, “Oh look, the US ambassador is calling him **my dear** ...what kind of close relations did he have that he calls him my dear...” This is etiquette. Or the same vice versa when I write a letter to the ambassador I may write dear ambassador, dear so and so, but they did not understand that, or they used that as a mean to agitate masses saying look they are calling Americans dear ambassador. Do you know what I mean?

Questions: Exactly, and some of those people were literally disposed. Tell me about that? Who was executed and what were the circumstances? Did you know some of the people personally? Tell me some of the details about that?

Response: What do you mean executed?

Questions: Weren't some of them actually executed, some of the people that were exposed by some of the documents?

Response: No, not in those days. Later on something developed. It was a character assassination, not a physical assassination. It was psychological warfare against intellectual Muslims. An unannounced coalition between extreme right with extreme left against intellectual Muslims to discredit them. Intellectual Muslims, the Freedom Movement of Iran, knew the contemporary situation of the world and how to run the country. We knew that if Iran wants to remain a member of the international family, a respected member we have to respect international laws. It was within our rights, our sovereign national right to close down the American Embassy. We could have asked all the embassy staff to leave the country, but we didn't have the right to take over. If you are unhappy with what the Americans were doing in Iran, we could have responded that way, in accordance with international laws. We told those people, if we want to do anything against the Americans (for their) deeds in Iran, we should do it according to international law, not in a way to discredit the revolutionary government. I believe that there was some American influential lobby in the United States that coordinated this, in a sense. As you mentioned they knew very well that if they allow the Shah to enter in the United States, there would be another attack on the US embassy in Tehran and hostages would be taken. Despite the warnings that Ambassador Sullivan and Nass sent to Washington, they decided to allow the Shah to enter to the United States. More than that, when Henry Precht in charge of the Iran desk at the State Department came to Iran to inform us soon the Shah would be allowed to enter the US. We asked him if the Shah was really ill, for the sake of having a means to convince our people that it was not a game to let some Iranian physicians with the right to practice medicine in the United States to examine the Shah and see his medical file and report to us, so we can, in turn report to our people, to Khomeini and others. But the Americans refused to do so. Then Mr. Bazargan wrote a private letter to the Shah, to "His Excellency

...the ex- Shah of Iran... “, asking him for the sake of his country to resign from being Shah, abdicate the crown, so that he would be a private citizen seeking medical treatment in the United States. Bazargan gave the letter to me, I took the letter to Khomeini, and Khomeini read it and said Bazargan is very optimistic, the Shah will not accept abdication. We were after resolving a serious problem. When the Shah went to the United States and the US got involved, the sad memory of the 1953 coup came to the mind of many Iranians. They thought this was another plot, another game. Mr. Bazargan had a very strong logic here, that if the Shah abdicated the thrown, it means that he was no longer Shah and there would be no way that he could come back as Shah. American authorities refused to take the letter and hand it over to the Shah. This created more suspicious. Why did the Americans refuse? If they claim the Shah is ill, and he has traveled to the United States as a private citizen, why are they refusing to take a letter from the Prime Minister and hand it over to the ex-Shah?

Questions: That is a good question. Were there members of the Embassy who were warned the United States that said hey if you let the Shah in it's going to be big, big trouble? Did you have conversations with the Embassy people, in the embassy over that?

Response: Oh yes, before the hostage taking, we had several meetings with them, negotiating about military contracts for arm sales to Iran with the US Department of Defense and the Iran Fund, the special account for arms purchases. The account was not clear according to our information. Twenty three billion dollars were deposited into that account. How many cases were involved? We didn't know. We had to clear these things up with the American staff. Even when I went to New York to attend the UN general assembly, we had meetings with the Secretary of State, Vance and his staff and discussed several issues. There were no objections to these meetings.

Questions: Do you remember specific meetings with people at the Embassy?

Response: Yes. After Ambassador Sullivan returned to the US in March 79, Charles Nass was charge d'Affairs. He was in Iran until Bruce Laingen replaced him, with whom we had several meetings. According to documents in several reports in the Embassy, both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Nass warned authorities in

Washington about the consequences of permitting the Shah to enter the US.

Question: And so did you have any involvement as the 444 days went on?

Response: Not in an active form. I was considering, however, with the history of American activities in Iran and the US involvement in the military coup of 1953, since Iranians had taken Americans hostage, we should bring international dignitaries to have an international forum for a 'trial' of the American government's deeds in Iran; an international tribunal similar to the forum that Bertrand Russell organized during the Vietnam war. My proposal was not to go after any legal action against the United States, which was not possible and practical, but rather to inform the American people why Iranians were against their government and complaining against them. I felt and I believe that the American people are broad-minded. They can understand our grievances if we take our case to and address the American people to say, "Look, this is what your government has done in our country and to our people. We are not against the American people; we are against the American government's activities in Iran, their continuous intervention in our internal affairs and support of the tyrannical regime of the Shah." I thought through that action we would get the sympathy and support of the American people. Khomeini agreed with my proposal. In the spring of 1980 the Iranian government invited many international dignitaries to Iran to take part in a meeting to review the crimes of American government in Iran. Ramsey Clark and Richard Falk from America and several dignitaries from Muslim countries all over came to Iran. My idea was to have an international tribunal, through which we could present to the world as well as the American public our grievances against the deeds of the Americans, about what Americans have done in Iran, the result of the Shah's despotic rule in Iran. I thought that could have been a very successful operation. Unfortunately, it didn't end in any tangible, conclusive results.

Question: But I thought that Ramsey Clarke couldn't get into Iran? He was trying to come into Iran and they stopped him.

Response: Not for that meeting. Three or four days after the hostage taking Ramsey Clarke wanted to come to Iran with Mr. Fisher as an envoy of President Carter to negotiate on the hostage

crisis. When they were in Ankara, Turkey to get their visas for Iran, Khomeini was informed and announced that they were not welcome to come to Iran, and if they come nobody would even talk to them. About a year later he came to Iran and participated in that international forum.

Questions: Did they meet the hostages?

Response: No, the student did not permit that.

Questions: Ok, what were some of the reaction in Iran just amongst normal people? Among normal citizens as to what the reports coming from the embassy, coming from the TV for instance? What was there their reaction?

Response: The geographical location and strategic position of Iran is such that has been the subject of repeated invasions by many foreign forces. The result is a very deep anti-foreign sentiment in Iranian culture. Iranians are very sensitive to foreign domination and foreign intervention. When in 1953 the American government with the cooperation of the British intervened in internal affairs of Iran and overthrew Dr. Mossadegh's national government, Iranians were hurt badly and became very bitter with these two governments. The memory of this transgression is very vivid in their minds. The American government underestimated that basic element in Iranian culture. Therefore when Americans took the risk to permit the Shah to enter the United States, actually triggered Iranian suspicions and that hate came to the surface. Therefore in the first phase the Iranian masses welcomed the hostage taking, but of course the minority of intellectuals, like me and my party who knew what was going on were against it. We didn't see any benefit for our country, but however the masses supported it, particularly when Khomeini endorsed it. Khomeini was a great and charismatic leader to ordinary people in the streets. Probably many of those people didn't know what was going on, but since Khomeini said yes, they too said yes.

Questions: What was your reaction when you heard about the failed rescue attempt? Did you feel like some sort of major armed conflict was imminent?

Response: I felt pity for those who planned such a military operation in Iran. The operation actually added fuel to the fire and showed that the American government had decided to confront Iran through covert military operation. We were all astonished, and when

it failed, many Iranians considered it a miracle of God. As you may know, actually no person was involved in the disastrous event in the Tabas desert. It was purely a natural phenomenon. Those who planned that operation did not consider the very common sand storms in that part of the desert. When they landed there, there was sand storm. What happened after that was a disaster. However as far as the impact in Iran is concerned, it influenced political events, it fortified the position of religious hardliners and zealous, who considered it an act of God. This operation also showed that the Americans were ready to use their military power to intervene in our internal political affairs when they are not able to resolve a problem through political means.

Questions: And then how were the Iranians convinced to give those bodies back?

Response: I am not aware of the details, however I think Khomeini ordered it for humane reasons.

Question: Do you remember when you heard that they were being released?

Response: Basically, I was supporting any action to reduce the tension, even if it meant that we send back the bodies of the dead. When Khomeini ordered the release of the women hostages, we welcomed it. When he ordered the release of some of the black hostages, we said, 'good'. Every one of these actions was a step towards the reduction of tensions, which we welcomed.

Question: Now-a-days the political situation in Iran, a lot people back home are saying wow it sounds like there is almost a counter revolution going on. Now there is the student movement. It sounds like a revolution in the other direction. What is your reaction to that? How do you act to that situation?

Response: I would not say this is a new revolution. As you are aware, the psychology of people who have made a revolution and afterward have experienced its deviation would not get involved in another revolution. It is almost impossible. The psychology of the masses is such that they would not come forward to have another revolution. Therefore our people want change and reform. The people want change, but not the kind of changes that the American authorities now propagate. I am afraid that American hardliners, whose strong lobbies are against us, are influencing American

foreign policy. Iranians want change, but doesn't want the restoration of monarchy in Iran, particularly through the support of the American government. Again, it is reviving the old memory of the military coup of 1953, particularly when they notice what is going on in Iraq after Saddam. American intervened in Iraq and overthrew Saddam, fine, but what is going on over there? Are we living in the 19th century, where a colonial army attacks and occupies a country and then appoints a military governor, a civil government, appointing a government for example in Basra? Many Iranians now think twice when they hear what Americans may want to do in Iran. Yes, Iranians want change, but on their own terms, not the terms of foreign powers. Through contradictory statements made by American authorities a lot of suspicions are raised in the minds of Iranians. American authorities are very ambiguous on what they want to do. Iranians are suspicious of the intentions of the US government.

Question: How do you think the world has changed as a result of the hostage crisis? A handful of students with no resources in the name of Islam can bring a superpower in a sense to its knees, at least for a year and a half to two years. How do you think that? Does that inspire things? Does that reverberate through out the consequences...actions around the world?

Response: I think that the hostage taking in Iran has greatly influenced the pattern of political development in Iran and also has somewhat influenced Muslim masses throughout the world. One must take into consideration that most Muslim countries have been hurt by western colonialism. Ordinary people in the street don't differentiate between European and American foreign domination. To them they are all foreigners. Particularly as far as Americans are concerned, among Muslims throughout the world, the Palestinian issue is a very sensitive issue. To many Muslims, American policy in the Middle East is completely single-handed and one-sided. The Israeli government categorically and continuously rejects the UN resolutions concerning settlements in Palestine, and yet the US continuously vetoes those resolutions and sides with Israel. I think that is a very sensitive issue among Muslims. Therefore when the students took the hostages, it actually brought to the surface Muslims' complaints against the US government and influenced it in this way.

Question: Do you see a parallel between the hostage crisis and 9/11? Students who martyr themselves?

Response: The only parallel I can draw is that both of them were against international law and against Islamic values. To most Muslims, what happened in New York is against Islamic teaching. No Muslim has the right to indiscriminately bomb or attack a building and kill thousands of innocent people. Therefore the claim of those who did it cannot be justified by basic Islamic teachings. The same way the students in Iran may have had a lot of valid complaints against American deeds in Iran, but the means they used, the way they reacted is completely un-Islamic. They did not have any right to keep those people hostage for 444 days. I can see this similarity between these two actions.

Questions: Do you believe that if it was after September 11th at that time, could it happen today, the hostage taking?

Response: No, there were very distinguished, well defined differences. According to international law the American embassy compound is a part of the US mainland. That is why even the host country cannot enter to any embassy without the permission. They have the right to defend the embassy against any invasion. There is, however, a question. Why did the Marines in the US embassy not respond or resist the attack? Why were they ordered to retreat? Was there an order to not resist? I don't know. In New York and Washington the attack could only be compared with the Japanese attack in December 1941... I think 42 or 43 in Pearl Harbor. It was an attack on the mainland. Millions of American felt their vulnerability. They had the first hand experience of what terrorism means. I think the same way that the Pearl Harbor attack changed American foreign policy forever from isolation to more involvement, the September 11 attack has clearly and drastically changed American foreign policy. The issue is that the result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was that America joined the allied forces against the German and Italians. Then the question is what was the result of September 11th; to what direction has American foreign policy changed. Those who attacked New York and Washington did in the name of Islam. Therefore American foreign policy towards Muslim countries has changed drastically, in many ways without justification. I think American foreign policy towards Muslims in the long run is in the wrong direction. When somebody blew up the

Oklahoma Federal Building, nobody talked about Christian Terrorism. They said this crazy American boy has done it, but intentionally many American authorities, journalists, analysts, say “Muslim terrorists”, they name it Islamic Terrorism. That hurts Muslims, because most Muslims reject Bin Laden’s actions and the idea of attacking non-combatant innocent people. You know when the American army wanted to go to Afghanistan, 14,000 American Muslim soldiers in the American army also went to Afghanistan. All of a sudden they were confronted with a very basic religious issue. They were going to Afghanistan to fight Afghans, who are Muslims. Can an American Muslim fight with a Muslim in Afghanistan? The Chaplain of the American army went to some Muslim countries to debate the issue. In a written question to some of the Muftis he presented the question. Five of them collectively answered that if you are an American Muslim, you must be loyal to the constitution of the country, you must be loyal to your government and since Bin Laden’s actions are not considered Islamic, you can go and fight with them. Although many intellectual Muslims, Muslim scholars have rejected the claims of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, nonetheless, more and more we hear about Islam phobia. That is the position of the American government amongst the Muslim masses. I am afraid that the American authorities are going in the wrong direction as far as Muslims the world over are concerned. Terrorism is terrorism, whether it is a Jewish terrorist, a Sikh terrorist, a Hindu terrorist, a Christian terrorist, a Muslim terrorist. To only emphasize a Muslim terrorist, I think will create a discourse the result of which is more hate against Americans, because it is unjustified. Muslims in general are very peaceful people. Islam is a part of your country. There are 7 million Muslims in the United States. Islam is no longer a remote idea in the desert of Saudi Arabia. It is your next door neighbor. After September 11th, in all the masses gathered to pray for the victims of the attack, Muslims, Jews and Christians prayed together. Do you remember the Madison Square gathering, they all prayed together. Therefore there is no justification to categorize all Muslims as terrorists or terrorists as Muslims. There is no justification for Islam phobia

Question: There is one thing that scares people, is that there has not been a Jewish, Christian, or otherwise suicide bomber. That is something that is different and that frightens people.

Response: Well, I don't want to respond to that; there have been.

56. Interview with Ebrahim Yazdi, Leader of the Iran Freedom Movement

By *Jehangir Pocha*, *In These Times*, January 17, 2003

Ebrahim Yazdi is the leader of the Iran Freedom Movement. Since his days as a student activist protesting the Shah's regime, Yazdi has advocated for a multi-party democracy in Iran. In 1979, Yazdi served as foreign minister in the provisional government set up by Ayatollah Khomeini and headed by Mehdi Bazargan, founder of the IFM. After Bazargan's death in 1995, Yazdi became the leader of the IFM, and today he is one of Iran's most prominent pro-democracy activists. The following interview was conducted by Jehangir Pocha during his visit to Iran in November.

What concrete steps would you like to see Iran take toward establishing a real multi-party democracy in the country?

The first step toward multi-party democracy is the full implementation of our present laws, such as Article 26 of the Constitution and Political Parties Act (which allows the formation of political party elections in Iran). The second step is to nullify the authority of the Guardian Council in the election of MPs. The third step is to change Iran's election system. The current system, which allocates parliamentary seats on the "first past the gate" basis, needs to be replaced with one that allows for proportional representation. This would allow political minorities to be presented in parliament and decision-making bodies. Equally important is to develop a legal definition and clarification of "political offenses" and implementation of Article 168 of the Constitution regarding the trial of press and political offenses.

As Iran becomes a democracy will it remain an Islamic state, or must it find new ways of defining itself as a nation?

With 97 percent of its population being Muslim, Iran is a Muslim country. Islam has 1,400 years of history in Iran. But Iranian identity has two components: nationality, which is Iranian, and religion, which is Islam. Two decades of experience with a government that rules in the name of God and Islam has created a negative impact on our people, particularly the new generation.

Now the question is two-fold. First, there is the question of demarcating a line between religion and state. Second, there is the relation between the institution of religion, the Guardian Council, and the institution of government. We do not believe (there should be) any special rights or privileges for clergy in the government. Being an Islamic state does not mean being controlled and run by the clergy.

What will it take for the United States and Iran to develop a positive working relationship?

The United States has failed to understand the deep impact of the military coup it carried out in 1953 in Iran. This coup actually suffocated the development of democracy in Iran at its embryonic stage. The United States has also failed to understand the depth of the Iranian revolution and to respond positively toward Iran after September 11, when we were presented with a historical opportunity for reconciliation. There was great sympathy for the American people in Iran and our government cooperated fully with the United States in Afghanistan. Still, Bush chose to brand Iran as an “axis-of-evil” nation.

To reconcile with the Iranian people, the United States should openly express regret for the military coup of 1953 and announce its readiness to compensate for that interference. The tragedy of Palestinians is another dark spot on the face of U.S. government. Iranians, like many people all over the world, are very sensitive to the suffering of the Palestinian people.

You have said you do not believe the United States can bring democracy to Iraq even if it fights and wins a war against Saddam Hussein. Why is that?

Democracy is not a commodity that can be imported at will by a U.S.- led invasion of Iraq. One cannot learn democracy in a classroom, and certainly not by the invasion of a foreign army. The United States will probably topple Saddam, but it will not establish democracy in Iraq.

Jehangir Pocha, a native of Bombay, is an international journalist based in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

57. Iran’s Yazdi tells top hardliners to quit

Top Iranian dissident says will stand for president if hardliners resign, political prisoners freed from jail

(2004) TEHRAN - One of Iran's most prominent dissidents, Ebrahim Yazdi, announced Tuesday that he would stand in the June presidential election, but only on the condition that powerful hardliners resign and political prisoners are freed from jail.

"I will run for presidency if members of the Guardians Council resign," the head of the banned Iran Freedom Movement told reporters.

The Guardians Council, an unelected 12-member body controlled by hardliners, holds the power to screen all legislation and candidates for parliament or the presidency.

Prior to the February 2004 parliament elections, the Council barred thousands of candidates from standing - most of them reformists.

"These people have been unjust and are not competent to be there," the 73-year-old dissident said.

"Pressure on political activists and the press must stop, and all political prisoners must also be freed," he added.

Yazdi is currently facing charges of seeking to overthrow the Islamic regime and is a figure the Guardians Council would be highly unlikely to approve as a presidential candidate in the June 17 polls.

He was a close aide to Iran's revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during his final years in exile in 1978 in France, and served as foreign minister in the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan.

The Iran Freedom Movement, founded in the 1960s by Bazargan, is a liberal nationalist opposition movement seen as close to Iran's reformers.

The group was tolerated until 2001 but is now banned in Iran because it questions certain principles of the Islamic Republic.

58. Why Iran Can't Become the New China

The Roving Eye, By Pepe Escobar, Sep 14, 2005

TEHRAN - Ebrahim Yazdi was the man who convinced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to wear a bulletproof jacket on the chartered

Air France flight that took the Imam from Paris to Tehran to consolidate the triumph of the Islamic revolution in January 1979. He was one of the Westernized, Islamic non-turbaned princes of the Revolution himself. He was the man who "translated" Khomeini to the international media.

Then he became foreign minister in the first, post-revolutionary Mehdi Bazargan government. He fell out with the system after Khomeini's death and was inevitably branded a counter-revolutionary. As the leader of the liberal, secular Iran Freedom Movement, Yazdi saw his party banned and party candidates routinely excluded from standing for office. He was even dismissed himself for not holding a higher education degree - when in fact he's a PhD. His latest disqualification - by the Council of Guardians - was for the June presidential elections. He has been repeatedly thrown in jail - facing accusations like "attempting to convert the *velaii* [jurisprudence] rule into a democratic rule". Yazdi, arguably Iran's top dissident politician, received Asia Times Online at his residence in the comfortable middle-class neighborhood of ValiAsr to deliver a devastating indictment of the regime. Yazdi is the quintessential Islamic Republic version of a "leftist". Iranian "leftists" are in favor of total freedom of speech, liberal democracy, deregulated economy, a strong role for private enterprise and foreign investment, a strong voice for women and a strong civil society; in sum, post-modernist Islam. Yazdi divides the new government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into three groups. The first group, "are those in charge of economic matters, qualified, with a proven record. They know what they want - a market economy, support for the private sector, reducing the size of government." The second group, bundled as security/intelligence/culture, "represent extreme, repressive forces, display a disbelief in human rights and advocate harsh treatment" of any dissent. The third group is composed of technocrats, in ministries like health or communication, "individuals with good academic records, but not a management record. A good professor is not necessarily a good minister." Yazdi sees a glaring internal contradiction in this new cabinet. The first group, pushing for privatization, knows that capital only flows to places under political stability, "They cannot help the privatization drive while confronting the suppressive group. If the hardliners - in the

ministries of information, interior, culture and Islamic guidance - want to continue in their harsh ways, capital will flow elsewhere." The total amount of Iranian capital flight may now exceed US \$600 billion.

Lessons from the Middle Kingdom

Yazdi deconstructs the idea exposed by many "rightists" of Iran rising to become the new, Muslim China. "There are three components - economic development, social freedom and political expression. The Iranian authorities are only equipped for suppression. Social freedoms in China - like freedom for boys and girls to get together - are no problem in China, as long as they don't involve anything political. The dress code was never an issue. The Iranian government, on the other hand, keeps hammering an Islamization of social behavior. Even novels are censored - there is no kissing in novels published in this country." Yazdi appreciates how, "the Chinese divorced themselves from the Cultural Revolution. They put Mao's [Zedong's] widow and her cohorts in prison. They released liberals and invited them to government. The Communist Party decided to remove any ideology. Only nationalism remained. Can Iranian authorities divorce themselves from Islam? No. They do have a problem." He adds, "The Chinese understand the world superbly, how to explore all international opportunities in favor of implementing their goals. They have extended their economic relationship with the US." He compares it with Iran's Kish Island, a free zone in the Persian Gulf shores that is "a separate entity, and was not supported enough to set an example." Yazdi says that from the beginning the revolution has evolved a variation of the same theme: "They (the conservatives) insisted they should have total power. We always said this is very dangerous." This has led to what Yazdi considers the crucial problem, the isolation of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. "During the revolution, the slogan was 'we are all together'. After the revolution, the slogan was switched to 'all (who are) with me'. This phenomenon gradually eliminated everyone, one way or another. Those dedicated to the cause of the revolution gradually left. 'All with me' has been the slogan all the way up to this last election." Yazdi points out that even Khamenei's closest associates, such as former speaker of the parliament Mehdi

Karrubi, were sidelined (Karrubi, who maintains that the June 17 elections were stolen, has started a new political party). "This means that the leader is alone. None of the old comrades are with him anymore. So we have reached a critical point. The history of Iran offers several examples of the caliph surrounded by squabbling groups. At the moment Khamenei feels that he has total power; but lessons from our own history show how dangerous this could be."

Montazeri rules

It all comes back to the holy of holies, the problem of Khamenei's legitimacy. Yazdi is extremely attentive when he learns the official list of eight *marja'as* - sources of imitation - according to the clerical establishment in Qom. "So Montazeri is not on the list? But he's the most influential of them all." Yazdi remembers how, five years ago, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri literally opposed the Supreme Leader, saying, "You are not qualified to issue a religious verdict." On top of that, Montazeri always insisted that the Supreme Leader must be a spiritual guide, and that control of the police, state security, armed forces and state media is certainly not part of his attributes. Montazeri - who was Khomeini's most prized colleague and political confidante - remains a giant thorn in the side of the regime. He was to be Khomeini's successor - as designated by the Imam himself, and confirmed in 1984 by the Council of Experts. But three years later he was already enmeshed in a web of revolutionary intrigue, branding him a "liberal", i.e., counter-revolutionary, just like Bazargan and Yazdi.

When Khomeini died in 1989 there was what secular Iranians call nothing less than a coup d'état: a triumvirate composed of Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ahmad Khomeini, the Imam's son, changed the constitution. From then, one would not necessarily have to be a *marja'a* to assume the functions of the *velayat-e-faqih* (the ruling of the jurisprudent). So a sort of junior cleric, Hojjatoleslam Ali Khamenei, became the new leader, while he was not even an ayatollah, much less a revered *marja'a*. Montazeri happens to be one of the world's leading authorities on *velayat-e-faqih* - a doctrine that is the Shi'ite theological version of Plato's philosopher-king. He was the president of the assembly of experts that drafted the constitution of the Islamic Republic, and

the Constitution was explicit: the *faqih* must be a *marja'a*. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei has centralized total religious and political power, to doubt it is to risk a Shi'ite inquisition. Yazdi says, "For Khamenei's supporters, he is the leader of all Muslims. At most, he is the leader of the Shi'ites," and he adds to the chorus pointing out that "many Shi'ites object to it as well. Fadllullah (the Lebanese Ayatollah) objects to it openly. Khomeini has been an ayatollah long before becoming a political leader. Others recognized his title as a genuine gift. Khamenei on the other hand got this title as an 'honorary degree' by the Council of Experts." Yazdi stresses the example of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq. "He does not believe in *velayat-e-faqih*. This is how he earned the power to bring together Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds. It's completely different from the Iranian authorities."

The dilemma of the ruling class

So now, for Yazdi, as far as the regime is concerned, "They say, 'We are the ruling class, and we are equal to Islam'. To stay in power is more important than the daily life of Iranians. But now that they have full power, how can they keep it? In the Japan of the Meiji emperor, the conservatives had full power. To keep it, they made changes." But however hard the struggle, he remains an optimist: "Intellectual power in Iran is strong. We are the youngest nation in the world, 70% of the population is younger than 30. In Iranian university classes, women account for 80% of the students. Women are active in all walks of life. They don't believe in this regime. And the government is helpless to do anything about them. They may try something harsh, but will have to retreat." As a former foreign minister educated in the US, Yazdi sees the non-stop Iran - US diplomatic conflagration centered on two themes: nuclear activity and human rights. "Iran has no other choice but to accept IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) resolutions. Many Iranians believe we should stop uranium enrichment and solve the crisis." That's not exactly the feeling one gets in the mosque, in the bazaar or in the teashop, where Iran's nuclear program is viewed as an assertion of national will. On human rights, Yazdi is convinced "there's no way out of the global village. This is not an American design. America is also trying to adjust. Even the US cannot compete if it has a backward government.

Some Iranian authorities blame it all on American democracy. There is no such thing. Even if Iran succeeds in its nuclear program, the human rights question will remain. That's why the rightists cannot do whatever they want." Or can they? One may ask the collective leadership in Beijing. But the only one with a definitive answer may well be the Supreme Leader himself.

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58. *The Roving Eye, By Pepe Escobar April 1, 2006*

TEHRAN - A day after the UN Security Council, in a non-binding decision, gave Iran one month to stop enriching uranium, the Nayeb restaurant, serving the best kebab in Tehran for the upper middle classes, was absolutely packed for lunch. In this worldly, secular atmosphere - no clerics, only two chador-clad women in sight, and most displaying authentic Hermes and Burberry scarves - some were nonetheless incensed that the decision in New York was timed to a particularly holy holiday in the Islamic Republic: the anniversary of the death of Prophet Muhammad. The Iranian government has officially designated 2006 as "The Year of the Prophet".

Prophets of a more prosaic nature risk their take on the nuclear row. "We don't need a bomb," said a businessman with extensive interests in Dubai. "And even if we did, we could buy from the Chinese or the Pakistanis, or in the Russian black market." Some accuse the EU-3 (England, France and Germany) of being two-faced, some point out that, "the Italians told us they also want to be part of the negotiations; they want to invest even more here". Tehran's Westernized upper middle classes may not be die-hard fans of Iran's theocratic nationalism, but virtually everyone agrees with Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki about the "unjustified propaganda" of the West regarding Iran's nuclear program. As to a specific Mottaki warning that, "We have readied ourselves to meet any threat," many are not so sure. Before Friday's prayers - when top clerics inevitably lash out against "US Imperialism" - Tehran had just responded to the UN via ambassadors and foreign ministry officials. The single most important authority in the Islamic Republic - Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - had not yet

issued his verdict. But the consensus remains virtually iron clad, cutting across all social and intellectual barriers, that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program and is now the victim of double standards by both the US and the European Union.

From bazaari's and taxi drivers to clerics and economic analysts, Iranians also openly charge that the nuclear row is just an excuse by the US to undermine the Islamic Republic. Few would disagree with Iran's UN ambassador, Jafed Zarif, who said in New York, after the statement was approved, that "the single most active instigator of the concern about Iran is Israel, which is not a member of the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), is a known possessor of nuclear weapons, has a history of aggression against its neighbors, is in non-compliance with I don't know how many Security Council resolutions". Zarif also charged that he was prevented from addressing the Security Council to make Iran's case. "We have been told this was a matter of procedure, but I believe it was more than that."

A few minutes away from the Nayeb restaurant, widely respected Ebrahim Yazdi, a former foreign minister under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, seems to have a solution to defuse the crisis. "Iran should accept part of the Russian proposal, with a definite timetable for the completion of the Bushehr plant," said Yazdi, who "translated" Khomeini to the world in the late 1970s and is currently the secretary-general of the Freedom Movement of Iran, an opposition party. "After 40 years, we would finally have our electricity network." The Russians have been working on the Bushehr nuclear reactor for years but have never guaranteed a date to finish the project, he said. At the same time they are still offering to enrich uranium in Russia in a joint venture with Iran, as long as it is part of a civilian program. Russia and China only approved the UN statement because it does not imply sanctions against Tehran. Russia's UN ambassador, Andrei Denisov, once again stressed that there was no evidence by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has embarked on a nuclear weapons program. Russia and China - as well as Germany and Italy - want the IAEA to solve the matter, not the Security Council.

A US-educated economic analyst commented: "But the statement was a blow to Iran anyway because the government was

sure both Russia and China would never allow the US to deny Iran's rights under the NPT." Yazdi's proposal concentrates on Bushehr. With the nuclear reactor completed, "Iran would have time to develop mutual trust" with the Europeans. The country should then welcome European investors "to come to Iran and enrich uranium here as joint ventures". Yazdi does not consider uranium enrichment in Russia a good idea - nor do Iranian negotiators for that matter. But Yazdi goes beyond that, charging that the Iranians "did not comprehend the full meaning of the Russian proposal". He dismisses the negotiators' "Cold War mentality". As a former foreign minister who knows the West in depth, Yazdi is on overdrive in the Iranian media, offering unofficial advice to the Iranian side. He's adamant though that "if the Americans and the Europeans want to control and tame the Iranian government, this will only add fuel to the fire of the extreme rightists." He added that "the rightists even justify political repression at home by referring to the American government's internal policy after 9/11." "Any foreign threat" - such as the ones constantly issued by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton - "will backfire". For Yazdi, "the only way to control Iranian nuclear activities is to help democracy in Iran. For us, the restriction of our civil liberties is more important than a nuclear program."

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60. Letter to Kofi Anan, Secretary General, United Nations

July 14, 2006

61. How the U.S. Ignored Iran's Reformers

Time Magazine, Scott MacLeod, March 1, 2007

The Bush administration, despite President Bush's vocal call for democracy in Iran, has failed to grant visas to several prominent Iranian pro-democracy activists. Among the Iranians still waiting for a U.S. visa is Abdolkarim Soroush, a philosopher who is widely regarded as the leading intellectual force behind the reformist movement that swept President Mohammed Khatami to power in 1997.

After being tipped by an Iranian source and looking into the issue, I learned that another important figure whose visa request was rejected outright is Ebrahim Yazdi, head of the Freedom Movement of Iran. Despite being under severe pressure from hard-liners aligned with Khatami's successor, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Soroush and Yazdi sought to visit the U.S. in part to take up speaking invitations at prestigious institutions such as Harvard and Stanford universities.

Soroush, who is presently a visiting scholar at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World at Leiden University in the Netherlands, told me that he applied for his visa at the U.S. embassy in Berlin in June 2006 and did not have any knowledge about why it had not yet been approved. "They did not respond to my e-mails," he said.

Yazdi, a pharmacist by training, learned that his application for a U.S. visa, which he initially submitted to the U.S. embassy Paris in 2005, was denied. "They talked nonsense with me," Yazdi told me when I contacted him by phone in Tehran about his interview at the U.S. consulate in Dubai. "They wanted to be sure that I am not going to stay in the U.S. I said, 'Ma'am, I am a 76-year-old Iranian who has been fighting for 60 years for the cause of freedom. I don't want to leave my country. I want to visit my children and my 15 grandchildren.' But they refused to give me a straightforward answer." The problems encountered by Soroush and Yazdi are additionally puzzling because both men have been welcome visitors to the U.S. in the past. Soroush, who has been dubbed the "Martin Luther of Islam" for his writings on separating mosque and state, was a visiting professor at Harvard and Princeton University, and a scholar in residence at Yale University between 2000-2005.

Yazdi, whose group's website says its objective is "to gain freedom, independence and democracy for the Iranian nation on the basis of modern interpretation of Islamic principles," has a longstanding relationship with the U.S. He acquired a U.S. passport, later relinquished, when he lived in the U.S. between 1956-78 during the rule of the Shah of Iran. After his group joined Ayatollah Khomeini in overthrowing the Shah, he became foreign minister in the first revolutionary government headed by Mehdi Bazargan. Yazdi resigned along with Bazargan over the U.S. embassy hostage crisis, however, and they went on to become two

of the important domestic critics of the increasingly radical Islamic regime. The U.S. began granting Yazdi visitor visas in the mid-1980s. His last visit was in 2000, when he gave several university lectures on Iran and Iranian-American relations.

Besides seeing his family in the U.S., Yazdi intended to take up several new speaking invitations. They included a lecture on Islam, Iran and democracy at Stanford's Iranian Studies Program, and another on the challenge of democracy in the Muslim world at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington. In addition to Harvard, Soroush was invited by an Islamic cultural center in Oakland, Calif., to give three weeks of lectures on Islam's role in the modern world and by the Center for the Study of Democracy, Toleration and Religion at New York's Columbia University to give a talk on religion, democracy, civil liberties and pluralism. The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University invited him to give two weeks' worth of presentations on Islam, democracy and Catholic-Muslim relations.

Asked about the visa problems of Iranian reformists, and specifically about Soroush and Yazdi, a State Department spokesman told TIME foreign affairs correspondent Elaine Shannon: "We give full consideration to requests for visas to travel to the U.S. by persons from all nations, including Iran. Visa records are confidential and we can't comment on individual cases. In these two situations, however, I can say that we have advised these two gentlemen that we have received or will receive and process applications for visas appropriate for the purposes of their intended travel to the United States. Federal law requires that security reviews be completed before we can issue visas to travelers from designated state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran."

Reasonable enough, yet that seems an oddly bureaucratic explanation considering the Bush administration's big rhetoric advocating freedom in Iran. Bush's democracy-themed inaugural address in 2005, which mentioned freedom 27 times, said America's mission is "to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way." Less than a year ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked Congress to allocate \$75 million "for democracy programs" inside Iran. Testifying on

the goals of the U.S.'s transformational diplomacy, she stated: "For our part, the United States wishes to reach out to the Iranian people and support their desire to realize their own freedom and to secure their own democratic and human rights."

It may be that the U.S. government bureaucracy hasn't caught up with the White House's freedom agenda for Iran. But several Iranian reformists I spoke with--in Iran and in the U.S.--believed that hard-liners in the Bush administration may be blocking the visa applications for political reasons. Their feeling is that the hard-liners might be doing everything to discourage dialogue with Iranians, even reformists, lest it complicate their agenda of confronting Iran. They also fear that administration hard-liners may not be interested in giving a platform inside the U.S. to the views of Iranians like Soroush and Yazdi who are dissidents but don't buy Bush's confrontational approach to Iran.

The administration has made a notable exception in the case of Iranian journalist Akbar Ganji, who has visited the U.S. twice in the past year. Perhaps it would have been hard to keep Ganji out, however, given the administration's past public support for Ganji during the six years he spent in prison for challenging the Islamic regime. In testimony about Iran policy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2005, Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns singled out Ganji "for uncovering the truth."

62. Interview with LA Times

June 6, 2007

Q. Do you believe there is a large crackdown going on against Iranian dissidents and human rights activists right now? Is it anything out of the ordinary going on in Iran? Who is behind this and why?

A. Yes. It is not only against political and human right students activists. Women, workers, Sufis (Dervish Gonabadi) and teachers are also enclosed. What is going on in Iran is the intensification of the past political suppression. The policies are now more overt and naked. I do not know who is behind this and why. I can only speculate. The new administration has come from Sepah's file and ranks. Because of their role in war against Iraq, they have certain claims to run and control the affair of the country.

Q. Do you think there is increased pressure on the local press, scholars, students and union leaders in Iran? Why are they doing this now?

A. Yes, there is very well felt pressure by all groups you mentioned. Part of it comes from the ideological and political convictions of the authorities and part is the manifestation of inherent instability or the instability feeling on part of the authorities.

Q. Is the Iranian government worried that women and student groups are part of an effort to overthrow the government?

A. This is exactly what the authorities have claimed. They have accused these activists of being after the so called velvet revolution.

Q. Why has the Iranian government decided to tighten domestic controls now? Is it the work of one faction? Is it fear of the U.S. attempts at subversion? Is it in response to the large amounts of U.S. military hardware in the Persian Gulf?

A. In addition to what I said, the US government has openly announced its determination and plans to change the regime of Iran and/or modify the Iranian government present policies and behaviors. Well, I think this has given a good excuse to the Iranian authorities to justify their new wave of suppression. There are, however, two approaches to the external pressure. One is to reduce the internal pressure in order to stimulate national conciliation. The other approach, nevertheless, is to silence any voice of dissent in the country.

Q. What do you think of the attempt to get private banks to lower their lending rates to 12%? What is the reason for that? What effect has it had on the financial community?

A. Lowering the bank interest rate is one thing; the way the president acted is another matter. Usually the Money and Credit Council of the State study the issue and evaluate the situation and accordingly decide of the matter. The President would follow the advice of the said council. In the recent event, however, the president ignored the Council's advice and decided otherwise. The consequence is uncertainty in the money market and the message is chase in management of the state affairs.

Q. There is a sense that the current climate has created a situation in which people are afraid to be critical to the President and his circle. What do you think of that? Is he being elevated to someone who is above criticism?

A. The matter is not elevating some one above criticism. The new administration is a sort of military kind. The mentality and management style of military men is blind obedience, no question and no criticism.

63. Iran's Nuclear Program, Sanctions and the Prospects for Democracy: a View from Tehran

By Ebrahim Yazdi

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The interdependency of international politics and Iran's development may be examined through the influence and consequences of two momentous events: the end of the Cold War in 1991, and the election of Barak Hussein Obama in 2008.

Political imperatives, which dominated international relations during the Cold War, have been replaced by economic ones. But long-term strategic economic planning, at both national and international levels, demands political stability in the form of democratic development. One consequence of the end of the Cold War was the removal of one major political obstacle for democratic development in many "Third World" countries. The result has been a wave of democracy all over the world.

Democratization of the political system in a given country leads to political and economic stability. Initially, democratization drives the presence and participation of all political forces, whether minority or majority, into the processes of decision making. This then gives legitimacy to all decisions being made. Later, this broad participation and legitimacy increases the likelihood of continuity of long range national plans, particularly economic plans. Countries where the group in power does not recognize or tolerate opposition political groups and seeks to denigrate their values and delegitimize their activities are harmed with respect to long range political and economic stability.

A second important characteristic of a democratic system is orderly and nonviolent replacement of political players. In the democratic process, a minority opposition political party may become the majority. Power holders freely give way to the new group. But in many developing and/or newly independent countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, entrenched authorities refused to accept the results of free elections. The consequences have been the so-called velvet and orange revolutions and continued political unrest. In some developing countries, such as in Iran, the people in power consider themselves to be the sole legitimate keepers of the system, appointed by God. In their logic, any attempt to replace them through a free and fair election is branded as “soft” and/or “legal subversion”, of the velvet and orange revolution type, but subversion nonetheless.

If one considers the interdependency of strategic economic relations and democratic development as a necessity for political stability, then for the first time in the history of many developing countries, and Iran in particular, the overall strategic economic interests of developed countries of the West have become aligned with the national aspirations of our people with regard to liberty and popular sovereignty. Democratization is not an American design or policy; it is the requirement of our time and a by-product of the global information revolution. In today’s global village, the economic interests of Western countries depend on the institutionalization of democracy in developing countries. In other words, the fulfillment of the national goals and aspiration of countries like Iran is no longer in conflict with Western interests. And likewise, in a true democratically elected government, no economic relations with foreign countries would be accepted or tolerated if they are in conflict with national interests.

Now let me go to the second and more recent event, the election of Barak Hussein Obama as the President of the United States of America. Mr. Obama's campaign slogan was "change", and I assume he meant primarily change inside the USA. But first I must say that he himself and his election represent some fundamental changes in American society. The America I knew, living in the USA in the 60's and 70's, has manifestly transformed itself. I arrived in America in the years of Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Malcolm X. There was great promise of change at that time, then tragedy and disappointments. This change is long overdue.

What he will or can do to change America is not the issue here. The relevant issue is what changes he will bring to American policies and actions in the Middle East and Iran. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his recent book, criticizes the foreign policies of the outgoing administration as being domineering. He still considers the U.S. to be the greatest economic and military power of the world, but advocates *global leadership* instead of *global domination*. Mr. Obama will most probably follow Dr. Brzezinski's recommendations. I disagree. International relations in our global village are such that regardless of America's economic or military might, the most successful approaches will be based on *global cooperation*, not American global leadership, to say nothing of global domination. The policies of global domination or leadership both are based on the presumption of America's economic and military superiority and require the acceptance and submission of other countries to this superiority. The proper management of the affairs in our global village requires cooperation of not just highly developed Western countries, but rather all countries, small and big, weak and powerful, underdeveloped as well as developed. Without such cooperation, global peace and prosperity will not be achievable in this new age.

President Elect Obama has promised to end American military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can this be done without Iranian cooperation? Can Mr. Obama overcome 30 years of mistrust and animosity between the two countries? Is there sufficient will within the ruling elites on both sides to overcome internal political hurdles to reconciliation between these two nations? If the will is there, he can find ways to do it. In the case of Afghanistan, Iran fully cooperated with the US to overthrow the Taliban government and used her influence to convince all Afghan groups to support the new government. But what was the outcome? Iran was rewarded for her assistance by being placed at the center of President Bush's "Axis of Evil". After the tragedy of 9/11, many Iranians expressed their condolences to the American people. The Bush administration, however, ignored this and other Iranian humanitarian gestures altogether and failed to seize an opportunity.

American administrations have articulated four major complaints against the Iranian government: Iran's nuclear technology program, Iran's opposition to the "peace process"

between Israel and the Palestinians, Iran's support of terrorists groups, and lastly, the Iranian government's violations of the human rights of Iranians.

As far as Iran's nuclear program is concerned, the position of my party, the Freedom Movement of Iran, as an opposition party, and the views of many Iranians, based on our own national interests and security may be summarized as in the following. Many Iranians have raised serious questions concerning the advisability of nuclear energy production for a country such as Iran. Iran is one of the largest oil producing countries in the world and has the second largest reserves of natural gas. Iran is a country with more than 70% direct sunshine year-round. Nuclear energy production is, compared to other sources of energy, very expensive economically and complicated technically. We therefore question, on economic and technical grounds why Iran should invest in nuclear energy technology when other, more profitable and safer investments are available. That said, Iran is a signatory to the NPT, entitling Iran to acquire nuclear technology for non-military purposes. Iran should not be denied this right. Although many Iranians have serious objections and reservations to nuclear energy production, it is up to Iranians to decide. Foreign powers should not be deciding this issue on our behalf as they have done in the past with our oil industry. That is ended in 1979.

That said, as a signatory to the NPT, Iran is also committed and obliged to completely observe the NPT Safeguards Agreement, and, as a confidence-building measure observe the Additional Protocol and to cooperate fully with The IAEA. The IAEA argues that Iran was and is involved in covert undeclared nuclear activities. Iran did not report to the Agency at the time some of her nuclear projects, such as uranium enrichment in Natanz, yellowcake production in Isfahan, and production of heavy water in Arak. In addition, there is not yet one operational nuclear reactor in Iran. The one under construction in Bushehr is not yet operational. The Russians have repeatedly postponed the opening of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. This circumstance raises the question of what use is our Iranian-enriched uranium? According a recent Agency report, while Iran has cooperated with the IAEA it has refused to allow Agency inspectors to visit the Arak heavy water production facilities. Also, Iran did not accept an offer made

by the group of 5+1 to replace the heavy water production with a light water facility. In addition, Iran continues the enrichment of Uranium, despite the Agency's objection and the UN resolutions.

The package deal offered to Iran by the group of 5+1 could be a working basis for resolving this impasse, provided some revisions and additions are introduced to it. Some of these additions may be, for example, an end to US opposition to the construction of pipelines for transportation of oil and gas from central Asia through Iran to Europe and to the Persian Gulf. The same may be applied to the construction of a pipeline for Iranian oil and gas for India via Pakistan. Many Iranians do not agree that the enrichment of Iranian uranium should be transferred to Russia. Iranians do not trust Russia. Iran had in the past, and rightly so, proposed the formation of an international consortium to manage uranium enrichment facilities inside Iran. Under the present environment of mistrust this does not seem to be viable, but if negotiations continue and Iran accepts some sort of package deal, then the needed international trust could be achieved and the formation of such a consortium would be realistic.

The problem seems to be the Iranian government's unwillingness to resolve the nuclear issue. The reason, some in Iran believe, is that resolving the nuclear issue will not end the dispute between Iran and the Western countries and the UN. There are other issues more serious than the nuclear program, such as human rights violations, which would then rise again to the forefront as they did before the nuclear issue emerged. Human rights violations in Iran are severe, blatant and widespread. Members of political opposition groups, labor and teachers' unions, student organizations, women's rights groups, and even the Shia clergy who disagree with the official doctrine of *Velayate faqih*, are routinely suppressed and subjected to arbitrary arrests and detention.

To Western countries, Iran's nuclear program may be more urgent than any other issue. But to Iranians it is diverting the world's attention from the gross violation of human rights and the absence of democracy in Iran. Iran has signed the NPT, but let us not forget that it has also signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international covenants. Article 9 of Iran's Civil Rights Code clearly declares that those international

agreements and conventions that have been approved by Iran are considered Iranian law and should be observed by Iranian authorities, but Iranian authorities do not respect these international commitments and obligations. Furthermore they even discard the articles of Chapter 3 of Iran's own Islamic Republic Constitution with respect to the basic rights and liberties of our people.

To most Iranians, the gross violations of human rights in Iran are a greater threat to the national interest and security of Iran and to peace in the region than our nuclear program. Restoration of human rights is a prerequisite to the progress of democracy in Iran. Democratic development, the bedrock of economic and political stability requires reliable and permanent solutions to the ongoing problems with Iran, and within Iran.

The sanctions that have been applied by unilateral decisions of the US government or via UN resolutions have not been effective in forcing Iran to comply. On the contrary, these sanctions are actually hurting ordinary Iranians, not the authorities. Furthermore, the overall climate of confrontation created by US administrations provides excuses to Iranian authorities to put more pressure on political activists and is thus hurting the cause of democracy in Iran.

As far as peace in the Middle East is concerned, we do not believe Iran is an obstacle to the peace. The solution to the conflict is now very clear: that is the so-called "land for peace" notion. There is universal consensus on the issue. The Arab governments unanimously adopted and declared that if Israel abide by the UN resolution 242, withdraw from land occupied in June 1967, and recognize an independent Palestinian state in these lands, then they would all recognize Israel and establish full diplomatic relations. In addition, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced that in that if Jewish settlers in West Bank are not willing to stay in the West Bank and live there as Palestinian citizens and wish to leave, Saudi Arabia would pay \$10 billion, as compensation, to these settlers. There is a historical chance for a just and lasting peace in Middle East. The burden of peace is on Israel. Is Iran the real obstacle in the peace here? If Israel acts now and this peace is achieved, could do Iran anything to block it? It does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, two former Iranian presidents, Hashemi and Khatami, have stated publicly that if the Arabs, including the Palestinians,

agree with Israel on a particular peace plan, Iran will go along with their decision.

The American government also claims that Iran is supporting Lebanese and Palestinian terrorists. Iran does not hide or deny supporting several groups. Iran, however, based on the UN definition of terrorism, considers them as groups defending their homeland and resisting an invading army, not terrorists. Nevertheless, with the emergence of peace, this issue would become obsolete. Peace means Israel would evacuate the Shaaba farms in south Lebanon. Lebanon's leaders, including Hezbollah, have agreed that after the evacuation of these farms by Israel, Hezbollah would lay down their arms and become a political party.

These four issues are often stated as the primary blocks to reconciliation between the Iran and Western nations. But on the other side, there are burning challenges facing both Iran and Western nations and other leading powers that we suffer from in common and which cannot be resolved unless we work together. President Elect Obama has stated his view clearly on this, that America needs the cooperation of the world to solve the problems of the world. Iran shares with other nations in suffering from the scourges of terrorism, environmental degradation, energy insecurity, drug addiction, infectious disease epidemics, financial instability, and refugee migrations, and the list grows. The incentives for Iran and the USA to begin working together to address these common challenges should also be kept in mind.

So the real underlying problem between these two countries, the USA and Iran, is not on the list of the 4 issues above. There is thirty years of distrust and animosity between the two, a climate that has been reinforced internally in the populations on both sides by decades of propaganda. To resolve outstanding issues and reach a degree of reconciliation, first there must be a will for reconciliation and then negotiations. To many Iranians, the best course of action for the new Obama administration and for the European Union, as well as for Iran, is unconditional, direct, overt and official negotiations. Not tactical ones, on one single issue, such as security in Iraq. Rather, serious, comprehensive and strategic negotiations covering all points of difference and points of collaboration. Such a step will send a powerful signal to people on both sides and in other nations that Iran and the USA are building the basis for trust and cooperation. This in turn, like the

ending of the tensions of the Cold War, will hopefully permit the wave of freedom and democracy to reach Iran as well.

64. The West, Islam, and Muslims

Ebrahim Yazdi, Jan. 12, 2008

Several months have past since the negative comments of Pope Benedict and other Church leaders regarding Islam, and the emotions of Muslims around the world have calmed to a great extent. Now may be a good time for a more serious analysis and discussion of the motivation behind these repeated verbal and written attacks on Islam and the Prophet of Islam. These attacks and the provocative slander against Islam and Muslims are part of long-term plans that must be dealt with. An immediate explosive and sensational reaction to western Jewish and Christian institutions will not be productive. Drafting a comprehensive strategic plan concerning relations between the world of Islam and the western world, or more precisely with the Northern Hemisphere, is a fundamental necessity.

The Jewish and Christian reaction towards Islam and Muslims since the time of our beloved Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), or during the past 1400 years, has gone through various phases and experienced transformation and modification. Careful analysis of these evolutionary changes can help Muslims to foresee the future of this relationship, and to formulate a proper and healthy strategy for a meaningful and more productive relation between the two sides.

The late Mehdi Bazargan, a well-known Iranian Muslim scholar, in his book "The Question of Revelation" has reviewed the positions, views and judgments of various prominent western scholars concerning the Prophet, his mission and revelation, and has divided them into four categories or eras. These are:

- A) Era of ignorance and hate,
- b) Era of doubt and consideration,
- c) Era of research and gratification and
- d) Era of understanding and conversion.

Analyzing the evolutionary path of western thought concerning the Prophet Mohammad, his apostleship and revelation, Bazargan stated the following:

"Westerners (from eastern Roman to the Middle Ages, as well as contemporary Europe and America), in the margin of their military engagement, economic exploitation, political domination and colonialist relations, have always had some cultural relations with Muslim countries as well. In particular they have had ideas and opinions towards Islam and its founder which did not always remain constant, rather which varied according to and parallel with their study and information collected concerning Islam and the Prophet. Thus one may see considerable evolutionary changes throughout time and space. This evolution, of course, like any other development, did not have a stable direction, but rather has had speed as well as delay, up and down, back and forth. It is, nonetheless, interesting and would be valuable to spend some time and effort to review it."

The opinions and the judgment of westerners regarding the Prophet of Islam could be categorized in four groups and/or periods. The pattern is a little overlapping and sometimes confusing from one country to another (and from one era to another). Therefore one may, instead of four periods, refer to them as four schools of thought.

A. The Era of Ignorance and Hate

The era of ignorance and atrocity or severe animosity toward Islam is accompanied with accusation and the absence of information. The first western encounter with the new religion took place on the battlefield. From the early confrontation between the eastern Romans in the 7th century A.C. until the years after the Crusade, a number of very strange and extraordinary opinions are expressed concerning the Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). Among the opinions one may find every kind of slander and name-calling, such as camel thief, sorcerer and head of highway men. In the Middle Ages, the scope of ignorance and fabrication reached the point that the founder of Islam was introduced as a Roman Cardinal who ran away to Arabia because he was not elected as pope, or he was introduced as the one who claimed divinity and the Arabs built his statue from gold, worshiping him and sacrificing themselves for him. They also claimed that his name, Mohammad was a derivative of the name of an idol "Mahoum", which was mentioned in Arab mythical stories. In the famous poems of Chansons De Roland

there are parts in which it is said that when Charlemagne's knights overcame the Arabs, they broke many Muslims idols. Pope Innocent 3rd called our Prophet "Dajjal"(false Jesus). The writer Gilbert De Nugent narrated of the Prophet Mohammad that because of his drunkenness, pigs ate his crops. He then states that it is for this reason that drinking wine and eating pork is forbidden in Islam. The infamous Dante in his "Inferno" placed the Prophet of Islam in the 28th level of hell, while his body is split in two pieces, and saw him as the head of hell (tenet?) souls who falsely claimed to be prophets of God, and mutilated their bodies by their own hands. Briefly it could be said that during the Middle Ages, the Europeans considered the holy Prophet a liar and the agent of Satan, an epileptic and insane man.

B. The Era of Doubt and Consideration

Five hundred years after the rise of Islam, in the 12th century, the first serious book about (although against) Islam was written by Pierre Le Venerable. At the same time, the first Latin translation of the Quran was prepared. Pierre Pascal was considered to be the first "bon Islamisant" of the 14th century. There are, however, those who have "nuance" judgments about Islam; people like Raymond Lulle in the 14th century, Guillaume Posterl in the 16th century, Rollan and Gangnier in the 18th Century, Bishop Abbe De Broglie and Renan in the 19th century, to mention a few. Not all opinions expressed are like these. For example, Voltaire, the famous French philosopher and critic, in 1742 in his "Mohammad's Tragedy" criticized Prophet Mohammad and protested his followers strongly. He said if Mohammad had been an emir, king or elected president defending his country and had brought peace for people, his approval may be justified. But one must be out of his mind or blinded by prejudice to defend a camel broker who instigated a revolution and claimed that he had spoken with Gabriel and received an ambiguous book, the content of which is contradictory; who, to obvious logic, killed men and women and forced people to believe his book. This is a case of absolute ignorance; when one is ignorant and is ignorant of his own ignorance.

Nevertheless in another treaty titled "Essais Surles Moeurs", Voltaire modified his views on the Prophet, acknowledging his greatness and qualification, although he criticized Mohammad or

being, in his view, violent and brutal. At the same time he concluded that in the Prophet's message there is nothing new from previous religious messages, but "Mohammad is Allah's messenger". Diderot, another French philosopher, follows Voltaire's view, which was the dominant view about Islam at the time.

C. The Era of Research and Gratification

Years before Voltaire, G. Sale published the English translation of the Holy Quran in 1734. He compared Prophet Mohammad with Numa and Thesus. A few years earlier, de Boulainvillier wrote the "Life of Mohammad". His clear intention was to prove the superiority of Islam over Christianity. de Boulainvillier portrayed Mohammad as a man of wisdom, justice and enlightenment, his purpose being to bring a rational and logical new religion to replace Judaism and Christianity.

When the restraining curtains and ill intentions were removed and eyes that seek truth are opened, then the face of truth could gradually appear.

Savary, who translated the Holy Quran completely in 1752, introduce Prophet Mohammad as one of the extraordinary personalities of history in awakening and revitalizing humanity and guiding mankind to the path of salvation and happiness. In Savary's opinion, Mohammad ibn Abdullah, after studying the mistakes of and disagreements between Jews and Christians, and considering the problems of his times, decided to develop a new and religion to have a united God who rewards good deeds and punishes sin. To advance his cause, he was forced to innovate and claim a relation with a supreme divine entity. His apostleship, Savary postulates, was in fact a necessary, legitimate and pious trick, or fraud. He therefore kept those issues of Judaism and Christianity which were correct, useful and compatible with the hot climate of Arab desert. In brief, Savary was a western intellectual and researcher who only negated the divinity of Prophet Mohammad's message, but he considered Mohammad the greatest man who has come to the world. Later in 1840, in the second volume of his book "Heroes and Hero Worship" which expounds on the personality of Prophet Mohammad, Carlyle strongly challenges the view of his fellow religious and country men and praises the greatness of Mohammad.

He clearly states that all the negative opinion about Mohammad and the accusations against him are the result and manifestation of our own shortcomings and baseness. He asks, how be possible that a just and wise God permits 180 million human beings for whom the life and the word of Mohammad is the guiding star, to remain astray. How could it be possible that a charlatan have such great influence in so many people's lives? He says, "Mohammad for sure was an honest man, as any great man is. We can consider him as a great person, a man of creativity and a messenger who has brought to us news from the eternal and unknown world. We can consider him as a poet or a messenger, because his words are different from the words of ordinary men. The sources of these words are the inner truth of being since he was sincerely in touch with these facts." According to Carlyle's hypothesis of romantic idealism, the genius himself is the highest stage of revelation and the manifestation of such power of the Lord which is the hidden truth and the existing nature of Him. He says: "Mohammad in that great darkness which was synonymous and close to death, saw the light of divine providence as a glorious shining flame, a mixture of life and cosmos, and called it revelation or Gabriel. Now which one of us could call it different name?" According to Carlyle philosophy of intuition, Mohammad was one of the great personalities who themselves were symbols and of life creating words of God.

Ten to fifteen years after Carlyle an English author, Davenport, in his book, "An Apology for Mohammad and the Quran", shows as the title indicates the repentant attitude and consideration which appeared in European intellectuals towards Islam.

D. The Era of Understanding and Conversion

The 20th century saw an increase from the previous century in objective research and study of the personality of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) reflected in many books. In recent years, the interest has been more focused on the political and sociological situation in Muslim societies and Islam. This brief review, does not mentioned the many names and works of those who have researched Muslim history and civilization (such as Gustave le Bon) or fundamental work on the compilation and combination of the Holy Quran (such as that of T. Noldeke). This is because our aim is to focus on the revelation and apostleship. So much for the past.

Today what Muslims throughout the world are witnessing is an expansion and deepening of positive western and scholarly attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. Prejudice and closed or narrow-mindedness towards Islam and Muslims, nevertheless still show up in various forms.

The relationship between the West and Muslim countries during the past two centuries has been very much influenced by not only the anti-Islamic stance of westerners, but also by a long record of colonialism. Thus, the relationship may be looked upon as having distinct periods, each one with characteristic political and sociological consequences. The first period is the era of dominant and suppressive European colonialism. During this period, the colonialists, through an immediate, visible presence, (such as in India, Indonesia, Egypt, North Africa etc), or indirect and invisible presence, (such as in Iran) dominated the political as well as economic affairs of these Muslim countries and plundered their natural resources. The record is absolutely unacceptable by any criteria. The unpleasant and sad memory of this era is very vivid in the minds of millions of Muslims throughout the world, and plays a significant role in shaping the attitudes of Muslims towards the west. It is a prohibiting factor in healthy relations between the West and Muslims.

The second era begins from the end of World War II. During this period many Muslim nations awakened from a long sleep. The struggle against colonialism and western political and economic domination gradually succeeded and Muslim countries one after another achieved their independence from western colonialists. However, this did not mean the end of western domination in Muslim countries. The Western powers, exploring the political, social, economic and cultural insufficiency, continued to dominate and control these countries. When the Second World War ended, the Cold War between the two competing blocks, the Western capitalist countries with the American leadership in one hand and the Socialist block under the leadership of the USSR started. The Cold War brought a new western policy towards Islam and Muslims. Considering the atheistic and antireligious nature of communism and the well-established monotheistic belief of Islam, the Western countries tried to use Islam as a mean to prevent the spread of communism in Muslim countries. This policy did not

bring any democratic and/or favorable political and economic changes for Muslim societies. The western powers, at the same time, did not permit or tolerate any independent national or Islamic movements to take over. They claim that even if independent Muslim or national movements in Muslim countries win and take over their governments they would be so weak that they would very soon be replaced by stronger communist parties. This is their excuse for continued support of corrupt and brutal dictators in these countries, despite strong public protest. The cost and consequence has been the historical intensification of the Muslim masses enmity towards the western powers. The long range product of such policies is the growth of extremism and violence.

International relations between the West and Muslim world entered into a new era when the Cold War ended and the USSR disintegrated. Some of the characteristic of the post Cold War era and the new circumstances may be defined as following:

The Electronic Revolution, similar to the Industrial Revolution, radically changed political, economic and social relations at the global level as well as at the international, interstate, and nation-states levels. The Electronic Revolution may have been one of the major contributing factors in the downfall of the USSR and the removal of the Berlin Wall. Another result of the Electronic Revolution is a drastic change in the size of our world. The change in space and time has squeezed the world to the size of a global village. Social relations in small human units, such a village, are very close, so close that everybody can observe the daily activities of other members of the unit, and no one may be ignored. Living in a global village is like dwelling in an apartment building. In traditional societies, such as in Iran many years ago, the houses were very large, with very thick walls and compartmentalized structures. People lived in these houses without anyone from the outside knowing what was going on inside the house. Members of the household could do whatever they wanted. The privacy of individual and family life was very much possible. Living conditions in new cities, in large apartment buildings are completely different from the old house structures and far from the ideal with respect to privacy. In these apartments, one can hear the radio or television of the next door neighbor, their talking or shouting and even the quarrels of the family. No more can one

have the privacy of the old housing system. Under these circumstances, the behavior of each member of the complex directly or indirectly affects the social relations and the well-being of all members of the complex. Similarly, in the global village no nation, no country, small or big, weak or strong, can ignore or be indifferent to the living conditions of the other countries and nations.

The Electronic Revolution has also drastically changed relations between Muslim countries with the world at large and the northern hemisphere in particular. There is a very deep and unprecedented evolution in this relationship, as is evident in the following.

During the Cold War, political priorities were defining and/or controlling international relations. In the post Cold War era, economic priorities have the decisive role in shaping global relations. Economic relations are meaningful if and when they are strategic and involve long term goals, not short term gains. The developed countries in general, and the members of Northern hemisphere in particular want long term economic relations with the other nations, which can only be achieved if those nations have enduring political stability. The meaning of political stability has changed completely from strong dictatorship to democratic ones, in the post Cold War era. The weakest democracies are more reliable than the strongest dictatorships. No wonder there has been a third wave of democracy after the Cold War. Democracy is a prerequisite of strategic economic relations between nations. It is obvious that there is not only one kind of democracy. There is no liberal and /or radical democracy. There is only *constitutional democracy*. A constitution is a social contract or agreement among the people of a country. The content of any constitution in any given country is based on the historical background, the popular culture and beliefs and the circumstance under which it has been drafted. Therefore there are some sharp differences in the content and structure of democracies in different countries. The common feature of all democracies is twofold. On the one hand all political groups must be represented. No group should be barred from being present or participating in the decision making processes. The presence of all political groups, particularly minorities, legitimizes the decisions made at the national level, making decisions authentic and acceptable by all political groups. The nature of

political activities is such that one political group may be a minority in one time and become majority at another time. When such a party becomes the majority and takes over, it can not claim the previous decisions unlawful, as far as they are concerned. This democratic procedure guarantees the continuation of enduring internal as well as external economic development.

The second characteristic of any democracy is the non-violent transformation of the power from one group to another. This smooth transition of authority from one group to another again permits the continuation of strategic economic plans. The democratic nature of the political system also ensures that foreign commitments are in the national interest.

The point here is that the end of the Cold War changed international relationships. During the Cold War, external powers prevented democratic development in many countries, including Muslim ones. Now that the Cold War is over and circumstances have changed, the influence of external factors have been reduce tremendously, making internal factors more decisive.

Nowadays, in the contemporary situation the most critical, sensitive and influential issue in international relations is those between the Western World with Islam and Muslims. Let us examine each one separately.

Islam as a world-view, religion or ideology is quietly, gradually and smoothly growing day by day. The hearts and the minds of many people all over the world are attracted by the message of Islam daily. The pace and scope of this attraction is such that many observers and expert analysts believe that as a dynamic system of thought, Islam is the most discussed issue in the world today and will be into the future. The age of Marxism and other materialistic ideologies is over. Judaism is a religion attached to a particular race, in which the ethnicity and racial consideration overshadows the spirituality. Christianity is trying hard to upgrade its doctrine to fit the contemporary world, and to adapt itself to the age of the Electronic Revolution. It seems, nonetheless, that Christianity is lacking the basic theological characteristic to satisfy this modification.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the 20th century the confrontation between religion and science was at its peak.

Scientific dogma was dominant and religious phobia and anti-religious sentiment was prevalent. The 20th century ended, however, as world scientific circles opened the doors of reconciliation with a new approach to religion and recognition of the necessity of religion for the well-being of mankind. This new approach and attitude of science to religion has brought up new questions about religion itself. Although Christian theologians have tried to answer some of these questions, basic theological Christian dogma does not permit serious changes in order to satisfy unavoidable inquiries. Although the return to Christianity is growing, this revisiting of Christian believers is not within the frame of any organized and official institutions or church. It is rather a return to and recognition of the necessity of spirituality in human life. It is a return to religion free from traditional theology and thought and official churches and Christian institutions, a reaction to one-dimensional attention to materialistic or spiritual consideration of human life. It is man's new search for the existence of his whole being. During the past century contemporary Western man, through his own endeavors has achieved many of his worldly aims, and is now enjoying relative security and welfare. But at the same time he is dissatisfied and unhappy. A sort of emptiness and a kind of nihilism is bothering him. He seeks a new world view and new ways of life. In this quest, the average western man is relatively free from prejudice about other religions and school of thoughts. He has broken the traditional barriers and expanded his inquest to all religions of the world. It is in this search for new meaning in life that many western men and women, particularly the young middle class, are attracted to oriental mysticism, including Hindu, Japanese, Chinese and Islamic mysticism. A large number of classic writings of oriental mystics are translated into western languages. Among these writings the Islamic mystics have gain a very profound position. One reason for this may be related to the nature of Islamic mysticism. The nature and the content of Islamic mysticism is negation of worldly motivation, without discarding worldly activities. In another words, one may walk the path of Islamic mysticism and reach high ranking positions and yet have normal activities in life. Islamic mysticism is changing man's view and attitude towards the inner as well as the outside world of man.

One example of this inquest may be the counter culture movement in early the 1960's. The antiwar movement of that period, a protest against US involvement in Vietnam, was a cry against the establishment. Part of that antiwar movement was actually a reflection of the counter culture movement among American youth, thousands of whom left their homes and went to the countryside, mountains and woods to establish "communes". Thousands more left the country in search of the meaning of life, going to India to acquaint themselves with Indian religions. The attraction to Islamic mysticism was remarkable. Official Christian institutions, while tolerating and even sometimes encouraging the conversion to oriental mysticism, were very sensitive to conversion to Islamic mysticism. Afro-Americans were attracted to Islam, not for its mysticism, but for different reasons. Black Americans and Native Americans were the victims of deep-seated racism which once was very strong in USA. This segment of the American population saw their liberation and prosperity in Islam. As the result, black Muslim Americans are the largest Muslim group in the US. One of the most famous and influential leaders of this group is the late Malcolm X. During his first trip to Hajj he was deeply touched by Muslim unity and brotherhood, he saw people from all walks of life, all races, all colors, men and women, young and old, educated as well as illiterate, all walking shoulder to shoulder, performing the same prayers. He was so moved that wrote back to his followers: "the cure for the American malignant tumor of racism is only possible through Islam. Here in Hajj the blackest of all blacks sat side by side with the whitest of whites and eats from the same table from the same bowl and pray together. In their language, their attitudes and behavior one could not see, feel or notice nay sign of any racial awareness. "

There was a time when Islam was a remote and unfamiliar idea and religion, distant for the majority of western people. For them Islam was synonymous with the desert, camel, sword and tribal fighting. Aramco, the infamous American oil company arranged a briefing class about Islam and Arabs for the staff going to work in Saudi Arabia. They were questioned about Islam and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). From their answers it was found that 99% of them did not know anything about Islam or the Prophet. Some of the answers were shamefully improper. Only one answer could be

considered to have any similarity to historical fact. The answer was that he knew there was a relation between Muhammad and the mountain. Either the mountain went to Muhammad or he went to the mountain!! Today, however, Islam is in the mainstream of American and European life and plays a very serious and significant role. The Muslim population of Europe is about 25 million. In the US their number is about 7 millions, the second largest religion minority after Catholics. American Muslims are very much aware of and sensitive to their social position. They try to understand the social, economic and political networks in order to interact with the society at large and fulfill their historical mission in American society.

American public interest in Islam is increasing at a rapid pace. There are numerous reasons for this interest. During the past 30-40 years there have been a number of events in the Muslim world that has drawn the attention of western people, including the Americans, towards Islam and Muslims. Some of them have hurt the cause of Islam and some have helped. One very influential factor has been the Islamic revolution of Iran. As a result public interest about Islam has increased. Thus many new books about Islam have appeared on bookshelves and in libraries and many research articles published in various journals. Although some of them are biographies full of distortions and do not reflect the reality of Islam, nonetheless many of them are quite realistic and written in a quest to know the true facts about Islam. Public interest about Islam is also growing in Europe. There are a number of prominent thinkers with the pure motivation for truth, who have researched Islam and converted (like Roger Garoudi and Dr Annemarie Schimmel, to mention a few). There are also many prominent artists, athletes and musicians who have embraced Islam, Such as Karim Abdul Jabbar, Abdu Hakim, Youseph Islam, and Kaka. One of the long range consequences of these new converts is that they could present Islam far better than the Muslims from Islamic countries.

Going back to the historical pattern of development of western opinion towards Islam, revelation and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which was discussed earlier, one may quite realistically conclude that there is a very clear, promising and healthy relation and understanding of Islam in the contemporary world in

general and among western people, in particular. This scenario is probably one of the reasons for occasional attacks on Islam by certain religious groups in Europe and the US.

The relationship of western countries to the Muslim world must also be considered separately from Islam. The Muslim population throughout the world is estimated to reach approximately one billion and three hundred. Muslim countries stretch from the Atlantic to Pacific Ocean like a belt, separating the northern hemisphere from the south. The richest deposits of natural resources in the world are found in Muslim countries. The economic, social, cultural and political situation in Muslim countries is going through a historical transformation. Two hundred years ago when invading Egypt and entering Cairo, Napoleon Bonaparte was impressed by the depth and glory of old Egyptian civilization, particularly the Pyramids and the Sphinx. He was so surprised that he ordered his army to demolish the Pyramids and shell the Sphinx. He did not succeed, but the sound of the shelling echoed in Muslim countries and shook Muslims, causing them to wake up from a long historical sleep. From then on, an awakening movement, with the aim of religious revitalization and religious reconstruction started. Many social and political movements to fight against foreign domination became active throughout Muslim countries. Muslims became aware of the necessity to change their sociological and economic conditions. Many new educational institutions were built. Although the level of education in many Muslim countries is low compared with developed countries, nonetheless, the number of men and women with higher education in Muslim countries in the past decades has increased significantly. There are numerous highly skilled Muslim scientists occupying high positions in respectable academic institutions of the world. Muslim countries now have all the major requisite resources for political, economic and scientific development. History is telling us that Muslims are capable of absorbing the positive elements of foreign cultures and integrating them into their own native culture. Muslims have civilization building capability and potential.

As far as relations between Muslims and western countries are concerned, as I have already mentioned, during the Cold War the Western Block with American leadership was looking to Islam as a

means to prevent the spread of communism, but they never trusted Muslims or nationalist movements to manage their own affairs. The excuse was that these movements were so weak they could be overrun by communist parties. But the Cold War is now ended. The communist threat is no longer an issue. Furthermore, in the post Cold War era, social and political movements in Muslim countries, with a variety of religious and political orientations and tendencies are gaining popular support among the masses. These movements may be categorized into two major groups. The first consists of the traditionalists, who are mainly composed of clergy and other religious authorities. The second group belongs to intellectual and educated Muslims who are mainly from the universities. Despite major differences between the two, both groups have common political orientations. Both groups are in general against the present ruling political systems in their respective countries. Many of the governments in Muslim countries are not only financially and otherwise corrupt and are suffering from ill management, they are strongly affiliated with western powers, which are backing them for the sake of their own interests and economic benefits. Since these governments are highly unpopular, the consequence is that the western powers are equally unpopular. There is, however, another reason for public opinion in Muslim countries to be strongly against the western powers and to mistrust them: the deeds of western powers in Muslim countries during colonialism. Thus the spread of social and political movements in Muslim countries is accompanied by pronounced anti-western sentiments. The outcome not only paralyzes the development of much needed healthy relations between the two sides, it also causes violent and destructive policies on both sides.

As I mentioned earlier, in the post Cold War era, there is a new wave of democracy throughout the world. Unpopular totalitarian regimes are gradually being replaced by elected popular governments. While there are rapid democratic changes in countries where the majority of people adhere to the Christian faith, the pace of development in Muslim countries is very slow and faces various problems. This means that underdeveloped Christian countries in the former third world could move rapidly towards sustaining development, because of the fact that from all

denominations, the Christian churches have solved their basic problems with the concept of natural human rights, including the right of the sovereignty of people. The Church has withdrawn the traditional theological divine claim to govern the worldly life of people and accepted the legitimacy of democratically elected governments. In Muslim countries, although after the end of the Cold War the external preventive elements disappeared, the internal anti-democratic elements are very effective. At the macro level, preventive internal elements may be looked at as two-fold. The first consists of the political, social and cultural remnants of long periods of despotism in Muslim countries. The political and economic benefits and interests of the present rulers harbor an indigenous antagonism with democracy. The second preventive factor, however, is probably more influential than the first. The source of is Muslims' attitudes and comprehension of democracy. To many Muslim scholars, Shia and Sunni alike, democracy is incompatible with Islam. They consider it blasphemy. Part of this attitude is a reflection of the fact that present day democracy, which is not more than 100 years old, is a western phenomenon. As I mentioned earlier, the majority of Muslims have a very negative opinion about everything western. This is not all. Many Muslims have a distorted image of democracy, the same way that many western people have about Islam. The despotic regimes in Muslim countries also foment this anti-democratic attitude to preserve their own power. In all these factors, Muslims are confronted with a paradox. On the one hand there are rapid changes in international relations, with the emphasis on the role of economics. These changes require long range political stability. The political instability and uncertain future of these despotic regimes is not compatible with those strategic long range economic arrangements. There is international demand and pressure for change, not just for the sake of democracy, but rather for the sake of economic interests.

In addition to resentment towards democracy by these despotic governments, democracy in Muslim countries faces another problem. In these countries, in the midst of political liberalization, along with the restoration of citizen's basic rights and liberties and the development of open society, populist movements take shape. The result is the victory of the traditionalist and close-minded and

reactionary political groups. In the short term, it is unavoidable. Ordinary simple-minded people are easily swayed by tradition. The traditionalists in Muslim society, in order to attract the ordinary man on the street, emphasize their raw and undeveloped inner religious sentiments. Thus by gaining the support of the ordinary man, they get to power through democratic means, but they are unprepared to give economic and social services expected of them. This stems from their perception of an Islamic government as the antiquated historical *khelafa*. In the old system of *khelafa*, the head of state was never elected by the people and had absolute power. This example of government is not suited to the contemporary world. First of all, the concept of and expectations from the state have changed tremendously. Furthermore, the economic, social, cultural and political situation in contemporary society, compared with the old system, is very complicated. To enter into the new era of development the concept of nation-state must be changed. The concept of nation has changed as the notion of state has changed. The paradox is that power is acquired through a democratic process and those in power immediately turn against democracy. One good example is in Algiers, where the Salvation Front won the election, and immediately announced that democracy is blasphemy. No doubt they are very honest, dedicated and committed Muslims. This position turned many, even educated Muslims, against them. Subsequently, democracy was lost to extreme anti-democratic forces within the military. Another example of interaction between Muslims and democracy is in Turkey. In Turkey all economic, military and political parties want Turkey to be accepted as a member of the European Union. One of the conditions for Turkey's admission to the EU is the democratization of Turkey's political system. The military authority reluctantly accepted this condition. The result of a democratic vote, however, was the victory of Islamic parties. Now the institutionalization of democracy in Turkey depends to great extent on how the Muslim administration performs its state duties in a secular government and to what extent the new Muslim authorities push for Islamization of that society. So far the new administration has done a good job. This experience could be repeated in some other Muslim countries. In Egypt the problem is similar to the one in Algiers.

All these factors create obstacles in the process of democracy in Muslim countries, so none of the Muslim countries have yet entered into the phase of political and economic development. The outcome is various challenges from within and without Muslim societies, and turbulent relations between Muslims with countries in the northern hemisphere.

Now let us examine the recent Islamophobic phenomenon. During the Cold War, in order to justify military expenditure and the expense of the arms race with the USSR, and to prepare public opinion for accepting the cost of the Cold War, western governments, particularly the US military establishments, were continuously drumming the threat of communism. During this period, even though the leaders of the former USSR openly and repeatedly declared their intention, goal and plan to overthrow and bury capitalism, and did not hesitate to blow up western interests anywhere in the world, nonetheless, certain quarters in the US exaggerated the dangers of communism and USSR's military capability. This policy led to an imaginary psychological fear of communism among the masses called *red phobia*. It was because of this red phobia that American militarists were able to get the budget they needed for their military preparations and advanced armament. Through this policy they were also pressuring the USSR into an arm race. The USSR leaders too, in order to keep up their military capability to confront capitalism accepted the arm race. The huge military expenses, however, were behind the country's economic resources and development. The so-called armistice peace finally broke the back of the USSR. Subsequently, drumming on red phobia became meaningless.

The great powers of the world, however, needed a real and/or imaginary enemy. When the USSR was at the verge of historical collapse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser in the Carter administration said the biggest blow to the US by Gorbachev was that he took away a needed enemy from American policy makers. On this basis very soon certain American institutions made a new enemy: Islam. The Islamic revolution of Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Russian army and the events that followed radicalized many Muslim movements, both Shia and Sunni. These radical groups believed in violent confrontation with their opponents and foreign powers. The

political and economic treatment given to Muslims by the great powers, particularly the continuation of Palestinian suffering and human tragedy in the occupied lands of Palestine fermented such radicalism. Very soon many overt and covert violent groups were funded. The violent activities of these radical groups, in many instances were not only incompatible with the teaching of Islam; they were not in accordance with the interest of Muslims. Certain anti-Islamic quarters quickly coined the idea of Islamophobia to replace the old red phobia.

When S. Huntington brought up the issue of the 'Clash of Civilizations', he was not referring to present relations between the West and Muslims, rather he was concern about the future position of Islam and Muslims in the world. If we consider the fact that relations between western countries and the Muslim world is the most important issue in the arena of international relations today, and accept the fact that Islam, as one of the most dynamic religions, is entering a new era of growth all over the world, and also accept that the overall direction of change in Muslim societies is towards improving and overcoming present challenges and obstacles, then Huntington's statement is not far from reality. We may be witness to a new kind of confrontation between Islam and Christianity, Muslims and the West. But this confrontation should and will not be a physical and military one. Some corners in the West prefer this to be a physical confrontation. They do not want to see a non-violent smooth transformation in Muslim societies. Since they are aware of the deep-rooted religious sentiments among some Muslims, they intentionally, through statements, pictures, caricatures and other similar means provoke violent reactions from extreme radical Muslims. They abuse Muslims' religious sentiments to benefit their aims. They intentionally provoke Muslims to elicit radical violent reactions, to justify the baseless fear and Islamophobia, and to convince western people of a 'threat posed by Muslims and Islam'. Salman Rushdi's book, the slanderous caricatures in some European newspapers, the Pope's statements regarding Islam and Muslims, all attempt to provoke Muslim religious sentiment and effect violent reaction. These reactions, although in many cases quite innocent, actually fuel Islamophobia. It is understandable why these kinds of provocations are supported by some western institutions. The speakers of

Christian institutions officially cheered the statement made by Pope Benedict. The extreme reaction by some Muslim radicals, such as attacking churches, killing a nun, or attacking European embassies in Muslim countries such as the Danish Embassy in Iran, are not only contrary to the religious teachings and national interest of any given Muslim country, and do not help the cause of Islam and/or interest of Muslims, rather they convince the designers of Islamophobia that they are on target. Let me emphasize that not all Muslim's reactions to these provocations were violent and radical. Many Muslim scholars used Pope Benedict's statement as an opportunity to have a serious dialogue with their Christian counterparts. Unlike the radical violent reaction, these kinds of well-thought and logical initiatives are, in the long run, beneficial to Islam.

In the early history of Islam, there was a famous peace treaty between Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the unbelievers of Mecca, called the Hodaybiyyeh peace treaty. Reading and analyzing this treaty is very educational and could help contemporary Muslims to deal with opponents of Islam. When Prophet Muhammad signed this treaty many believers were unhappy and mildly complained to him. Apparently the text of the treaty was in favor of the unbelievers and was a loss for Muslims. Not only did the Prophet sign the treaty without hesitation, but also, the surah Fath was revealed immediately after this treaty was signed as a message of victory. One may ask what hidden wisdom is in the Hodaybiyyeh peace treaty which deserved the Fath revelation. What does it have to do with contemporary Muslim's situation?

There are some very important similarities between the situation of Muslims at the time of this peace treaty and of contemporary Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad and his followers were on route to Mecca for performing Hajj. This was the first Hajj for the Muslims after immigration from Mecca to Medina. The social and political circumstances in Arabia were changing comprehensively in favor of Islam. The non-Muslims of Mecca realized this, so they came in large numbers to Hodaybiyyeh to stop Muslims from entering Mecca. The messenger of kindness and wisdom did not consider this fight to be beneficiary to the long-term interest of Muslims. Therefore when he was informed that a large army of unbelievers had gathered in the area to prevent

Muslims from entering Mecca, he realized they must fight back, but first asked his followers their opinion. He asked them to enter into a new covenant or Beyat, which is known as the Jihad (or shajare) Beyat, which was a different kind of beyat and could be considered as a sort of referendum on a major national issue.

When the Prophet left Medina, the aim and the purpose of the trip was not to fight enemies but to perform the Hajj ritual. Many non-Muslim tribes were also traveling with the Prophet. When they were confronted by the army of unbelievers preventing them from entering Mecca, to solidify their own rank and file, the Prophet advocated the beyat.

When the Meccan army realized the determination of the Prophet to fight back, they proposed a peace treaty, which he accepted. He even changed some items in the treaty to satisfy the Meccans' demands. The peace treaty was, indeed a turning point in the history of Islam.

What does this mean for Muslims in their present situation?

If we accept the fact that the interest of people all over the world in Islam is ever-growing, and that Muslims need to reconstruct their own societies and to improve and develop their economic, political and civil institutions in order to come into the mainstream of the contemporary world, then they need time. They should exercise self-restraint when confronted with provocation. Instead of radical and violent reaction, Muslims should design their strategy with full trust in Allah on the basis of, and in according with the call of Allah: "Invite (all) mankind to the Path of your Lord with wisdom, and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious."(Nahl, 125)

Sadghallah Alazim

65. Letter to Mr. Ban Ki Moon, Sectary General of the United Nations

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, Secretary General of Freedom Movement of Iran, December 13, 2008

Your Excellency

The recent brutalities in Al-Khalil city have shocked the conscience of the world. Continuation of these atrocities in the Gaza Strip, in occupied Palestine was cruel enough on the scale of

humanity. Now the world is witnessing another gross violation of international laws and regulations by Jewish settlers and the Israeli army against unarmed Palestinian men, women and children in Al-Khalil. Instead of restoring peace and preventing Jewish settlers from committing these crimes, the said army is helping and protecting the Jewish settlers. Palestinian authorities, unable to confront the fully equipped and supported Israeli troops can do nothing but watch the suffering of innocent people.

The tragedy of Palestinian suffering by Israel is a human agony. It is not merely an Arab or even an Islamic concern; it is a human rights issue. Israeli authorities continue to ignore all the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Palestinian issues.

This is an appeal to Your Excellency.

We hereby emphatically request you to use the power of your office and take immediate effective action in order to restore peace and end all atrocities against innocent Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip as well as in other parts of Palestinian lands.

With kind regards

Ebrahim Yazdi, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, IRI
Secretary General of the Freedom Movement of Iran Party
Tehran

66. Letter to Mr. Rached Al-Ghannouchi, The Leader of Al-Nahzah Party, Tunisia

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, October 26, 2011

Bismillah Ar-Rahman Ar-Rahim

Dear Brother Rached Al-Ghannouchi,

Assalaamu alaikum wa rahamttulahi wa barakaatu.

I congratulate you and your Tunisian brothers and sisters for your victory, not only in overthrowing an oppressive regime, but more than that, for successfully conducting a free and fair national election. From Iran there is keen interest and prayers for your success, and I have followed closely the news of Tunisia's struggle for both freedom from oppression and a democracy government.

Your party's election victory is indeed commendable, but it puts a tremendous burden on your shoulders as the leader. While I am deeply touched by the political maturity of Tunisians, nonetheless, I am seriously concerned about the long range outcome. Our people, Muslims of every nation, struggle for the restoration of

their basic rights, liberty, and sovereignty. But we do not have sufficient experience with democracy. We fight and overthrow dictators, but not dictatorship itself. Despotism is not just a political structure. It has its corresponding social and cultural dimensions which enable it to persist and which become ingrained in individuals and whole societies afflicted by despotism for a long time. The result is that we Muslims overthrow despots often to see a new ones replace it. This is what has indeed befallen us in Iran. We deposed the Shah, but neglected to address the 'shah' personality within our own selves. Thus the vicious circle continues.

What then can be done to break this cycle and institutionalize democracy? Democracy is not an importable commodity. It is a national process of learning and development. Elections are valued instruments, but are not by themselves democracy. I call to your attention three basic concepts that if learned and taken to heart by people, offer a chance of ensuring the blessings of freedom and democracy for generations of Muslims:

The first concept is the recognition and celebration of the diversity of human society and pluralism. Allah subhanahu wa-ta'ala, in His Holy Qur'an, reminds us of this and commands us to tolerate each other. He says He will judge about our diverse opinions in the Day of Judgment. Muslim countries, including Tunisia, have the characteristics of a "transitional society". As such, the diversity of opinions is much greater than in established stagnant societies. So acceptance and celebration of pluralism, particularly in this phase of Muslim history, is a critical concept.

The second concept is tolerance. As you know, this is a cherished part of our Islamic traditions, in the form of tasamoh, moderation and tasahol. But where there is a diversity of opinions, this may lead to confrontation and the re-emergence of tyranny. Tolerance itself is a passive attitude and is never sufficient to avoid this outcome.

This leads to the third concept central to a sustainable healthy democracy: compromise. Tunisia's social and economic development will require the compromise and cooperation of all of your citizens, regardless of their ideological, racial and religious affiliations. Compromise does not imply neglecting ones beliefs and agenda. Rather, is it the recognition that cooperating with each

other is essential for the cause of national salvation, which will benefit all groups.

My dear brother: You have the support of the most voters, and it is now up to you to set an example of open-mindedness and recognition of the rights of others. I pray that God will protect you from repeating the mistakes we have made in Iran, or those of our brothers in Algeria and elsewhere.

This spring, Tunisia was the vanguard of the contemporary Arab awakening movement. Now Tunisia is again first in this wonderful move in the direction of a democratic society. I pray that God will bless Tunisia to be the vanguard of true and sustainable democracy in the Arab world, and an example to Muslims everywhere.

Your Brother in Islam

Ebrahim Yazdi, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Tehran. October 26, 2011

PS: Please see attached an analysis of the challenges of Islam and Muslims with respect to the West that you may find of interest.

67. A Letter to Mr. Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, November 21, 2011

Your Excellency

In a global village, to be a witness to the violent confrontation between people and government forces and the suffering of innocent men, women and children is indeed a painful experience. This is exactly what is going on in many UN member states, including Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. No human being could stay indifferent to these atrocities.

Your Excellency: the United Nations could and should intervene to solve the conflict in order to stop these crimes. The solution, however, is neither military intervention, nor economic sanctions. The conflict is the results and manifestation of a deep and real legitimacy crisis. Thus, the solution is a referendum to be implemented and supervised by a UN special task force. It is a healthy and most civilized way to resolve the crisis of legitimacy in these countries. The authorities claim that they have the support of

majority of their people, while the opposition claims and evidence confirms otherwise. Probably the ruling parties have some support among their subjects. A referendum would show this. My own estimate is that they may have some support but not the majority. If the authorities accept the results of the referendum, they may escape a bloody and tragic end, as we have seen in recent events in Libya, but would have to give up power and step down. Nevertheless, they would not be removed from political power structures all together. This by itself would be very healthy and helpful in creating and maintaining political balance in a post revolutionary state.

Your Excellency, in the name of humanity I am asking you to use the power of your office and do what is noble for the suffering people of Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, and make this valuable contribution to the cause of world peace and justice.

With regards

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran

Teheran, November 21, 2011

Cc: Secretary General of Arab League; Chairperson, Human Rights Council, UN.

**68. Letter to Mr. Kofi Annan,
Special UN envoy for Syrian Internal Conflict**

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, April 28, 2012

Your Excellency, Mr. Kofi Annan

When you were receiving your Noble Peace Prize you gave a historical speech. As UNSG you said many members of UN were continuously violating the Universal declaration of human rights, while they do not allow the UN to intervene, excusing themselves under the shield of national sovereignty. You emphasized the necessity of controlling them one way another to safeguard regional and global peace. You succeeded in creating two international bodies: the World Criminal Court and Human Rights Council.

Now that you have been requested and trusted by the UN to resolve the disastrous Syrian conflict, the world is hoping that the life of many innocent men, women and children be saved. While I praise your efforts and hope the Syrian authorities respond

positively to the demands of their own people as well as the people of the world, I believe you may do something more pronounced and set a precedent. In many authoritarian governments, where change could not be achieved through regular and non-violent means, a legitimate crisis develops and easily turns into violent confrontation between people who demand political change. These governments claim to be eternal, natural and competent rulers, and wish to continue their rule with an iron fist, not caring the price their people will pay. The rulers of these countries claim that their people support them. In these cases the UN should intervene and run a referendum. Both rulers and opposition should accept the outcome

The dwellers of this global village are tired of being a passive witness to violence in countries like Syria. No longer can these governments be indifferent to world public opinion. UN intervention and arbitration through a public referendum is the most desired solution. This should be a global solution for such national conflicts.

With best wishes

Ebrahim Yazdi, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran

Teheran, April 28, 2012

69. His Excellency Abdullah Gul, President of the Republic of Turkey

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, July 16, 2012

Dear Brother Abdullah, Salaam Alaikum va Rahmatullah

What is going on in Syria, the killing of innocent men, women and children, is beyond the ordinary tolerance of any human being, regardless of race, nationality or religious conviction. Turkey is involved at the national, regional and universal level, whether wanted or not. Turkey is the host of thousands of Syrian refugees. Instability in Syria directly and/or indirectly is affecting the stability of many neighboring countries in the region.

Enclosed please find a copy of my letter to His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki Moon, the United Nations Secretary General proposing a referendum as a solution to the current crisis in Arab countries, and a copy of my letter to Mr. Kofi Annan in regards to the Syrian crisis. Kofi Annan's suggested solution for Syria has failed. The

failure was predictable. I strongly believe that a referendum in Syria under the supervision of international institutions is the only civilized and peaceful solution to the ongoing crisis and human suffering. The officials in Syria claim that they have the support of the majority of Syrian people. The opposition claims the contrary. No party should be against such solution. The Russians and the Chinese also could not seriously object such a solution. Two conditions should be accepted by all sides: first, both sides must accept the outcome of such a referendum; secondly, to end further bloodshed, both sides must accept a general clemency and no one should be persecuted after the referendum. Therefore, dear brother, I humbly request you use all the power of your office to convince international institutions, namely the United Nations to accept and perform such a referendum in Syria. May Allah (st) shower you with His blessings and help you serve your people.

Sincerely yours,

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran

Teheran, July 16, 2012

Attachments: copies of the letters to Mr. Ban Ki Moon and Mr Kofi Annan.

70. Letter to Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, Secretary General National League for Democracy

Written by Ebrahim Yazdi, April 11, 2013

Dear Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi,

Your uncompromising struggle for freedom and democracy in your country has been an inspiration to freedom-loving Iranians and freedom fighters throughout the world. It is even more inspiring to see encouraging signs from Burma that your efforts at political reform are bringing fruit. We share the values you have championed during the long years of struggle, most of all respect for the human rights of peoples of all ethnic and religious communities.

As we experienced in Iran, periods of political transition put reform leaders to the test. Leaders may be focused on the realization of one cherished value, such as free elections, while other values, such as respect for the rights and dignity of religious minorities, receive less attention. When this happens, a fledgling

democracy is put at great peril and the seeds of reemergence of dictatorship are sown.

You have spoken lovingly of Burma's diverse peoples as "siblings from a single family". I appeal to you to pay closer attention to the increasingly brutal violence against a small minority within your family, Burmese Muslims. These acts and incitement are perpetrated by groups and individuals claiming to speak for you, as a member of the majority. I am sure you are familiar with the heart-rending details. For many of us in Muslim-majority countries that support your values, a pall of fear for Burma has appeared where there was a great deal of hope.

You have shown courage in speaking the truth to powerful men. Will you now show the same courage to speak up against a new powerful force in your country, that of ethnic and religious bigotry in the name of the majority? This is a force that will no doubt be wielded by unscrupulous politicians who would undermine all you have fought for. I appeal to you to stand up to them. In doing so, you will save the lives of countless Burmese Muslims, Buddhists, and other ethnic groups, and you may also be saving the dream of a democratic and free Burma.

Respectfully,
Ebrahim Yazdi, PhD
General Secretary, Freedom Movement of Iran
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister,
Islamic Republic of Iran Tehran, 11 April 2013

Appendix One

An Introduction to Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi

Ebrahim Yazdi was born 1931 in Qazvin, and is the Secretary General of the Freedom Movement Party in Iran, which has been declared illegal by some Iranian officials.

After the military coup of 1953 which deposed the government of Dr Muhammad Mossadegh, Yazdi joined the underground National Resistance Movement of Iran and was active in this organization from 1953-1960. This organization was active against the dictatorship of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Yazdi traveled to the United States in 1960 to continue his education, and in the US continued his involvement in political activities against the Shah. He was a founding member of the Freedom Movement of Iran abroad, along with Mustafa Chamran, Ali Shariati, and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh in 1961. Because of these activities, he was unable to return to Iran and remained in the United States until the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978. In 1975, Yazdi was tried in absentia in a Iranian military court and condemned to ten years imprisonment, with orders issued for his arrest upon return to Iran.

While in the US, he participated in the founding of several Muslim and Iranian student associations, including the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada, the Islamic Medical Association of the United States and Canada, and the Islamic Society of Greater Houston.

A long-time resident of Houston, Texas, Yazdi was a faculty member at the Baylor College of Medicine, with appointments in the Departments of Pathology and Pharmacology. At Baylor, he was engaged in cancer research and published several original journal articles in fields of Molecular Oncology.

Yazdi was the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Interim Government of Mehdi Bazargan in Iran until November 6, 1979.

The day after the victory of the revolution, on February 2, 1979, several foreign embassies in Tehran, including those of the United

States, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia were over-run by groups identifying themselves as leftist revolutionaries. The opinion of the Revolutionary Council, of which Yazdi was a member, was that these attacks may be aimed at creating chaos and preventing the international recognition of the new regime. In the case of the US embassy, the attackers were successful in entering the embassy compound and taking personnel, including the US ambassador, William Sullivan, captive. Yazdi, at the request of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council, went to the embassies and resolved the crisis, resulting in the release of embassy personnel and the departure of the attackers.

Yazdi led the Iranian delegation to the 6th Summit of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, Cuba in 1979, and to the United Nations 34th General Assembly in 1979. At both meetings, he delivered speeches explaining the aspirations of the Iranian revolution.

On November 4 of the same year, the US embassy was taken over again by a group calling itself “Students Following the Line of the Imam (i.e. Ayatollah Khomeini) and led by a clergy Mousavi Khomeiniha, who had closer ties to certain revolutionary leaders. The planning of the attack was done without the prior knowledge of Khomeini, Interim Government or Revolutionary Council.

As before, Yazdi was asked to go to the embassy and resolve the crisis. Before Yazdi could take any action, on the evening of the attack, Khomeini appeared on state television and openly endorsed the attack and takeover of the embassy. The entire cabinet of the Interim Government, including Ebrahim Yazdi and Mehdi Bazargan resigned in protest the next day. They stated that they opposed the embassy takeover as “contrary to the national interests of Iran”.

The embassy takeover is considered to have been motivated in part by an internal struggle between various factions within the revolutionary leadership, with Yazdi and Bazargan on one side, and more radical clergy on the other. The embassy attackers in subsequent statements have indicated that one of their primary objectives in the takeover of the US embassy in November 1979 was to force the resignation of Yazdi, Bazargan, and the entire Interim Government.

Among the areas of conflict between the two factions was the behavior of the Revolutionary Courts and the Revolutionary Committees. Yazdi and Bazargan supported a general amnesty for all members of the Shah's regime, provided that they cease to act against the revolution. They publicly opposed the secret trials and the summary executions carried out by the Revolutionary Courts, led by Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhaali. Bazargan and other members of the Interim Government called for fair and open trials for those accused of crimes committed under the Shah's regime. The radical clerics, on the other hand, stated that the rapid trials and executions were essential to protect the revolution.

After resignation from the government, Yazdi and other members of the Freedom Movement of Iran ran in elections for the first post-revolutionary Iranian Parliament, Majlis-e Shura-ye Islami. Yazdi, Bazargan, and four other members of the Freedom Movement, Mustafa Chamran, Ahmad Sadr, Hashem Sabbaghian, and Yadollah Sahabi, were elected. They served from 1980 to 1984.

After the Iraqi military invasion to Iran in September 1981, Yazdi fully supported the Iranian war efforts against the invasion, but opposed the continuation of the war after the Iranian victory in Khorramshahr in 1983. The war continued for an additional six years. During these six years, Yazdi and others in the Freedom Movement issued several open letters to Ayatollah Khomeini opposing the continuation of the war. These letters and other public statements resulted in the firebombing of Yazdi's residence in Tehran in 1985, and the arrest and imprisonment of several member of the Freedom Movement.

In subsequent elections in Iran for president, parliament, and city councils, Yazdi and other members of the Freedom Movement filed for candidacy but were barred from running by the Guardian Council because of their opposition to policies and actions of the government.

Since the death of Mehdi Bazargan in December, 1994, Ebrahim Yazdi has served as the Secretary General of the Freedom Movement of Iran.

== Selected books authored by Ebrahim Yazdi (in order of original publication) ==

Aakhareen Talaash-ha Dar Aakhareen Rooz-ha (Final Efforts, Final Days), Qalam Publications, 1984 (13th Edition, 1999). (a report and analysis on the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979)

Principles of Molecular Genetics (Third Edition), Ettela'at Publications, Tehran, 2000

Mutational Changes in Genteic Materials, Matin Cultural Foundation, Tehran, 1986

Seh Jumhuri (The Three Republics), Jaameye Iranian Publications, 2000 (a compilation of political essays and articles by Ebrahim Yazdi published in Iranian journals from 1997-2000)

Khatti Dar Darya (A Line in the Sea), Qalam Publications, Tehran, 2000. (a new interpretation of the verse of the Holy Quran on "Marajul Bahrain")

Khaak-haa-ye Rosi va Paydaayesh-e Hayaat (Clay Minerals and the Origin of Life), Qalam Publicaitons, 2001. (a new interpretation of the verses of the Holy Quran on "Teen-e Laatheb").

Kalbod Shekaafee-ye Towte-e: Barresee-ye Kudetaa-ye Beestohasht-e Mordaad 1332 (The Anatomy of a Plot: An Analysis of the Coup of August 1953), Qalam Publications, 2002. (a collection of essays on the US and British led military coup against the national government of Muhammad Mossadegh)

Docterin-e Amniyyat-e Melli (National Security Doctrine), Sarai Publications, Tehran, 2004. (a compilation of political essays on Iranian foreign affairs from 1980-2004)

Jonbesh-e Daaneshju-yi-e Iran 1320-1340 (The Iranian Student Movement from 1941-1961), Qalam Publications, 2004 (a history and memoirs of the student movement and activities of Ebrahim Yazdi during this period)

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J D Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution*, Indiana Univ Press, 1981

Sadegh Khalkhali, *Khateraateh Khalkhaali (Memoirs of Khalkhaali)*, Sayeh Publications, Tehran, 2003

Abdolali Bazargan, ed, *Moshketaal va Masa'ele Av'valeen Saale Enghelaab Az Zabaane Mohandes Bazargan (Issues of the First Year of the Revolutions as Explained by Mehdi Bazargan)*, Tehran, 1981

Appendix Two

Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI)

(Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran)

Brief History

Its Establishment and Activities before the 1979 Islamic Revolution

FMI was founded on May 14, 1961 in Tehran by a number of popular political, social and/or religious personalities belonging to the Iranian National Front, found by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh (1882-1966) and/or National Resistance Movement, including Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1994), Ayatollah Mahmood Taleghani (1911-1979) and Yadollah Sahabi (1905-2002). The main objective of FMI is to gain freedom, independence and democracy for the Iranian nation, on the basis of modern interpretation of Islamic principles.

Due to its serious opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, FMI underwent constant pressure shortly after its establishment and in 1963. A number of its leaders –including Messrs. Bazargan, Taleghani and Sahabi and active members were arrested, tried in a court material and sentenced to 4-10 years of imprisonment.

FMI supported the movement led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1963.

Since the 70's, severe suppression and prohibition imposed by the Shah's notorious security and intelligence organization (SAVAK) and frequent arrests and exile paralyzed FMI activities in Iran. However, its branches in Europe and U.S.A. founded and headed by Dr. Ali Shariati (1933-1977), Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi (1932-) and other active members played decisive roles in the political opposition abroad until the revolution. In addition to the influence of Dr. Shariati's thought and teachings particularly on the young generation, FMI key figures had an important role in the formation and guidance of the Islamic Revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership, which resulted in the collapse of the despotic monarchy regime in Iran in February 10, 1979.

After the Revolution

Due to the outstanding features of Mehdi Bazargan FMI's Secretary General, and his party's prominent role in the contemporary political history of Iran, he was appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini as the prime minister of the Provisional Government and some key members of FMI were given important responsibilities.

The Provisional Government lasted 9 months only and since its collapse, FMI leaders have been denied governmental or judicial positions. However, 4 FMI top figures were elected by Tehran residents as their representatives in the first post-revolution Parliament Assembly, Majlis.

Furthermore, due to FMI being a serious but loyal critic of the clerical establishment, it has been continually denied freedom of political activities and has suffered governmental pressure. For example, in 1988 and 1990 several FMI prominent executives were imprisoned and some of them badly tortured for criticizing the ruling class for its mishandling of the war imposed by Iraq (notwithstanding FMI's full support of the defensive war and Dr. Chamran's outstanding role in irregular battles) and other national or international matters.

Upon Mehdi Bazargan's demise in Jan. 20, 1993, Ebrahim Yazdi was appointed by FMI's Central Council as its new secretary general and he still maintains the same position.

FMI's candidates for the presidency, city councils and the Islamic Assembly (Majlis) have been almost always rejected by the Guardians' Council in the past 15 years. FMI is a serious supporter of the Political Development Program introduced and being implemented by President Mohammad Khatami and still struggles for goals and establishment of a Civil Society in Iran.

بخش سوم

مقالات، سخنرانی‌ها و مصاحبه‌ها
و تحلیل‌های سیاسی، اسلامی و اجتماعی

۱۳۳۲ - ۱۳۹۳

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۲۰. توطئه بزرگ

ابن سینا^۱ (۱)

مجله گنج شایگان سال اول شماره ۲ تیر ماه ۱۳۳۲

«... شخصیت ابن سینا زائیده طرز فکر جهانی اسلام می‌باشد و تکریم و تقدیس او بایستی با نشر افکار و عقاید او و مکتب خداپرستی، توأم باشد...»

برای آنها که تاریخ را به خاطر آموزندگی آن - به خاطر منبع روشنائی بخش حقایق مطالعه و بررسی می‌کنند. مسائل جزئی درباره اشخاص بزرگ کمتر اهمیت دارد - آنها قبل از آنکه درباره سال تولد ابن سینا بحث کنند یا درباره محل تولد او؛ به افکار، اعمال و منابع الهام‌دهنده او ارزش قائل بوده و توجه دارند.

برای آنها تاریخ تنها ذکر افسانه‌ای نمی‌تواند باشد بلکه تاریخ راهنمایی برای راه آینده آنهاست. آنها تاریخ را می‌خوانند و می‌نویسند تا از گذشته برای آینده پند گیرند و دانش بشری - میراث کار میلیون‌ها بشر را حفظ و توسعه داده در خدمت اجتماع به کار برند و برای ما که در این رهگذر هستیم آنچه مهم است و میزانی برای بررسی شخصیت ابن سینا و ابن سیناهاست، سیستم فکری او و تحولی است که او در زمان خود به وجود آورده است.

ارزش هر فرد چیست؟

این سؤالی است که قبل از ورود در بحث ارزش افراد و شخصیت‌ها به چشم می‌خورد. آیا ارزش ابن سینا تنها به نبوغ اوست؟ آیا اگر فکر ابن سینا - دکترینی را که او تشریح و تفسیر کرده خلاصه عقاید او را از او جدا کنیم باز هم نبوغ او علتی برای عظمت او می‌تواند باشد؟

۱. مقاله تحقیقی پیرامون شخصیت و افکار و اندیشه‌های ابن سینا در سه بخش در شماره ۳، ۲ و ۵ مجله گنج شایگان در سال ۳۳۲ منتشر شد. با توقیف مجله و بازداشت صاحب امتیاز آن، مرحوم مرتاضی لنگرودی، بعد از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲، انتشار آن ناتمام ماند.

آنچه قطعی است: عقاید و اعمال تعیین‌کننده ارزش افراد می‌باشد. سیستم فکر - نحوه جهان‌بینی و اثراتی است که در محیط خود به وجود آورده و یا حدی است که اجتماع را به دنبال خود کشیده و باعث حرکت در جهت تکامل می‌شوند. ارزش نبوغ‌ها به خاطر استفاده‌ای است که در مسیر منافع ملت و توده و پیشرفت دانش ایجاد می‌کنند. ارزش هر مسلک و دین و فکری حدی است که می‌تواند نبوغ‌ها، استعدادها پنهان‌شده و راکد اجتماع را در یک محیط باز و آزادی در مسیر اصلی خود رهبری کند.

سعی ما در این مقاله بر این است که حقیقت ارزش بوعلی را آن‌طور که هست - لخت و عریان - از زیر نقاب‌ها بیرون کشیده و قیافه واقعی او را به دوستانان دانش و حقیقت‌بنمایانیم و همچنین در بررسی‌های بعدی اگر مجال دست داد از نمایاندن این مطلب که بهای عقاید فلسفی - اجتماعی ابن سینا به خاطر حفظ اصالت منبع الهام‌گیرنده خود، منبع غنی و لایزال مکتب واسطه، ایدئولوژی سعادت‌بخش اسلام می‌باشد.

بدون شک آنچه را ابن سینا بدان رسیده - درک کرده - تشریح می‌کند و موجد عظمت اوست، حقایقی است که از مکتب اسلام کسب کرده است؛ تنها ابن سینا نیست - نهضت پر شکوه اسلام ... در رهگذر تاریخ از این مشعل‌های تابناک بسیار افروخته است و...

عصر نو کاین صد چراغ آورده است چشم در آغوش او وا کرده است ابن سینا یکی از هزاران شاگرد برجسته این مکتب است - تنها یک بررسی اجمالی به جریان نهضت اسلام این حقیقت را تأیید می‌کند - اسلام با مشخصات فکری - روانشناسی و فلسفه علمی خود که از اعماق روح مرموز بشر سخن می‌گوید، دردها را می‌شمارد - درمان را می‌نمایاند - اجتماعاتی را که هیچ نداشتند و فاقد همه چیز بودند - نه فرهنگ، نه بهداشت نه علم نه تمدن - اجتماعاتی را که همه چیز و همه کس در خدمت مثنی فئودال استثمارگر کشیده شده بود - اجتماعاتی که در آنجا اشک بیوه‌زنان - آه یتیمان به صورت برق خیره‌کننده الماس‌های درخشان بر تاج شاهان جلوه می‌نمود ... همه را به خود جلب و در خود حل کرده به زودی همچون موجی سرتاسر جهان متمدن و غیرمتمدن زمان را به زیر بال خود کشید.

روح زمان اسلام را می‌طلبید - ندایی بود که از میان توده‌های زنجیرشده، اسلام را می‌خواند.

ایران آن زمان نیز دست کمی از نقاط دیگر جهان نداشت - به زودی توده‌های رنج‌دیده - آنها که همیشه کار می‌کردند ولی هیچ‌گاه چیزی نداشتند با آغوش باز ندای آزادی و برابری اسلام را پذیرفته و به منت گردن نهادند زیرا به خوبی درک کردند که اسلام می‌تواند ضامن سعادت همیشگی آنها باشد.

همگام با پیشرفت سریع نیروهای نجات بخش اسلام، همه‌جا فرهنگ و دانش و اقتصاد اسلامی نیز گسترش می‌یافت و بندها پاره و زنجیرها گسسته می‌شد.

دیگر محصول کار میلیون‌ها انسان خرج یک شب جبارها نمی‌توانست باشد. اسلام نه تنها بشر را از قید اسارت اقتصادی نجات داد بلکه با شعار فرهنگ برای همه، دانش و علم را نیز از انحصار و تیول عده‌به‌خصوصی خارج و به رایگان در اختیار همه گذارده و حتی ... پا فراتر نهاده تعلیمات اجباری را پایه‌گذاری نمود. آتشکده‌ها ویران، بت‌خانه‌ها با خاک یکسان و دانشگاه‌ها به‌پا شد. محافل علمی روز به روز در ترقی و توسعه و سطح دانش عمومی و شعور اجتماعی بالا رفت. استعدادها و نبوغ‌ها از بند رستند و ابتکارات خود را در مسیر اساسی توسعه و دانش اجتماعی نشان دادند و تعلیم اسلام آموخته که هر کس بایستی به خود حق بدهد تا در آنچه به او می‌آموزند، انتقاد کند در تکمیل یا روشن شدن مباحث اظهار عقیده کند. عقاید مخالفین، مکاتب مختلفه فلسفی در محیط‌های منزه از رعب و ترس یا جار و جنجال مورد بررسی قرار گرفت. جلسات بحث و انتقادهای باشکوه و عظمتی ترتیب و شوق و علاقه‌ خاصی در مردم نسبت به کسب دانش و علم و فهم مسائل ایجاد گردید.

هنوز بیش از ۳ قرن از اسلام نمی‌گذرد که استعدادهای پرورده شده نهضت عظیم اسلام ثمر می‌دهد؛ دانشمندانی بی‌نظیر که تنها فهرست اسامی آنها از تعداد صفحات مجله ما افزون خواهد بود، تحت تسلط حکومت و زبان واحد اسلامی به شاهراهی که چین را به جبل‌الطارق وصل می‌کرد با ابتکارات خود، تحول و تکامل عظیمی در میراث بشر به وجود آوردند و قالب تنگ و تاریک و بی‌قواره‌ای که تمدن جهان را احاطه کرده بود در هم ریخته و علم و فرهنگ را از قید اسارت رهایی بخشیدند.

ابن سینا (۲)

مجله گنج شایگان سال اول - شماره ۳ مرداد ۱۳۳۲

«هرگاه در مسأله‌ای سرگردان می‌ماندم و بر حد وسط قیاس دست نمی‌یافتم به مسجد جامع می‌رفتم و نماز می‌گذاردم و در برابر آفریننده همگان فروتنی می‌کردم تا اینکه دشواری بر من گشاده می‌شد و مشکل من آسان می‌گشت.»

در مقدمه گذشته اشاره شد که برای آنها که به دنبال رمز اصلی شخصیت‌های بزرگ جهانی هستند، مسائل کوچک زندگی اهمیت بزرگی را دارا نمی‌باشد ولی از آنجا که تحصیل دانایی عمیق‌تری درباره عقاید و افکار ابن سینا مستلزم مختصری از شرح حال و زندگی او می‌باشد ما نیز قبل از بحث اصلی خود این مسأله را با ایجاز بیان می‌کنیم و آنگاه به عقاید و آراء او می‌پردازیم.

زندگی ابن سینا^۱

ابوعلی حسین ابن عبدالله ابن حسن ابن علی ابن سینا در سال ۳۷۰^۲ در قریه خرمیسن، نزدیک افشنه از قراء بخارا متولد شده است و به نام‌های مختلف شیخ‌الرئیس، حجه‌الحق، شرف‌الملک... و در اروپا در زیر عکس‌های بی‌شمار او که در کتابخانه‌ها و مجامع علمی با ذکر نام نقاش و سال ترسیم دیده می‌شود به نام‌های AVICENNA و بیشتر CAVIENNE اشاره شده است. پدر او عبدالله میرزای قریه و مادرش ستاره می‌باشد. در ۵ سالگی همراه پدر و مادر به بخارا می‌رود. پدر او از فرقه اسماعیلیه بود که جلسات بحث اسماعیلیه اکثر در منزل آنها تشکیل می‌شده... و عبدالله علاقه زیادی داشت که از کودکی فرزندان خود را با عقاید خود بزرگ کند و به همین لحاظ همیشه حسین با برادرش محمود را مجبور می‌کرد تا در

۱. این قسمت از شرح خاطرات بوعلی به قلم خود او و شاگردش ابو عبید جرجانی اقتباس شده است.

۲. در باب سال تولد او اقوال مختلف است ولی معتبرترین قول‌ها همین ۳۷۰ است.

جلسات آنها شرکت نمایند و چندی بعد محمود برادر حسین به آنها می‌گردد. ولی حسین که از همان اوان کودکی عادی نبود، کمتر سخن می‌گفت و بیشتر فکر می‌کرد و گوش می‌داد، حاضر نبود تحت تأثیر تلقینات آنها و احساسات خود قرار گرفته، تقلیدی کرده و خود را به آنها ملحق سازد. تحصیلات ابتدائی خود را در بخارا فرا گرفت. برای نبوغی که محیط آزاد و مساعدی برای پرورش خود بیابد بدون شک می‌بایست سریع‌تر از تصور ما ترقی کند. او در محیطی زندگی می‌کرد تحت حکومتی متکی و طرز فکری منطقی، سطح فرهنگ تا آنجا بالا رفته بود که حساب را نزد بقال بخارائی، ریاضی را نزد محمود مساح و فقه را نزد اسماعیل زاهد فرا گرفته و در جزو بهترین سالکان درمی‌آید.

منطق فروریوس^۱ را نزد ابو عبدالله ناتلی موسوم به متفلسف می‌آموزد علاوه از منطق، کتاب اقلیدس را نزد ناتلی می‌خواند و همه وقت از استاد جلوتر بود و پس از آنکه ۵ شکل از هندسه را درس گرفت بقیه را نزد خود تمام کرد، آن‌گاه المجسطی بطلمیوس را شروع نموده و وقتی به مبحث اشکال و مسائل هندسه رسید، ناتلی به او گفت که تو خود اینها را بخوان و حل کرده به من نشان بده تا خطاب و صواب تو را بنمایانم، هنوز استاد از جای خود برنخاسته تمام مسائل و شروع را تشریح و حتی بسیاری از آنها را که برای خود استاد مجهول بود، حل می‌کند. و گاه او استاد را استاد خود قرار می‌دهد. و ناتلی وقتی نبوغ او را می‌بیند سفارش بیشتری در حق او به پدرش می‌نماید. در این موقع ناتلی به گرگان می‌رود و خود ابن سینا به مطالعه کتاب‌ها به خصوص مشروح طبیعیات و الهیات می‌پردازد و چون به طب علاقه‌مند می‌شود در مدت کوتاهی آن را نزد عیسی ابن یحیی ابوسهل^۲ و به قولی در نزد ابومنصور حسن بن نوح قمری استاد طب^۳ فرا گرفته و در ۱۶ سالگی به مداوا پرداخته و دوره کارورزی را در ۱۸ سالگی خاتمه می‌دهد.

۱. منطق فروریوس یا ایسا غوجی عبارت است از مبحث کلیات پنجگانه در منطق که عبارتند از:

نوع، جنس، نصر، عرض عام، خاص

۲. از عیسویان گرگان بوده که در خراسان طبابت می‌کرده

۳. قول دکتر نجم آبادی استاد دانشکده پزشکی

مقالات علمی □ ۳۹۹

در این موقع امیر نوح بن منصور سامانی سخت بیمار گردید و به دنبال او که شهرتش را شنیده بود، می‌فرستد و چون از عهدهٔ معالجه امیر به خوبی برمی‌آید مقرب درگاه امیر می‌گردد.

نبوغ شگرف ابن سینا تحت رهبری افکار عالی او، شیخ را برمی‌انگیزد که برخلاف کوتاه‌فکرانی که از این پیشامدها حداکثر استفاده مادی یا مقامی را می‌برند، کوششی کند تا بر دانش خود بیافزاید و روح تشنه او به کتابخانه سلطان راه یابد و به قول خود:

«به سرایی اندر شدم که خانه‌های بسیار داشت و در هر خانه‌ای صندوق‌های کتاب بود که روی هم انباشته بودند. در یک خانه کتاب‌های تازی - شعر - در دیگری فقه و بدین‌گونه در هر خانه‌ای کتاب‌های دانش. پس بر فهرست کتاب‌های اوایل (پیشینیان) نگریستم و هرچه از آنها را که بدان نیاز داشتم خواستم و کتاب‌هایی یافتم که نام آنها به بسیاری از مردم نرسیده بود. من هم پیش از آن ندیده بودم و پس از آن هم ندیدم. پس این کتاب‌ها را خواندم و از آنها سود برداشتم و چون به ۱۸ سالگی رسیدم از همه این دانش‌ها فارغ آمدم».

در این موقع حریقی در کتابخانه رخ می‌دهد که دشمنان شیخ او را متهم می‌کنند در حالی که از چنین مردی با چنان دانشی و معرفتی بعید به نظر می‌رسد. همان‌طور که ملاحظه شد شیخ در ۱۸ سالگی از تمام دانش‌های زمان خود فارغ می‌شود و در فاصله بین ۱۶ تا ۱۸ سالگی است که شب و روز به مطالعه مشغول بود و در همین وقت است که به مطالعه الهیات و کتاب مابعدالطبیعه (متافیزیک) ارسطو می‌پردازد و آن را چهل بار می‌خواند و همهٔ آن را حفظ می‌کند بدون آنکه بفهمد به قول خود: «با این همه آن را نمی‌فهمیدم و بدان راه نمی‌بردم و از خود ناامید شدم و گفتم برای فهم این کتاب راهی نیست» تا به طور اتفاقی در بازار کتابفروشان اغراض مابعدالطبیعه فارابی را به اصرار دلالتی به سه درهم می‌خرد و با ناامیدی به مطالعه می‌پردازد و «در همان زمان اغراض این کتاب بر من گشاده شد، و از آن شادی کردم و روز دیگر چیز بسیار به تهی‌دستان صدقه‌دادم و سپاس خدای را».

در این دو سال در سنی که تمام دوستان و همسالان او به عیش و نوش و جواب به هیجانان جوانی مشغول بودند، شیخ آنی از مطالعه غافل نبوده و: «در این مدت

هیچ شب را تا پایان نخفتم و هیچ روز را جز آن کاری نداشتم و هر چه بود بر من آشکار شد و گرد آمد و چون بر آن نگریستم مقدمات قیاس بر من ثابت می‌شد و آنها را بدین‌گونه مرتب می‌کردم و چندان بر آن می‌نگریستم تا به نتیجه می‌رسیدم و به شرط مقدمات آن رفتار می‌کردم تا بر من حقیقت حق در آن مسأله محقق می‌شد و هرگاه در مسأله‌ای سرگردان می‌ماندم و بر حد وسط قیاس دست نمی‌یافتم به مسجد جامع می‌رفتم و نماز می‌گذاردم و در برابر آفریننده همگان فروتنی می‌کردم تا اینکه دشواری بر من گشاده می‌شد و مشکل من آسان می‌گشت».

شیخ تا این موقع خوشه‌چین خرمن علوم بود، اکنون دوره استحصال فرا رسیده و موقعی است که چون خورشید نور بخشد و راهنما باشد. و بنا به درخواست همسایه خود ابوالحسن عروضی کتاب المجموع را که در تمام علوم به جز ریاضیات است تحریر می‌کند و این اولین کتاب اوست در سن ۲۱ سالگی. پس از آن به درخواست ابوبکر خوارزمی الحاصل و المحصول را درباره فلسفه در ۲۰ جلد و بعد البروالائم را می‌نویسد و از این دو کتاب متأسفانه امروز اثری در دست نیست در ۲۳ سالگی پدرش وفات یافت و خواه و ناخواه او را از یک محیط علمی خالص به محیط اجتماع و کشاکش تنازع بقاء می‌کشاند و اجباراً از بخارا خارج و به گرگانج رفته و به کمک ابوالحسن سهیلی وزیر دربار امیر علی بن مأمون در لباس فقها باطیلسان و تحت الحنک راه یافته و برایش مقرری تعیین می‌شود و چون سلطان محمد غزنوی بر خوارزم مسلط شد ابوالفضل حسن بن میکال را مأمور می‌کند که نزد مأمون خوارزمشاهی رفته، بوعلی و سایر علما را به دربار او ببرد.

می‌گویند شیخ چون شنید مذهب سلطان محمد سنی بوده با او عداوت داشته است و شیخ قبل از آنکه عازم غزنین گردد به کمک ابوالفضل حسن بن میکال همراه با ابوسهل مسیحی به عزم گرگان حرکت می‌کند و در راه با سختی زیادی - گرسنگی و تشنگی - روبرو می‌شوند که ابوسهل طاقت نیاورده تلف می‌شود و شیخ خود را به گرگان نزد قابوس می‌رساند و در اینجا هم شیخ با تشخیص اعجازآمیز مرض عشق خواهرزاده قابوس^۱ و شمگیر شهرتش به حد اعلی

۱. بیماری خواهرزاده قابوس از نوع بیماری‌های روان - جسمی یا Psychosomat بود. تشخیص بیماری روان - جسمی توسط ابن سینا شاید اولین مورد گزارش شده در تاریخ پزشکی باشد.

مقالات علمی □ ۴۰۱

می‌رسد^۱ و پس از دستگیری قابوس شیخ به دهستان رفته و در آنجا سخت مریض می‌شود در این موقع است که شاگرد باوفای او ابو عبید جوزجانی به او می‌پیوندد و مدت ۲۵ سال یعنی تا آخر عمر استاد را رها نمی‌کند، تا اینجا شرح زندگی شیخ به قلم خود او می‌باشد که با شعر معروف زیر ختم شده است.

لما عظمت فلیس مصر و اسعی لما غلا ثمنی عدمت المشتري

وقتی عظیم شدم شهری نبود که گنجایش مرا داشته باشد - همچنین که بهایم بالا گرفت بی‌مشتری ماندم.»

از این به بعد آنچه نقل می‌شود قول شاگرد اوست:

«... در این موقع در گرگان ابو محمد شیرازی از روی ارادت به شیخ، خانه‌ای برای او تهیه کرده و هر روز جلساتی تشکیل داده و شیخ، المجسطی و منطق را درس می‌داد و ابو عبید هم تحریر می‌کرد تا کتاب‌های المختصر و المبدء و المعاد - الارصاد الکلیه - قسمت اول قانون - مختصر المجسطی و رساله‌های زیادی تهیه شد. شیخ از گرگان به نزد ملک خاتون مادر مجدالدوله رفته و مرض سودای او را معالجه می‌نماید و همانجا «المعاد» را می‌نویسد بعد به قزوین و سپس به همدان نزد کدبانویه می‌رود - شمس‌الدوله برادر مجدالدوله حاکم همدان از وجود او مطلع می‌شود و او را دعوت می‌کند و چون مرض قولنج او را معالجه می‌کند در جزو ندیمان او قرار گرفته و کمی بعد - وقتی در جنگ با عناذ شکست می‌خورد وزارت را به شیخ وامی‌گذارد - در زمان وزارت شیخ سپاهیان به علت نرسیدن مقرری شورش کرده و به تحریک مخالفین به خانه شیخ ریخته و به خصوص کتاب‌های او را به غارت می‌برند و به درخواست آنان امیر اجباراً شیخ را معزول می‌سازد و او نیز مدت ۴۰ روز در خانه دوست خود پنهان بود تا این که در اثر عودت مرض امیر و معالجه مجدد آن دوباره به وزارت می‌رسد. در این هنگام است که بنا به درخواست شاگرد دانش‌پژوهش که همیشه شیخ را وادار به نوشتن عقاید خود می‌نموده است **شفا** و قسمت اول **قانون** را می‌نویسد.

پس از فوت شمس‌الدوله، شیخ با علاءالدوله حاکم اصفهان مکاتبه نموده و از ترس مخالفین در خانه ابوطالب عطار پنهان بود. در همین حالت است که باز هم ابو عبید شاگرد او از فرصت استفاده کرده شیخ را وادار می‌کند کتاب **فناء** را به جز

۴۰۲ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

مبحث نبات و حیوان تمام می‌کند که در این هنگام به جرم مکاتبه با علاءالدوله او را گرفته و در قلعه فردجان زندانی می‌کنند و بیت معروف زیر را در این وقت سروده است:

دخولی بالیقین کما تراه و کل الشک فی امرالخروج

۴ ماه زندان فردجان برای شیخ فرصت مناسبی است تا دور از جنجال‌های سیاسی دانش خود را در دسترس نسل بعد - آیندگان - قرار دهد و در اینجاست که کتاب‌های «الهدایه»، «رساله حی بن یقطان» و «القولنج» را می‌نویسد. وقتی علاءالدوله^۱ همدان را می‌گیرد، شیخ را نیز آزاد می‌کند ولی شیخ از ترس دشمنان خود پس از چندی همراه برادرش محمود و شاگردش ابو عبید و دو تن غلام در لباس صوفیان به اصفهان حرکت می‌کند و در طبرستان از طرف علاءالدوله مورد استقبال قرار می‌گیرد و شب‌های جمعه در اصفهان جلسات بحث و انتقاد باشکوهی از علما دائر می‌گردد. در اصفهان شیخ شفا را تمام کرد. المجسطی (منطق) رساله اقلیدس ارثماتیقی (رساله موسیقی) را تمام می‌کند و درباره هر یک با ابتکار خود مسائل جدیدی را می‌افزاید. در بحث اختلاف النظر، ده شکل جدید در المجسطی و هیئت و موسیقی نیز تازه‌ها زیاد افزود در سفر به شاپور «النجات» را نوشت و بنا به خواهش علاءالدوله به کار رفع نواقص تقویم‌ها، رصدخانه‌ای دائر و ۸ سال تمام مشغول کار بود. اکثر تئوری‌های بطلموس را مورد بررسی عملی قرار داده و آلات زیادی در استرئونومی اختراع می‌نماید.

روزی در محضر علاءالدوله، ابو منصور جبائی به او می‌گوید: «تو فیلسوف و

حکیمی ولی از لغت بهره‌ای نداری تا گفته‌تو مورد قبول همه واقع گردد».

سه سال تمام شیخ مطالعه می‌کند و سپس برای تأدیب گستاخی ابومنصور سه قصیده با الفاظی مشکل به سه سبک مهم روز می‌سازد و از امیر می‌خواهد که از ابومنصور راجع به آنها نظر بخواهد، چون او نتوانست درک کند. شیخ او را راهنمایی می‌کند و ابومنصور می‌فهمد که شیخ او را تأدیب می‌نماید از او عذر

۱. حاکم همدان پس از فوت شمس‌الدوله با پسرش که چون شیخ وزارت او را قبول نکرده با او دشمن می‌گردد و پس از شکست از علاءالدوله وقتی دوباره او به اصفهان برمی‌گردد آنها هم دوباره به همدان آمده و شیخ را تکریم می‌نمایند ولی شیخ ترسناک بوده تا اینکه فرار می‌کند.

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می‌خواهد، درباره لغت و زبان کتاب «لسان العرب» را نوشته که اوراق اصلی آن متأسفانه از بین رفته و علاوه بر آن کتاب ضمیمه قانون در تجربیات پزشکی شیخ هم مفقود شده است. کتاب «الانصاف» بهترین اثر او که شامل افکار فلسفی خود او بوده و در حمله سلطان محمود به اصفهان از بین رفت. در سالی که علاءالدوله به جنگ تاش فراش می‌رفت شیخ قولنج نموده و به معالجه خود پرداخت و همچنین زخمی در امعائش تولید شده مبتلی به اسهال شدید می‌گردد در ضمن مبتلا به صرع نیز می‌گردد. روزی دستور می‌دهد دو کرفس در حقنه کرده برای او مصرف کنند ولی طبیعی که به دستور شیخ او را معالجه و پرستاری، می‌کرد ۵ تخم می‌افزاید و گویا این عمل هم عمدی بوده و در نتیجه اسهال او شدیدتر می‌شود. همچنین برای معالجه صرع خود مترو دیطوس می‌خورد، و غلامان او افیون همراه او نمودند و او را رنجورتر کردند و آنگاه که علاءالدوله به همدان می‌رفت او نیز همراه رفته و مرضش شدت یافت و دانست که وقت مرگ است و به قول خودش: «مدبری که مرا تدبیر می‌کرد در کار خود عاجز شده است و دیگر معالجت سودی ندارد...»

روز جمعه اول ماه رمضان ۴۸۸ به سن ۵۸ سالگی وفات یافت در حالی که تاریخ در مقابل قدرت نبوغ او سر تسلیم فرود آورده است.

بوعلی سینا - ۳

گنج شایگان سال اول - شماره ۵، مهرماه ۱۳۳۲
«طب معدوم بود و جالینوس موجودش ساخت، پراکنده بود و رازی فراهمش آورد؛ ناقص بود و پورسینا تکمیلش کرد».

طب بوعلی

آنچه که بیشتر شیخ را در اروپا معروف ساخته و مدت ۷ قرن - تا یک قرن پیش - پیشرو مجامع علمی بوده، ارزش پزشکی ابن سیناست و هنوز هم هزاران عکس ابن سینا به طوری که در شماره قبل اشاره شد در و دیوار مجامع پزشکی اروپا را تزئین نموده است.

همان طور که در شرح حال شیخ در شماره گذشته بیان شد در ۱۶ سالگی به طب پرداخت و استاد او به قولی که بیشتر تأیید شده «ابوسهل مسیحی» بوده است و ۱۸ سال داشت که طبیب رسمی دربار گردید.

مقام پزشکی ابن سینا را کمتر می توان توصیف نمود. همان قدر کافی است که مغز خیال پرور بشر، او را از مرحله یک طبیب ساده بالا برده و عنوان سحر و جادو را مطرح می کند و به او نسبت می دهد، به طوری که کتاب زیر به ترکی در این باره جمع آوری شده است: *Revue de l, Hist. Des Religions: R, Bassat*.

ما برای نشان دادن اهمیت مقام شامخ شیخ کافی می دانیم که شرحی اگرچه مجبور به اختصاریم، از نظریات طبی او تحلیلی بنمائیم. ولی برای روشن شدن ارزش بیشتر عقاید طبی او لازم است که شرحی فشرده و مختصر از اصول طب قدیم بیان نموده و سپس به آنچه مورد نظر است پرداخته شود.

طب قدیم گاه حملات شدیدی که بیشتر به مغلظه و گاه تخطئه نزدیک تر است نسبت به طب قدیم دیده می شود، خصوصاً در میان آنها که خودباختگی شدید و زنده ای نسبت به تمدن اروپایی دارند. و این امر بدون شک مولود ضعف نفس و

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عدم اعتماد نیروهای ارزنده اجتماعی خود می‌باشد. اگر امروز غرب پرچمدار علم و دانش گردیده، دلیلی ندارد که گذشته پرافتخار شرق خصوص پس از نهضت پرافتخار اسلام که درخشان‌ترین دوره‌های تاریخ می‌باشد، فراموش شود و بسیار بی‌جا خواهد بود که ما بدون تجزیه و تحلیل یا حداقل قضاوت منطقی در این باره نظر بدهیم. بر همین زمینه است که برخلاف متعصبین و خود باختگان، طبق قدیم علمی منبسط و دقیق و وظیفه طبیب در گذشته مشکل‌تر و سنگین‌تر بوده است. اگر امروز با وسایل بی‌شماری که برای تشخیص و معالجه بهتر کار پزشک تسهیل یافته و حتی با طبقه‌بندی پزشکی کارها و وظایف سبک‌تر شده است، پزشک قدیم مجبور بوده با عدم وسایل، تنها از نبوغ و هوشیاری ذاتی خود به کمک مطالعات مداوم و عمیق و تجربیات بی‌شمار و تحقیقات فراوان از وضع کار، شغل، غذا، استراحت مریض و تطبیق حالات او با آنها که در دفتر دانش اوست مرض را تشخیص داده و به معالجه بپردازد. با یک مقایسه ساده به عظمت مقام پزشک و سنگینی وظیفه او متوجه خواهید شد خصوصاً وقتی که در این زمینه در بین عقاید آنان نظریاتی می‌یابید که از نظر قطعیت و علمیت هنوز هم مورد قبول بوده و دانش پزشکی ما راجع به آنها همان است. مثلاً چقدر جای اعجاب است که وقتی ما می‌بینیم که «زکریای رازی» سل و طرق معالجه و آنچه را که امروز باید دانست و حتی معالجه با نور خورشید را شرح می‌دهد و تنها علم جدید پزشکی میکروب را به آن اضافه نموده است. این امر و سایر امور مشابه به علت غیر قابل انکار قوی بودن قوای عقلانی پزشک قدیم می‌باشد.

بعضی سؤال می‌کنند که چرا اطبای قدیم حتماً حکیم هم بوده‌اند؟ و به طبیب غیر حکیم چندان اطمینانی نبوده است؟ این کاملاً صحیح و منطقی است اولاً فلسفه و به‌طور کلی مباحث نظری قوای فکری ما را به سرعت ترقی داده و قدرت تفکر بیشتر می‌گردد ثانیاً مباحث تئوریک بیشتر با استدلال سر و کار دارد در طب قدیم هم تشخیص امراض بیشتر نظری بوده و طبیب به استدلال و تفکر بیشتر محتاج بوده است ثالثاً شرط پزشک خوب بودن، انسان خوبی بودن است و گرنه:

تیغ دادن در کف زنگی مست به که نادان را فتد علمی به دست

پایه حکمت و فلسفه: خصوص فلسفه اسلامی را اخلاق تشکیل داده است و یک پزشک حتماً بایستی نکات اخلاقی - اجتماعی - روانشناسی را دانسته و به آنها ایمان داشته و عامل باشد.

در این مورد پندنامه‌هایی در طبق قدیم بوده است و به طور خلاصه دانایی و دانش‌های زیر را نیز برای طبیب لازم می‌دانسته‌اند: ۱- علم دین؛ ۲- علم اخلاق؛ ۳- حکمت یا فلسفه؛ ۴- علم طبیعی؛ ۵- علم هندسه؛ ۶- علم هیئت؛ ۷- احکام نجوم؛ ۸- علم حساب؛ ۹- علم فراست یا قیافه‌شناسی، به اضافه مطالب جالب دیگر که به علت ضیق صفحات و فرصت و ترس انحراف از بحث اصلی، تنها اکتفا می‌کنم به اینکه آنقدر طب در قدیم ارزش داشته که مقام پزشکی را تالی مقام پیامبری می‌دانسته‌اند و حتی در اسلام هم بعد از علم دین یا می‌توان گفت بعد از سوسیولوژی و فلسفه بلافاصله مقام پزشکی و پزشک در تجلی است.

بنای طب قدیم

پایه‌های ساختمان طب قدیم که طی قرون متمادی براساس آن‌ها به حیات علمی خود ادامه می‌داده و هزاران انسان محتاج را جواب داده و از مرگ رهایی بخشیده، بر دو پایه و دو بخش بزرگ تقسیم می‌شد، که در بخش اول مباحث علمی یا نظری و پایه ثانی آن مبحث عملی آن بوده است.

الف. علمی - نظری مطالبی است از ساختمان بدن و اموری که برای طبیعت دانستن آنها لازم بوده است و به سه نوع طبیعی، غیر طبیعی، خارج از طبیعت تقسیم شده است.

۱. **طبیعی:** شامل ارکان، مزاج، اخلاط، اعضاء، ارواح، قوا و افعال آنها و تشریح وظائف الاعضاء می‌باشد.

در این مورد با توجه مختصر به عدم دسترسی کامل به وسایل لازم از طرفی و سخت‌گیری‌های بی‌جا و بی‌اساس متعصبین از طرف دیگر خصوصاً در تشریح انسانی، وقتی شما در شرحی که بعداً ذکر خواهیم کرد به نکات علمی دقیقی در بحث آناتومی از محل رگ‌ها، اعصاب، استخوان‌ها، شکل و شماره آنها برخورد می‌کنید، خود به خود به اعجاب نبوغ آنها تسلیم خواهید شد.

۲. **امور غیر طبیعی:** که برای بقای زندگی انسان لازم است و عبارتند از:

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۱. هوا، ۲. حرکت و سکون، ۳. طعام و شرب، ۴. خواب و بیداری، ۵. استفراغ و احتباس ۶. اغراض نفسانیه. تعادل در این قوا شرط سلامتی بوده است.

۳. امور خارج از طبیعت: امراض و علل و اسباب موجود و اغراض تابعه که تقریباً می‌توان گفت پاتالوژی امروز می‌باشد.

ب. عملی: در این مورد دو مرحله قائل بوده‌اند

۱. پیش‌گیری ۲. تداوی؛ اهمیت مرحله اول زیادتر بوده و مفهوم پیش‌گیری همان حفظ‌الصحه و دقت در سلامتی بوده است و آن‌قدر مهم بوده که اصولاً طبیب را حافظ‌الصحه می‌خواندند و خانواده‌هایی بودند که به اطباء مخصوص خود حقوق ماهانه می‌پرداخته‌اند ولی وقتی مریض می‌شده‌اند در تمام طول مرض حقوق آنها را قطع می‌کرده‌اند.

۲. تداوی: بدو بخش دارویی - یدی تقسیم شده است که هر یک از اطباء در این مورد برای خود روش خاصی داشته و قائل بوده است.

و تداوی یدی همان اعمال داروسازی امروز می‌باشد - در مورد تداوی داروئی فارماکولوژی بایستی گفت قدما به قدری پیش رفت نموده‌اند که حتی با امروز قابل ملاحظه و رقابت است و هم اکنون بیشتر مجامع علمی نظر آنها را تأیید و قاطع دانسته‌اند. علت این تکامل عجیب که طبیب را به صورت یک ساحر و عمل او را معجزه نشان داده اولاً تکیه طبیب بر تجارب متمادی و فراوان عملی خود ثانیاً هر طبیعت واقعی یکی از وظایف خود را توسعه طب و اضافه نمودن مقدار زیادی تجربیات شخصی می‌دانسته و در این مورد کمتر طبیبی است که کتاب‌های متعدد از خود باقی نگذاشته باشد و در شرح زندگی ابن سینا همانطور که رفت ضمیمه‌ای بر کتاب قانون می‌نویسد که مجموعه‌ای از افسوسناک‌ترین اشخاصی بوده که متأسفانه مفقود گردیده است.

نکته جالب‌تر اینکه طبیب قدیمی خود را هیچگاه مقلد ندانسته بلکه با توجه به کلیات موجود خود در معالجه روش‌های ابتکاری خاصی به کار می‌برده است که به طور عموم معالجه آنها براساس زیر بوده:

۱- ابتدا تشخیص قطعی و بعد شروع به معالجه، ۲- در صورت تشخیص انواع مرض‌ها ابتدا معالجه مرض اصلی، ۳- دقت در عدم امکان ایجاد امراض دیگر در نوع معالجه، ۴- اثر ذاتی دارو را بایستی توجه داشت نه اثر عرضی و ظاهری آنها،

نظیر معالجه ارزان درد با افیون، ۵- درمان با رژیم غذایی و در صورت لزوم استفاده از دارو، ابتدا از داروهای اصلی و ساده و در صورت لزوم از داروهای مرکب و صور جالینوسی آن استفاده نماید. علاوه بر تمام اینها لازم و مهم بوده که مریض از نظر روانی (پسیکولوژی) بیشتر مورد مطالعه قرار گیرد. دادن داروهای خطرناک و کشنده مثلاً برای سقط جنین مطلقاً حرام و ممنوع بوده است.

به طور خلاصه این بود شرحی مختصر از طب قدیم.

و اما در بحث اصلی ما که نشان دادن گوشه - تا حد امکان برای ما - از قدرت پزشکی ابن سیناست بایستی جمله معروف را که می‌گوید: **طب معدوم بود و جالینوس موجودش ساخت و پراکنده بود و رازی فراهمش آورد و ناقص بود و پورسینا تکمیلش کرد** قبول نماییم.

با این تفاوت که علاوه بر تکمیل، قاطعیت نظریات او بیشتر بوده و می‌باشد و معلومات پزشکی او از بقراط پدر علم طب و از جالینوس هم عمیق‌تر و وسیع‌تر و همه‌جانبه‌تر بوده در تمام مباحث پزشکی، جراحی، بهداشت، تشخیص درمان، فارماکولوژی، آناتومی، بوتانیک، پسیکوآنالیز، دندان‌پزشکی متحرک بوده. و بر خلاف نظر بعضی او مقلد نبوده بلکه مبتکر و مبتدع بوده است مثلاً درباره سل جالینوس آن را قابل علاج نمی‌داند زیرا سل مربوط به ریه و ریه متحرک است و جسم متحرک بهبود حاصل نمی‌کند مگر به سکون. لیکن شیخ آن را چاره‌پذیر دانسته و گفته جالینوس را نقل کرده و بیهقی در تاریخ خود بنا به قول صاحب «روضات» گفته است که شیخ بسیاری از بیماران مسلول خود را که در هواهای مختلف و مکان‌های دور بوده‌اند با گل‌قند و شیر معالجه کرده است و ابو عبید جوزجانی می‌نویسد که یکی از بیماران او بنا به دستور او صد من گل‌قند به تدریج خورده و شفا یافت.

به طور کلی ابن سینا علم طب را نگاهداری سلامت و صحت و نه درمان بیماری‌ها - دانسته و در رساله جوزیه می‌نویسد: آفات سلامتی ۴ چیز است. ۱- خوردن بسیار ۲- گفتن بسیار ۳- خفتن بسیار ۴- دوستی بسیار که هر یک را تشریح و عواقب آنها را بیان می‌کند.

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مهمترین اثر پزشکی ابن سینا که محرک شناسائی و احترام وسیع و طولانی غرب نسبت به او می‌گردد کتاب قانون است که اصل آن در ۱۵۹۳ به عربی چاپ شده است و در قرن ۱۲ میلادی به لاتین ترجمه و ترجمه آن به زبان‌های مختلفه اروپایی بیش از سی بار به چاپ رسیده است و با توجه به این که اختراع چاپ در سال ۱۴۵۰ میلادی بوده است و چاپ اولین ترجمه قانون به عربی در سال ۱۴۹۱ میلادی بوده است، اهمیت آن و تأثیر شگرف آن در اروپا به خوبی روشن می‌گردد. به خصوص که در سی سال آخر قرن ۱۵ شانزده بار و در قرن ۱۶ بیست بار متن کامل آن به چاپ رسیده است که علاوه بر آن چاپ خلاصه و یا بعضی از قسمت‌های آن از شمار بیرون است. و تا همین اواخر در اروپا منبع استثنایی قاطع و غیر مشکوک مجامع علمی بوده و در بزرگترین مرجع علمی دنیای قرن ۱۹ در دانشگاه مون پلیه تدریس می‌شده است. (شرح قانون در شماره بعد).

متأسفانه با توقیف مجله و بازداشت صاحب امتیاز آن، مرحوم مرتاضی لنگرودی در ماه‌های بعد از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲، ادامه این مقاله میسر نشد.

علاقمندان به طب سنتی - Traditinal Medicine یا طب تجربی Emperical Medicine و رابطه آن را با طب جدید یا Rational Medicine به سخنرانی اینجانب در همایش منطقه‌ای مدیران شرقی سازمان جهانی بهداشت در قاهره ۳۰ نوامبر - ۳ دسامبر ۱۹۹۱ (۹ تا ۱۲ آذر ۱۳۷۰) مراجعه کنند. اصل انگلیسی این سخنرانی در «مجموعه آثار - بخش چهارم - مقالات، سخنرانی‌ها و مصاحبه‌های انگلیسی» آمده است. برگردان این سخنرانی به فارسی در مجله اطلاعات علمی شماره‌های ۲۲ و ۲۳ فروردین ۱۳۷۱ منتشر شده است.

امید قرن ما

مجله گنج شایگان، شماره ۳، مرداد ۱۳۳۲

«در ماه گذشته سه نفر از دانشجویان مسلمان شما در آفریقا، آقایان عبدالقادر قریصات از الجزایر و محمد عبدالرحمن از مراکش و احمد بکر الهلالی از تونس که در بغداد تحصیل می‌کنند به منظور آشنایی با اوضاع فرهنگی و اجتماعی برادران مسلمان خود به تهران وارد می‌شوند. انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان مقدم برادران هم‌کیش خود را گرمی داشته و علاوه بر راهنمایی‌های لازم به منظور بازدید مراکز و مجامع مختلف فرهنگی به منظور ایجاد ارتباط عمیق‌تر و امکان شناسایی و شناساندن بیشتر برادران هم‌کیش خود مجلس جشنی به افتخار آنان برپا می‌کند. طی این جشن که عده زیادی از علاقمندان به نهضت مسلمانان شمال آفریقا و همچنین عده‌ای از نمایندگان مجلس شورا و استادان دانشگاه شرکت کرده بودند ما موفق شدیم بیش از پیش احساسات خود را نسبت به مسلمانان ضد استعمار شمال آفریقا نشان دهیم. اینک صفحه‌ای از دفتر یادبود آن شب تاریخی:

نمی‌دانم آیا تا به حال شوق و ذوق‌زدگی دو دوست آشنا را از دید هم دیده‌اید؟ دو آشنایی که دور از هم با قلبی مملو از عشق و صفاست و به خاطر هم می‌طلبند؟ آن هم عشق و علاقه و دوستی و برادری که از اعماق قرون، پیوندی عظیم و گسست‌ناپذیر دارد؟! - از آنجا که پیامبر بزرگ ما با چهره قهرمانانه و آغشته به خون سرخ پیشانی خویش پیوند دوستی عظیم ما را امضاء نموده و برای همیشه گسست‌ناپذیر ساخته است؟

راستی چه نیروی شگرف و چه پیوند عظیم و چه رستاخیز با شکوهی؟

دیدار چهره‌هایی که از یک طرف حامل پیام دوستی جوانان و دانشجویان مسلمان سراسر جهان است و از طرف دیگر منعکس‌کننده تأثرات و غم و اندوهی فراوان می‌باشد، قلب همه را به طبعش در می‌آورد و وقتی ندایی که از اعماق قلوب

سوزان برادران ما که نشان روح انقلابی توحیدی آنان است فضا را به لرزه درمی آورد، همه آرزو می کنند تا از آنجا که هستند پرواز کرده و در میان برادران خود در شمال آفریقا در پیشاپیش صفوف رهایی بخش آنان قرار گرفته و در تظاهرات انقلابی آنان شرکت کرده و با خون خود پیمانها را تجدید ساخته و همبستگی و پشتیبانی بی دریغ خود را در مبارزه و جهاد مقدسی که در سرتاسر جهان اسلام علیه استثمار سرخ و سیاه علیه دو بلوک جنگ افروز جهان درگیر است اعلام دارند.

اکنون با تلاوت چند آیه از کلام الله مجید و نطق عربی افتتاحیه توسط جناب آقای سعیدی عضو هیئت مدیره اتحادیه مسلمین جشن ما آغاز می گردد سپس در میان ابراز احساسات فراوان و بی شائبه ای برادر الجزایری ما آقای عبدالقادر سخن آغاز می کنند و وقتی با یک دنیا تأثر و غم و اندوهی آغشته به کینه و نفرت عمیق که در عین حال امید فردای مسرت بخش مسلمانان سرتاسر جهان است در میان سکوت مطلق و تأثرانگیزی که حاکی از ابراز همدردی عمیق حاضرین بود، قتل عام فجیعی را که فرانسویان استعمارطلب و مدعی اعلامیه حقوق بشر؟ با کشتن ۴۵ هزار مسلمان در ظرف پانزده روز شرح می دادند موجی از نفرت و انزجار برمی خیزد ... همه از خود می پرسند چگونه کسانی که خود انقلاب کبیر بر پا می کنند و پرچمدار انقلابات اروپا می شوند و درس آزادی می آموزند خود را برای چنین جنایت های ضد بشری حاضر می سازند؟ آنگاه که آقای عبدالقادر اعلام داشتند که اگر فرانسه توپ دارد... تانک و زره پوش دارد اگر از قدرت امپریالیسم جهانی برخوردار است ما هم از نیروی عظیم تری برخورداریم نیرویی که هنوز در برابر بمب و توپ و تانک فرانسوی مغلوب نشده و در میان خون و آتش به راه پرافتخار خود ادامه می دهد. نیروی لایزال ایمان چندین میلیون برادران شما در شمال آفریقا ... غریوی از شادی و دروهای افتخارآمیز بر ملت مبارز الجزایر برمی خیزد.

آنگاه محمد عبدالرحمن مراکشی برادر دانشجوی ما رشته سخن را به دست می گیرد و از عدم توانایی خود به سخن گفتن به فارسی اظهار تأسف می کند و چنین ادامه می دهد: «ولی افتخار می کنم که همگی با زبان قرآن آشنایی داریم و از

حدود مرزها و سنن کهنه و پوسیده گذشته و با پیوند عظیم‌تری با هم ارتباط داریم» و بعد ایشان وضع مسلمانان را تشریح کرده و نتیجه می‌گیرند که امروز نیروی عظیم مسلمانان جهان در میان دو بلوک جهانی می‌تواند بلوک واسطه را تشکیل دهد و چنین هم هست. و بالاخره وقتی ایشان سخنان خود را با «اخوانی» همچنان که شروع کرده بود ختم می‌کند هر مسلمان روشن‌بینی تصدیق می‌کند که تنها با یک حرکت مختصر و گذشت و فداکاری ناچیزی که زنجیر اختلافات کوچک و مبتذل را پاره کند مسلمانان جهان قادر خواهند بود که رهبری انقلابات ضد استعماری ملل ستم‌دیده را به دست گرفته و نقش سازنده خود را در بنای فردای بهتری ظاهر سازند.

سپس از طرف انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان آقای مهندس شکیب‌نیا با تلاوت آیه شریفه وَ كَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ أُمَّةً وَسَطًا لِتَكُونُوا شُهَدَاءَ عَلَى النَّاسِ پس از تشریح وضع رقت‌بار فعلی مسلمانان - اختلافات بی‌جا و بی‌اساس آنان سخن را آغاز می‌کند. پس از روشن کردن ماهیت عناصر مخرب و وابسته به استعمار سرخ و سیاه فصلی از مکتب اسلام از آزادی و برابری ... از روح انقلابی مسلمانان صدر اسلام، به سیاست خانمان‌سوز ضد اسلامی فرانسه و انگلیس و آمریکا و دول دیگر اشاره و حمله نموده و از انقلابات عظیم و امیدبخشی که امروز همچون موجی سرتاسر جهان اسلام را فراگرفته سخن گفتند و همچنین اظهار داشتند که:

امروز مسلمانی نیست که به فکر آینده نباشد. قلوب تمام برادران ما به خاطر وضع اسفناک کنونی مسلمانان جریحه‌دار است و همه کوشش داریم تا راهی برای نجات بیابیم راهی که نه با تکیه به امپریالیسم آمریکا و اعوان و انصارش شروع شده باشد و نه به استعمار سرخ که اکنون تازه‌نفس با نشان دادن در باغ سبز می‌خواهد ما را به زنجیر بکشد منتهی شود - اگر آن روز - به دستور پیامبر بزرگ ما ندای «إِنَّ الزَّمانَ قد استدار کهیئته یوم خلق الله السماوات والأرض» از سرزمین مکه صلا داده شد، امروز ندایی است که از میان مزارع سرسبز سواحل اندونزی تا کوچه‌های باریک کازابلانکا و از میان هیاهوی مراکز صنعتی پاکستان تا امواج خروشان دره نیل ما را به خود می‌خواند نیرویی است که پیش می‌رود. قدرت می‌گیرد ... مبارزه خود را وسیع‌تر می‌کند ... این نیرو، نیروی عظیم و حقیقت

مقالات علمی □ ۴۱۳

غیرقابل انکار ۴۰۰ میلیون مسلمان در سرتاسر جهان است. اگر کشف آتش مقدمه‌ای بر تاریخ علوم بوده، اگر دسترسی به نیروی عظیم اتم فصلی بر تاریخ علم افزوده، بدون شک بزرگترین مسئله‌ی زمان ما بیداری مسلمانان در نیمه‌ی اول قرن بیستم و بزرگترین واقعه‌ی تاریخ در نیمه‌ی قرن دوم پیروزی نهضت پرشکوه مسلمانان در سرتاسر جهان است مسئله‌ی بلوک میانه و نیروی عظیم آن - مسأله‌ای نیست که بتوان انکار کرد - چگونه می‌توان انقلابات شمال آفریقا را علیه استعمار فرانسه که حتی علیرغم وابستگی به کرملین به وجود آمده و در آستانه‌ی پیروزی است را انکار کرد؟

سپس ناطق به سیاست سازشکارانه‌ی بعضی از عناصری که در اجتماع کنونی ما با داشتن صلاحیت رهبری نهضت مسلمانان ایران حاضر به فعالیت بیشتری نیستند و به اصطلاح هنوز کاسه‌ی چه کنم را در دست دارند، حمله شدیدی نموده و اظهار داشتند که تنها با ایجاد یک تشکیلات مترقی که در حین اتکاء به مکتب نجات‌بخش اسلام روح زمان را درک کرده باشد ما قادریم رسالت بزرگ تاریخی خویش را که اسلام بر عهده‌ی ما واگذار کرده است با موفقیت به انجام برسانیم.

آنگاه آقای احمد بکیرالهالی پس از اظهار تشکر از مهمان‌نوازی‌های برادران ایرانی خود اظهار داشتند بی‌نهایت خوشوقتم که خود را در محیطی می‌یابم که نمی‌توانم اظهار کنم دور از وطن خود بوده و می‌باشم و سپس با تشریح حب‌الوطن من‌الایمان اظهار داشتند که اگر ما این جمله را متعلق به اسلام بدانیم، باز هم اصالت با ایمان است و اشاره کردند که محال است مسلمانی در میان برادران ایمانی خود قرار گیرد و احساس ناراحتی نماید و سپس با اشاره به سخنان ناطق انجمن و تأیید آن اظهار داشتند که همگی ما از خدای بزرگ پیروزی نهضت جهانی اسلام را خواستاریم.

قطعنامه‌ی زیر در میان احساسات بی‌نظیر و ضد استعماری برادران ما خوانده و تصویب شد:

۱. تمام جمعیت‌ها و انجمن‌های اسلامی ایران باید همکاری و معاضدت بیشتری با مسلمین ممالک شمال آفریقا و سایر نقاط نموده و ارتباط و پیوند خود را عمیق‌تر و دامنه‌دارتر سازند.

۴۱۴ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

۲. تمام مسلمانان ایران خود را در نهضت‌های ضد استعماری ملل غارت‌زده اسلامی شریک دانسته با کوشش و فعالیت دست جمعی و خستگی‌ناپذیر خود روز رهایی ملت‌های مسلمان را نزدیک می‌سازند.

۳. جمعیت‌های اسلامی ایران شایسته است اطلاعات لازم از مظالم کشورهای استعماری و ضد دینی را به دست آورده و در اختیار برادران ایرانی خود بگذارند.

پس از ختم قرائت قطعنامه، مجلس در ساعت ۱۰ شب پایان یافت.
درود فراوان ما و تمام مسلمانان ضد استعمار جهان به شهدای تونس - الجزایر - مراکش

پیروز باد نهضت انقلابی مسلمانان سرتاسر جهان.

نطق تاریخی طارق بن زیاد

مجله گنج شایگان، شماره ۵، مهر ۱۳۳۲

طارق پسر زیاد غلامی از قبیله بربر بود که موسی بن نصیر فرمانده قوای اسلامی در شمال آفریقا او را آزاد کرده و به فرماندهی ۷هزار مجاهد، مأمور فتح اسپانیا نمود. طارق با همراهانش از بندر سیوط Ceuita کنونی واقع در مراکش با کشتی بادی حرکت و در جنوبی‌ترین نقطه اسپانیا که امروز به نام او به جبل الطارق معروف است از کشتی پیاده شده در ۲۰ کیلومتری ساحل اردو می‌زند. طارق که دوره سربازی و تربیت خود را در مکتب اسلام به صورت غلامی طی کرده و قلبی سرشار از عشق و ایمان به مکتب جاودان اسلام و طریق نجات‌بخش آن داشت، مأموریت «صلای ندای حق» را در دنیای کفرآلود اروپا پذیرفته بود و بلافاصله پس از ورود به ساحل دستور می‌دهد کشتی‌ها و آذوقه را آتش زدند و در مقابل اعتراض بعضی از همراهان نطق جالبی ایراد می‌کند که شاعر و متفکر بزرگ جهان اسلام مرحوم محمد اقبال پاکستانی قسمتی از آن را چنین نقل کرده است:

طارق چو بر کناره آندلس سفینه سوخت گفتند کار تو به نگاه خرد خطاست
دوریم از سواد وطن باز چون رسیم؟ ترک سبب ز روی شریعت کجا رواست؟

خندید و دست خویش به شمشیر برد و گفت: هر ملک، ملک ماست که ملک خدای ماست.

نطقی را که طارق در مجمع همگانی برای مجاهدین ایراد می‌کند به‌طور عجیب و بی‌سابقه‌ای تا اعماق روح پرشور و مملو از عشق و توحید آنان تأثیر می‌کند و آنچنان مؤثر واقع می‌گردد که در اولین تماس با دشمن بشارت خدا را به فتح و پیروزی دریافته و برای ۷۰۰ سال حکومت فرهنگ و دانش اسلامی را پایه‌گذاری می‌نمایند.

رودریک آخرین پادشاه گت‌ها بود که تمام قوای خود را برای مقابله با پیشقراولان نهضت اسلام متمرکز و آماده نمود و در ۱۹ ژوئیه ۷۱۱ مسیحی در نزدیک دهانه رود بریت که اکنون به نام سالادو Salado نامیده می‌شود اولین تقابل صورت گرفت که به نفع کامل مسلمانان تمام شد و از آن پس نهضت پرشکوه و عظیم اسلام پس از عبور از اسپانیا و قتل پیروزی تمدن و فرهنگ خود را در سر تا سر اروپا بسط و گسترش می‌دهد و تا قرون متمادی از میان اوراق دفتر دانش جهان مشعل فروزان طرز تفکر جهانی اسلام با درخشندگی خاصی متجلی می‌گردد. بدون شک نطق تاریخی طارق نه تنها از بلیغ‌ترین خطابه‌های اسلامی است بلکه همانطور که مورخین قائلند نسبت به موقعیت و تأثیرات خود در ردیف مهیج‌ترین نطق‌های تاریخ می‌باشد - چون امکان ندارد که بتوان تمام احساسات و عظمت آن را در ترجمه به فارسی منعکس نمود. البته برای درک عظمت آن بهتر است که به متن کامل عربی آن مراجعه شود. مترجم

اینک ترجمه خطابه

«ای مردم! کو راه نجات؟ دریا پشت سر شما و دشمن در مقابل! و شما فاقد همه چیز! «جز خدا» و در طریق حق جز صداقت و پایداری هیچ عاملی ارزنده نخواهد بود. آیا تا به حال اطفال یتیمی را بر سفره مرد لثیمی دیده‌اید! دشمن با انبوه لشکر در مقابل شماست قدرت او را خوب بنگرید - امیدی برای شما نیست و جز شمشیر تکیه‌گاهی ندارید و جز به آذوقه‌ای که در دست شماست به هیچ چیز دسترسی برای شما ممکن نیست، من شما را هشدار می‌گویم. با شرایط کنونی اگر ما پیروز نگردیم، احتیاج مداوم ما قدرت ما را تضعیف خواهد نمود و «چشمانی که از ترس شما خواب ندارند و دل‌هایی که آکنده از ترس شماست، نسبت به شما جسور می‌گردد - برای طرد قطعی سرنوشت شومی که ما را تهدید می‌کند تنها راه، مبارزه و جهاد با دشمن می‌باشد. این دشمن خون آشام شماست که با تکیه بر ذخائر فراوان و شهرهای آباد و غنی به جنگ شما آمده است. خود را برای مرگ آماده کنید - پیروزی نهایی به دنبال شماست. ما در راه پرافتخاری قدم گذاشته‌ایم که در برابر آرمان مقدس آن کمترین گذشت ما خون سرخ ماست. من به وظیفه عظیمی را که خود قبول نکرده باشم و برای اجرای آن آماده نباشم، شما را دعوت

مقالات علمی □ ۴۱۷

نمی‌کنم و اگر قبل از هر کس به استقبال مرگ نمی‌شناختم، شما را به کاری که جانبازی در راه آن ضروری است نمی‌خواندم.

همه بدانید...! کمترین استقامت شما، پیروزی جاویدان و افتخار و آسایش ابدی شما را تضمین نموده است. شما از نتایج گرانبها و محصول پرافتخار نبرد خویش در این جزیره آگاهید و **امیرالمؤمنین ولید بن عبدالملک** با آگاهی تمام، شما را از میان برترین مردان جنگی و سربازان رشید و پاک‌نهاد اسلام برای چنین مأموریت عظیمی برگزیده است. او شما را با قلبی لبریز از خرسندی و مسرت شایسته آن دانسته که «پیام توحید و وحدت و ندای مساوات و برابری را در میان وحشیان متفرق صلا دهید!» و این وظیفه را با اطمینان قاطع به نیروی تسخیرناپذیر شما بر عهده شما قرار داده و ایمان دارد که شما خود پیشقدم چنین امر عظیمی می‌باشید.

خدای بزرگ ما تمام غنائم این جزیره را نصیب شما و سایر مؤمنین فرموده است. خدای بزرگ جنگ و جهاد شما را برای رضای او در جهت اعتلای کلمه حق و استقرار حکومت نجات‌بخش اسلام پیروز می‌گرداند تا نه فقط اجر این دنیا، بلکه پاداش عظیم و ثمربخش‌تر جهان دیگر را هم دریابید.

همیشه بدانید! به آنچه شما را دعوت می‌کنم خود پیشقراول بوده و در هنگامه نبرد در صفوف مقدم جبهه قرار می‌گیرم و قبل از هر کس برای پیکار با **رودریک** جلاد و ظالم قدم برمی‌دارم تا با خواست خدای بزرگ او را نابود سازم.

من پیش می‌روم اگر قبل از شهید شدن در راه حق و عدالت او را نابود سازم دیگر شما نگران نخواهید بود و نیازمند مردی سلحشور و قهرمان که شما را با آگاهی تمام اداره و رهبری کند، نخواهید بود، و اما اگر قبل از انجام وظیفه - نابودی او - با خون من میدان نبرد رنگین شد، شما باید اقدام و عمل مرا سرمشق قرار داده و جهاد مقدس خود را علیه او هرچه شدیدتر ادامه دهید. من ایمان دارم که نابودی او و پیروزی شما در این سرزمین و در تمام سرزمین‌های کفرزده قطعی و بلاشک است»

۴۱۸ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

مقاومت میکروارگانسیم در برابر آنتی‌بیوتیک‌ها

مجله «در کلینیک چه می‌گذرد؟» ۱۳۳۳ متاسفانه متن این نوشته به دست نیامد.

مقایسه اثرات درمانی تتراسایکلین‌ها در عفونت‌های گوارشی

تز دکترای دارو سازی ۱۳۳۳

مبارزات مردم آنگولا برای آزادی

مجله دانشجو ۱۳۴۲ یا ۱۳۴۳. متاسفانه متن به دست نیامد

شورشگری و ضد شورشگری

ترجمه و تدوین ۱۳۴۴

این مجموعه در همان سال ۱۳۴۴ برای استفاده سازمان مجاهدین اولیه به ایران فرستاده شد. سپس اولین بار توسط نهضت آزادی ایران - خارج از کشور چاپ شد و بعد از انقلاب نیز در ایران تجدید چاپ شد. متن کامل این اثر در سال ۱۳۹۱ در سایت‌ها قرا داده شده است.

اقتصاد اسلامی - بخش اول

مکتب مبارز - شماره زمستان ۱۳۴۵ / ۱۹۶۷

خلاصه: مسائل اقتصاد اسلامی از جهت زیربنای نظری و محتوای عملی و مقایسه با سیر تکاملی عقاید به طور عمومی و همچنین تاریخ اقتصاد اسلامی در سه فصل مورد مطالعه و بررسی قرار گرفته است.

این سه فصل عبارتند از:

فصل اول - بررسی پیدایش و سیر تکاملی عقاید اقتصادی تا قرن حاضر

فصل دوم - اقتصاد اسلامی شامل:

۱- بخش اول: مقدمه

۲- بخش دوم: زیربنای نظری (تئوریک) اقتصاد اسلامی

۳- بخش سوم: محتوای عملی (پراتیک) اقتصاد اسلامی

۴- بخش چهارم: روابط درونی مسائل اقتصادی با سایر مسائل اجتماعی در اسلام

فصل سوم - اقتصاد اسلامی - یک بررسی تاریخی

مقالات علمی □ ۴۱۹

سلسله مقالاتی که به تدریج در مکتب مبارز تحت عنوان بالا خواهد آمد فقط شامل فصل دوم می‌باشد.

پیش‌گفتار

کدام راه؟ در سال ۱۰۷ هـ.ق به دستور هشام بن عبدالملک اراضی مزروعی را در مصر مساحی و ارزیابی نمودند. جرجی زیدان به نقل از مقریزی وسعت این اراضی را در مصر بالغ بر سی میلیون فدان (هر هکتار برابر است با ۲/۴۷۱ فدان) ذکر نموده است^۱. اهمیت و عظمت وسعت کشاورزی در مصر، در ۱۳ قرن پیش وقتی مشخص‌تر می‌گردد که ما وسعت این اراضی را در حال حاضر با آن زمان مقایسه نماییم.

به موجب آمارهای که در سه سال پیش از طرف دولت جمهوری عربی متحده منتشر شده است^۲، آمار اراضی مزروعی در مصر به قرار زیر است:

۱۸۹۷ میلادی ۵۰۴۸۰۰۰ فدان

۱۹۱۴ میلادی قریب به ۶ میلیون فدان (جرجی زیدان، تاریخ تمدن اسلام)

۱۹۵۲ میلادی ۵۶۸۰۰۰۰ فدان (قبل از انقلاب)

۱۹۶۲ میلادی ۵۷۴۹۰۰۰ فدان (بعد از انقلاب)^۳

بر اساس برنامه‌های عمرانی دولت، پیش‌بینی می‌کنند که هر ساله بین ۲۰ تا ۵۰ هزار فدان بر سطح اراضی مزروعی اضافه شود. همچنین پس از پایان سد عالی آسوان قریب به یک میلیون فدان بر اراضی مزروعی اضافه خواهد شد. اگر چنانچه حداکثر پیش‌بینی سالیانه عملی شود و سد عالی در سال ۱۹۷۰ پایان پذیرد، مجموعه اراضی مزروعه در مصر در سال ۱۹۷۰ با یک محاسبه ساده بالغ بر ۷۱۵۰۰۰۰ فدان خواهد بود. بر اساس استانداردهای موجود این رقم یک پیروزی بزرگ برای دولت مصر خواهد بود. ولی از جانب دیگر، اگر با همین نسبت و

۱. الاصلاح الزراعی فی الاسلام، صادق مهدی الحسینی، موسسه الصادق، کربلا، عراق

2. Statistical pocket book 1952-1962 cairo april 1963

۳. از مجموع ۲۴۷ میلیون فدان خاک مصر فقط سه درصد مزروعی و مسکونی است. در برابر ۶ میلیون فدان مزروعی ۲۳۸ میلیون اراضی غیر مزروعی و صحرا وجود دارد. اراضی مزروعی و مسکونی، صرف نظر از تعدادی مختصر واحدهای پراکنده در صحرا تماما در دو طرف نیل متمرکز می‌باشند.

۴۲۰ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

سرعت کار اصلاحات اراضی در مصر توسعه یابد، قریب به ۴۴۰ سال وقت لازم است تا سطح اراضی مزروعی را در مصر به وسعت ۳۰ میلیون فدان در قرن اول هجری - ۱۳ قرن پیش برسانند! آیا مصر تنها نمونه است؟

با هم به یمن سری بزنیم. پس از پیروزی کودتای یمن، رئیس جمهور جدید اعلام کرد، و دنیا هم مشاهده کرد که یمن یکی از عقب مانده ترین کشورهای آسیا و یا شاید دنیا باشد. اما این یمن همیشه این طور نبوده است. یمن زمانی تاج افتخار^۱ دنیای اسلام بوده است. و هر مسافری اعم از سوار یا پیاده که از این سر تا آن سر کشور (یمن) را طی می کرد آفتاب را نمی دید. زیرا در دو طرف جاده آنقدر درخت های سایه دار بودند که سایه آن قطع نمی شد. اهالی، مرفه الحال و از لذایذ حیات برخوردار بودند - لوازم زندگی مهیا - اراضی آباد... حکومت عالی و قوی و پایدار و کشور در نهایت ترقی و تعالی بود.^۲

آیا مصر و یمن نمونه های استثنایی هستند؟ با هم به عراق می رویم. سری به ایران می زنیم! عراق را مورخین سرزمین سیاه «السواد» می خوانده اند و این بدان علت بوده است که از بصره تا موصل یک قطعه زمین خشک و بایر دیده نمی شد. تمام دهات و اراضی کشاورزی به هم متصل بوده اند. در بحث تاریخ اقتصاد اسلامی خواهیم دید که درآمد دولت مرکزی از مالیات اراضی عراق بالغ بر ۶۰۰ هزار درهم در سال بوده است. در ایران خودمان می خوانیم که در نیشابور لشگر مغول قریب به سه کرور جمعیت را از دم تیغ گذراندند (هر کرور نیم میلیون نفر است). نیشابوری که در حال حاضر شاید بسیاری از ما ندانیم در کجای ایران می باشد؟ باز می خوانیم که خوزستان زمانی ۴۰ کرور جمعیت داشته است. در بندر معشون، که قبل از تبدیل آن به یک بندرگاه نفتی، یک ده مخروبه بندری بیش نبوده است زمانی چنان آباد بوده که از مراکز فرهنگی در جنوب محسوب می شد و شهر دارای کتابخانه بزرگی بوده است. توسعه فرهنگی بدون شک با توسعه اقتصادی رابطه ای دارد.

باز می خوانیم که در سرتاسر دنیای اسلام زمانی می رسد که انسان محتاجی پیدا نمی شود که دولت به او کمک نماید. چرا چنین بوده است؟ در کشوری که

۱. فیلسوف نماها، ص ۸۲ ناصر مکارم

۳. مروج الذهب مسعودی

۹۷ درصد اراضی آن صحرای بایر است چگونه ۳۰ میلیون فدان اراضی مزروعی بوده است؟ این توسعه عجیب کشاورزی با نبودن وسایل فنی جدید! کشاورزی موتوریزه حاصل چیست؟ آیا این توسعه با نظام اقتصادی حاکم در آن دوران رابطه‌ای ندارد؟ در آن زمان‌ها که هنوز کریستف کلمب آمریکا را کشف نکرده بود که بعداً از تصدق سر برنامه‌های اصلاحاتی ما مجبور به درخواست گندم از آمریکا بشویم! انبوه کثیر جمعیت در عراق و در ایران از کجا زندگی خود را تامین می‌کرده‌اند؟ نمی‌توان گفت که گرسنه بوده‌اند چراکه بدون رشد اقتصادی ایجاد یک تمدن و وسعت فرهنگ امکان‌پذیر نیست. آیا جز این که ما علیت را در نظام اقتصادی جستجو کنیم راهی هست؟

دکتر واسیا استاد عرب و تاریخ و تمدن اسلام در دانشگاه ناپل به‌طور مختصر به این علت اشاره می‌نماید. آنجا که می‌گوید: «آنگاه نوعی حکومت تازه که از لحاظ اصول و صفات اخلاقی به درجات بر آنچه در آن زمان موجود بود و برتری داشت، تأسیس شد. طلا که در صندوق‌های سرمایه‌داران مقتدر پنهان شده بود، به جریان افتاد و از این دست به آن دست گشت تا اینکه به فقرا می‌رسید و دوران یک سیستم اقتصادی سالمی به وجود آمد. مردان تحصیل کرده هوشمند تحت رهبری حکومتی که به وسیله مردان پاک و شریف اداره می‌شد روی کار آمدند و افکار دموکراتیک در نظم نوین مورد تشویق قرار گرفت و دارندگان این امتیازات توانستند به عالی‌ترین مقامات ارتقا یابند»^۱. قصد ما در اینجا بحث درباره تاریخ اقتصاد اسلامی نمی‌باشد. چنین بحثی به تفصیل در فصل سوم از سلسله مقالات «اقتصاد اسلامی» خواهد آمد. اشاره مختصر در این مقدمه به منظور طرح یک سوال اساسی است! و آن اینکه: آیا در برابر مشکلات اساسی اقتصادی و اجتماعی که جامعه ایرانی با آن سر و کار دارد، چه راه حلی انتخاب کنیم. راه حل پیشنهادی دنیای غرب را؟ یا راه حل‌های پیشنهادی مکتب اسلام را که راه حل‌های آزمایش شده و امتحان داده هستند؟

۱. پیشرفت سریع اسلام ترجمه سید غلامرضا سعیدی نویسنده Dr caselli-Dr vaceia vaglieri این کتاب توسط Dr. Caselli از دانشگاه پنسیلوانیا به انگلیسی برگردان شده است.

مسئله اگر علاقمندی ما به سعادت جامعه و توده‌ها بیش از تعصب ما نسبت به این مرام یا آن مرام باشد و اگر قبول کنیم که نمی‌توان و نباید چشم بسته فرمول‌ها و راه‌حل‌های «حکیم فرموده» را قبول کرد و به‌کار بست، در آن صورت مطالعه راه‌حل‌های پیشنهادی اسلام، حداقل، یک ضرورت اجتناب‌ناپذیر خواهد بود.

تنها کسانی از چنین مطالعه‌ای سرباز می‌زنند و تنها کسانی خود را بی‌نیاز از چنین مطالعه‌ای می‌دانند که یا به علت غریزدگی تعصب آنها به این «ایسم» یا آن «ایسم» از علاقمندی آنها به سعادت توده‌های ملت بیشتر باشد یا آنکه به علت تعهدات و وابستگی‌های موجود با مراکز کنترل‌کننده‌ی دنیای غرب راهی جز تعقیب و اجرای فرمول‌های حکیم فرموده برایشان موجود نباشد.

ما معتقدیم که راه‌حل‌های پیشنهادی مکتب اسلام نه‌تنها می‌تواند به بهترین وجه پاسخگوی مشکلات جامعه ما باشد، بلکه می‌تواند به بسیاری از سوالات دنیای غیرمسلمان نیز پاسخ منطقی و عملی بدهد. این صرف یک ادعا نیست، تاریخ در برابر ماست و با قاطعیت گواه صادق این واقعیت است.

رویه ما در تنظیم این مقالات بر آنست که حتی‌الامکان، اطلاعات بیشتری در اختیار خواننده بگذاریم و کمتر به اثبات آنها پردازیم. ما اگر سعی کنیم حقایق اسلامی را صرفاً به‌طور واضح و بی‌پیرایه بیان کنیم، خود آنها آنچنان قاطع و طبیعی هستند که نظر هر انسان واقع‌بین حقیقت‌جویی را جلب می‌نمایند.

اگرچه سید جمال‌الدین اسدآبادی، برای اولین بار واژه سوسیالیسم را برای اقتصاد اسلامی بکار برده است، و امروزه نیز همراه با رشد و توسعه جنبش نوین فکری در دنیای اسلام هر روز بیشتر و بیشتر مایه واژه‌هایی چون «سوسیالیسم اسلامی»، «سوسیالیسم عرب»، «سوسیالیسم تحقیقی»، «سوسیالیسم برپایه خداپرستی» که همه معرف یک واقعیت اقتصاد اسلامی هستند برخورد می‌کنیم اما ما در اینجا بنا به دلایلی از بکار بردن و اطلاق هر نوع واژه‌ای برای سیستم اقتصاد اسلامی خودداری می‌کنیم. در مفهوم و محتوای سوسیالیسم، میان طرفداران و معتقدین بدان، به قدری اختلاف وجود دارد که انطباق و به‌کار بردن این واژه را بر اقتصاد اسلامی مشکل می‌سازد. این از آن جهت نیست که در مقام مقایسه اصولی کلی قبول شده سوسیالیسم با اقتصاد اسلامی، تناقضاتی وجود داشته باشد، بلکه

برعکس شاید از جهاتی اقتصاد اسلامی به مراتب از افراطی‌ترین مکاتب سوسیالیستی افراطی‌تر باشد. در بحث راه طی شده در سیر اقتصادی خواهیم دید که این یک ادعا نیست چه در سیر تکاملی عقاید اقتصادی که امروز عقاید سوسیالیستی، یک مرحله از این تکامل را معرفی می‌کند، اسلام در مراحل بسیار جلوتر قرار دارد و شاید تنها حسن و فایده اطلاق سوسیالیسم بر سیستم اقتصاد اسلامی، همراه شدن با این جذب و کششی است که امروز در میان قشر روشنفکر ملل محروم درباره کلمه سوسیالیسم وجود دارد. به هر حال ما می‌کوشیم تا حد امکان اصول این سیستم اقتصادی را بیان کنیم تشخیص اینکه چنین سیستمی در ماهیت سوسیالیستی است یا نه، بر عهده خوانندگان ما خواهد بود. صفحات مکتب مبارز برای هرگونه بحث، سوال، انتقاد باز است و ما نه تنها از آنها استقبال می‌کنیم بلکه از همه علاقمندان انتظار دریافت کمک فکری و انتقاد علمی را داریم.

بخش اول - مقدمه

قبل از ورود به بحث اصلی لازم است سلسله نکاتی را که توجه به آنها در مطالعه و قضاوت درباره اقتصاد اسلامی ضروریست، توضیح داده شوند. این نکات به‌طور خلاصه عبارتند از:

نکته اول: اسلام به عنوان یک مکتب و نه یک مذهب

اسلام به آن معنا که در غرب مصطلح است مذهب نیست، بلکه یک مکتب یا Institution می‌باشد. منظور ما از مکتب در اینجا عبارتست از (مجموعه‌ای از اصول معین و مشخص شده یا مقررات و قوانین اساسی در تمام زمینه‌های حیات بشری)^۱ به عبارت دیگر با توجه به چنین مفهوم و تعریفی، اسلام تنها مذهب یک اعتقاد به قدرت یا قدرت‌های مافوق بشری که باید از آن تبعیت کرد، نیست. عدم توجه به یک چنین واقعیتی در مورد اسلام و انطباق مفهوم مذهب در غرب بر محتوای اسلام موجب بسیاری از عدم تفاهمات شده است. روشنفکران ما براساس چنین عدم درکی از محتوای اسلام از طرفی و از طرف دیگر به علت غریب‌زدگی همان قضاوت و عکس‌العملی را که در غرب نسبت به مسیحیت وجود دارد، در

1. Webster dictionary

مورد اسلام نیز نشان می‌دهند و لذا برای آنها خیلی عجیب است وقتی ما صحبت از اقتصاد اسلامی می‌نماییم یا صحبت از دولت اسلامی می‌شود. شعار جدایی مذهب از دولت، در غرب به هیچ وجه با مفاهیم اسلامی تطبیق نمی‌کند.

بر همین اساس اسلام به آن معنا که مارکس مذهب را تعریف می‌کند، مذهب نیست. مارکس با مطالعه کلیسا در غرب است که معتقد است مذهب عبارتست از یک سلسله اوراد و ادعیه که توسط گروهی به نام روحانی اجرا می‌گردد. در اسلام کلیسا به آن معنای مسیحیت وجود ندارد و روحانیت به آن صورت که در مسیحیت تعیین‌کننده تام همه نوع مقررات مذهبی باشد وجود ندارد. متأسفانه نویسندگان مارکسیست ایرانی نیز بدون توجه به یک چنین تفاوت فاحشی عیناً قضاوت مارکس را که متوجه مسیحیت است، به اسلام نیز تعمیم می‌دهند. اما چون در عمل چنین نیست با واقعیات غیرقابل انکاری روبرو می‌شوند که عکس‌العمل طبیعی آنها موجب تناقض آشکار میان گفته‌ها و نوشته‌های آنان و تعلیمات مارکس می‌گردد.^۱

امروز به‌طور جهانی و بین‌المللی قبول شده است که اسلام به عنوان یک مکتب فکری در تمام زمینه‌های فعالیت بشری از قبیل دولت، جامعه، اقتصاد، ازدواج و خانواده، تعلیم و تربیت، جنگ و صلح، دموکراسی و ... نظر می‌دهد. اسلام نه تنها رابطه میان خدا و بشر را تعیین می‌کند، بلکه با آموزش هدف و محتوای حیات این رابطه را به‌صورت یک دینامیسم و نیروی محرکه انقلابی تبدیل می‌کند. رابطه‌ای که نمی‌تواند از آن نوعی باشد که کاری به کار اعمال روزانه ما نداشته باشد و یا رابطه‌ای باشد که عملاً به‌صورت «تریاک توده‌ها» درآید. اسلام نه تنها تریاک توده‌ها نیست، بلکه نمونه‌های بسیار فراوان در همین سالیان اخیر در برابر ما وجود دارند که تریاق یا آنتی‌دوت (Antidote) بسیاری از سموم اجتماعی در سطح ملی و جهانی می‌باشد.

نکته دوم - روابط درونی و متقابل میان قسمت‌های مختلف در اسلام

گفتیم اسلام یک مکتب است. میان این اصول معین اسلام در زمینه‌های مختلف حیات بشری یک رابطه ارگانیک و درونی وجود دارد. هرکدام از این اصول با

۱. به نشریات حزب توده ایران در ایام محرم و مقالات مربوط به قیام حسین بن علی (ع) و همچنین مقاله (اسلام و نهضت رهایی‌بخش میهن ما) مجله دنیا، تابستان ۴۴ مراجعه شود.

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دیگری مربوط و بدان وابسته است. محتوای دولت را از سیستم اقتصادی و هردوی اینها را از سطح اخلاق اجتماعی توده مردم نمی‌توان جدا ساخت. قضاوت راجع به جنگ در اسلام بدون توجه به رسالت مسلمانان در رهایی توده‌ها از زیر یوغ بندگی زور و زورمسلماً بسیار سطحی و نارسا خواهد بود. در مسأله اقتصاد اسلامی نیز این رابطه را با سایر قسمت‌ها نباید از نظر دور داشت.

نکته سوم - جهان‌بینی اسلام

با توجه به نکته اول و دوم اشاره‌ای به مسأله جهان‌بینی اسلام که زیربنای قسمت‌های مختلف مکتب فکری می‌باشد ضروری است. به‌طور خلاصه جهان‌بینی عبارتست از:

الف. هدف در آفرینش و هستی: «بودن» و «وجود» هیچ فنومن و پدیده‌ای در تمام کائنات و هستی بدون هدف و یا عبث نیست.

- افحسبتم انما خلقناکم عبثاً - آیا گمان می‌کنید که شما را بیهوده خلق کرده‌ایم؟
(سوره ۲۳، آیه ۱۱۵)

- ربنا ما خلقت هذا باطلا سبجانک - پروردگارا تو منزه‌ای (دوری) از این که این آسمان‌ها و زمین را بیهوده خلق کرده باشی (سوره ۳، آیه ۱۹۱)
- و ما خلقنا السماء و الارض و ما بینهما باطلا - ما آسمان و زمین و آنچه میان آنهاست بیهوده خلق نکردیم (سوره ۳۸ آیه ۲۷)

و انسان هم به عنوان یکی از اجزاء طبیعت تحت کنترل همان قوانین قرار دارد:
- ایحسب الانسان ان یترک سوی - آیا انسان می‌پندارد که رها گذارده شده؟ (سوره ۷۵، آیه ۳۶)

ب. حرکت دائمی و پیوسته: دنیای ما و تمام هستی از کمترین ذره تا بزرگترین ستارگان همه در حال حرکت هستند. دنیای ما دنیای استاتیک نیست. حرکت را از وجود نمی‌توان جدا ساخت. چه حرکت خود عین وجود است.

ج. جهت حرکت: حرکت یک امر نسبی است که آن را با مقایسه واقعیت دیگری بیان می‌کنند. حرکت نمی‌تواند فاقد جهت باشد. اگر درست است که تمام هستی و محتوای آن در حال حرکت دائم و لایزال می‌باشد، جهت این حرکت به کجاست؟

۴۲۶ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

پاسخ اسلام: حرکت به جانب خداست.

- الیه مرجعکم جمیعا - بازگشت همگی شما به سوی اوست (سوره ۱۰، آیه ۴)
- ثم الیه ترجعون - سپس به سوی او بازگردانیده می‌شوید (سوره ۳۹، آیه ۴۴)
- و ان الی ربک المنتهی - پایان زندگی به سوی پروردگار توست (سوره ۵۳، آیه ۴۲)

- انا لله و انا الیه راجعون - ما از خداییم و به سوی او بازگشت می‌کنیم (سوره ۲، آیه ۱۵۶)

- هو الذی... و الیه تحشرون - او (خدا) کسی است که... به سوی او برگردانیده شوید (سوره ۶۷، آیه ۲۴)

- یا ایها الانسان... الی ربک کدحا فملاقیه - ای انسان (در حرکت) به سوی پروردگارت رنج و مشقت می‌کشی ولی بالاخره به او خواهی رسید (سوره ۸۴، آیه ۶)

آیا خداوند در جایی قرار دارد و مستقر است که ما و تمام موجودات در حرکت دائم و پیوسته خود به طرف آن مکان پیش می‌رویم؟ مسلماً خیر. خداوند کمال مطلق است، علم مطلق است، نظم مطلق است. صفات خداوند از ذات خداوند جدا نیستند به عبارت دیگر جهت تمام کائنات و وجود به جانب بهتر شدن و توسعه دانش که کشف قوانین طبیعت است، حرکت می‌کند. سیر قهقرایی وجود ندارد. به قول طالقانی: «حرکت عین بقاء و کمال و حیات است» و «غریزه و فطرت بقاء» و کمال و گریز از مرگ و فنا، جویای راهی است که پیش برود و در آن توقف و سکون پیش نیاید و این همان «صراط المستقیم است» و «طلب صراط المستقیم» مطلوب ذاتی انسان، بلکه هر موجود زنده است. سر حرکت ذاتی و جوهری و اصل تکامل همین رسیدن به صراط است.^۱ و این چنین جهت‌گیری خاص انسان نیست بلکه:

د. تمام هستی به عبادت خدا مشغول است.

- یسبح له ما فی السموات و الارض (سوره ۵۹، آیه ۲۴)

۱. پرتوی از قرآن، طالقانی، شرکت انتشار

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- یَسْبَحُ اللَّهُ ما فی السموات و ما فی الارض (سوره ۶۴، آیه ۱ و ۱-۶۲)
- سَبَّحَ اللَّهُ ما فی السموات و ما فی الارض (سوره ۶۱، آیه ۱ و ۱-۵۷ و ۱-۵۹)
- خدای را تسبیح گوید آنچه در آسمانها و آنچه در زمین است.
- و ما خلقت الجن والانس الا ليعبدون - جن و آدمی را نیافریدیم تا مگر مرا پرستش کنند (سوره ۵۱، آیه ۵۶)

تسبیح از لغت سباحه به معنای شناوری و شناکردن مشتق است. در اصطلاح آن را به معنای پاک دانستن خدا نیز به کار می‌برند. حقیقت تسبیح خدا یا تسبیح حمد و ستایش خدا که در نماز می‌خوانیم عبارتست از کوشش و حرکت مستمر و دائم به سوی کمال و خیر مطلق و رهایی از آلودگی و ضعف و جهل و بردگی است. لذا تمام موجودات از کمترین سلول بدن ما تا بزرگترین پدیده‌ها دارای این خاصیت تکاملی هستند و از نظر جهان‌بینی اسلام هدف حیات انسان همراهی با تمام کائنات در حرکت به سوی چنین کمال و بهتر شدن خلاصه می‌شود.

هـ. **مفهوم عبادت:** و لذا براساس تعریف بالا عبادت خدا، در اسلام تنها نماز و اعمال مذهبی نمی‌باشد. نماز و روزه و غیره قسمتی از عبادت هستند هر حرکت یا جنبشی از طرف ما که با خلوص نیت و در جهت بهتر شدن، رهایی از جهل، بردگی، حرکت برای کشف رموز و اسرار هستی (علم) باشد، عبادت محسوب می‌شود و این همان عبادت «فی سبیل الله» یا «قربه الی الله» است که ما در بسیاری از اعمال خود موظف هستیم در نظر بگیریم. به عبارت دیگر قید فی سبیل الله یعنی گریز از کارهای بی‌هدف، عاطل و باطل و در عوض جهت دادن به کوچکترین کاری است که انجام می‌دهیم. لذا اعمال روزانه ما دارای معنا و محتوای می‌شود، آگاهی و هشیاری ما وسعت می‌یابد. این خود وحدت تمام هستی است. عدم جدایی انسان از طبیعت و کائنات است. تمام موجودات در حرکت خود متوجه چنین راه و مسیری هستند، انسان باید این راه را با عقل و اراده طی کند اما سایر موجودات، آن را با غریزه طی می‌کنند.

و. **یک مقیاس برای سنجش عملی:** جامعه جانشین خداست. در بحث آینده به‌طور مبسوط‌تری شرح خواهیم داد که جامعه، یعنی تمام انسان‌ها به‌طور کامل جانشین خدا در روی زمین هستند و لذا در سنجش اعمال روزانه خود وقتی

بخواهیم قید فی سبیل‌الله را در نظر بگیریم همه برمی‌گردد به فی سبیل‌المجتمع یعنی منافع بشریت. منافع انسان‌ها. به عبارت دیگر چوب ذرعی که ما اعمال روزانه خود را با آن بسنجیم که از خط مستقیم در راه خدا خارج نشویم. سنجش با راه ملت و جامعه و منافع آن است. منافع به‌طور عام و وسیع نه براساس معتقدات توده مردم و احساسات آنها یا قضاوت روز در جامعه که چه بسا مضر به حال بشریت باشد.

نکته چهارم: سه‌بعدی ایمان، عمل صالح، تقوی

اگر درست است که اعمال ما کوچک یا بزرگ نمی‌توانند بدون هدف باشند و انسان بی‌هدف اگر مرده نباشد بیشتر از مرده هم نیست و همراه با تمام موجودات جهان هستی انسان هم باید با آگاهی در فعل و انفعالات حیاتی شرکت کند، در آن صورت شکل واضح و عملی این ضرورت رابطه متقابل میان ایمان و عمل و تقوی خواهد بود. ستون فقرات سیستم حاکم را در جامعه اسلامی این سه عامل تشکیل می‌دهند و از نظر معنای لغوی و مفهوم آن به‌طور خلاصه ایمان از افعال آمن هست یعنی رسانیدن خود یا دیگران به امنیت و درامان قرارگرفتن. در فارسی ایمان را به گراییدن که پیوستگی وجود را می‌رساند، مانند گراییدن جسم به آتش که اندک اندک با آن جور می‌شود. در اصطلاح، ایمان و عشق و علاقه تعظیم و تقدیس و پیوستگی می‌باشد. طلب امنیت و گریز از فنا، انسان را پیوسته به تلاش وامی‌دارد تا تأمین خاطر نماید. ایمان درک نقشه سعادت فرد و جامعه است. هر عمل صالحی باید از مبدأ ایمان باشد. ولی ایمان تنها منشأ عمل صالح نمی‌گردد. ایمان خود منشأ عمل صالح می‌باشد و در بسیاری از موارد مقصود از ایمان همان عمل صالح است.^۱ اما در معنای عمل صالح: هر چیزی که مستلزم صرف زحمت و جلب مقصودی باشد، عمل است و همیشه لازم نیست عمل یا کار معنای مکانیک و صورت مادی داشته باشد. کسی که حاضر شود درباره پادشاه ظالمی جرأت به خرج داده خود را به خطر بیاندازد و حرف حقی را ادا کند، کار بزرگی کرده است. معلم یا خطیبی هم که از روی مطالعه و دقت، کلام بامعنای مفیدی را بیان می‌کند

۱. پرتوی از قرآن، طالقانی، شرکت انتشار

را اهل حرف یا اشخاص بی‌ارج نمی‌دانند. حتی نشستن و فکر کردن برای کشف مجهولات باز عمل است. ولی آب در هاون کوبیدن، ورزیدن، بدیهیات نوشتن، خیالبافی کردن و هرگونه آثاری که خالی از فایده یا عاری از زحمت باشد کار نیست... در فارسی کلمه صالح را شایسته ترجمه می‌نماییم.^۱

اما تقوی - تقوی لغت ویژه قرآن است. به معنای وقایه گرفتن. وقایه وسیله نگهداری و مانع در میان است، مانند سپر و لباس زمستانی و آنچه که حدی را نگه دارد یا از آسیبی انسان را باز دارد. ترمز ماشین را هم وقایه می‌گویند. طالقانی آن را به جای پرهیز به پروا ترجمه کرده است. «متقین یعنی پرواپیشگان» از جهت فردی وجدان آگاه و فعال که شهوت خشم و عواطف را از سرکشی و تصادم با حقوق دیگران بازدارد، خود وقایه نفس انسان است و صاحب آن متقی یا پرواپیشه است. اما از جهت اجتماعی: نگهداری حدود و اجزاء قوانین به وسیله قوای انتظامی و اجرایی تحت فرمان قوای عقلی حکام و دانشمندان تقوای اجتماعی و سیاسی نامیده می‌شود. اگر تقوای اجتماعی برقرار ماند هر طبقه و فردی از سرمایه‌های مادی و معنوی درست بهره‌مند می‌گردد و راه تکامل پیش می‌گیرد. عکس این موجب اختلال در جامعه خواهد بود.

با توجه به مفاهیم سه‌گانه بالا است که در اسلام شرط پیروزی و سعادت را در هماهنگی عمل و پراتیک میان این سه فاکتور می‌داند - از ۱۲۸ آیه که در قرآن در شروط رستگاری آمده است عوامل مؤثر به قرار زیرند:^۲

ایمان و عمل صالح، ۸۴ آیه

ایمان و تقوی، ۲۴ آیه

ایمان به تنهایی، ۷ آیه

غیرمشخص، ۳ آیه

ایمان، عمل، تقوی، ۲ آیه

تقوی به تنهایی، ۱ آیه

۱. کار در اسلام، مهندس مهدی بازرگان، شرکت انتشار

۲. کار در اسلام، مهندس مهدی بازرگان، شرکت انتشار

نکته پنجم: حقوق و احتیاجات

یک تفاوت اساسی میان حق و احتیاج وجود دارد. حق یک پایه و استدلال فلسفی - نظری دارد. درحالی که احتیاج یک پایه و مفهوم علمی دارد. احتیاج براساس شناخت درون انسان یا جامعه استوار است. آنچه را که ما در بسیاری موارد به نام حق بیان می‌کنیم در واقع حق نیستند بلکه احتیاج اند. مثلاً حق اظهار نظر آزادانه قبل از آنکه حق باشد، احتیاج است. امروزه ثابت شده است که آزادی بیان جزو احتیاجات روانی ماست و هر نوع ممانعت در جواب به این احتیاج موجب اختلالات روانی می‌گردد. بر همین اساس محرک اقتصاد از نظر اسلامی به صورت یک احتیاج نفسانی انسان مورد بحث قرار گرفته است^۱ و تأمین اقتصادی به عنوان پاسخ به فطرت و به این احتیاج نفسانی می‌باشد.

نکته ششم: شریعت ثابت و فقه متحرک

اگر درست است که:

۱. انسان برخوردار از غرایز و قدرتهای نفسانی می‌باشد،
۲. اساس این غرایز درانسان، صرف نظر از زمان و مکان، ثابت و لایتغیر هستند،
۳. منبع و مبدأ و محرک روابط فردی و اجتماعی انسانها براساس این غرایز استوار است و
۴. هدف هر نظام و سازمان اجتماعی، قوانین و مقررات آن است که این «روابط انسانی» را کنترل و منظم نماید.

بنابراین ضروری و منطقی به نظر می‌رسد که اساس و پایه یا زیربنای نظری ثابتی برای قوانین وجود داشته باشد. اساس ثابتی که لایتغیر و بالاتر از زمان و مکان باشد و قوانین که باید دائم متناسب با زمان و مکان تغییر یابند، از این اصول ثابت استخراج گردند. **الکسیس کارل**، بیولوژیست معروف چنین احتیاجی را به این صورت مطرح می‌سازد که در «جهان یک نظم قطعی برقرار است، طبیعت نمی‌تواند هوسباز باشد... اعتقاد به یک شکل اصلی، حقیقت موجود علم گردیده است... تمام تحقیقات علمی با ایمان به نظم عقلانی طبیعت آغاز می‌گردد. ترقیات

۱. مالکیت در اسلام، محمود طالقانی، شرکت انتشار

شگفت‌انگیز علمی نشان داده است که این اعتقاد نه تنها خرافات نیست بلکه شاهد صادقی در نظم جهان است... سپس کارل بحث می‌کند که «انسان نیز جزو طبیعت است و محکوم مقررات و اصولیست... ما گمان می‌بریم که مستقل از نظم طبیعت هستیم و آزادیم که به میل خود رفتار کنیم و نمی‌خواهیم بفهمیم که رهبری زندگی نیز مستلزم اطاعت از بعضی قوانین است... اما این قوانین چه‌ها هستند و کجا باید آنها را جستجو کرد؟ او می‌نویسد: «... ما با تمام پیشرفتمان در علوم، ستارگان و اتم را خیلی بهتر از روان خود می‌شناسیم... در قلمرو ماده بی‌جان علم پیروز شده است... ما فعال مایشاء زمین شدیم ولی در قلمرو بشری یعنی در راه و رسم زندگی فردی و اجتماعی، علم شکست خورده است... موقعیت زندگی اخلاقی و اجتماعی ما بلاشک بستگی به اصولی دارد که در عین پیچیدگی، چون اصول فیزیکی قطعی است. اما ما این اصول را هنوز نمی‌شناسیم».^۱ برای شناخت باید چه کرد؟ او جواب مطمئنی ندارد. کارل فقط به وجود این احتیاج اشاره می‌کند و برای جستجوی راه حل او پیشنهاد می‌کند که: «مؤسسه‌هایی با ریاست مردانی بسیار هوشمند و آزاد از قید تمام عقاید و آرا لازم است به مطالعه ترکیب آدمی نه تجزیه کیفیات بدنی و روانی تأسیس گردند تا مسایل فیزیولوژی و روانی را از نقطه نظر کاملاً انسانی‌اش مطالعه کنند...». هدایت مرکز تربیت انسان‌های برجسته هرگز نباید به دست متخصصین بیولوژی یا روانشناسی یا هر علم دیگری بیفتد... و تعجب‌آور است که کارل می‌نویسد مرکز چنین مؤسسه‌ای باید «در اروپا که مدنیت را در آغوش خود پرورش داده است باشد...».^۲

اسلام نه تنها مسأله را به صورت کلی مطرح می‌سازد بلکه جواب و پاسخ و راه حل خود را نیز ارائه می‌دهد. از نظر اسلامی غرایز و محرکات و احساساتی که وجود و تجلی و فعل و انفعال آنها مصون از دستبرد زمان و مکان در شرایط عادی است، به عنوان مجموعه انگیزه یا فطرت خوانده می‌شود و آن راه و رسمی که راه حل‌های خود را بر اساس این فطرت بنا بنهد، یک راه و رسم یا طرز تفکر یا مکتب پابرجا و دائم یا به اصطلاح قرآن: «ذالک الدین القیم - اسلام مکتب

۱. راه و رسم زندگی، الکسیس کارل، ترجمه دکتر دبیری

۲. انسان موجود ناشناخته، الکسیس کارل، ترجمه دکتر دبیری

پابرجاییست (سوره ۳۰، آیه ۳۰) و شریعت قوانینی است که «بر روی اساس این احتیاجات تکوینی و واقعی انسان مستقر شده است» و چون همان‌طور که گفتیم احتیاجات فطری یا غریزی انسان قابل تحول و در معرض تغییر نیست، بنابراین شریعت یک امر ثابت و لایتغیر است. اما فقه استخراج قوانین از مصدر شریعت برای رفع احتیاجات روزمره بشر می‌باشد. فقه برخلاف شریعت «عنصر متجدد و سیالی است که هیچ‌گاه و در هیچ زمانی متوقف و راکد نمی‌ماند و هرگاه با موانعی از خارج برخورد نکند، اوضاع و احوال متحول و متغیر زندگی را با اصول ثابت و تغیرناپذیر شریعت وفق می‌دهد».^۱

البته امروزه متأسفانه فقه دچار یک جمود و رکود عمیقی شده است که به کلی ناقص و ناجور به نظر می‌رسد. این جمود محصول و معلول جمود عمومی است که در قرون اخیر برای افکار همه مسلمانان و جامعه اسلامی پیش آمده است.^۲ در اقتصاد اسلامی یک زیربنای نظری و یک محتوای عملی وجود دارد که مجموعه آن جزو شریعت است و ترسیم چنین سیستمی براساس شناخت فطرت یا همان احتیاجات تکوینی انسان استوار است. فقه اسلامی طی قرون دربارہ مسایل اقتصادی آن چنان عمیق و وسیع شده است که مطالعه و بررسی آن به آسانی برای هرکس میسر نیست و بسیاری از محتوای آن نیز خارج از دستور و احتیاج روز می‌باشد.

نکته هفتم: پاسخ به سه احتیاج اساسی بشر - راه طی شده

گفتیم که هدف و منظور از خلقت و هستی حرکت به طرف کمال است و انسان نیز «جزء غیرمستقلی است که از آفرینش عمومی منفصل نیست و طبیعت عمومی آفرینش هریک از اجزاء خود را به هدف و کمال وجودی لایق خود می‌رساند و رهبری می‌نماید».

«محرک و انگیزه چنین حرکتی در غیر انسان صرف غریزه است درحالی که در انسان عقل و اراده نیز وجود دارد و انسان نوعی است که به سوی مقاصد زندگی و هدف و کمال خود با شعور و اراده رهسپار می‌شود...».^۳ بنابراین برای اینکه انسان

۱. برهان قرآن، سید صدرالدین بلاغی

۲. اسلام و مالکیت، سید محمود طالقانی

۳. مرجعیت و روحانیت، مقاله ولایت و زعامت، علامه طباطبایی، شرکت انتشار

بتواند در این مسیر طبیعی سیر کند و حرکت نماید به مقدماتی احتیاج دارد و این احتیاجات او باید برآورده شوند. این احتیاجات اساسی بر پایه ساختمان عمومی انسان و محرکات او مربوط به اراده و عقل و غرایز در انسان است و لذا:

۱. **رهایی فکر، اندیشه و عقل:** در دنیای امروز با پیشرفت علوم و دانش بشری ما می‌دانیم که بدترین انواع استعمار جدید و قدیم، استعمار و استثمار فکری بوده است و می‌باشد. هیچ ملت و هیچ مردمی قادر به مبارزه با استعمار نیستند مگر آنکه ابتدا خود را از قید بندهای استعمار فکری رهایی بخشند. بردگی فکر و اندیشه یک نوع نیست، انواع مختلف و متعدد دارد. اما همه از یک شکل اصلی سرچشمه می‌گیرند. لذا کوشش اسلام در بنای یک اجتماع آباد و آزاد قبل از هر چیز، قبل از ارائه راه حل‌های اقتصادی و سیاسی و غیره آزادساختن عقل‌ها و افکار است. آزادی و رهایی از قید و بست سنن و آداب و رسوم قبیله‌گی، میهنی، نژادی و هر نوع دیگری.

از نظر منطق اسلامی آلودگی فکر به هرچه غیر از خدا - کمال مطلوب و مطلق - بردگی فکری است. در فعالیت‌های فردی و اجتماعی توجه و جهت‌گیری به هرسو و به هرکس و به هر فکر و به هر مطلوبی که پایین از خدا و غیر خدا باشد بردگی فکری بوده و مانع تکامل و ترقی انسانی خواهد شد.

در اصطلاح قرآنی برای چنین مفهومی طاغوت ذکر شده است و هدف نهایی و اساسی دعوت همه پیامبران، رهایی انسان‌ها از بردگی طاغوت می‌باشد.

- ولقد بعثنا فی کل الامه رسولا ان اعبدوا الله واجتنبوا الطاغوت (سوره ۶، آیه ۳۶)
از هر ملتی پیامبری برانگیختیم تا مردم خدا را پرستش کنند و از طاغوت دوری گزینند.

از نظر لغوی طاغوت «به هر متعدی و متجاوز، پیشوایان گمراه و کاهن و شیطان و هر کس که مردم را از طریق خیر و کمال بازدارد و به هر معبودی غیر از خدا وادارد، گفته می‌شود. هر جبار و متکبر و سرکش و احمق طاغوت است... لقب پادشاهان روم و ایران را نیز طاغوت می‌خوانند...^۱

۱. آغاز وحی یا تفسیر سوره علق، محمد تقی شریعتی مزینانی

۴۳۴ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

و لذا یک جنگ آزادیبخش برای آزادساختن و رهایی انسان‌ها از هر نوع طاغوتی، از تمام انواع آن، رسالت جاودانی هر انسان خداپرست و مسلمان است و هر انسان خداپرست مسلمان خود باید اول به این مرحله از آزادی فکر و اندیشه برسد. رهایی از قید بردگی اندیشه و عقل.

۲. رهایی و آزادی اراده انسان‌ها

گفتیم وجه تمایز دیگر انسان از غیر انسان اراده است. اراده انسان باید آزاد باشد. انسانی که نتواند اندیشه‌های خود را آزادانه بیان کند و عمل کند خداپرست نیست. مجموعه این آزادی‌ها در یک سطح کلی‌تر، همان چیز است که امروزه به نام دموکراسی در غرب مطرح می‌باشد. میلیون‌ها انسان برای برخورداری از چنین آزادی‌هایی خود را فدا می‌سازند.

۳. آزادی اقناع غرایز

عدم ارضاء منطقی غرایز منجر به ایجاد عقده‌ها و پیچیدگی‌های روحی می‌گردد. برای جلوگیری از بروز پیچیدگی‌های روانی باید غرایز انسانی به‌طور طبیعی ارضاء گردند و ارضاء این غرایز هدف نیست بلکه وسیله است. در یک جامعه سعادت‌مند، آزاد و آبادی که اندیشه‌ها و اراده آزاد در تکاپوی دائم برای بهتر شدن و کامل‌تر شدن باشند، باید غرایز ارضاء شده باشند. به عبارت دیگر انسان‌های محروم تا زمانی که برای تغییر وضع خود حرکت و جنبشی ننمایند، نمی‌توانند خداپرست باشند. در جامعه‌ای که اکثریت آن محروم و تحت سلطه استعمار یا استبداد به سر می‌برد، عملاً عبادت خدا امکان‌پذیر نیست. در میان غرایز دو گزینه گرسنگی و شهوت قوی‌ترین محرک می‌باشند و لذا در اسلام به عنوان وسیله و مقدمه برای تکامل اجتماعی ارضاء این گزینه را به‌طور آزادانه - نه هرج و مرج ضروری می‌داند. بحث گزینه جنسی و آزادی ارضاء آن در اسلام خود موضوع دیگری است. در اینجا در بحث اقتصاد اسلامی به‌طوری که خواهیم دید اسلام می‌کوشد که با ارائه راه حل‌های خود، به یک احتیاج نفسانی و اساسی انسان جواب مساعدی بدهد. این تأمین اقتصادی هدف نیست بلکه وسیله و مقدمه‌ای برای ایجاد و فراهم‌ساختن شرایط مساعد جهت پرستش خدا، عبادت و حرکت به سوی کمال و به عبارت وسیع‌تر همراهی با نظام هستی و تمام کائنات می‌باشد.

بازرگان در کتاب راه طی شده نشان می‌دهد که بشر در قرون گذشته همیشه با سرسختی از قبول دعوت انبیاء سرپیچی کرده است. اما همین بشر با طی راه‌های سخت‌تر و طولانی‌تری به تدریج به راه انبیاء نزدیک‌تر شده و می‌شود و بشر بالاخره روزی با تلاش و کوشش خود به این راه، به‌طور کامل خواهد رسید. انبیاء دعوت - کنندگان بشر به حقیقت و واقعیت واحدی معتقد بوده‌اند که عملاً انسان طی جریان (پروسه) طبیعی حقیقت‌جویی خود که جزو فطرت اوست به آن نزدیک می‌گردد.

مطالعه و بررسی پیدایش عقاید اقتصادی از ابتدای تاریخ تا عصر حاضر نشان دهنده واقعیت راه طی شده در سطح مسایل اقتصادی نیز می‌باشد. امروزه دموکراسی و سوسیالیسم در مفهوم کلی خود صرف نظر از نواقص یا انحرافات، اختلاف درباره محتوای آنها، به عنوان مرحله‌ای از سیر تکاملی آراء و عقاید بشری در دو زمینه اساسی حیات می‌باشد. میلیون‌ها انسان مجذوب دموکراسی و سوسیالیسم - وبه خاطر آن حاضر به همه نوع قربانی هستند - در همان مفهوم کلی انعکاس روح حق‌طلبی و حقیقت‌جویی بشر می‌باشند که کار و تلاش مداوم و مستمر میلیون‌ها انسان را منعکس می‌سازد و این بزرگترین پیروزی بشر در شناخت قوانین طبیعت می‌باشد. اما یک اختلاف اساسی وجود دارد؛ بشر به هر دوی اینها به عنوان هدف می‌نگرد نه وسیله.

مکتب اسلام راه حل‌های پیشنهادی خود را برای استقرار دموکراسی و سوسیالیسم (یا هر اسم دیگری که شما بگذارید) به عنوان وسایل ذکر می‌کند و هدف را بالاتر از این سطح قرار می‌دهد. اما با توجه به منحنی تغییرات و تطورات حرکت بشر و مقایسه آن با راه اسلام پیش‌بینی اینکه حرکت بشر به کدام جهت است، مشکل نیست. مشکل نیست که بتوان پیش‌بینی کرد که دیر یا زود در اولین فرصتی که استعمار و استثمار در سطح ملی و جهانی از بین برود بشر به جستجوی هدف و کشف آن به‌طور عمومی نائل خواهد شد. امروز بشر نمی‌خواهد باور کند که دموکراسی و سوسیالیسم وسیله هستند نه هدف، اما دیر یا زود آن را قبول خواهد کرد.

«توین بی» مورخ معروف معاصر پیش‌بینی می‌کند که ما به‌سوی خروج از عصر پیچیدگی‌های وسیع مادی و ورود به یک عصری که حقایق روحی روانی زندگی را عمیق‌تر خواهد ساخت، حرکت می‌کنیم.

در قسمت بعدی زیربنای نظری اقتصاد اسلامی، محتوای عملی اقتصاد اسلامی مورد بحث خواهد بود.

اقتصاد اسلامی - بخش دوم

زیربنای نظری (تئوریک) اقتصاد اسلامی، مکتب مبارز - پاییز ۱۳۴۶/۱۹۶۷ در شماره قبل گفتیم که اسلام به عنوان یک ایدئولوژی جهانی در تمام زمینه‌های حیات بشری اظهار نظر می‌نماید و راه حل‌های خود را به طور قاطع عرضه می‌دارد. مطالعه و بحث و داوری درباره یک قسمت از ایدئولوژی اسلام بدون توجه و در نظر گرفتن روابط متقابل میان قسمت‌های مختلف موجب نتیجه‌گیری‌های ناروا و غلط خواهد شد.

از نقطه نظر رابطه میان اقتصاد اسلامی و سایر جنبه‌های فردی و اجتماعی اسلام اشاره کردیم که اسلام قبل از آنکه به ارائه و اجرای سیستم اقتصادی خود پردازد می‌کوشد تا «آدم» بسازد. سیستم‌های اجتماعی به خودی خود نمی‌توانند خلاق و موگد باشند. توده‌های مردمی که عوامل اجرایی هستند، در پیروزی یا شکست آنها دخالت دارند لذا اسلام قبل از هر چیز به تصفیه و خلوص محتوای جامعه می‌پردازد.

در بررسی مسائل اقتصادی ما به سه مطلب توجه داریم:

مطلب اول: اصول نظری (تئوریک) یا جهان‌بینی اقتصادی است که در هر مکتب یا ایدئولوژی اجتماعی براساس آن روابط انسان و جامعه را بررسی کرده و راه حل‌های خود را برای ایجاد جامعه‌ای با نظم اقتصادی مورد نظر پیشنهاد می‌نماید. این اصول بنیادی را به نام جهان‌بینی اقتصادی، مذهب اقتصاد یا فلسفه اقتصاد خوانده‌اند. تفاوت و تضاد در جهان‌بینی کلی یا بنیادی دو سیستم کاپیتالیستی و مارکسیستی است که رو بنای عملی و محتوای و شکل درونی مسائل اقتصادی را در این دو سیستم از هم متمایز می‌سازد. اسلام به عنوان یک دین کامل یا یک ایدئولوژی اجتماعی از روابط اقتصادی در جامعه غافل نیست و براساس جهان‌بینی خاص خود راه حل‌های مناسبی را جهت ایجاد یک جامعه سعادت‌مند و برخوردار از یک نظم اقتصادی پیشنهاد می‌نماید.

مطلب دوم: روبنای عملی یا پراتیک مسائل اقتصادی است. براساس اصول بنیادی است که در هر مکتب یا سیستمی اصول پراتیک و عملی آن مطرح می‌گردد. مثلاً در جامعه مارکسیستی که اساس فلسفه اقتصاد آن برپایه قبول و ایمان با اصالت طبقه کارگر و ارزش کار استوار است، نتیجه فوری و عملی آن از نظر روبنای اقتصادی رد و محو مالکیت‌های فردی و دولتی کردن وسایل تولید و توزیع می‌باشد. درحالی که در جامعه سرمایه‌داری که زیربنای تئوریک آن اصالت سرمایه و فرد را قبول کرده است، مسأله مالکیت‌های فردی به‌طور وسیع و سرمایه‌گذاری‌های خصوصی، شرکت‌های بزرگ و انحصارات و رقابت‌ها روبنای عملی روابط اقتصادی را تشکیل می‌دهد.

مطلب سوم: محتوای اقتصاد، جامعه است. این محتوا براساس دو مطلب بالا حاصل و ناشی از آن‌ها می‌باشد. درحالی که دو مطلب بالا قاعدتاً باید ثابت و لایتغیر باشند، مطلب سوم یعنی محتوای اقتصاد در جامعه دائم در حال تغییر و تبدیل است. محتوای اقتصادی جامعه متناسب با شرایط مکان و زمان و پیشرفت‌های اقتصادی، کشاورزی و صنعتی در حال تغییر است. ولی تغییرات این محتوی تابع اصول اساسی و عملی حاکم بر نظام اقتصادی جامعه می‌باشد. محتوای اقتصاد جامعه مارکسیستی نیز مانند سایر جوامع در حال تغییر است. آنچه محتوای اقتصاد روسیه شوروی در ۴۰ سال پیش بود با حالا تفاوت کرده است. اما تجزیه و تحلیل مشکلات اقتصادی و پیش‌بینی‌های ضروری و لازم به منظور حل آنها در طی دوران بعد از انقلاب اکتبر همیشه با الهام از اصول بنیادی و اساسی مارکسیسم - لنینیسم بوده است (یا حداقل می‌بایستی بوده باشد). انحراف از این اصول بنیادی تنها وقتی خواهد بود که در اساس جهان‌بینی و تحلیل روابط اقتصادی تناقضات دورنی یا عدم تفاهمات وجود داشته باشد. وقتی جهان‌بینی کلی یک ایدئولوژی - در اصل - در تحلیل پدیده‌های حیات و شناخت انسان دچار اشتباه باشد واضح است که روابط انسان‌ها را منجمله روابط اقتصادی را با تصور نادرستی بررسی می‌نماید. نتیجه این اشتباه در بررسی آن خواهد بود که در راه حل‌یابی مشکلات اقتصادی جامعه به عدول از اصول اساسی مجبور گردد. تناقضات دورنی در جهان‌بینی اقتصادی یک ایدئولوژی موجب خواهد شد که جامعه در جستجوی راه حل‌های مناسب برای مشکلات اقتصادی خود نه تنها آن را کنار می‌گذارد بلکه در

موارد خاص از ایدئولوژی متضاد با آن الهام می‌گیرد. مثلاً در اقتصاد سرمایه‌داری به علت تناقضات بنیادی که در اساس جهان‌بینی اقتصادی آن وجود دارد، جامعه سرمایه‌داری در جستجوی راه حل برای مشکلات اقتصادی به تغییراتی در روبنای اقتصاد عملی خود دست می‌زند که با اصول اساسی اقتصادی سرمایه‌داری تناقض آشکار دارد. در این تغییرات جامعه سرمایه‌داری به تدریج از اصول اساسی خود انحراف پیدا می‌کند. البته ممکن است جامعه سرمایه‌داری، به علل متعدد حاضر به قبول و اجرای این راه‌حل‌های مناسب نشود و در نتیجه عدم تعادل و تناقضات درونی به حدی زیاد شود که منجر به انقلابات عظیم اجتماعی گردد. مطالعه تغییرات درونی در جامعه سرمایه‌داری آمریکا به‌خوبی نشان می‌دهد که چگونه جامعه سرمایه‌داری با مشکلات اساسی روبرو می‌شود و چگونه به‌طور دائم در یک نزاع و جدال داخلی درگیر است. از یک طرف سرمایه‌داری آمریکا برای حفظ خود مجبور به قبول بسیاری از تغییرات می‌شود که این تغییرات در عین حال با اساس جهان‌بینی سرمایه‌داری مغایرت دارند. اما از جانب دیگر تسلیم شدن سرمایه‌داری به همین تغییرات تدریجی، جامعه را از یک انقلاب شدید ناگهانی حفظ می‌کند.

به همین ترتیب در جامعه مارکسیستی نیز ما شاهد تغییراتی هستیم که صرفاً تغییرات در محتواست که امری طبیعی و لازم نمی‌باشد بلکه تغییراتی است در روبنای عملی و پراتیک و متناقض و مغایر با جهان‌بینی اقتصاد مارکسیستی. به عنوان نمونه می‌توان مساله تفاوت دستمزدها، مالکیت فردی، بهره و نظایر آنها را مورد توجه قرار داد.

با توجه به این مقدمه، برای آنکه به بررسی راه‌حل‌های اسلامی در برابر مشکلات اقتصادی جامعه خودمان پردازیم، ضروری است که ابتدا به آن اصول اساسی یا نظری (تئوریک) اقتصاد اسلامی که زیربنای کلی را تشکیل می‌دهد توجه نماییم.

توجه و آشنایی و شناخت این اصول اساسی که به نام «شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی» می‌توان خواند در فهم و جهت‌گیری تجزیه و تحلیل مشکلات اقتصادی جوامع اسلامی نه تنها مفید است بلکه ضروری است. براساس این «شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی» است که علمای اقتصاد مسلمان باید به جستجوی راه‌حل‌های

مناسب و شکل دادن به محتوای اقتصادی مناسب با شرایط زمان و مکان پردازند. این عمل آنها، به عبارت دیگر همان کار فقه است چراکه فقیه باید از یک طرف شریعت را بشناسد (مجتهد باشد) و از طرف دیگر به احتیاجات زمان و امکانات عصر نیز واقف باشد تا بتواند با علم خود راه حل‌های «شرعی» را به جامعه عرضه نماید. محتوای اقتصاد سنتی در جوامع اسلامی در طی سالیان دراز براساس شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی بنیان نهاده شده و کم و بیش از آن الهام می‌گرفته است. بزرگترین نقص و گره‌ای که در حال حاضر ما با آن روبرو هستیم آن است که علمای فن که واجد شرایط برای تطابق شریعت با زمان و مکان باشند وجود ندارند. در مسائل اقتصادی مشکل ما این است که متخصصین اقتصادی ما آنها که تحصیل کرده‌ی غربند بدون آنکه به زیربنای آن که جمعاً یک جهان‌بینی سرمایه‌داری است توجه کنند، صرفاً تئوری‌ها و راه حل‌های آنها را می‌خواهند در جامعه ما به کار برند. درحالی که غافلند از اینکه مشکلات اقتصادی جامعه ما را نمی‌توان با جهان‌بینی سرمایه‌داری حل کرد و آنها که تحصیل کرده‌ی دنیای شرق هستند دانسته جهان‌بینی مارکسیستی را پذیرفته و می‌کوشند و ادعا می‌کنند که مشکلات اقتصادی ما را با این جهان‌بینی می‌توان حل نمود. در این میان آنها که در عین برخورداری از تحصیلات شرقی یا غربی دارای تمایلات اسلامی هستند متأسفانه از شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی باخبر نیستند. از جانب دیگر مراجع ما که کم و بیش به شریعت و اصول اقتصاد اسلامی آشنایی دارند، سالیان دراز از ضرورت‌های قرن عقب هستند و نمی‌توان انتظار داشت که بدون آشنایی با پیشرفت‌های اقتصادی عصر حاضر بتوانند راه حل‌های منطقی برای مشکلات اقتصادی ما ارائه دهند.

امیدواری و کوشش ما بر این است که در این بحث کوتاه و مختصر و کم و بیش ناقص خودمان راه جدیدی را باز کنیم و آن اینکه دوستان و برادران اسلامی ما که در رشته‌های علوم اقتصادی مشغول تحصیل و کسب دانش هستند به این مسائل اساسی نیز توجه پیدا کرده و به مطالعه عمیق‌تر و جدی‌تر پردازند. به نظر ما وجود این گروه از دوستان سرمایه‌های امیدوارکننده‌ای برای جوامع اسلامی به‌شمار می‌روند.

در این بخش اصول تئوریک یا نظری اقتصاد اسلامی را به ترتیب زیر مورد بحث قرار می‌دهیم:

۴۴۰ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

۱. مالکیت اصلی و کلی و مطلق از آن خداست.
۲. بشر (جامعه) خلیفه و جانشین خدا در زمین است.
۳. تمام هستی و وجود طبیعت برای استفاده بشر است و بشر بالقوه قدرت تسخیر همه آنها را دارد.
۴. قدرت حکومت اسلامی
۵. تأمین و تضمین زندگی همه انسانها
۶. شناخت مالکیت فردی، عامل نفسانی محرک اقتصادی
۷. وحدت انسانها، نابرابریها
۸. اصالت کار و عمل، از هر کس به اندازه استعدادش
۹. مصرف به اندازه احتیاج
۱۰. ضرورت عدالت اجتماعی
۱۱. رسالت انبیاء و مسلمانان

اصل اول: مالکیت اصلی و کلی از آن خداست

آیات و شواهد بسیار زیاد و مکرری در قرآن وجود دارد که همه دال بر آن است که مالکیت اصلی از آن خداوند است. همه چیز به خدا تعلق دارد. درحالی که عده‌ای از آیات به مالکیت و سلطنت خداوند بر تمام هستی و موجودات اشاره می‌نمایند، آیاتی هم هستند که به مالکیت خداوند بر اراضی و زمین به‌طور خاص اشاره می‌نمایند. برای توجه خواننده به ذکر چند شاهد از قرآن می‌پردازیم:

۱. وَ لِلَّهِ مِيرَاثُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ (۵۷-۱۰)

میراث آسمانها و زمین از آن خداست.

۲. لَهُ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ (۵۷-۵)

فرمانروایی آسمانها و زمین از آن خداست.

۳. الَّذِي لَهُ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ (۹-۱۱۶)

کسی که (خدایی که) فرمانروایی آسمانها و زمین از آن اوست.

۴. وَ لِلَّهِ مُلْكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا (۵-۱۷)

فرمانروایی آسمانها و زمین و آنچه بین آنهاست از آن خداست.

۵. أَرْضُ اللَّهِ وَاسِعَةٌ (۳۹-۱۰)

زمین خدا پهناور است.

ع. فَذَرُوهَا تَأْكُلْ فِي أَرْضِ اللَّهِ (۷-۷۳)

پس بگذارید تا او (اشتر) در زمین خدا بخورد.

۷. إِنَّ الْأَرْضَ لِلَّهِ يُورِثُهَا مَنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ (۷-۱۲۸)

زمین متعلق به خداست و به بندگان که بخواهد واگذار می‌کند.

این تأکید در مالکیت خداوند صرفاً یک امر ذهنی که اثرات اجتماعی و اقتصادی نداشته باشد نیست. چراکه بلافاصله در بحث آینده خواهیم دید که چگونه این اصل اول از فلسفه اقتصاد اسلامی بر تمام و سرتاسر فعالیت‌های اقتصادی و قدرت دولت و تحدید مالکیت فردی حاکم و ناظر می‌باشد.

براساس این اصل است که حق مالکیت کلاً به خداوند مربوط می‌شود. بشر حق هیچگونه اظهار و ادعای مالکیتی ندارد. «حق» در اینجا یک مفهوم حقوقی و قانونی دارد. از دو مفهوم حق و احتیاج، حق مربوط می‌شود به خداوند و آنچه برای بشر به رسمیت شناخته شده است «احتیاج» اوست.

اصل دوم: بشر خلیفه و جانشین خداوند در زمین است

بعد از اصل اول بلافاصله این سوال پیش می‌آید که اصالت مالکیت خداوند چه اثراتی در روابط اقتصادی جامعه دارد و تأثیرات آن چگونه است. اصل دوم از فلسفه اقتصاد اسلامی ناظر بر چگونگی این تأثیرات است. مطابق این اصل، انسان به‌طور عام در جمع جانشین خداوند در زمین و یا شاید در تمام هستی و وجود می‌باشد. شواهد این امر در قرآن و آیات فراوان است و ما چند نمونه در اینجا می‌آوریم:

۱. وَهُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَكُمْ خَلَائِفَ الْأَرْضِ (۶-۱۶۵ و ۳۵-۳۹)

او (خدا) شما را جانشینانی در روی زمین قرار داده است.

۲. أَمْ جَعَلْنَاكُمْ خَلَائِفَ فِي الْأَرْضِ (۱۰-۱۴)

سپس شما را جانشین در روی زمین گردانیدیم.

۳. وَأَنْفِقُوا مِمَّا جَعَلَكُمْ مُسْتَخْلِفِينَ فِيهِ (۵۷-۷)

از آنچه شما را در آن جانشین قرار داده است بپخشید.

۴۴۲ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

۴. وَأَتَوْهُم مِّن مَّالِ اللَّهِ الَّذِي آتَاكُمْ (۲۴-۳۳)

از مالی که خدا به شما داده است به آنها بدهید.

۵. إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً (۲-۳۰)

در روی زمین جانشینی قرار خواهم داد.

براساس این جانشینی است که حق مالکیت خداوند تحت شرایطی به جامعه برای استفاده و رفع احتیاجات وکالت داده شده است. براساس این اصل است که حکومت اسلامی که نماینده مردم و اجراکننده دستورات خداوند باشد، این حق و این امتیاز وکالت را در خود متبلور و متجلی می‌سازد. این امر به دولت اسلامی بزرگترین قدرت‌ها را از نقطه نظر مسائل اقتصادی عطا می‌نماید. به عبارت دیگر براساس این اصل دوم است که همه فقهای اسلام متفق‌القولند که «مالکیت جز با ثبات و تقریر شارع (حکومت اسلامی) ثابت نمی‌شود... همه حقوق و از جمله حق مالکیت جز به اثبات شارع و امضاء اسباب آن ثابت نمی‌شود. پس حق چیزی نیست که طبعاً و خودبه‌خود پیدا شود بلکه از اذن شارع و اینکه او سبب آن را مثمر این نتیجه دانسته درست می‌شود.»

باز این نتیجه و حاصل این اصل است که می‌نویسند «قاعده این است که هر چیزی ملک اجتماع است و مالی که در دست بشر است مال خداست و مردم اصالتی نداشته و جانشینانی بیش نیستند»^۱.

اصل سوم: تسخیر طبیعت برای استفاده بشر

از نظر اسلامی نه تنها کره زمین بلکه آنچه در آسمان‌ها و زمین و سایر کرات وجود دارد هم برای استفاده بشر به‌وجود آمده‌اند. تمام هستی آماده برای استفاده بشر می‌باشد. بشر نه تنها حق دارد از تمام آنچه در هستی و طبیعت وجود دارد استفاده کند بلکه به‌طور بالقوه در نهاد انسان آنچنان قدرتی وجود دارد که در صورت به‌کار انداختن آن می‌تواند بر تمام این طبیعت تسلط یابد و آنها را «تسخیر» کند، می‌تواند آنها را رام و مهار سازد. بشر می‌تواند و باید با به‌کار

۱. محمد ابوزهره - استاد فقه اسلامی، دانشکده حقوق دانشگاه قاهره نقل از عدالت اجتماعی تالیف

مرحوم سید قطب، ترجمه فارسی ج ۱، ص ۲۲۲

مقالات علمی □ ۴۴۳

انداختن استعداد و کشف اسرار خلقت خداوند هرگونه منابع طبیعی را که خدا برای او خلق کرده است مورد بهره‌برداری قرار داده و به بهتر ساختن زندگی خود بپردازد.

۱. هُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمُ الْأَرْضَ دُلُولاَ فَاْمَشُوا فِي مَنَاكِبِهَا وَكُلُوا مِنْ رِزْقِهِ (۱۵/۶۷)

او (خداوند) است که زمین را برای شما رام کرده پس به جهات مختلف آن بروید و از نعمات آن بهره‌گیرید.

۲. وَلَقَدْ مَكَّنَّاكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَجَعَلْنَا لَكُمْ فِيهَا مَعَايِشَ (۱۰/۷)

شما را در زمین جا دادیم و برایتان در آن زندگی‌ها فراهم ساختیم.

۳. أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سَخَّرَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ (۶۵/۲۲)

آیا نمی‌بینی که خدا آنچه را در روی زمین است در اختیار شما قرار داده؟

۴. أَلَمْ تَرَوْا أَنَّ اللَّهَ سَخَّرَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَأَسْبَغَ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَهُ ظَاهِرَةً وَبَاطِنَةً (۲۰/۳۱)

آیا نمی‌بینی که خدا آنچه را در آسمان‌ها و زمین است در اختیار شما قرار داده و نعمت‌های خود را به‌طور آشکار و نهان برای شما فراوان ساخته است؟

۵. خَلَقَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا (۳۹/۲)

خدا آنچه را در روی زمین است برای شما خلق کرده است.

۶. وَالْأَرْضِ وَضَعَهَا لِلْأَنْعَامِ (۱۰/۵۵)

خدا زمین را برای همه مردم جهان قرار داد و در آن میوه‌های بیست

۷. وَمَا أَنْتُمْ بِمُعْجِزِينَ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ (۲۲/۲۹)

و شما در روی زمین و آسمان‌ها اعجازی نخواهید کرد.

و نظایر این آیات.

اصل چهارم: قدرت حکومت اسلامی

در کلیه مکاتب اقتصادی قدرت دولت یکی از مسائل بسیار مهم و حساس است. پایه اختلاف بسیاری از مکاتب اقتصادی بر روی وسعت یا محدودیت قدرت دولت قرار دارد. بحث راجع به حکومت در اسلام از حوصله و غرض بحث ما بیرون است. توجه و اشاره ما در اینجا صرفاً از جهت ارتباط آن با مسائل اقتصادی است. حکومت اسلامی از نقطه نظر قدرت یا اختیارات دارای یک دوگانگی است.

به این عبارت که دولت اسلامی از یک طرف از اختیارات و قدرت نامحدودی برخوردار است، اما از جهت دیگر فاقد قدرت و اختیار است. یکی از ریشه‌های اساسی اختلاف شیعه با خلفا و امرا و سلاطین وقت براساس همین دوگانگی قدرت و عدم قدرت دولت اسلامی می‌باشد. اساس قدرت دولت در جامعه اسلامی بر آن است که:

«أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ»

از خدا، فرستاده او و زعمای خود (اولی الامر) پیروی کنید.

دولت اسلامی که از طرف خود مردم صاحب «امر» و قدرت شده باشد و برنامه‌ها و اعمالش در جهت اجرای اوامر خدا و برنامه‌های رسول خدا باشد، بر جامعه همان اندازه قدرت دارد که خدا و رسول خواهد. و این برای دولت قدرتی است نامحدود. مردم موظف هستند از چنین دولتی اطاعت کنند. به عبارت دیگر یک مرکزیت (سانترالیسم) بسیار قوی، محتوای و چگونگی اطاعت نیز از همان نوع اطاعت از خدا و رسول است خداست. امروز می‌دانیم که از جهت توسعه برنامه‌های اجتماعی و اقتصادی مسأله سانترالیسم و قدرت مرکزی تا چه حد در پیشرفت موفقیت‌آمیز جامعه دخالت داشته و از عوامل اساسی محسوب می‌گردد. چنین دولتی از نظر اقتصادی دارای همان حق جانشینی خداست و به آن اندازه قدرت دارد که حتی می‌تواند «لباس من و شما را هم از تنمان بیرون بکشد»^۱.

اما این چنین قدرتی بدون قید و شرط نیست و به محض اینکه بر یکی از این قیود و شرایط خدشه وارد آمد، قدرت دولت صفر می‌شود و ملت نه تنها می‌تواند از اطاعت چنین دولتی سرباززند بلکه اطاعت از چنین دولتی «گناه» محسوب شده و در حکم جنگ با خداوند خواهد بود. همین مسئله بی‌قدرتی دولت در عین قدرت هسته نزاع و جدال و پیکار مستمر و لاینقطع تشیع را با خلفای فاسد و فاسق یا ظالم و جابر و حکومت‌های غیرملی در طی تاریخ تشکیل می‌دهد. در بحث آینده تحت عنوان «جنگ اسلام با سرمایه‌داری - علل اقتصادی جنگ‌های انقلابی در اسلام» به‌طور مبسوط‌تری این مسأله را بررسی خواهیم کرد. غرض از اشاره به آن در اینجا این است که توضیح بدهیم دولت اسلامی در جامعه اسلامی

۱. سید هادی خسروشاهی، نقل از یکی از مراجع بزرگ، پاورقی در عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام

از نقطه نظر اقتصادی دارای چه نقش عظیمی است و چه وظایفی از جهت اقتصادی و اجتماعی به موجب این اصل برای دولت اسلامی به وجود می‌آید.

اصل پنجم: تأمین و تضمین زندگی همه انسان‌ها

خداوند به‌عنوان مالک و صاحب اختیار تمام هستی و امکانات و منابع اقتصادی زندگی مادی و دنیوی همه انسان‌ها را تعهد و تضمین کرده است. شواهد این امر در آیات قرآن به قدری زیاد است که اشاره به تمام آنها در اینجا میسر نیست. کثرت این آیات خود حاکی از اهمیتی است که قرآن برای تضمین زندگی افراد جامعه قائل است.

۱. وَمَا مِنْ دَابَّةٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَّا عَلَى اللَّهِ رِزْقُهَا وَيَعْلَمُ مُسْتَقَرَّهَا وَمُسْتَوْدَعَهَا (۶/۱۱)

هیچ جنبنده‌ای در زمین نیست که روزیش بر عهده خدا نباشد و او (به‌خوبی) آرامشگاه و کوچ‌گاهش (احتیاجات) را می‌داند.

۲. إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَرْزُقُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ بِغَيْرِ حِسَابٍ (۳۷/۳)

خداوند به کسی که بخواهد بی‌شمار روزی می‌دهد.

۳. إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَهُوَ خَيْرُ الرَّازِقِينَ (۵۸/۲۲) خداوند بهترین روزی‌دهندگان است.

۴. نَحْنُ نَرْزُقُكَ وَالْعَاقِبَةُ لِلتَّقْوَىٰ (۱۳۲/۲۰)

ما شما را روزی می‌دهیم و فرجام از آن پرهیزکاریست.

۶. أُولَئِكَ يَعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ يَبْسُطُ الرِّزْقَ لِمَنْ يَشَاءُ وَيَقْدِرُ (۵۲/۳۹)

آیا نمی‌دانند که خداوند برای هر که بخواهد روزی را گشایش و تنگی دهد؟

به عبارت دیگر خداوند تأمین «رزق» و «روزی» همه کس را بر عهده گرفته است. در معنای رزق می‌نویسند «هر نوع بهره معنوی و مادی حلال است به‌خصوص که نسبت به خدا و عوامل خدا داده شده... و یا آن مالی است که محصول عمل و فکر است یا اعضای عمل و اخلاق و علم است که منشاء عمل می‌باشد.^۱ این صراحت تأمین زندگی عناصر جامعه از طرف خداوند، بلافاصله یک اصل اساسی دیگری را در اقتصاد اسلامی به وجود می‌آورد. گفتیم که جامعه جانشین خداست و در بهره‌برداری از منابع و امکانات طبیعی از طرف خداوند وکالت دارد و گفتیم که حکومت اسلامی از اختیارات خاصی برخوردار است و این اختیارات با حق مالکیت مطلق خداوند و وکالت آن به جامعه و در نتیجه دولت

۱. طالقانی پرتوی از قرآن

اسلامی رابطه مستقیم دارد. بنابراین بلافاصله براساس تعهد موظف است که زندگی شرافتمندانه‌ای برای همه افراد ملت فراهم کند. برای آنها که قادر به کارند باید شرایط مساوی و مساعد به وجود آورد. باید امکانات «عمل» و گردآوردن «علم» را به وجود آورد و آنها که قادر به کار نیستند باید حکومت اسلامی آنها را تأمین کند. «کفالت نظام‌ها و سیستم‌های اسلامی بر کفایت امور معاشی هر فردی از افراد ملت است، اعم از اینکه قادر به کار باشند یا به طور دائم و یا موقت از انجام کار عاجز باشند».^۱ رزق و روزی برای هر فرد و ضمانت کفایت معاش برای همه در رژیم اسلامی گام ابتدایی اسلام در راه تحقق بخشیدن به عدالت اجتماعی است، «جماعت ضامن کفالت هر فردی است که در میان آنان به سر می‌برد. این کفالت معاش مسأله‌ای الزامی است نه یک امر اخلاقی و احسان» و این کفالت معاش شامل همه افراد جامعه صرف نظر از رنگ، نژاد و مذهب می‌باشد. در تاریخ اقتصاد اسلامی شواهد بسیار زیادی وجود دارد دال بر اینکه حتی افراد وابسته به سایر مذاهب که در جامعه اسلامی به سر می‌برده‌اند در مواقع ازکارافتادگی از بیت‌المال مقررری دریافت می‌کرده‌اند. به عنوان نمونه می‌نویسند روزی از کوچهای می‌گذشت، عربی را دید که به گدایی مشغول بود، تعجب کرد و به جستجوی احوال او پرداخت. معلوم شد پیرمردی است مسیحی که سالیان دراز کار می‌کرده اما حالا به کوری مبتلا شده است و چون درآمد یا پس‌اندازی ندارد برای تأمین معاش خود به گدایی پرداخته است. علی(ع) فرمود: عجب! تا وقتی که توانایی داشت از او کار کشیدید و اکنون او را به حال خود گذاشته‌اید؟ در مدتی که توانایی داشته کار انجام داده و خدمت کرده است، بنابراین بر عهده حکومت اجتماع است که تا زنده است او را تکفل کند.^۲

اصل ششم: شناخت مالکیت فردی - عامل نفسانی محرک اقتصادی

جنبش اقتصادی در افراد یک مبدأ و ریشه نفسانی دارد و قسمتی از شخصیت او را تشکیل می‌دهد.

۱. وَتُجِبُونََ الْمَالَ حُبًّا جَمًّا (۲۰/۸۹) مال را بسیار دوست می‌دارید.

۱. سید قطب، عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام، ترجمه فارسی

۲. مرتضی مطهری، داستان راستان جلد دوم، ص ۲۰۷

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۲. وَإِنَّهُ لِحُبِّ الْخَيْرِ لَشَدِيدٌ (۸/۱۰۰) انسان در دوستی خواسته سرسخت است
عامل نفسانی انسان در فعالیت‌های اقتصادی همراه با عامل و احتیاج جنسی دو
پدیده روانی همراه و همزاد انسان هستند که محرک او در بسیاری از فعالیت‌های
خصوصی و اجتماعی می‌باشند. جوابگویی و اغناء این دو محرک در انسان از
عوامل اساسی آرایش روانی او می‌باشد. اسلام این کشش و تحرک را به عنوان
فطرت بشر شناخته و وقتی به صورت طبیعی ارضاء شوند زینت حیات و زیبایی
زندگی شناخته است.

۱. الْمَالُ وَالْبَنُونَ زِينَةُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا (۴۶/۱۸) مال (خواسته) و فرزندان پیرایه
زندگانی دنیا هستند.

۲. زُيِّنَ لِلنَّاسِ حُبُّ الشَّهَوَاتِ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ وَالْبَنِينَ وَالْقَنَاطِيرِ الْمُقَنْطَرَةِ مِنَ الذَّهَبِ.
دل بستگی به تمایلات درونی از قبیل زنان و فرزندان و پوست‌های گاو آکنده از
طلا... (کنایه از زندگی مرفه) مورد پسند مردم افتاده است.

از این دو زیبایی زندگی یکی، مال، حاصل محرک نفسانی انسان در فعالیت
اقتصادی و دیگری فرزندان، میوه محرک و غریزه جنسی اوست. اسلام در راه
حل‌های خود برای انسان، به ارضاء و اغناء واقعی که حاصل آن را آرامش عمیق و
دائمی خواهد بود، تنها و تنها در سایه قبول و عمل به این راه حل‌های اسلامی
می‌باشد. کسانی که ندانسته به طرف نفی این دنیا به تفریط رفته و خود را از این
زینت‌های زندگی محروم می‌سازند، مورد سرزنش قرار می‌گیرند.

۱. وَلَا تَنْسَ نَصِيبَكَ مِنَ الدُّنْيَا (۷۷/۲۸) بهره خود را از دنیا فراموش نکن.

۲. قُلْ مَنْ حَرَّمَ زِينَةَ اللَّهِ الَّتِي أَخْرَجَ لِعِبَادِهِ وَالطَّيِّبَاتِ مِنَ الرِّزْقِ (۳۲/۷) بگو (ای
پیامبر) چه کسی زینت و روزی‌های پاک را که خداوند برای بندگانش بیرون داده
حرام کرده است؟

براساس این درک واقعی از شخصیت انسان است که اسلام فرد را به رسمیت
می‌شناسد. اما این مالکیت یک امر نسبی و اعتباری است و در بسیاری از موارد یا
به کلی ساقط شده است و یا محدود گردیده است.

مالکیت فردی از یک طرف براساس اصل تسلیط و به موجب الناس مسلطون
علی اموالهم به رسمیت شناخته شده است اما از جهت و جانب دیگر براساس
اصل لا ضرر و به موجب لا ضرر و لا ضرار فی الاسلام محدود گردیده است.

محدودیت مالکیت فردی در اسلام تنها بر اساس قاعده لاضرر نیست، بلکه همانطور که گفتیم اساس آن یک امر نسبی است. به این معنا که چون خداوند (مالک مطلق) حق خود را در حد خلافت (جانشینی از خود) به انسان واگذار کرده است و حکومت مبعوث ملت مدار گذار کار جامعه می‌باشد لذا این حاکم است که از کل حق خود، در بعضی از موارد و تحت شرایطی قسمتی را به فرد واگذار می‌نماید. به عبارت دیگر «مالکیت یک حکم شرعی است که در عین یا در منفعت» فرض شود... و باید با اجازه تصریحی یا غیر تصریحی شارع بوده باشد...^۱

در شریعت اسلام از نظر اقتصادی بعضی از موارد چگونگی مالکیت را تصریح کرده است و در سایر موارد پیش‌بینی آن را به حکومت اسلامی واگذار کرده است. این قید و محدودیت در چگونگی تحقق مالکیت فرد است. به این عبارت که حتی وقتی فردی بعد از طی تمام مراحل و رعایت همه جوانب اسلامی بر مالی دست یافت و مالک شد، مالکیت او تا وقتی محترم است که موجب زیان و ضرر برای دیگران نشود.

محدودیت در چگونگی مصرف یا برخورداری از این حق مالکیت است که به افراد فقط اجازه استفاده به اندازه رفع احتیاج را می‌دهد و بس.

اسلام مالکیت فردی را به عنوان عاملی برای ارضاء غریزه و عامل نفسانی بشر در محرکات اقتصادی به رسمیت می‌شناسد. اما چون اساس آن (مالکیت) یک امر غریزی است، معتقد است در این امر نیز مانند سایر غرایز «انسان وقتی اراده و توجه خود را برای اشباع هر غریزه و خواهشی مصروف داشت، به حد ضرورت و تأمین حاجت متوقف نمی‌شود...»^۲ لذا آن را به صور مختلف و به شکلی که انسان فقط بتواند از این حق مالکیت اعتباری و نسبی خود در حد ارضاء غریزه استفاده کند محدود می‌سازد.

اصل هفتم: وحدت انسان‌ها و نابرابری‌ها

از نظر اسلام تمام انسان‌ها بندگان خداوند هستند و همه باهم برابرند- مبدا و منشأ همه انسان‌ها یکی است. آنچه در نظر ما به صورت اختلاف جلوه‌گر می‌شود، وسیله‌ای برای شناسایی و تشخیص انسان‌ها از هم می‌باشد.

۱. سید محمود طالقانی، اسلام و مالکیت

۲. همان

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۱. وَمَا كَانَ النَّاسُ إِلَّا أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً فَاخْتَلَفُوا (۱۹/۱۰) همه مردم ملت واحدی بودند ولی بعداً اختلاف کردند.
 ۲. إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَىٰ وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا^۱ إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ اتِّفَاقُكُمْ (۱۳/۴۹) ما شما را از زن و مرد آفریدیم و به صورت شاخه‌ها و تیره‌هایی قرار دادیم تا یکدیگر را بشناسید برترین شما در پیشگاه خدا پروا پیشه‌ترین شماست.
 ۳. يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ اتَّقُوا رَبَّكُمُ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ مِنْ نَفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ (۱/۴) ای انسان از پروردگار خود که شما را از یک مبدأ زنده آفرید پروا داشته باشید.
- این عدم اختلاف به آن معنا نیست که همه انسان‌ها یک «جور» و «یک‌دست» هستند، بلکه مردم در ساختمان نفسانی و جسمانی با هم فرق دارند. در استعداد، در قدرت تفکر و تخیل، در هوش و بسیاری از مشخصات روانی دیگر مردم با هم نابرابرند. این نابرابری‌ها میان انسان‌ها به عنوان شناخت فطرت و ماهیت انسان‌ها از طرف قرآن تأیید می‌گردد.
۱. نَحْنُ قَسَمْنَا بَيْنَهُمْ مَعِيشَتَهُمْ فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا^۲ وَرَفَعْنَا بَعْضَهُمْ فَوْقَ بَعْضٍ دَرَجَاتٍ (۳۲/۴۳) روزی آنها را در زندگی دنیا میانشان تقسیم کردیم و برخی از آنان را بر برخی دیگر پله پله برتری دادیم.

اصل هشتم: اصالت کار و عمل به اندازه قدرت

در بخش اول - مقدمه - به اهمیت کار اشاره کردیم. در بخش سوم مبسوط‌تر بحث خواهیم کرد. در اینجا اکتفا می‌نماییم به اینکه در جامعه اسلامی تمام افراد موظف هستند کار کنند و تنها کسانی می‌توانند از سفره گسترده نعمت‌های خداوند بهره‌برداری کنند که به کاری، خواه فکری یا یدی، که مفید باشد مشغول باشند. در معنی رزق گفتیم که آن مالی است که محصول کار و فکر است. تأمین روزی و رزق از جانب خدا به این معناست که هر کس کار کند و در کار خود هدف‌های اساسی را در نظر بگیرد خداوند روزی او را یا بازده کارش را تأمین نموده است و تحقق چنین تأمینی برعهده شارع یا جامعه اسلامی از طریق اجرای اصول اقتصاد اسلامی می‌باشد.

۴۵۰ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

۱. وَأَنْ لَّيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَىٰ وَأَنَّ سَعْيَهُ سَوْفَ يُرَىٰ (۴۰/۵۳) انسان فقط به اندازه

کوشش (کار) خود بهره می‌گیرد و کوشش او به زودی دیده می‌شود.

۲. فَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِنَ الصَّالِحَاتِ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ فَلَا كُفْرَانَ لِسَعْيِهِ (۹۴/۲۱) هر مؤمنی که کار

شایسته‌ای انجام دهد، کوشش او بی‌پاداش نخواهد ماند.

۳. كُلُّ نَفْسٍ بِمَا كَسَبَتْ رَهِيْنَةٌ (۳۸/۷۴) هر کسی مسئول اعمال خود می‌باشد.

۴. وَلِكُلِّ دَرَجَاتٍ مِمَّا عَمِلُوا (۱۳۲/۶) و هر کدام به لحاظ عمل خود درجاتی دارند.

و بازده کار برای همه صرف نظر از رنگ و نژاد و جنس یکی است.

۵. مَنْ عَمِلَ صَالِحًا مِنْ دَكَرٍ أَوْ أُنْثَىٰ وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ فَلَنُحْيِيَنَّهٗ حَيَاةً طَيِّبَةً وَلَنَجْزِيَنَّهُمْ أَجْرَهُمْ

بِأَحْسَنِ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ (۹۷/۱۶) و (۴۰/۴۰) هر مؤمنی از زن و مرد که عمل

شایسته‌ای انجام دهد او را زنده داریم و بر مبنای بهترین کارهایی که انجام داده

پاداش و جزا خواهیم داد.

۶. لِلرِّجَالِ نَصِيبٌ مِّمَّا كَسَبُوا وَلِلنِّسَاءِ نَصِيبٌ مِّمَّا كَسَبْنَ (۳۲/۴) بهره مردان از آن

چیزیست که کسب کرده‌اند و بهره زنان نیز از آن چیزیست که کسب کرده‌اند.

پرداختن به یک کار «صالح» یا مفید وظیفه هر فردی در جامعه است. هر کس

موظف است به اندازه وسع خود کار کند و به جامعه خدمت نماید. از آنجا که

جامعه جانشین خداست، صالح بودن کار افراد با مفیدبودن آن به حال جامعه

سنجیده می‌شود.

_ أَفْضَلُ النَّاسِ أَنْفَعُهُمُ لِلنَّاسِ (پیامبر خدا). بهترین مردم مفیدترین آنها برای مردم

می‌باشد.

_ النَّاسُ عِيَالِي، انفعهم اليهم احبهم الي (حدیث قدسی) مردم خانواده من هستند،

سودمندترین ایشان به حال مردم محبوبترین مردم برای من هستند.

آدم بیکار در جامعه اسلامی راه و جایی ندارد و خدا هم از او بیزار است.

_ خداوند از بنده‌ای که بیکار بوده و دهانش باز باشد و متصل بگوید خدایا به

من روزی بده متنفر است (رسول خدا).

می‌نویسند حضرت رسول (ص) وقتی به افراد جدیدی برخورد می‌کردند

می‌پرسیدند کارش چیست؟ اگر می‌گفتند بیکار است می‌فرمود: سقط من عینی (از

چشمم افتاد). امام صادق حاضر نشد برای آدم بیکاری دعا کند چراکه حضرت

رسول فرموده‌اند که آدم بیکار دعایش مستجاب نمی‌شود. بنابراین ملاحظه می‌شود که اصل «از هر کس به اندازه استعداد و قدرتش باید کار خواست» در اسلام به بهترین وجهی وجود دارد. از یک طرف مردم به عنوان عبادت و شروط ورود به بهشت موظف هستند که آن را انجام دهند و از طرفی دولت مأمور است که بر اجرای این اصل نظارت کند.

اصل نهم: مصرف به اندازه احتیاج

درست است که رزق و روزی که خداوند آن را تضمین کرده است فقط در سایه کار و عمل و فکر خود افراد تأمین می‌شود و هیچ کس حق بهره‌برداری بدون عمل را ندارد اما چون خود افراد هم به عنوان قسمتی از محتوای طبیعت به خداوند و در نتیجه به جامعه تعلق دارند، حاصل کار مولد و قانونی یا شرعی آنها نیز به طور مطلق به خود آنها تعلق نداشته بلکه آنها امانت‌داری بیش نیستند که باید آن را مطابق دستور و نظر صاحب اصلی مال - خدا - مصرف نمایند. فرض کنیم که افراد براساس اصل اصالت عمل، به کار مفیدی بپردازند و جامعه هم نتیجه کار آنها را مطابق ارزش کارشان به آنها بپردازد، افراد چگونه می‌توانند در این اموال یا بهره کار دخل و تصرف نمایند؟

چون «ثرت و مال امانتی در دست صاحب مال موظف به مصرف آن در راه اجتماع است، صاحب مال فقط حق دارد به قدر احتیاج خود از آن بهره بردارد»^۱ اگرچه در تعیین حدود احتیاج افراد مستقیماً سخنی نرفته است اما آنها که از مرز احتیاج تخطی و تجاوز کنند به عنوان اسراف یا تبذیرکنندگان، به شدت محکوم شده‌اند. در اینجا اسراف به معنای مصرف بیش از احتیاج برای خود شخص است و این نحوه از مصرف یا اسراف همان عیاشی کردن است.

۱. کُلُوا وَاشْرَبُوا وَلَا تُسْرِفُوا إِنَّهُ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُسْرِفِينَ (۳۱/۷) بخورید و بیاشامید ولی اسراف نکنید که خدا اسراف‌کنندگان را دوست ندارد.
۲. وَأَنَّ الْمُسْرِفِينَ هُمْ أَصْحَابُ النَّارِ (۴۳/۴۰) اسراف‌کنندگان همدم آتش‌اند.
۳. إِنَّهُ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُسْرِفِينَ (۱۴۱/۶) او (خدا) اسراف‌کنندگان را دوست ندارد.

۱. سید قطب، عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام، ترجمه فارسی جلد یک ص ۱۷۵.

۴۵۲ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

و بسیاری از آیات مشابه دیگر.

نه تنها افراد حق ندارند از حاصل کار خود بیش از احتیاج بهره‌برداری کنند، بلکه در مصرف آنها نیز باید رعایت عقل و منطق را بنمایند. مصرف باید سنجیده و منطقی باشد.

– لَا تَأْكُلُوا أَمْوَالَكُمْ بَيْنَكُمْ بِالْبَاطِلِ (۲۹/۴) اموال خود را بین خویش به ناحق نخورید (مصرف نکنید).

در اینجا خطاب فقط فرد نیست بلکه جامعه به‌طور جمع مورد خطاب است. جامعه به عنوان جانشین خدا حق ندارد در امانت سهل‌انگاری کند و امانت خدا را به باطل مصرف نماید. وجه دیگر مصرف تبذیر است. به این معنا که افراد حاصل کار خود را حیف و میل و در مصارف بیهوده صرف کنند.

– إِنَّ الْمُبَذِّرِينَ كَانُوا إِخْوَانَ الشَّيَاطِينِ (۲۷/۱۷) کسانی که مال را بیهوده مصرف نمایند برادران شیطان (منحرف) هستند.

– وَلَا تُبْذِرْ تَبْذِيرًا – هیچ‌گاه بیهوده ریخت و پاش نکن.

اما وکالت فرد در این «مالکیت» بعد از رفع احتیاج آنست که آن را در راه جامعه مصرف نماید. بخشی از این سهم اجتماع در حاصل کار فرد به‌صورت مالیات‌هایی معین و مشخص روشن شده است که باید بپردازد و جامعه از او خواهد گرفت. اما بخش دیگر که مجموعه آن چیزی است که بعد از پرداخت سهم مشخص شده جامعه و مصرف به اندازه احتیاج باقی می‌ماند. برعهده شخص است که آن را به خاطر خدا در راه جامعه مصرف نماید. به عبارت دیگر فرد حق ندارد مقداری که مازاد مانده است را در تصرف مالکانه خود قرار دهد، بلکه باید آن را در راه جامعه مصرف نماید. این عدم مصرف مازاد احتیاج در راه جامعه به عنوان گنج یا کنز از طرف اسلام به شدت محکوم شده است.

– وَالَّذِينَ يَكْتُمُونَ الذَّهَبَ وَالْفِضَّةَ وَلَا يَنْفِقُونَهَا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ (۳۴/۹) کسانی را که زر و سیم می‌اندوزند و آن را در راه خدا انفاق نمی‌کنند ...

اگرچه برخی در معنای کنز تردید دارند که آیا همان گنج مازاد احتیاج و عدم انفاق آن در راه خداست. اما سید قطب می‌نویسد: هرچه بیش از مقدار احتیاج باشد و انفاق نشود، تمرکز دادن و گنجینه نمودن آن باعث شکنجه و عذاب است.

مقالات علمی □ ۴۵۳

در این باره از رسول خدا(ص) روایات بسیاری نقل شده است که همه حاکی از آن است که آنچه شخص بیش از احتیاج خود دارد، باید بدهد. وجه دیگر از محدودیت فرد در چگونگی مصرف حاصل کار خود، عدم بخل است. بخل به این معنا که افراد در مصرف، بیش از حد لازم دچار دقت و حسابگری شوند. این بخل ورزیدن و دقت و حسابگری بیش از حد تنها در مورد مصرف برای رفع احتیاجات خود شخص نیست، بلکه شامل مصرف در اجتماع نیز می‌گردد. به این عبارت که امساک یا عدم مصرف در راه جامعه خود بخل ورزیدن است.

– وَلَا يَحْسِبَنَّ الَّذِينَ يَبْخُلُونَ بِمَا آتَاهُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ هُوَ خَيْرًا لَّهُمْ بَلْ هُوَ شَرٌّ لَّهُمْ سَيُطَوَّقُونَ مَا بَخُلُوا بِهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ^{۳۷} وَ لِلَّهِ مِيرَاثُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ (۱۸۰/۳)

– کسانی که نسبت به آنچه خدا از فضل خود بر آنها ارزانی داشته بخل می‌ورزند نپندارند که این روش برای آنها خوب است، بلکه شر است. آنچه از انفاق آن خودداری کرده‌اند روز قیامت گردنشان را خواهد گرفت. میراث آسمان و زمین متعلق به خداست.

– الَّذِينَ يَبْخُلُونَ وَيَأْمُرُونَ النَّاسَ بِالْبُخْلِ وَيَكْتُمُونَ مَا آتَاهُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ (۳۷/۴)

– کسانی که بخل ورزند و مردم را به بخل‌ورزی فرمان دهند و آنچه را خدا از فضل خود به ایشان داده پنهان کنند... و این بخیل بودن و امساک کردن انسان در مخارج و تأمین ضروریات نیز جزو طبیعت اوست.

– وَكَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ قَنُورًا (۱۰۰/۱۷)

– انسان همواره بر خود سختگیر بوده است.

و بالاخره محدودیت وسیع دیگری نیز وجود دارد و آن عبارتست از محدودیت فرد در مصرف، در راههایی که مخالف منافع جامعه و دستورات اسلامی است. در بخش سوم ما در این مورد مبسوط‌تر خواهیم نوشت در اینجا اشاره می‌کنیم که منظور از این محدودیت مصرف در راههایی که مغایر با منافع جامعه و یا مخالف آن باشد، نظیر خرید و فروش مشروبات الکلی، فواحش و ... می‌باشد.

اصل دهم: ضرورت عدالت اجتماعی

گفتیم جامعه دارای هدفی است که باید در طی فعالیت‌های مولد خود به‌سوی آن هدف – که تکامل و پیشرفت باشد – حرکت کند. حرکت تکاملی جامعه وقتی

۴۵۴ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

ممکن و میسر است که شرایط اولیه برای فعالیت مفید و خلاقه افراد آماده باشد. افراد بتوانند، صرف نظر از اختلافات رنگ و نژاد و...، استعدادهای خود را به کار اندازند. در سایه به روز و رشد استعدادها - افراد به حد وسع و توانایی خود کار کنند تا سطح تولید جامعه گسترش یابد. افراد برای اینکه به طور طبیعی به انجام وظایف خود بپردازند و اعضای مفید و مولدی برای جامعه باشند باید زندگی آنها تأمین باشد. ترس از فقر و ناداری از بین برود - نگرانی از بیکاری و فقر نباید وجود داشته باشد.

مجموعه این شرایط طبیعی اولیه از نظر اسلام در مفهوم کلی عدالت اجتماعی، به عنوان یک هدف کلی خلاصه شده است و مردم را به اجرای آن دعوت می نماید.

۱. وَأَقْسِطُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ (۹/۴۹)

- دادگری کنید که خداوند دادگران را دوست دارد.

۲. كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ

- از به پاداران دادگری باشید.

۳. فَاحْكُم بَيْنَهُم بِالْقِسْطِ (۴۲/۵)

- بین آنها به دادگری داوری کنید.

۴. قُلْ أَمَرَ رَبِّي بِالْقِسْطِ (۲۹/۷)

- امر(قانون) پروردگار مرا به دادگری (به مردم) بگو.

۵. كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ (۸/۵)

- از قیام کنندگان برای قانون خدا و نگهبانان دادگری باشید.

۶- إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ (۹۰/۱۶)

- خداوند شما را به دادگری و نیکی امر می کند؛

و هدف ارسال و بعثت انبیاء را برپا نگهداشتن همین امر طبیعی یا عدالت ذکر می نماید:

۷. لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ

(۲۵/۵۷)

پیامبران خود را با نشانه‌هایی فرستادیم و به آنان کتاب (قوانین) و ترازو (وسیله داوری) نازل کردیم تا مردم را به دادگری وادارند.

برهم خوردن عدالت اجتماعی وقتی است که ثروت جامعه به جای آنکه در دسترس همه مردم برای ارضاء احتیاجات طبیعی آنها قرارگیرد، در دست گروه معین و معدودی انحصارطلب متمرکز گردد. از اینجا انحطاط اجتماعی آغاز می‌گردد. طبیعی است وقتی احتیاجات انسان‌ها و افراد جامعه به صورت طبیعی ارضاء نشد، راهیابی برای ارضاء آنها از راه‌های غیرطبیعی آغاز می‌گردد و این آغاز فساد و ابتدای کفر است، و هر دوی آنها حاصل ظلم و عدم عدالت اجتماعی است.

از رسول خدا(ص): «خداوندا به نان جامعه ما برکت ده، زیرا اگر نان نباشد نه نماز خواهیم خواند و نه روزه خواهیم گرفت و نه سایر واجبات را به‌جا خواهیم آورد».

از ابوذر غفاری است: «هنگامی که فقر به جایی رود کفر به او می‌گوید مرا هم با خود ببر»^۱.

عدم عدالت اجتماعی، برهم خوردن نظم اقتصادی نه تنها موجب بروز کفر و هرج و مرج در توده‌های مردم خواهد شد، بلکه در میان همان گروه سرمایه‌دار بی‌نیاز نیز فساد و انحرافات می‌نماید. حاصل فساد و انحراف این جماعت سرمایه‌دار است که موجب نابودی جامعه می‌گردد.

وَإِذَا أَرَدْنَا أَنْ نُهْلِكَ قَرْيَةً أَمَرْنَا مُنْزِلِينَهَا فَتَسَفَّوْا فِيهَا (۱۶/۱۷)

– هرگاه بخواهیم شهری را نابود کنیم کامرانان و هوسرانان آن را به حکومت می‌رسانیم تا (از قانون خدا) نا فرمانی کنند.

و لذا اسلام در زیربنای تمام نظم اقتصادی خود می‌کوشد که از تمرکز سرمایه و ثروت جامعه در دست عده معدودی جلوگیری نماید.

– كَيْ لَا يَكُونَ دُولَةً بَيْنَ الْأَغْنِيَاءِ مِنْكُمْ (۷/۵۹)

– تا ثروت دستخوش گردش بین توانگران (سرمایه‌داران) شما نشود.

و در بحث سایر اصول اسلامی خواهیم دید که دولت اسلامی براساس همین آیه بالا و برای جلوگیری از چنین تمرکزی از چه قدرت وسیعی می‌تواند استفاده نماید.

۱. دکتر علی شریعتی، ابوذر غفاری

اصل یازدهم: رسالت انبیاء و مسلمان‌ها

همانطور که گفتیم رسالت انبیاء و بعثت آنها برای ایجاد همین نظم اقتصادی یا عدالت اجتماعی در جامعه بوده است. در تمام طول تاریخ نزاع انبیاء با طبقات سرمایه‌دار و اشراف و هدف آنها نجات و آزادی طبقات زحمتکش و رنجبر بوده است.

- نوح پیغمبر: «وَلَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا نُوحًا إِلَىٰ قَوْمِهِ... وَقَالَ الْمَلَأُ مِنْ قَوْمِهِ... (۶۰/۷)

- نوح را به سوی قومش فرستادیم... اشراف قوم او گفتند...

- موسی: «إِنَّ فِرْعَوْنَ عَلَا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَجَعَلَ أَهْلَهَا شِيَعًا يَسْتَضِعُّ طَائِفَةً مِنْهُمْ

» (۴/۲۸)

- فرعون در زمین طغیان کرده بود و در قوم خود اختلاف طبقاتی به راه

انداخته بود... و گروهی از آنان را ناچیز می‌شمرد.

- صالح: «قَالَ الْمَلَأُ الَّذِينَ اسْتَكْبَرُوا مِنْ قَوْمِهِ لِلَّذِينَ اسْتُضِعُّوا (۵۷/۷)

- مکالمه میان گروهی اشراف سرپیچیده از قانون خدا با طبقه‌ای از رنجبران و

ضعفاست...

در تمام مکالمات و جنگ و جدال موسی با فرعون (۱۰۹/۷ و ۳۴/۴۰ و ۱۳/۳

و ۳۶/۲۳) و شعیب با قومش (۸۸/۷ و ۹۰/۷) و هود با قومش (۶۶/۷) و صالح

(۵۷/۷) و... همه جا صحبت از وجود یک طبقه زحمتکش و محروم و اسیر است

و یک طبقه اشراف و سرمایه‌دار و بی‌نیاز که همه ثروت جامعه را در دست خود

گرفته است. در یک طرف انبیاء برای رهایی این طبقات زحمتکش توده مردم را

به سوی وحدت و خروج از بندهای کهن و شکستن زنجیرهای سنن پوسیده

اسارت دعوت می‌کنند و در طرف دیگر سرمایه‌داران و اشراف با تمام قوا حرف و

ادعای انبیاء را تکذیب و مردم را به عدم توجه و قبول ادعای انبیاء دعوت و

مجبور می‌نمایند.

- وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا فِي قَرْيَةٍ مِنْ نَذِيرٍ إِلَّا قَالَ مُتْرَفُوهَا إِنَّا بِمَا أُرْسِلْتُمْ بِهِ كَافِرُونَ... (۳۴/۳۴)

- به هر شهری ترساننده‌ای (راهنمایی) فرستادیم هوسرانان (اشراف) آنجا

گفتند که ما به حرف‌های شما ایمان نداریم.

مقالات علمی □ ۴۵۷

وَكَذَلِكَ مَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ فِي قَرْيَةٍ مِنْ نَذِيرٍ إِلَّا قَالَ مُتْرَفُوهَا إِنَّا وَجَدْنَا آبَاءَنَا عَلَىٰ
أُمَّةٍ وَإِنَّا عَلَىٰ آثَارِهِمْ مُقْتَدُونَ... (۲۳/۴۳)

- بدین سان هر موقع قبل از تو به شهری ترساننده‌ای (راهنمایی) فرستادیم
هوسرانان (اشراف) آنجا گفتند که پدران ما روشی (طرز فکری) داشتند و ما هم از
آنها پیروی می‌کنیم.

و این چنین جنگی تنها رسالت انبیاء نبوده است و نیست، بلکه این رسالت هر
انسان مسلمان و خداپرست است که به نجات توده‌های زحمتکش قیام کند.

جنگ‌های آزادی‌بخش اساس جهاد اسلامی را تشکیل می‌دهند:

- و مالکم: چه درد و مرضی دارید؟

- لا تقاتلون فی سبیل اللّٰه: که نمی‌جنگید در راه خدا؟

- و المستضعفین من الرجال و النساء و الولدان... و در راه آن ستم‌دیدگان و

ضعفاء از زن و مرد و بچه؟

- الذین یقولون: آنها که (دادشان به هوا است) می‌گویند:

- ربنا اخرجنا من هذا القرية الظالم اهلها - خدایا ما را از این شهر که مردمش

ستم‌گرند بیرون ببر (نجات بده)،

و اجعل لنا من لندک ولیا

- و برای ما از جانب خود فرمانروایی بگمار،

- و اجعل لنا من لندک نصیرا

- و برای ما از جانب خود یابوری قرار ده

بحث در اینکه از نظر رهایی ملت‌ها از یوغ اسارت و بردگی زر و زور چه
رسالتی بر عهده مسلمانان واگذار شده است موضوع مورد مطالعه ما در اینجا
نمی‌باشد. تذکر آن در اینجا فقط از باب جلب توجه خواننده به اهمیت مسأله
عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام و برقراری نظم اقتصادی می‌باشد.

در شرایط ظلم اقتصادی، اسلام نه تنها فقرا و محرومین را به تحمل و صبر
دعوت نمی‌کند، بلکه مردم راضی شده به ظلم را به عذاب و کیفر دردناکی تحدید
می‌کند.

در همین سوره نساء که آیه بالا را از آن نقل کردیم در آیه ۹۷ آمده است که:

«ملائکه از جمعی می‌پرسند که زندگی را چگونه گذرانید؟ آنها می‌گویند که ما در

زندگی جزء ضعفا و بیچارگان بودیم و قدرتی برای مبارزه و دفاع در برابر ظلم و ظالم نداشتیم! از آنها پرسیده می‌شود آیا سرزمین خدا وسیع نبود که مهاجرت کنید؟ سپس خداوند می‌فرماید: چون این جماعت بدون هیچ‌گونه سببی زیر بار ظلم رفتند و به زور و قلدری تن در داده‌اند به عذاب دوزخ و سوء عاقبت محکومند».

در بحث دیگری تحت عنوان **مکانیزم انقلاب** به نقش عوامل اقتصادی از نظر اسلام و پایه‌های اقتصادی جهاد یا جنگ‌های آزادیبخش در اسلام اشاره خواهیم کرد و در مورد این مسأله به‌طور مبسوط‌تری بحث خواهیم کرد. اشاره مختصر در اینجا صرفاً از جهت جلب توجه خواننده به اهمیتی است که اسلام برای تعادل اقتصادی و برقراری عدالت اجتماعی قائل می‌باشد.

در شماره آینده - بخش سوم - ما به روینای اقتصاد اسلامی خواهیم پرداخت.

اقتصاد اسلامی - بخش سوم

روینای عملی یا (شریعت) اقتصاد اسلام؛ مکتب مبارز، تابستان ۱۳۴۷/۱۹۶۸ در بخش‌های اول و دوم گفته شد که اسلام به عنوان یک مکتب و ایدئولوژی جهانی در تمام زمینه‌های حیاتی بشر اظهار نظر می‌نماید و راه حل‌های خود را به‌طور قاطع عرضه می‌نماید. مطالعه، بحث و داوری دربارهٔ یک قسمت از این ایدئولوژی بدون درنظر گرفتن روابط متقابل میان قسمت‌های مختلف موجب نتیجه‌گیری‌های ناروا و غلط خواهد شد. از نظر رابطه‌ای که میان اقتصاد و سایر جنبه‌های فردی و اجتماعی وجود دارد، اشاره شد که اسلام می‌کوشد ابتدا یک محتوای سالم برای جامعه بسازد و سپس برای حفظ و استمرار خلوص جامعه و سلامتی آن، سیستم اقتصادی خود را مستقر می‌سازد و هر دوی اینها لازم و ملزوم هستند. توضیح داده شد که مسائل عملی در هر مکتب اقتصادی با جهان‌بینی کلی آن مکتب رابطه دارد نمی‌توان این دو را بدون یکدیگر مطالعه کرد. میان مسائل عملی اقتصادی و جهان‌بینی کلی یک مکتب اصیل نباید تضاد و تناقض وجود داشته باشد. وجود هماهنگی یا تناقض و تضاد درونی میان جهان‌بینی اقتصادی حاکم بر جامعه با مسائل عملی که بشریت با آن روبروست و یا جامعه در طی

تزویرات خود با آنها سرو کار دارد پیدا می‌کند و راه حل‌هایی که برای حل مشکلات انتخاب می‌گردد، عامل اصلی در بقاء و یا شکست آن سیستم اقتصادی می‌باشد. و لذا برای یک مکتب اصیل که ادعای جهانی بودن را دارد و برای هدایت بشر در زمان‌ها و مکان‌هایی متفاوت و متضاد برنامه ارائه می‌دهد، مشکل اساسی که با آن روبرو می‌گردد آن خواهد بود که چگونه اصول اقتصادی خود را با شرایط متفاوت و گاه متضاد تطابق دهد، بدون آنکه در طی این تطورات بر آن اصول خدشه وارد آید. یا آنکه «تطابق» منجر به تغییرات در زیربنای اصلی نگردد. در این باره اضافه کردیم که اسلام با مهارت مشکلات را پیش‌بینی کرده است و راه حل خود را براساس «تغییرناپذیر بودن شریعت» به عنوان یک عنصر جامد و لایتغیر و فقه به عنوان یک عنصر سیال و متجدد و تابع زمان و مکان ارائه می‌دهد. سپس در بخش دوم ما طی بررسی جهان‌بینی اسلام درباره بشر و جامعه و مسائل اقتصادی نشان دادیم که از نظر اسلامی:

۱. مالکیت اصلی و نهایی از آن خدا است.

۲. بشر و جامعه، جانشین و خلیفه خدا در روی زمین است و حق مالکیت خداوند در تحت «شرایطی» به جامعه برای «استفاده» و بهره‌برداری به منظور «رفع احتیاجات»، «تفویض» شده است. به عبارت دیگر «مال»، مال الله و انسان خلیفه‌الله است.

۳. حکومت اسلامی که باید منتخب مردم و اجراکننده دستورات خداوند باشد، این تفویض و وکالت را به‌طور «مشروط» در خود متبلور و متجلی می‌سازد. این «تفویض مشروط» یا «وکالت مشروط» از یک طرف پایه «قدرت و بی‌قدرتی» دولت اسلامی و از طرف دیگر زیربنای حق انقلاب و طغیان مردم را در جامعه استوار می‌سازد.

۴. چون خداوند تأمین روزی تمام موجودات زمین را بدون تبعیض یا حبّ و بغض «تضمین و بیمه» کرده است. جانشین خداوند - جامعه - چه به صورت دسته جمعی و چه از طریق نماینده خود - دولت اسلامی - موظف و مجبور است «زندگی» کلیه افراد جامعه را صرف نظر از رنگ و نژاد و مذهب و غیره تأمین و بیمه نماید.

۵. مالکیت به صورت محدود، به عنوان یک «احتیاج» نفسانی شناخته شده است که باید ارضاء گردد. این مالکیت محدود و مشروط است و «به تقریر شارع» ثابت می شود. حدود و شرایط آن در سطح کلی با «اصل لاضرر و لا ضرار» تعیین شده است و در سطح عملی که تابع مقتضیات روز است، برعهده حاکم و نماینده جامعه است که از طریق «فقه» آن را مشخص سازد.

۶. اعضای جامعه موظف و مکلف هستند (امر و عبادت است) که به اندازه وسع خود کار کنند و استعدادهای خود را برای بهبود اقتصاد جامعه به کار اندازند و این وظیفه دولت اسلامی است که شرایط مساعد برای رشد این استعدادها را فراهم سازد.

۷. اعضای جامعه - افراد - جز به اندازه «احتیاج» خود حق بهره برداری از حاصل کار خود را ندارند. جامعه و دولت موظف هستند احتیاجات اعضا و افراد خود را تأمین و بیمه نمایند.

سپس به مفهوم عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام اشاره و جنبه های اقتصادی رسالت و مأمورین انبیاء را اشاره کردیم.

در این بخش ما به آن قسمت از اصول اقتصادی که روبنای عملی یا «شریعت اقتصادی اسلام» را تشکیل می دهد اشاره خواهیم نمود. توجه به مفهوم و معنای «شریعت» در اینجا از جهاتی ضروری و لازم است. اولاً از آن جهت که این اصول شریعت ثابت و لایتغیر هستند. هیچ مقامی و هیچ قدرتی حق تغییر و تصرف آنها را ندارد. ثانیاً از جهت دیگر این بدان معناست که برای اجرای این اصول ما احتیاج به تدوین «فقه اقتصادی» داریم.

به عبارت دیگر اصول شریعت اقتصادی اسلامی را باید با شرایط زمان و مکان تطبیق داد و این تطبیق ضرورت تدوین فقه اقتصادی را بیان می نماید. خواهیم دید چرا تدوین چنین فقهی ضروری است و چرا فقه اقتصادی اسلام که یک فقه سنتی است در حال حاضر جوابگوی مسایل اقتصادی جامعه امروز نیست و تنها ارزش راهنمایی را در تدوین فقه جدید اقتصادی اسلام دارا می باشد. و چرا محتوای این فقه مجبور است و باید در مکان های مختلف حتی در یک کشور باهم تفاوت داشته باشد.

تذکر دیگری قبل از ورود به مطلب اصلی ضروری است. مطالبی که در این مقالات مطرح می‌گردد صرفاً جنبه بحث و تحقیق دارد نه جزم و حتم.

شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی

اول: تکلیف منابع ثروت و تولید: دانسته شد که حق بهره‌برداری و استفاده از منابع ثروت و تولید به صورت «وکالت مشروط» به جامعه تفویض گردیده است. یکی از جنبه‌های این مشروطیت آن است که جامعه در بعضی از منابع ثروت و تولید می‌تواند این وکالت خود را به «افراد» جامعه تحت شرایطی برگزار نماید. درحالی که در بعضی موارد و نسبت به بعضی از منابع ثروت جامعه حق چنین برگزاری ندارد و لذا از این جهت مسأله به صورت زیر تقسیم می‌شود.

۱. ماعون: اشتراکت در احتیاجات عامه

سوره ماعون: أَرَأَيْتَ الَّذِي يُكذِّبُ بِالْإِيمَانِ، فَذَلِكَ الَّذِي يَدْعُ الْيَتِيمَ، وَلَا يُخْضِرُ عَلَى طَعَامِ الْمُسْكِينِ، فَوَيْلٌ لِلْمُصَلِّينَ، الَّذِينَ هُمْ عَنْ صَلَاتِهِمْ سَاهُونَ، الَّذِينَ هُمْ يُرَاءُونَ، وَيَمْنَعُونَ الْمَاعُونَ.

آیا دیدی کسی را که تکذیب (نفی) کرد روز جزا را و او آن کس است که می‌راند یتیم را و تحریص نمی‌کند (مردم را) بر اطعام مساکین.

پس وای بر نمازگزاران (از روی ریا) آنها که در نمازشان کاهل هستند آنها (هستند کسانی) که ریا می‌کنند و منع (محروم) می‌کنند (مردم را) از ماعون.

درباره معنای ماعون گفته شده است که آن «ابزار و لوازم عمومی یا سرچشمه‌های زندگی هستند»^۱ کلیه افراد و اعضای جامعه در این ابزار و لوازم یا احتیاجات عامه «شریک» هستند. به عبارت دیگر اسلام برای احتیاجات عمومی که سرچشمه حیات کلیه اعضای جامعه می‌باشد معتقد به «اشتراکیت» است. در معنای ماعون برخی آن را زکات تفسیر کرده‌اند. خیلی‌ها این معنا را رد می‌کنند. تفسیر دیگری جمع هر دو نظر را بیان می‌کند و آن اینکه «ماعون عبارت است از هر چیزی که به آدمی در انجام کار و رفع حاجاتش کمک نماید. به مال و ثروت هم

۱. اسلام و مالکیت، علامه سید محمود طالقانی، شرکت انتشار

که کمک بزرگی در انجام مقاصد است ماعون گفته می‌شود.... این است که مفسران هم ماعون را زکات و ابزار و اثاث زندگی معنی کرده‌اند.^۱

اصل شریعت اقتصادی این است که «مردم» در کلیه احتیاجات اساسی «از ابزار و لوازم عمومی (تولیدی و غیرتولیدی) و منابع ضروری زندگی به نسبت و اقتضای هر عصر شریک باشند»^۲ این یک اصل لایتغیر است. یعنی هیچ قدرتی نمی‌تواند بر این اصل خدشه وارد سازد یا آن را تغییر دهد. جامعه هم نمی‌تواند برای استفاده و بهره‌برداری از این احتیاجات و منابع به «افرادی» حق یا وکالت دهد. به عبارت دیگر مالکیت فردی و خصوصی نسبت به این منابع مطلقاً غیرقابل قبول است و به کلی مردود می‌باشد. تنها کاری که جامعه باید انجام دهد آن است که از طریق فقه، نوع ضروریات زندگی که بر حسب زمان‌های مختلف اختلاف پیدا می‌کند^۳ را تعیین نماید.

این احتیاجات نه تنها در زمان‌های مختلف با هم فرق خواهند داشت بلکه در مکان‌های مختلف در یک کشور واحد نیز باهم متفاوت خواهند بود. مثلاً در صدر اسلام وقتی سؤال کردند جواب داده شد:

المسلمون شركاء في ثلاث: في الكلا، والماء، والنار

- رسول اکرم (ص): «مردم در سه چیز باهم شریک هستند: آب، مراتع، و منابع سوخت. در جامعه ابتدایی عرب - و حتی امروزه در قسمت اعظم عالم - آب و مراتع و سوخت از اساسی‌ترین و ابتدایی‌ترین ضروریات بشر است. براساس این اشتراک است که فقه سنتی اسلام درباره این سه احتیاج به شرح و بحث مبسوطی پرداخته است. مثلاً درباره آب آمده است: «اگر کسی با احیاء، مالک چاهی شد و آب از آن درآمد باید به مقدار احتیاج خود و چارپایانش از آن استفاده کند و مازاد آن را برای رفع احتیاج دیگران مجاناً و بلاعوض بذل کند».^۴

۱. تفسیر نوین، محمد تقی شریعتی، شرکت انتشار

۲. برهان قرآن، صدر بلاغی

۳. عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام، سید قطب، ترجمه سید هادی خسروشاهی

۴. کتاب خلاف ج ۲، ص ۲۲۵، مرحوم شیخ طوسی

مقالات علمی □ ۴۶۳

در همین نقل قول کوتاه به دو عامل توجه کنید یکی «احیاء» به عنوان پایه مالکیت چاه و دیگری «استفاده به قدر احتیاج».

اما در شرایط دنیای کنونی با پیشرفت وسایل تولید و صنایع مسلماً علاوه بر سه عامل بالا احتیاجات دیگری نیز وجود دارند که از سرچشمه‌های اساسی زندگی مردم می‌باشند. البته ما در مقام تدوین فقه اقتصادی نیستیم اما می‌توانیم برای روشن شدن مطلب نمونه‌هایی ارائه دهیم. مثلاً در شهرهای بزرگ زندگی بدون آب و برق و یا تلفن اگر غیر ممکن نباشد، بسیار مشکل است لذا کار فقه اقتصادی است که اختیار این «احتیاجات عامه» را از دست عناصر خصوصی خارج سازد. درحالی که در شهرهای کوچک یا دهات و در بعضی از کشورها ممکن است مسئله برق و تلفن به اندازه شهرهای بزرگ حاد نباشد. برعکس در دهات وسایل کشت و زرع، تراکتور و غیره مطرح است که فقه اقتصادی باید آنها را مطرح سازد.

۲. ثروت‌های عمومی - انفال

يَسْأَلُونَكَ عَنِ الْأَنْفَالِ قُلِ الْأَنْفَالُ لِلَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ فَأَتَوْا اللَّهَ وَأَصْلَحُوا ذَاتَ بَيْنِكُمْ وَأَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ (انفال ۱)

- «از تو راجع به انفال سوال می‌کنند بگو انفال مال خدا و رسول اوست. پس از خدا بترسید و میان (روابط) خودتان را اصلاح کنید - اطاعت کنید خدا و رسولش را - اگر شما گرونده هستید.

انفال جمع نفل و در اینجا به معنای بخشش است. در کتب فقهی از انفال به معنای ما یختص بالامام یعنی هر آنچه که به امام تعلق دارد، عنوان می‌کنند.^۱ اگرچه گروهی از فقها^۲ انفال را صرفاً غنایم جنگی ذکر کرده‌اند، اما مکتب تشیع این معنا را نپذیرفته است و معتقد است که غنایم جنگی یکی از منابع انفال است نه تنها

۱. برای مطالعه کامل‌تر رجوع کنید به کتاب‌های: انفال یا ثروت‌های عمومی نوشته علی غفوری و برهان قرآن نوشته صدر بلاغی، مالکیت در اسلام محمود طالقانی.

۲. برادران اهل سنت معتقدند که منظور از انفال تنها غنایم جنگی است و به دنبال این اعتقاد است که در ترجمه انگلیسی، قرآن را به همین spoils of war یا spoils ترجمه کرده‌اند که به نظر ما این معنا ناقص و گمراه‌کننده است.

۴۶۴ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

مورد آن. براساس آنچه در کتب اسلامی آمده است،^۱ ثروت‌های عمومی که به جامعه تعلق دارند عبارتند از:

۱. آنچه امام از غنایم جنگی انتخاب نماید.
۲. هر زمینی که بدون لشگرکشی به دست آید.
۳. زمین‌های موات و اراضی وسیع بیابان‌ها، قلال کوه‌ها و هر زمین بی‌صاحب و هر مکانی که ساکنانش آن‌جا را ترک کرده‌اند یا منقرض شده‌اند.
۴. مراتع، جنگل‌ها، نیزارها، بیشه‌ها.
۵. اشیاء و نفائس و اموال و املاک اختصاصی شاهان و سلاطین و یا املاک غیرغصبی که به دیگران واگذار کرده‌اند.
۶. ارث کسانی که وارثی ندارند.
۷. آنچه بدون اذن امام عادل از دشمنان در جنگ گرفته شود.
۸. معادن روی زمین یا زیر زمین
۹. درون رودخانه‌ها و اشجار و سایر محتویات آن
۱۰. طرق و شوارع و ملحقات آنها
۱۱. آب دریاها و کلیه منابع و ثروت‌های حاصله از آن
۱۲. موقوفات عامه
۱۳. بازگشته‌ها (فیء)
۱۴. اراضی مفتوح عنوه یا آن اراضی که به دست مسلمان‌ها فتح شده است (در فصل زمین بحث خواهیم کرد).

قسمتی از موارد بالا جزو انفال است و قسمتی جزو ثروت‌های حکومت است. ما همه را در اینجا جزو ثروت‌های عمومی آورده‌ایم. منظور از «ثروت‌های عمومی» آنست که اختیار نهایی این منابع و تولید ثروت که نام برده شد، در دست جامعه و حکومت اسلامی است. با توجه به بحث اصلی ما که جامعه جانشین خداست و همه چیز به او تعلق دارد، شاید چنین به نظر برسد که تنظیم و تدوین این منابع به عنوان «ثروت‌های عمومی» زاید باشد. اما تنظیم این ثروت‌ها به صورت بالا اولاً

۱. وسایل الشیعه، تالیف شیخ حر عاملی ۷۳ حدیث درباره انفال در چهار باب ذکر می‌کند و رجوع کنید به کتاب انفال یا ثروت‌های عمومی علی غفوری

تأکید اصل مطلب و اینکه چگونه تمام منابع اصلی ثروت - در اختیار جامعه و یا به اصطلاح «ملی» است. تفکیک دو مورد «ماعون» و «انفال» از یکدیگر، به این علت است که در ماعون همان طور که ذکر شد، هیچگونه مالکیت فردی خصوصی به رسمیت شناخته نمی شود. هیچ مقامی یا قدرتی حق ندارد احتیاجات عامه (ماعون) را در تصرف فردی خود بگیرد یا آن را به دیگری واگذار کند. همچنین تحت هیچ شرایطی فقه نمی تواند مقرراتی برای خصوصی کردن احتیاجات وضع نماید درحالی که برای ثروت های عامه چنین نیست. جامعه در عین حال که صاحب اختیار این ثروت های عمومی است، می تواند مطابق مصلحت و منافع خود آنها را در اختیار عناصر خصوصی بگذارد یا از تسلط عناصر خصوصی خارج سازد. مثلاً یکی از ارکان انفال معادن است. در معادن، نفت و گچ و نمک را در نظر می گیریم. اولی به خاطر اهمیت آن نمی توان به دست سرمایه داران خصوصی سپرده شود. درحالی که برای معدن گچ و نمک ممکن است فقه شرایطی را پیش بینی کند که تحت آن شرایط افراد به بهره برداری خصوصی از معادن گچ پردازند. این تفاوت نه تنها در مورد انواع معادن دیده می شود، بلکه در سرزمین های مختلف نیز تفاوت می کند. مثلاً درحالی که در کویت نفت منبع درآمد اصلی است، در یمن که نفت نیست، نمک بزرگترین منبع درآمد ملی است. لذا رأی فقه اقتصادی درباره معدن نمک ایران و یمن نمی تواند یکسان باشد.

۳. اموال عمومی - فیء

فیء از نظر لغوی یعنی بازگشت و در اصطلاح «شریعت اقتصادی اسلام» یعنی (اموال و املاکی که یکسره از ملکیت افراد بیرون آمده و به اموال عمومی بازگشته است و هر نوع تصرف مالکانه فردی یا نقل و انتقال در آنها جایز نیست).^۱

مَا أَقَاءَ اللَّهُ عَلَى رَسُولِهِ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْقُرَىٰ فَلِلَّهِ وَلِلرَّسُولِ وَلِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ كَيْ لَا يَكُونَ دُولَةً بَيْنَ الْأَغْنِيَاءِ مِنْكُمْ ۚ وَمَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوا ۚ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ شَدِيدُ الْعِقَابِ (حشر ۶)

۱. اسلام و مالکیت محمود طالقانی، انتشار

آنچه از سرزمین‌های دهداران (دهکده‌ها) خداوند به رسولان خود بازگرداند (یا فیء او قرار داد) از آن خدا و رسول و خویشاوندان و یتیمان و بینوایان و ابن‌السبیل است (این حکم برای آن است که) این بازگشته (فیء) دست به دست در میان ثروتمندان نگردهد آنچه پیامبر برای شما آورد بگیریید و آنچه نهی کرد از آن پرهیز کنید از خداوند پروا کنید. چراکه مؤاخذه خداوند سخت است. اصل فیء تأیید قسمتی از انفال است. در بطن این اصل، یک اصل دیگری از شریعت اقتصادی نهفته است که باید به آن توجه کرد و آن عبارت «كَيْ لَا يَكُونَ دُولَةً بَيْنَ الْأَغْنِيَاءِ مِنْكُمْ» می‌باشد. یعنی نباید ثروت‌های عمومی در میان توانگران دست به دست و محصور گردد. این عبارت قرآنی، یکی از اصول شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی را در نفی انحصارات سرمایه‌داری و تمرکز منابع ثروت و تولید و توزیع را در دست گروهی اقلیت انحصارطلب بیان می‌کند و خط مشی عمومی اقتصاد جامعه را نیز منعکس می‌سازد. مسأله تنها به نفی و انکار محدود نمی‌شود بلکه به مرحله جنگ و جهاد و رسالت برای نابودی آن ادامه می‌یابد. کلام قرآن در برابر طبقه اشراف و سرمایه‌دار که عموماً همزاد و همراه با فساد و عیاشی هستند بسیار قاطع و کوبنده است. جای آشتی وجود ندارد. این اصل عدم تمرکز ثروت‌های جامعه در دست اقلیت سرمایه‌دار، به اضافه اصول دیگری نظیر سد ذرایع و مصالح مرسله که بعداً بدانها اشاره خواهد شد، برای ایجاد تعادل اقتصادی و استقرار عدالت اجتماعی بزرگترین قدرت را به جامعه و والی اسلام می‌دهد. این اصل منبع و مقدمه بسیاری از مقررات فقهی در باب اقتصاد می‌باشد.

۴. مسأله اراضی

در بحث انفال، فیء و سایر موارد از ثروت‌های عمومی دیدیم که من حیث المجموع کلیه اراضی، از آباد و غیر آباد، از طریق اراضی مفتوح عفوه، یا فیء یا انفال جزو ثروت‌های عمومی جامعه محسوب می‌شوند. مسئله دهقانان یکی از حادترین و قدیمی‌ترین مشکل جوامع بشری است. در حال حاضر سرنوشت سه چهارم کشورهای جهان به‌طور مستقیم یا غیر مستقیم با سرنوشت دهقانان و زمین وابسته است. در بسیاری از این کشورها دهقانان ستون اصلی میزهای ضد استعماری و یا انقلابی را تشکیل می‌دهند. پیروزی بسیاری از مبارزات ضد استعماری و یا انقلابی

را تشکیل می‌دهند. پیروزی بسیاری از مبارزات ضد استعماری و ضد استبدادی با جهت‌گیری جنبش دوباره دهقانان رابطه دارد. در کشورهای به اصطلاح در حال رشد، هیچ تحول بنیادی صورت نخواهد گرفت جز آنکه مسئله زمین و دهقانان در سایه اتخاذ یک سیاست اقتصادی واقع‌بینانه‌ای به‌طور عادلانه حل شود. لذا واضح است که یک مکتب جهانی، با وسعت دید اسلام نمی‌تواند درباره چنین مسئله اساسی نظر ندهد، بلکه این مسأله بخش بزرگی از شریعت اقتصادی و فقه سنتی را تشکیل می‌دهد. جهت‌گیری اسلام در این مسأله آن چنان است که در آغاز و شروع جنبش انقلابی اسلام - دهقانان و بردگان - صفوف اصلی مجاهدین را تشکیل می‌دادند. یکی از علل پیشرفت برق‌آسای جنبش اسلامی و شکست ارتش‌های بزرگی نظیر ارتش ایران همین جهت‌گیری اسلام درباره زمین و دهقان بوده است. شاید به همین علت بوده است که در جنگ میان مسلمانان و ارتش ایران، سربازان ایرانی که عموماً دهقان و دهقان‌زاده بوده‌اند، حاضر به جنگ نمی‌شده‌اند و افسران حکومت یزدگرد مجبور می‌شدند برای جلوگیری از فرار، آنها را با زنجیر به هم ببندند به همین علت جنگ‌ها به نام جنگ‌های سلاسل (جمع سلسله) معروف شده‌اند.

در اسپانیا طارق بن زیاد پس از جبل الطارق که به نام او معروف شده است گذشت، و با ارتش دشمن روبرو شد و در همه جا با سرعت پیش رفت. باتوجه به اینکه سربازان دشمن عموماً و اکثراً دهقانان بودند، طارق دستور داد اعلام کنند اگر دهقانان به ارتش اسلام تسلیم شوند، خواه اسلام بیاورند یا نیاورند در صورت پیروزی اسلام، به آنها اجازه داده می‌شود که به اراضی خود بازگردند و به کار خود ادامه دهند. یکی از مهمترین عوامل جنگ شیعه با زمامداران خودسر، تجاوزات آنان به حقوق ملت و زیر پا گذاشتن مقررات اسلامی درباره اراضی دهقانان بوده است. قیام علیه عثمان و قتل خلیفه، انعکاس سیاست ضد اسلامی عثمانی درباره اراضی و واگذاری آنان به اشراف بوده است. توطئه علیه حکومت امام علی(ع) نیز از جانب کسانی بود که امام علی(ع) در نهج‌البلاغه به کرات به تجاوزات آنان اشاره می‌کند و در حکومت خود به وضع نامشروع آنان خاتمه داد. در بحث انفال - فیء و سایر موارد از ثروت‌های عمومی دیدیم که تقریباً کلیه اراضی سرزمین‌های اسلام

۴۶۸ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

از آباد و غیرآباد به شکل اراضی مفتوح عنوه - فیء یا انفال - جزو ثروت‌های عمومی محسوب می‌شوند و به نحوی از انحاء تحت کنترل یا نظارت یا مالکیت «والی اسلام» که تبلور اراده عمومی است قرار دارند. در اسلام اراضی در مرحله اول به دو گروه اساسی تقسیم می‌شوند و حکم هرکدام با دیگری تفاوت دارد.

دسته اول: اراضی موات یا غیر آباد (بایر)

دسته دوم: اراضی آباد یا دائر

اراضی موات: منظور از این اراضی آنهایی هستند که در آنها هیچگونه تصرف احيایی صورت نگرفته است و در این اراضی هیچگونه تصرفات مالکانه از خرید و فروش و نقل و انتقال جایز نیست. تنها حقی که وجود دارد، آزادی «حق احياء» این اراضی است.

ـ موتان الارض لله و لرسوله ثم هی لکم ایها المسلمون.

رسول خدا(ص): «اراضی مرده به خدا و رسول او و سپس تعلق به شما دارد

ای مسلمان‌ها»

اما نحوه بهره‌برداری:

ـ من احياء ارضا میته فهی له.

رسول خدا(ص): «هرکس زمین مرده‌ای را آباد کند، پس آن زمین از آن

اوست».

ـ موتان الارض لله و لرسوله فمن احبب منها شیئا فهو له.

رسول خدا(ص): اراضی مرده به خدا و رسول او تعلق دارند پس هرکس آنچه

را که از این اراضی آباد کند به او تعلق دارد».

ـ فان الارض لله و لمن عمرها

امام حسین(ع): «زمین از آن خدا و از آن کسی است که آبادش کند».

بنابراین مسئله اراضی غیرآباد یا موات عبارت از این است که این اراضی به هر صورت که باشند و در هرکجا متعلق به خدا و جانشین خدا (جامعه) است. به افراد جامعه اجازه داده شده است که با آباد و احياء کردن این اراضی از آنها بهره‌برداری کنند و بهره یا حاصل آن مال کسی است که روی این اراضی کار کرده است. اجازه تملیک یا حق احياء یک نوع مالکیت مشروط و محدود است. به عبارت دیگر حق تملک احياءکننده فقط احياء است و فقط در حد احياء و مادام‌الاحیاء است. یعنی

در صورتی که آبادکننده زمین بعد از مدتی آن را رها ساخت و رفت این حق از او سلب می‌گردد و هر شخص دیگری نسبت به آبادانی آن دست بزند، این حق به او تعلق می‌گیرد. این حق شامل «هر» آبادکننده‌ای صرف نظر از مذهبش می‌گردد. - امام صادق(ع): «هر قومی که (حتی یهود و نصارا) اندازه‌ای از زمین را آباد سازند یا منشأ عمل گردانند (یا در آن عمل نمایند) به آن احقند و آن زمین از آن آنها می‌باشد».

بنابراین مالکیت احیاءکننده مالکیت ثابت و مطلق نیست. اگر از صورت آبادی بیرون رفت از مالکیت شخص خارج می‌شود.

مکانیسم احیاء

اما اینکه احیاء و آبادانی با چه عملیاتی ثابت می‌شود، یک بحث فقهی است و تابع زمان و مکان. فقه سنتی در این باره تحجیر را مأخذ قرار داده است. که آن عبارت است از کسی که اطراف زمینی را سنگ‌چین نماید یا دیوار بکشد. این تحجیر شروع حق احیاء و موجب حق اولویت است. ولی منشأ مالکیت را فقه سنتی برچیدن سنگ‌ها، برگرداندن زمین و تسطیح و ایجاد نهر و ریشه‌کشی و خشک‌کردن علف‌های زاید و هرزه و جاری ساخت آب را جزو تحجیر می‌دانند. البته این «تعریف» یا تعیین چگونگی احیاء در شرایط حاضر در کشورهای مختلف باهم فرق می‌کند و این وظیفه اقتصادی است که آن را مشخص سازد.

مالیات یا خراج زمین - چون گفته شد که این اراضی متعلق به جامعه است، هرکس که این اراضی را آباد کند و از آنها بهره‌برداری نماید، باید مالیات یا خراجی را که دولت اسلامی تعیین می‌نماید بپردازد. در بحث سایر اراضی درباره خراج صحبت خواهیم کرد.

اراضی آباد یا زیر کشت

در بحث ثروت‌های عمومی انفال و فیه به سه نوع اراضی اشاره شد.

۱. آنهایی که بدون صلح به دست مسلمان‌ها افتاده است (اراضی مفتوح عنوه) این اراضی (آباد یا غیرآباد) قابل خرید و فروش نیست. اداره و نظارت بر آنها برعهده امام و یا والی اسلام می‌باشد.

۲. اراضی که با صلح به دست مسلمان‌ها افتاده است. این اراضی به عنوان «ولایت» در دست «والی اسلام» است که می‌تواند در آنها تصرف کند.^۱

۳. املاک فیء، این‌گونه اراضی نیز به‌صورتی از گردونه مالکیت‌های خصوصی خارج شده و به اموال عمومی برگشته است. درحالی که اراضی نوع اول و دوم شامل اراضی آباد و غیر آباد هر دو می‌باشد، اراضی فیء بیشتر شامل اراضی آباد بوده است. در اینجا باید توجه داشت که جنبش انقلابی اسلام در رهگذر توسعه و تکامل رسالت‌رهایی بخش خود، هر کجا که سرزمین‌ها را از «جور حکام و سلاطین» آزاد می‌ساخت، اولین مسأله در برابر او مسئله توده مردم به‌خصوص دهقان‌ها بوده است. شک نیست که دهقانان روی اراضی آباد کار می‌کرده‌اند. این اراضی قبل از ساختن یا در اختیار سلاطین و شاهان و قیصرها و یا کارگزاران و نمایندگان و اعضاء خانواده و یا ملاکین بزرگ بوده است. اسلام صرف نظر از آنکه وجود سلطان و شاه و قیصر و یا ملاکین بزرگ و اشراف را همراه با نظام اقتصادی حاکم قبول نداشته است، بلکه اصولاً مالکیت آنان را بر این اراضی نمی‌پذیرفته است.

لذا جنبش انقلابی پس از ره‌ساختن اراضی مستقیماً با دهقان‌ها - شایسته‌ترین عناصر ذی‌حق روبرو می‌شده؛ در صورتی که دهقانان نظام اجتماعی اسلام را قبول می‌کردند، همه به‌طور یکسان و مساوی بدون تبعیض نژادی یا مذهبی با آنها رفتار می‌شده است. در تقسیم‌بندی سه‌گانه اراضی به‌صورت بالا - اراضی نوع اول (مفتوح عنه) و اراضی نوع سوم (فیء) چون به‌طور کلی متعلق به کلیه اتباع جامعه اسلامی است و از گردونه مالکیت‌های خصوصی خارج شده است. لذا «والی اسلام» حق نداشته آنها را میان دهقانان تقسیم و یا به‌صورتی به «افراد» برگزار نماید. لذا پس از رهایی این اراضی آنها را به دهقانها «اجاره» می‌دادند و این سیستم اجاره‌بندی اراضی کشاورزی موجب تدوین باب خراجیه در اقتصاد اسلامی شده است. در صورتی که در نوع دوم اراضی، که با صلح به دست مسلمان‌ها افتاده است «والی اسلام» می‌توانسته آنها را با حفظ منافع جامعه به خود دهقانانی که در این اراضی به کار زراعت مشغول بوده‌اند یا به هر کس دیگری واگذار نماید یا آنکه به آنها اجاره دهد. برحسب اینکه منافع خلق اسلام چگونه ایجاب نماید.

۱. اسلام و مالکیت، محمود طالقانی، شرکت انتشار

اقتصاد اسلامی - بخش سوم

دنباله رو بنای عملی یا «شریعت» اقتصاد اسلام

مکتب مبارز، شماره زمستان ۱۳۴۷/۶۹ - ۱۹۶۸

یک صفحه جا افتاده است. از متن تایپ شود و بیاید اینجا

در توضیح رو بنای عملی یا شریعت اقتصادی اسلام ابتدا به ضرورت اجتناب ناپذیر تجدیدنظر اساسی در محتوای فقه سنتی اشاره شد و سپس اصول شریعت اقتصادی اسلام را به شرح زیر بیان کردیم:

۱. **اشتراکیت در احتیاجات عامه یا اصل ماعون:** اسلام برای احتیاجات عمومی که سرچشمه‌های حیات کلیه اعضای جامعه می‌باشند معتقد به اشتراکیت می‌باشد. این احتیاجات اساسی از ابزار و لوازم عمومی (تولیدی و غیرتولیدی) که منابع ضروری زندگی بوده و به نسبت و اقتضای هر عصر تغییر می‌کنند قابل انتقال و تسلط مالکیت‌های خصوصی نمی‌باشند.

۲. **اموال یا ثروت‌های عمومی:** که دارایی جامعه هستند و اختیار نهایی این منابع تولید و ثروت که حدود موارد آنها را به تفصیل شرح داده‌ایم در دست جامعه و حکومت اسلامی است. حکومت اسلامی در پاره‌ای از موارد بنا به ضرورت و مصالح عمومی می‌تواند حق بهره‌برداری یا تصرف مالکانه از این منابع ثروت را به عناصر خصوصی برگزار نماید، چنین حقی درباره ماعون در اسلام و حکومت اسلامی وجود ندارد.

۳. **توزیع ثروت در جامعه براساس اصل عدم تمرکز ثروت و سرمایه در دست اقلیت محدود سرمایه.**

۴. **در مورد زمین و دهقانان،** اسلام در مرحله اول به جای حق «مالکیت» بر زمین «حق بهره‌برداری» را مطرح می‌سازد. به این صورت که افراد هیچ‌گاه مالک زمین نخواهند بود، بلکه در تحت شرایطی «حق بهره‌برداری» به آنها واگذار می‌گردد. گفته شد که اراضی چه آباد و چه غیر آباد (موات) جزء اموال عمومی (انفال) محسوب می‌شوند. بهره‌برداری از اراضی موات تابع «مکانیسم آبادی» یا «احیاء موات» می‌باشد که به موجب آن حق اولویت در بهره‌برداری از زمین متعلق به کسی است که زمین را آباد ساخته است. این حق تملک آباد (احیاء) کننده فقط

حق آبادانی (احیاء) است. یعنی در حد آبادانی و تا زمان آبادی (مادام‌الاحیاء). اراضی دایر یا آباد به گروه‌های چندی تقسیم می‌شوند که در تحلیل نهایی جز بخش مختصری از این اراضی عموماً در تصرف حکومت اسلامی باقی خواهند ماند. حکومت اسلامی این اراضی را نمی‌تواند میان دهقانان تقسیم یا به عناصر خصوصی دیگری واگذار نماید. بلکه باید آنها را به دهقانان اجاره دهد. دهقانان که «حق بهره‌برداری» از زمین را دارند به حکومت اسلامی اجاره یا «خراج» می‌پردازند. بحث حاضر در این شماره ادامه گفتار شماره قبل در شریعت اقتصاد اسلامی می‌باشد.

گفته شد که اسلام نه تنها به جنگ غرایز نمی‌رود، بلکه اقتناع این غرایز را مقدمه و شرط لازم جهت آماده‌ساختن انسان برای سیر به سوی هدف کلی زندگی می‌داند. ریشه تماس به مالکیت فردی را نیز در نفسانیات و غرایز انسانی می‌داند که باید ارضاء گردد. به عبارت دیگر تمایل به مالکیت نیز نظیر سایر تمایلات و غرایز انسانی که به‌طور عادی در مرز «ارضاء» و «اقتناع» متوقف نمی‌شود احتیاج به کنترل و تحدید دارد. گفته شد که اسلام مالکیت فردی مشروط را به رسمیت می‌شناسد و شرایط و حقوقی برای آن قایل است. از این نظر موقعیت و شرایط مالکیت خصوصی بر اموال با مالکیت خصوصی بر املاک باهم فرق می‌کند.

در مالکیت خصوصی بر اموال - اصل تسلیط (الناس سلاطون علی اموالهم)^۱
وجود دارد که حدود آن را اصل (لاضرر و لااضرار فی اسلام). به عبارت دیگر مالکیت خصوصی افراد بر اموالشان تا آنجا معتبر و محترم است که بر ضرر فرد یا افراد دیگر یا جامعه نباشد. به محض آنکه مالکیت خصوصی فردی بر اموالش موجب ضرر و یا زیانی گردد، حکومت اسلامی می‌تواند و باید کل مالکیت او را تعطیل نماید.

در مالکیت خصوصی بر املاک - اصل احیاء وجود دارد. در واقع اسلام مالکیت بر زمین را به رسمیت نمی‌شناسد بلکه حق احیاء را به رسمیت می‌شناسد. تا زمانی که فرد به عمران و آبادی زمین همت گماشته است و آن را نگه می‌دارد حق اولویت او بر زمین محفوظ است اما به محض آنکه زمین را رها کرد و به حال

۱. مردم بر اموالشان مسلط هستند.

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خود گذاشت، پس از گذشتن مدت معینی هرکس به آبادانی مجدد آن پردازد، محصول از آن او خواهد بود. بیان: الزرع للزارع ولو كان غاصباً^۱ انعکاس دیگری از مفهوم حق احیاء می‌باشد.

این تفاوت نظر درباره دو نوع مالکیت خصوصی بر اموال و املاک شاید از آن جهت باشد که اموال (دارایی منقول) بیشتر جنبه مصرفی دارند نه ارزش منبع یک درآمد ملی. و به مجرد آنکه اموال خصوصی به مرحله تراکم برسد که حکم یک منبع درآمد ملی را پیدا کند یا به صورت منبع احتیاج عامه بشود یا موجب برهم خوردن تعادل اقتصادی گردد، حکومت اسلامی می‌تواند آن را کلاً، تعطیل نماید. اما در اراضی مسأله ارزش مصرف مطرح نیست بلکه زمین فی نفسه دارای ارزش درآمد ملی است و می‌بینیم که قرآن هم مستقیماً و صریحاً در باب زمین به کرات نظر صریح داده است که تعلق به خدا و رسول و جامعه اسلامی دارد.

انتقال مالکیت‌های خصوصی به مالکیت عمومی

الف: مالکیت اراضی

علیرغم آنکه اسلام تعلق مطلق زمین را به خدا و رسول جامعه صریح و مکرر اعلام می‌نماید معذک در عمل به الغای ناگهانی و همه‌جانبه و کامل مالکیت‌های خصوصی نمی‌پردازد. اما این بدان معنا نیست که اسلام به الغای کامل آن نظر و توجه ندارد. بلکه برعکس توجه دقیق به آنچه عمل شده و آنچه دستور داده شده و آنچه پیش‌بینی کرده است، نشانه می‌دهد که هدف نهایی و غایی بازگشت کامل به مالکیت‌های اجتماعی است. این مراحل را می‌توان در سه دوره مشخص کرد:

دوران اول - آغاز کار جنبش اسلامی: در این دوران چه در جوامع پیشرفته نظیر امپراطوری روم و ایران و چه غیر متمدن نظیر عربستان و غیره اساس اقتصاد جامعه تولید کشاورزی بوده است. کلیه اراضی یا مستقیماً در دست سلاطین بوده است یا در اختیار مالکین بزرگی که جزو اعضای خاندان سلطنتی یا اطرافیان حکومت بوده‌اند (ملوک الطوائفی). دهقانان در این اراضی به صورت برده کار می‌کردند. جامعه طبقاتی بوده است دهقانان حق خروج از طبقه خود و انتخاب مشاغل دیگری را نداشته‌اند. در این دوران اسلام با اعلام اجتماعی بودن بخش

۱. محصول مال زارع است ولو غصبی باشد.

بزرگی از اراضی (قسمت اعظم آنها) به صورت اراضی مفتوحه العنوه یا انفال یا فیء - از یک طرف و اعلام آزادی حق احیاء از جانب دیگر یک قدم بزرگ و ناگهانی در جهت غایی و نهایی برمی دارد.

دوران دوم - فاصله میان دوران اول و دوران پایان اجتماعی کردن مالکیت هاست. در این دوران اسلام به نحو تدریجی مالکیت های خصوصی می پردازد. مکانیسم این نحو تدریجی را می توان در مسئله وقف مشاهده کرد.

سنت وقف: متوقف کردن ملک است از تصرفات مالکانه و بازگذارن بهره آن در راه خیرات و مصالح عمومی اسلامی (حبس عین و تسبیل منفعت) نتیجه وقف این است که ملک از ملکیت اشخاص و حکومت ها خارج می گردد و منافع آن برحسب نظر واقف و مصلحت در امور عام المنفعه مصرف می شود...^۱

برحسب عمل به این سنت است که در کشورهای اسلامی قسمت اعظمی از اراضی آباد (در برخی نقاط آبادترین آنها) اراضی وقفی است که از گردونه مالکیت های خصوصی خارج شده اند و بازگشت آنها به دایره مالکیت های خصوصی امکان پذیر نیست. در ایران با وجود آنکه اراضی موقوفه به علت همین آبادی حرص و طمع سلاطین و صاحبان قدرت را برانگیخته است و بارها این اراضی را تصاحب کرده اند، معذالک ۱۰-۱۵٪ کل دهات ایران را دهات موقوفه تشکیل می دهند (چگونگی اداره این موقوفات در حال حاضر بحث دیگری است که در اینجا مورد نظر ما نیست).

دوران سوم: در انتقال مالکیت های خصوصی به اجتماعی مرحله استقرار حکومت عدل و داد امام قائم است در این مرحله انتقال مالکیت ها شدید و ناگهانی و کامل است. به این عبارت که حکومت امام عادل و بر حق «زمین ها را یکسره به تصرف خود می گیرد».

عمران اراضی موات یک مشکل عمومی

در مقدمه بخش اول تحت عنوان کدام راه، آمار اراضی مزروعی مصر را در قرن اول هجری با آمار فعلی و حتی بعد از پایان سعدالعالی (آسوان) مقایسه کردیم. به اوضاع اقتصادی و تراکم جمعیت در یمن و عراق و ایران اشاره نمودیم. به طور

۱. اسلام و مالکیت، محمود طالقانی

مجمعل گفته شد که توسعه و رشد کشاورزی در آن زمان بدون برخورداری از تکنولوژی جدید تنها می‌توانسته است حاصل نظام اقتصادی حاکم بر جامعه باشد. در نتیجه نظام اقتصادی حاکم نه تنها تغذیه آن چنان انبوه جمعیتی انجام گرفته است، بلکه زمانی می‌رسد که می‌خوانید در سرتاسر دنیای اسلام محتاج و فقیری که دولت به او کمک کند پیدا نمی‌شود. تازه سیستم اقتصادی به‌طور کامل و همه‌جانبه اجرا نشده و انحرافات و بدعت‌های فراوان در آن ایجاد کردند. در تقسیم‌بندی ساده اراضی به دو گروه بایر (موات) و دایر (آباد) و اعلام آزادی حق احیاء (آبادانی) اراضی موات برای کلیه اتباع جامعه صرف نظر از رنگ و نژاد و مذهب و به رسمیت شناختن حق تملیک تا زمان آبادانی (مادام‌الاحیاء) آن چنان تحرک و دینامیسمی در جامعه به‌وجود می‌آورد که نتیجه آن همان توسعه وسیع اراضی مزروعی در تاریخ اقتصاد اسلامی می‌باشد که بدان اشاره شد. برای درک اهمیت این مسأله کافیسست به مشکل بزرگی که کشورهای در حال رشد با آن روبرو هستند توجه کنیم. کشورهای در حال رشد عموماً با دو مسأله دست به‌گریبانند. مسئله اول آنکه در این کشورها نسبت رشد جمعیت از نسبت رشد اقتصادی بیشتر است، در نتیجه علی‌رغم تمام کوشش‌ها و توسعه اقتصادی و استفاده از هرگونه وسایل فنی معذالک این کشورها با کمبود مواد غذایی روبرو هستند. اما از طرف دیگر در همین کشورها با وجود استفاده از تمام تجارب دنیای غرب و شرق وسایل فنی تنها قسمت کوچکی از کل اراضی قابل کشت تحت کشت و کار است. در ایران از کل اراضی قابل کشت فقط ۱۰-۱۵ درصد آن تحت کشاورزی است و ۸۵-۹۰ درصد بقیه اراضی قابل کشت بدون استفاده مانده است. در چنین شرایطی در کشورهای اسلامی متأسفانه نه تنها آزادی حق احیاء را اعلام نمی‌کنند، بلکه به تقلید کورکورانه از دنیای غیرمسلمان با محدودساختن مقدار زمینی که دهقانان می‌توانند مالک شوند، به محدودیت میدان فعالیت دهقانان می‌پردازند. درحالی که در اسلام اراده‌ها و استعدادها آزاد می‌شوند، هرکس هر اندازه می‌تواند حق احیاء دارد (اما برخلاف اقتصاد سرمایه‌داری حق تملیک را مشروط به احیاء می‌نماید). بنابر آنچه اشاره شد در مسأله زمین در اسلام یک تحرک و دینامیسمی ملاحظه می‌شود. مکانیسم این تحرک عبارت از آن است که به تدریج اراضی بایر به اراضی دایر تبدیل می‌شوند و اراضی آباد از طریقی که ذکر شد از گردونه

مالکیت‌های خصوصی خارج و به جرگه مالکیت‌های عمومی باز می‌گردد. جریان تبدیل اراضی بایر به دایر یک جریان دوطرفه است (reversible) یعنی اراضی آباد جریان انتقال مالکیت‌های خصوصی به عمومی جریانی یک طرفه و غیرقابل بازگشت (irreversible) می‌باشد.

تقسیم اراضی تقلیدی و کورکورانه عملی ارتجاعی یا قدمی اصیل و مترقی

گرچه چنین بحثی از مسیر اصلی مطلب ما خارج است اما از آنجا که این مسأله در کشورهای اسلامی و ایران موضوع روز است، یک توجه اجمالی به آن در اینجا ضروری است. در این بررسی ما در مقام آن نیستیم که به توضیح علل داخلی و خارجی که منجر به اعلام چنین برنامه‌هایی می‌شود بپردازیم و یا اصالت و صداقت آن را به اصطلاح مورد آزمایش قرار دهیم. این مسأله یکی از مهمترین و حساسترین مسائل و مشکلات جامعه ماست و احتیاج به تحلیل خیلی جامع‌تر و دقیق‌تری دارد. آنچه در اینجا مورد نظر ماست آن است که در یک سیستم اقتصادی مترقی و پیشرو با زمینه‌های انقلابی هدف نهایی و غایی آن است، یا آن باید باشد که مالکیت‌های خصوصی بر اراضی محدود و به تدریج محو گردد. دهقانان را از «بردگی» اربابان بزرگ زمین آزاد سازد بدون آنکه بردگی دولتی جانشین ارباب سابق گردد. با توجه به آنچه درباره اراضی در اسلام گفته شد، دیدیم که اسلام در مرحله اول جنبش بخش بزرگی از اراضی را از چنگ اشراف، سلاطین و مالکین بزرگ خارج ساخت. به موجب این تحول انقلابی، کلیه اراضی ایران جزو گروه اراضی مفتوح عنوه قرار می‌گیرند که نه قابل خرید و فروش و نه قابل تملک خصوصی است. انتقال این املاک به جرگه مالکیت‌های خصوصی بزرگ در طی چند قرن اخیر و به دنبال بذل و بخشش‌های ضد اسلامی سلاطین و یا غضب و تجاوزات آنان صورت گرفته است. این نوع تجاوزات و حاتم‌بخشی‌های املاک عمومی که ماهیت آن از همان نوع انحرافات حکومت عثمان و سایر خلفای عباسی و اموی بوده است و می‌باشد به هیچ‌وجه مورد قبول اسلام نبوده و نیست و مکتب تشیع علی‌الخصوص تاریخ خونین و انقلابی خود به‌طور مستمر علیه چنین تجاوزات غاصبانه‌ای جنگیده است و می‌جنگد. بنابراین واضح است که اسلام و مسلمان‌ها نمی‌توانند و نباید نظام اقتصادی این کشورها و سیستم ارباب رعیتی را تحمل نمایند.

اما در برنامه به اصطلاح ارضی هیچ یک از این مطالب و مسایل مورد نظر نبوده است. اینک به مالکین بزرگ اجازه داده شود که آبادترین دهات را به نام خود و سایر اعضای خانواده نگه دارند و بقیه را به دولت بفروشند تأیید تجاوزات گذشته و تثبیت مالکیت‌های غاصبانۀ خصوصی است. فروش این اراضی به دهقانان به صورت فعلی صرف نظر از آنکه به نفع دهقانان نیست، نوعی استمرار غارت ثروت‌های عمومی است. چه این اراضی مفتوح عنوه جزو ثروت‌های عمومی هستند که افراد حق خرید و فروش آنها را ندارند. چنین تجاوزی یک دزدی علنی است. بدتر از این تقسیم اراضی موقوفه می‌باشد. این اراضی از دایرۀ مالکیت‌های خصوصی خارج شده‌اند و هرگونه معاملات خصوصی در آنها غیرمجاز و غیر قانونی است. لذا به این جهت این برنامه‌ها نه تنها مترقی نیستند، بلکه نوعی بازگشت به قهقرا و تأیید استمرار تجاوزات گذشته است. صرف نظر از ارتجاعی و ضد اسلامی بودن این برنامه‌ها، آنها را نه به نفع دهقانان می‌دانیم و نه مفید برای توسعه سطح تولیدات کشاورزی و یا توسعه دایره اراضی آباد و زیر کشت.

کار و تقسیم بندی آن

کار مفید اجتماعی که در اسلام از آن به عمل صالح تعبیر شده است وظیفۀ هر فرد مسلمان است. کلیۀ اعضای جامعه که به سن رشد رسیده و قادر به کار باشند باید کار کنند. این کار نه تنها وظیفه است بلکه می‌تواند با توجه به هدف و نیت عبادت نیز محسوب گردد. از جهت عملی افراد در یک میدان محدودی در انتخاب نوع کار و چگونگی آن آزادی آراء و عمل دارند. حدود و ثغور این محدودیت را طبقه‌بندی یا مرزبندی زیر تعیین می‌نماید.

واجب، مستحب، حلال، حرام، مباح، مکروه

این مرزبندی تنها ناظر بر اعمال اقتصادی افراد نیست بلکه شامل هرگونه فعالیتی می‌باشد. درنهایت نه تنها وظیفه افراد است بلکه حکومت و والی اسلام نیز متساویاً موظف به رعایت آن می‌باشد. مرزبندی شش‌گانه بالا نه تنها ناظر بر تعیین نوع کار می‌باشد بلکه محتوای و چگونگی آن را نیز کنترل می‌نماید. ملاک و مأخذ مرزبندی شش‌گانه بالا از فعالیت‌های اقتصادی افراد یا دولت و منافع و مصالح جامعه می‌باشد. بخش بزرگی یا قسمت اعظم فقه سنتی را طبقه‌بندی مشاغل و

کارها و فعالیت‌های اقتصادی افراد و حدود و ثغور آنها براساس مرزبندی شش‌گانه بالا تشکیل می‌دهد. توضیح و بررسی محتوای این فقه در اینجا نه لازم و نه مفید است. بر اثر این مرزبندی، از انواع کارها مثلاً تجارت مباح و مجاز است اما قماربازی و تأسیس قمارخانه، جادوگری، شعبده‌بازی و نظایر آن حرام است. قماربازی را از آن جهت مثال زدیم که در کشورهای سرمایه‌داری و در غرب قمارخانه‌ها یکی از پردرآمدترین انواع کار است. در آمریکا برخی از ایالات زندگی اقتصادی خود را از راه قمارخانه‌ها تأمین می‌نمایند (ایالت نوادا، لاس‌وگاس در آمریکا و مونت کارلو در اروپا). در مورد تجارت اسلام آن را به عنوان یک عامل ارتباطی میان تولیدکننده و مصرف‌کننده مباح شناخته و ضرورت وجود چنین وسیله ارتباطی را به رسمیت شناخته است و اجازه بهره‌برداری را می‌دهد اما محتوای و چگونگی آن را آنچنان کنترل می‌نماید که اجازه و امکان هیچ‌گونه بازی‌های تجارتي از نوع سرمایه‌داری نظیر احتکار (انبارکردن احتیاجات و ارزاق مردم به منظور کنترل و بالا بردن قیمت‌ها) انحصارات و غیره را نمی‌دهد. اما در تجارت که اصول آن مجاز شناخته شده است انواعی از آن حرام و ممنوع است. تهیه و تولید و خرید و فروش ادویه مخدره، مشروبات الکلی، شرکت در معاملات حرام (نظیر خرید و فروش اموال دزدی، موقوفه، اراضی عمومی و غیره) کلاً غیرمجاز است.

نه تنها انواعی از تجارت حرام می‌شود، بلکه در انواع تجارت‌های مباح یا مجاز این مرزبندی شش‌گانه نظیر شبکه‌ای سرتاسری حتی جزئی‌ترین روابط اقتصادی واجب می‌گردد یا دست زدن به پاره‌ای از مسایل دیگر حرام و غیر مجاز است. در تجارت آزاد و مجاز کم‌فروشی، غل و غش، گران‌فروشی، احتکار، فروش یا خرید اموال دزدی یا نامعلوم، کلاه‌گذاری و نظایر آن حرام است. در جامعه سنتی ایران حتی تا نیم قرن پیش افراد قبل از اینکه به کار تجارت بپردازند لازم بود یک دور «مکاسب» را بخوانند و آن را فراگیرند. مکاسب قسمتی از فقه است که در باب روابط تجارتي حدود و ثغور افراد را تعیین می‌نماید. یک بررسی ساده و مختصر از محتوای مکاسب نشان می‌دهد که اسلام اگرچه تجارت آزاد را به رسمیت می‌شناسد، اما «این تجارت آزاد» با آنچه در دنیای سرمایه‌داری مرسوم و جاری و حاکم است بسیار فرق دارد. تجارت آزاد اسلامی هرگز ممکن نیست به

«سرمایه‌داری» و تشکیل تراست‌ها و انحصارات سرمایه‌داری منجر گردد. این عدم امکان نه تنها از جهت نظارت شبکه‌بندی شش‌گانه بالاست بلکه دولت والی اسلام موظف است که نه تنها بر اجرای این شبکه‌بندی نظارت نماید بلکه در موارد معین حق دارد از تمرکز و تراکم سرمایه‌ها جلوگیری نماید. یکی دیگر از مسائلی که در اقتصاد اسلامی مورد بحث فراوان قرار گرفته است مسئله «کارگری و کارفرمایی» است. سه گروه مشخص کارگر و کارفرما مورد بحث می‌باشد:

الف. کارگران روستایی، یا کسانی که در مزارع برای دهقانان کار می‌کنند.
ب. کارگران شهری، کسانی که در شهرها در خدمت صنایع، تجار یا سایر مشاغل کار می‌کنند.

ج. کارمندانی که در مشاغل دولتی به کار مشغولند.

و سه نوع کار به رسمیت شناخته شده است:

کار یدی (فیزیکی) نظیر کار دهقانان، کارگران صنایع و غیره

کار فکری - مغزی، معلمین و نویسندگان و غیره

کار احساسی یا عاطفی - ار هنرمندان یا مادر یا پرستاری که از نوزاد نگه‌داری می‌کند. در هر نوع از انواع کارهای بالا شبکه‌شش‌گانه ناظر و حاکم است. مطالعه و بررسی نظرات اسلام در باب انواع کارها و روابط کارگر و کارفرما از جهت شناخت ارزش کار به معنای اقتصادی ضروری است اما چنین بررسی از امکانات بحث فعلی ما خارج است تنها اضافه می‌کنیم که اسلام برای کار بالاترین ارزش‌ها را قائل شده است کار تنها منبع و مأخذ مالکیت شناخته می‌شود. هرگونه استثمار انسان از انسان به هر شکلی و نحوی غیرمجاز است. نه تنها «بهره‌کشی» و استثمار ممنوع است بلکه «همکاری» یا کار برای افراد یا مؤسسات یا آنها که به نحوی از انحاء در جهت خلاف مصالح اقتصادی جامعه فعالیت‌هایی دارند حرام و غیرمجاز است. یکی از انواع کارها که در اسلام بدان توجه زیاد شده است، مشاغل اداری است. در این مشاغل کارفرمای عمده دولت است و کارمندان ابزار و وسایلی در دست دولت برای اجرای مقاصد دولت می‌باشند درحالی که این نوع کار از نظر اسلامی غیرمجاز نمی‌باشد، نوع و نحوه عمل شدیداً تحت توجه و کنترل است، ماهیت دولت و چگونگی کار دولتی حرام یا مجاز بودن همکاری را تعیین می‌کند و کار برای یک دولت غاصب و متجاوز به هر اسمی و به هر صورتی حرام است.

کسی که برای کمک (در کار) به سوی ظلمی برود و بداند که او ظالم است پس به تحقیق او از اسلام خارج شده است (رسول اکرم ص).

امام موسی بن جعفر(ع): اگر من از قلۀ کوه پرتاب شوم و قطعه قطعه شوم بهتر است تا در دستگاه جابر و ظالمانۀ حکومت غاصب کار کنم.

امام علی(ع): هرگز نگو که من مأمورم (از طرف دولت یا کارفرما) و معذورم. دیده شد که اسلام با تشکیل سرمایه‌های بزرگ خصوصی مخالف است. برای جلوگیری و یا از بین بردن انحصارات سرمایه‌داری و تراکم ثروت در دست گروهی اقلیت و تأمین تعادل در توزیع ثروت سه مرحله قابل توجه است:

۱. مرحله پیشگیری - محدودیت‌ها - در بحث گذشته اشاره شد که اسلام نوع کار افراد و محتوای آن را شدیداً کنترل می‌نماید. جهت و هدف این کنترل عبارت از آن است که افراد جامعه نتوانند با از بین بردن حقوق دیگران ثروت‌اندوزی کنند.

۲. مرحله دوم وقتی است که افراد از طریق وسایل مجاز و مشروع اسلامی بهره‌ای کسب می‌نمایند. در این مرحله اسلام از چهار طریق کلی سهمی از نتایج کار آنان را از آنان می‌گیرد و در راه ایجاد تعادل توزیع ثروت به کار می‌برد.

۳. مرحله سوم وقتی است که افراد اعضای جامعه در فعالیت‌های اقتصادی خود شبکه‌بندی شش‌گانه حلال، حرام، مستحب، مباح و مکروه و واجب را رعایت کرده‌اند و قدمی از این حدود بیرون نگذاشته‌اند و پس از انجام کار و کسب و بهره‌حقوقی را که به آنها تعلق می‌گیرد، پرداخته‌اند اما معدالک سطح درآمد و انبوه ثروت در دست گروهی از اعضای جامعه (اقلیت) خیلی بیشتر از گروه دیگر (اکثریت) و این تفاوت به صورت اختلاف عظیمی جلوه‌گر است. در این مرحله حکومت و والی اسلام دخالت می‌نماید و برای ترمیم وضع به موجب اصولی که شرح می‌دهیم به از بین بردن این اختلاف می‌پردازد. بنا به اعتقاد اسلام به‌خصوص مکتب تشیع هرگز ممکن نیست کسی بعد از مرحله اول و دوم به مرحله سوم و «سرمایه‌دار» شدن برسد.

امام صادق(ع): خدا سی هزار درهم به کسی نمی‌دهد که خیر او را بخواهد هرگز کسی ده هزار درهم از مال حلال جمع نکرده است.

و در صورتی که سرمایه‌ها در دست گروهی متمرکز گردد، وظیفه دولت اسلامی است که برای ترمیم آن براساس آنچه خواهیم گفت اقدام نماید. چهار طریق کلی که افراد براساس آن سهمی از درآمدهای خود را به جامعه برگردانند، عبارتست از: الف. سیستم مالیات‌ها (شامل زکات و غیره)

ب. صدقه و انفاق؛ ج. ارث؛ د. سنت وقف و باقی‌الصالحات؛ هـ. کفارات (جرایم نقدی)

الف: سیستم مالیات‌ها - پرداخت و وصول این مالیات‌ها از یک طرف هم وظیفه و هم عبادت است و از طرف دیگر هم به منظور جلوگیری از تراکم سرمایه است و هم برای اداره تشکیلات و سازمان‌های دولتی.

۱. زکات: در اکثر موارد در قرآن همپای «صلوة»، «زکات» هم آمده است.

به‌پا دارید نماز و بدهید زکات را و فرمان برید رسول خدا را شاید رحم کرده شوید. (نور آیه ۵۶)

کسانی که برپای دارند نماز را و می‌پردازند زکات را و به آخرت یقین دارند. (نمل ۳)

به تحقیق رستگار شدند گردانندگان... و کسانی که آنها عمل‌کننده به زکات هستند (مومنون آیه ۴-۱)

وای بر مشرکین، کسانی که زکات نمی‌دهند و آخرت را انکار می‌کنند (فصلت آیه ۶-۷)

در رسالت سایر انبیاء نیز زکات آمده است. به سوره مریم (۵۵-۵۴) و انبیاء (۷۳-۷۲) رجوع کنید.

از نظر لغوی زکات به معنای پاکی و نمو^۱ تزکیه و تطهیر قلب و پاک نمودن ثروت از حقوق دیگران^۲ آمده است که موجب «پیوند نفوس»^۳ می‌گردد.

و بر اثر زکات است که روابط مالی افراد و طبقات باهم می‌پیوندند و رو به رشد و اصلاح و پاکی می‌روند...^۴

زکات را در دو نوع ذکر می‌کنند: زکات عمومی و زکات عید فطر

۱. عدالت اجتماعی در اسلام، سید قطب (ترجمه فارسی) ۲. پرتوی از قرآن، طالقانی
۳. تفسیر نوین، محمد تقی شریعتی ۴. تفسیر نوین، محمد تقی شریعتی

۴۸۲ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

زکات عمومی: مقدار مالی است که از سرمایه‌های تولیدی و نقدی که به حد نصاب معین برسند، گرفته می‌شود. فقه سنتی موارد زکات را در نه مورد به شرح زیر تعیین کرده است:

چهار نوع قله: گندم، جو، خرما، کشمش
سه نوع از دام‌ها: گوسفند، شتر، گاو
دو نوع نقدینه: طلا و نقره^۱

اما در قرآن (منبع اصلی شریعت) با آنکه به کرات زکات آمده است و حتی موارد مصرف آن را ذکر کرده است به موارد تعلق زکات اشاره نشده است لذا علاوه بر موارد بالا برخی برای سایر محصولات کشاورزی و یا مال‌التجاره^۲ نیز زکات را واجب دانسته‌اند. علاوه بر این با توجه به اصل زکات (ضرورت پاکی و نمو فرد و جامعه) و تغییرات و تطورات اقتصادی و صنعتی در جامعه امروز راه را برای اجتهاد و فتوا در غیر موارد منصوص به خصوص در موارد احتیاج و ضرورت باز است.^۳ به این عبارت که فقه جدید باید به تدوین و تنظیم سایر مواردی که امروز با آن روبرو هستیم و زکات بر آنها واجب است اقدام نمایند. مصرف زکات - بیمه‌های اجتماعی: در قرآن مصرف زکات به شرح زیر تعیین شده است.

اول: افراد شامل فقرا، مساکین، در راه ماندگان، بدهکاران، آزادساختن برده‌ها، این افراد (جز برده‌ها) وقتی مشمول می‌شوند که خود از حد نصاب زکات کمتر از مالک باشند. به عبارت دیگر تعیین حد نصاب زکات تنها ارزش پرداخت زکات را ندارد، بلکه تعیین آن حداقل سطح ضروری زندگی را در جامعه اسلامی منعکس می‌سازد. وضع اقتصادی افراد جامعه باید حداقل در سطح نصاب زکات تأمین و تضمین گردد. اگر عده‌ای کمتر از این حد داشته باشند، برعهده دیگران و حکومت است که سطح زندگی آنان را بالا بیاورد.

سوم: در راه خدا (فی سبیل الله) که مورد خاصی نیست بلکه برعهده جامعه و حکومت است که هر طریقی را که شایسته‌تر و مفیدتر به حال جامعه تشخیص دادند، مصرف شوند.

۱. مختصر الاحکام، فتاوی مرجع عالیقدر حاج سید محمد هادی میلانی

۲. اسلام و مالکیت، طالقانی

۳. همان

زکات فطر: مقدار مالی است که هر سال در روز عید فطر به تعداد افراد تعیین می‌گردد. میزان آن به شرایط زندگی و سطح هزینه زندگی بستگی دارد. توضیح: با تغییر در مدیریت مجله مکتب مبارز چاپ ادامه مقاله متوقف شد.

مسأله‌ای به نام شکست!

تحلیلی پیرامون جنگ ۱۹۶۷ اعراب و اسرائیل؛ سرمقاله مکتب مبارز شماره ۱۹۶۷
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کانادا - گروه فارسی‌زبان ۱۹۷۳-۱۳۵۲

موضوع صحبت در این سمینار تجربه تقابل کمونیزم یا مارکسیسم با مذهب است. بدون شک در بررسی مسأله مذهب در رویدادهای اجتماعی و تأثیری که مذهب بر جوامع بشری چه به لحاظ مثبت و چه به لحاظ منفی در راه تغییرات انقلابی و اجتماعی یا در جهت سد این تغییرات ایجاد کرده یا می‌کند. ما نمی‌توانیم از توجه نسبت به این تجربه بسیار مهم پرهیز کنیم. این مسأله هم ضروریست و هم مفید. از این نظر که در طی تاریخ بشر در هیچ زمانی با چنین پدیده‌ای روبرو نبوده‌ایم که تحت شرایط اجتماعی خاصی مذهب به صورت سیستماتیک مورد حمله قرار گرفته باشد و از تمام امکاناتی که در خدمت یک دولت قرار دارد برای از بین بردن ریشه‌های مذهب در میان مردم استفاده شده باشد.

سوالی که برای ما مطرح است این است که آیا به عنوان یک تجربه تاریخی چه حاصلی به دست آمده و این یک بحث علمی است، چرا که اساس علم تجربه است. در جوامع بشری ما نمی‌توانیم یک جامعه ایده‌آل یا یک جامعه نمونه درست کنیم و بعد یک سلسله مسایل را پیاده کنیم و بگوییم تجربه کردیم و حالا تجربه‌مان را نتیجه می‌گیریم و یک قانون وضع می‌کنیم. امروز در برابر ما تجربه‌ای وجود دارد؛ حرکتی وجود دارد که در این حرکت در طی زندگی دو نسل تجربه‌ای صورت گرفته و ما می‌خواهیم این تجربه را بررسی کنیم، ببینیم که حاصل این تجربه چیست. آیا مذهب از بین رفته یا خیر و در چه مرحله‌ای حرکت می‌کند. در این بررسی ما به خصوص دو کشور را از دنیای کمونیزم مورد بررسی قرار

می‌دهیم، یکی چین و دیگری روسیه شوروی، هر دو به لحاظ اینکه مدتی طولانی از تسلط ایدئولوژی مارکسیسم بر این جوامع می‌گذرد. نظام اجتماعی که در آنجا حاکم بوده تغییر پیدا کرده و مسأله مهم اینکه بدانیم آیا در این جوامع مذهب به‌طور کلی و اسلام چه شکلی پیدا کرده، در هر دوی این جوامع نه تنها نظام کند و کهنه و پوسیده قدیمی از بین رفته، بلکه نظام نو و جدیدی جانشینش شده و نیز توانسته تغییرات بنیادی اقتصادی در آن جوامع به وجود بیاورد که از لحاظ روابط تولیدی و توزیع تولید هیچ وجه شباهتی بین نظام و سیستم موجود با سیستم‌های قبلی خودشان ندارند.

این بررسی که قسمتی از آن فقط در اینجا معرفی و مطرح می‌شود شامل شش قسمت است:

۱. مارکسیسم و مذهب
۲. سیر مذهب در روسیه شوروی
۳. سیر مذهب در چین کمونیسم
۴. احزاب کمونیستی در ایران و مسأله اسلام
۵. اسلام و جنبش‌های کمونیستی در ایران
۶. نتیجه‌گیری

در بررسی مارکسیسم و مذهب ابتدا ما مجبور هستیم که خود مارکسیسم را مورد مطالعه قرار دهیم که ببینیم اصلاً مارکسیسم چیست و چه موضعی نسبت به مذهب دارد و ریشه‌های این موضع‌گیری‌ها چه هستند! وقتی ما از مارکسیست صحبت می‌کنیم، سه چیز مورد نظر ماست، مارکسیست سه قسمت دارد:

فلسفه، اقتصاد، کمونیسم علمی

وقتی از فلسفه مارکسیسم صحبت می‌کنیم منظور ما ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک است که خود ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک از دو بخش عمده تشکیل یافته: یکی ماتریالیسم فلسفی و یکی ماتریالیسم تاریخی.

گفتیم که مارکسیسم سه بخش عمده دارد: فلسفه، اقتصاد و کمونیسم علمی، آنچه که در بحث مذهب با آن سر و کار داریم قسمت اول، فلسفه از نظر مارکسیسم است و فلسفه مارکسیسم، ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک است. یا به عبارت دیگر

ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک از دو بخش عمده تشکیل شده است، ماتریالیسم فلسفی و ماتریالیسم تاریخی یا: باز هم آن قسمت از فلسفه ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک که مورد بحث ما هست در رابطه با مذهب قسمت فلسفه ماتریالیسم تاریخی است (اینها را کد می‌کنم، نقل قول می‌کنم که اگر بعداً کسی مایل باشد مأخذ را هم ذکر می‌کنم). «ماتریالیسم تاریخی انطباق اصول ماتریالیسم فلسفی بر فرآیند یا جریان یا پروسه تکامل تاریخ جامعه بشری است. که طی این تفسیر ماتریالیسم تاریخی مسایلی را از قبیل شیوه تولید، نیروهای مولده، مناسبات تولید، فرماسیون‌ها (Formations) یا شکل‌بندی‌ها یا شکل‌گرفتن‌های اجتماعی و اقتصادی از دید جهان‌بینی مارکس مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهیم. در طی این مباحث مارکسیسم دو مسأله را مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهد. یکی مسائلی که مربوط به زیربنای جامعه است و یکی مسائلی که مربوط به روبنای جامعه است. شما در هر بنایی دو قسمت دارید، یکی اینکه زیربناست و دیگر آنچه روبناست. آنچه این ساختمان روی آن قرار گرفته به آن می‌گویند زیربنا.

بنا به تعریف مارکس زیربنا چیزی است که روبنای اجتماعی بر آن قرار دارد، حالا چه چیزی در جامعه زیربناست که اساس و تعیین‌کننده است. مارکس این جور بیان می‌کند. «مجموعه مناسبات تولیدی زیربنای اجتماعی است و اینکه ماهیت هر جامعه‌ای که به صورت تسلسل فراماسیون‌های اقتصادی و اجتماعی تجلی می‌کند به ویژه در آن است که چگونه مناسبات تولیدی در آن جامعه حکم‌فرماست». تفاوت و تمایز بین جوامع بشری همانا در همین جاست. زیربنا همین مجموعه مناسبات تولیدی است. بنابراین وقتی مثلاً شما می‌خواهید یک جامعه را بشناسید از نظر مارکسیسم کافیست که ببینید که روابط تولیدی در آن جامعه به چه صورتی است، روابط تولیدکننده، کارگر، کارفرما، روابط دهقان، اینها به چه صورت است. اگر می‌خواهید جامعه‌ای را بشناسید فرضاً در یک جامعه‌ای که هنوز صنایع دستی و کارگاه‌های کوچک وجود دارد این نماینده پایان دوره فئودالی و آغاز دوره بورژوازی است. از لحاظ فرم‌بندی‌های اجتماعی در جامعه‌ای که خان بزرگ با زمین‌داران بزرگ وجود دارند آن جامعه می‌خواهد شناخت پیدا کند، اگر این را بفهمد یعنی اینکه آن جامعه، جامعه فئودالی است.

روابط تولیدی را بیان می‌کند و بعد می‌گوید روبنا اینها هستند، از جمله این روبنا چه چیزی را باید گفت؟ مذهب را، چراکه مذهب روبنای جامعه است. بنابراین حالا وقتی می‌خواهیم با این جهان‌بینی نگاه کنیم که چرا اسلام در عربستان به وجود آمده، به جای هر نوع مطالعه‌ای از لحاظ دید مارکسیستی شما بایستی اول ببینید که روابط تولیدی در عربستان به چه صورت بوده، جامعه شبانی بوده، خانی بوده، ایلاتی بوده و فلان بوده. بعد می‌گویید چون جامعه این طوری بوده این مذهب به وجود آمده است. اگر می‌خواهید در یک جامعه روبنا عوض شود، مذهب عوض شود، ایدئولوژی عوض شود، بایستی زیربنا را عوض کنیم، روابط تولیدی را عوض کنیم. بدون اینکه بخواهیم وارد بحث هر یک از این مسایل بشویم به سرعت رد می‌شویم و فقط می‌خواهیم یک جریان منطقی در ذهن شما به وجود بیاید، برگردیم به مسأله مذهب خودمان. (هر وقت خسته شدید می‌توانید یک صلوات بفرستید)

حالا برمی‌گردیم می‌بینیم با رابطه ما تعریف مذهب از نظر مارکسیست چه چیزی است. مارکس مذهب را به این صورت تعریف می‌کند. «ماهیت مذهب باور تعبّدآمیز به نیروهای مافوق طبیعی و خدایان است، مذهب انعکاس مسخ شده و پندارآمیز نیروهای طبیعی و اجتماعی مسلط بر انسان در ذهن اوست و بدین صورت نیروهای زمینی و ناسوتی در مذهب شکل لاهوتی و ماوراء طبیعی به خود می‌گیرد». «مذهب یک سیستم جامعه از انواع نظریات درباره جهان و پیدایش آن، انسان و وظایف اوست». لذا دارای یک خصلت جهان‌بینی است. چون ما هر وقت صحبت از جهان‌بینی منظور از برداشت‌های شما از انسان و دنیا در رابطه با وظایف انسان و ماهیت انسان. در این مورد حرفشان درست است که مذهب یک جهان‌بینی دارد. «جهان‌بینی مذهبی نیاز انسان را به داشتن تصویری از جهان در چهارچوب خیال‌آمیز آن برآورده می‌کند» این جهان‌بینی مذهبی، جهان‌بینی پنداری است، تخیلی است. بشر برای درک ماهیت بغرنج پدیده‌های مختلف طبیعی و اجتماعی مانند رعد و برق، طوفان، قحطی، خشکسالی، بیماری، خواب‌دیدن، جنگ، مرگ، چاکری، سروری، فقر، ثروت و غیره و غیره. در شرایطی که درک

واقعی آنها میسر نبود به درک پنداری و خیال‌آمیز آنها و به تصور خدایان و شیاطین و اجنه و ارواح و معجزات و غیره و غیره کشانیده می‌شد».

به عبارت دیگر ترس سازنده خدایان است. بشر از چیزهایی که مجهول بوده می‌ترسیده، آن خدایان را برایشان وضع کرده. حالا با چین برداشتی که مارکس این برداشت را به اصطلاح برداشت علمی خطاب می‌کند (برداشت به اصطلاح علمی از مذهب و همه مذاهب)، به تجلیل مذهب در طی تاریخ می‌پردازد. می‌گوید «ابتدا بشر معتقد به خدایان خانواده شد سپس جای آنها را به خدایان قبایل داد».

همان‌طوری که جامعه تکامل پیدا می‌کند، اولین شکل جامعه خانواده است بعد از خانواده قبایل است بعد قبایل به جوامع بزرگ‌تر تبدیل می‌شود. بنابراین می‌گوید اول بشر معتقد به خدایان خانواده بود، سپس جای آن را به خدایان قبایل داد و به دنبال آن چندخدایی (Polytheism) جای خود را به (Monotheism) یکتاخدایی یا توحید داد (البته توحید با این monotheism فرق دارد) که همان مشخصات شاهنشاه یا قیصر را در روی زمین دارد. «مذهب اطاعت محض و کورکورانه انسان را به عنوان عبد و بنده به قدرت‌های آسمانی و نمایندگان آنها که پیامبران و دیگر موجودات مقدس هستند می‌طلبد».

در جای دیگری انگلس (حتماً شنیده‌اید که از دو نفری که بنیان مارکسیسم را گذاشتند، مارکس انگلس بود. البته چون مارکس تنظیم‌کننده این عقاید و جهان‌بینی است به نام مارکسیسم معروف شده و انگلس هم سهم بسیار به سزائی داشته است) می‌گوید: «مذهب کلاً چیزی نیست جز یک بازتاب خیالی در نظر کسانی که نیروهای خارجی بر زندگی روزانه‌شان حاکم است. انعکاس آن پدیده‌های تازه به شکل نیروهای مافوق طبیعت رخ می‌نماید و بروز می‌کند». بر اساس تمام این تحلیل‌های بالا است (که به اضافه تحلیل‌های جامعه‌شناسی مفصل، که فرصت مرور آنها نیست) که مارکس آن بیان معروف خودش را دارد که لابد شنیده‌اید به نام «مذهب تریاک توده‌هاست». این پس از آن بحثی است که در کتابی که انتقاد بر فلسفه هگل در سال ۱۸۴۱ می‌نویسد این جمله معروف را بیان می‌کند که نقل قول شده که مذهب تریاک توده‌هاست. و بلاخره در خاتمه این بحث مارکس می‌گوید «مذهب به تناسب از میان رفتن علل اجتماعی (من این نقل قول‌هایی که می‌کنم،

بدون اینکه گفتم می‌خواهم مرور بکنم، بحث کنم، بعضی‌ها را که تکرار می‌کنم و تکیه می‌کنم برای این است که توجه داشته باشید که خود شما هستید که شما دیگر الان آن بینش اسلامی را پیدا کرده‌اید و بایستی پیدا کرده باشید که می‌بیند چقدر تناقض دراد اصلاً این تعریف‌ها در کل با مفاهیمی که از اسلام داشته‌ایم و داریم که نه باورهای تعبدآمیز است و نه پندارها، هیچ‌کدام از آنها نیست و به همین دلیل با توجه به این تحلیل که می‌کنیم تحلیلی عملی به معنای علمی که همه ما درک داریم نیست) حالا بر این اساس چون از نظر مارکسیست روابط تولیدی در جامعه زیربناست و مذهب با تمام مشخصاتی که او فکر می‌کند روبناست، لذا نتیجه‌ای را بیان می‌کند و می‌بینیم که می‌گوید باید زیربنا را عوض کرد. به چه صورت برخلاف الحاد بورژوازی و تبلیغات تجدیدی ایدئولوژی آن و کوتاه‌بینی فرهنگی‌اش مارکس معتقد است که مذهب محو نخواهد شد مگر اینکه شرایط اجتماعی و سیاسی تولیدکننده آن از بین برود و نابود شود در یک جای دیگری در کتاب (On the religion) که به قلم هر دو مارکس و انگلس است که به فارسی می‌شود «درباره مذهب» می‌نویسد که «مذهب متناسب از میان رفتن علل اجتماعی و معرفی آن از بین خواهد رفت ولی البته این یک پروسه طولانی است (من پروسه را در اینجا فرآیند ترجمه کردم، بعضی از دوستان فارسی‌زبان من به من گفتند که این معنی ندارد فرآیند در فارسی، بنابراین نمی‌دانم پروسه را برایش پراسس بگذارم) که آن را نمی‌توان و نباید به شکل مصنوعی تصویر کرد زیرا جهان‌بینی تخیلی احساساتی مذهب که از وسایل مختلف تأثیر استفاده می‌کند در شرایط مساعدی که هنوز در تاریخ برای وی وجود دارد جان‌سختی نشان می‌دهد و نباید غلبه بر آن را ساده انگاشت». حالا قسمت دومی را که می‌خواهم در اینجا بحث کنم این است که: منبع تأثیرات فکری‌ای که مارکس درباره مذهب داشته از کجاست، آنچه را که مارکس گفته، سوال اول آنکه باز اسلام قابل ترمیم است یا نیست؟ شما می‌دانید که ما ادعا می‌کنیم که اسلام مذهب نیست. مذهب بخشی از اسلام است و نه همه آن. اسلام یک نظام فکری است، یک سیستم است، یک مجموعه است (مذهب - religion). توجه کنید مجبورم یک لغت خارجی را استفاده کنم که وقتی صحبت از religion می‌کنیم، در انگلیسی یک تعریفی وجود

دارد، شما هر دیکشنری را که باز کنید و ببینید در برابر religion چه نوشته، می‌گوید عبارت از رابطه فرد با نیروی مافوق طبیعت که یا کاذب است یا صحیح و درست است که این را تعریف می‌کند. در اسلام این بخشی است از اسلام نه همه اسلام. ولی ما به جای اینکه حالا بخواهیم بحث کنیم که ببینیم این حرف‌هایی که مارکس زده درست است یا غلط نمی‌خواهیم وارد آن بشویم، فرصتش را نداریم، فقط من در اینجا کوشش کرده‌ام که منابعی که مارکس زده درست است یا غلط نمی‌خواهیم وارد آن بشویم، فرصتش را نداریم، فقط من در اینجا کوشش کرده‌ام منابعی را که مارکس تحت تأثیر آن منابع قرار داشته در تکوین ایده‌اش نسبت به مذهب بیان بکنم.

ببینید مارکس یک عالم بود او با متدهای علمی به بررسی جامعه پرداخته، اولین پایه کار علمی (observation) یا مشاهده است، یعنی یک عالم نشسته می‌بیند یک سیبی از درخت می‌افتد این مشاهده است بعد به علت اینکه دید علمی دارد به چرا فکر می‌کند، نه به چی، وقتی این را می‌بیند، قانون جاذبه را نیروی جاذبه را کشف می‌کند. اساس علم مشاهده است. تمام تحقیقات علمی که شما می‌کنید بر اساس مشاهده است حتی یک آزمایش که شروع می‌کنید. مشاهده است که آزمایش را بیان می‌کند، شما عمل می‌کنید، نتایج را مشاهده می‌کنید، بررسی می‌کنید. مارکس هم آمده این مشاهده را کرده، ولی منبع مشاهده‌اش کجا بوده، جامعه‌اش و محیط خودش بوده و آن جامعه و محیطی را که مارکس بررسی می‌کند، جامعه مسیحی اروپایی قرن نوزدهم است، حالا چند تا مأخذ ذکر می‌کنم که توجه داشته باشید: مثلاً در مجموعه کارهای مارکس (Collective works) که در آنجا بحثی دارد به نام گزارش وضعیت کارگران در انگلستان و در این گزارش انگلس وضع جنبش کارگران در انگلستان را شرح می‌دهد. او وقتی می‌خواهد به وضعیت فکری و روانی کارگران در آنجا اشاره کند می‌نویسد که در آنجا کارگران بی‌سواد هستند، مدرسه برایشان نیست و اشاره می‌کند که تنها محل و مرجع برای تربیت و تدریس اطفال کارگران، مدارس روزهای یکشنبه کلیساست، مذهب به خصوص آن قسمت از مذهب که کمترین نفعی برای احدی ندارد تنها موضوع تربیت نوآموزان می‌باشد که حافظه بچه‌ها را با دگم‌های (dogma) بی‌سر و ته و

مجرد مذهبی پر می‌کنند و هرگونه تفکر منطقی را در بچه‌ها از بین می‌برند. بسیاری از مدارس یکشنبه خواندن و نوشتن را در کلیسا نمی‌آموزند، تدریس نمی‌کنند به دلیل آنکه جنبه دنیوی آنها بیش از آن است که در کلیسا بتوان آن را تدریس کرد، چون کلیسا یک محل روحانی است و هیچ وقت کار دنیوی نباید در آنجا انجام شود.» بنابراین چون تدریس، درس نوشتن و خواندن خیلی دنیوی است در کلیسا قابل استفاده نیست و به این دلیل نتیجه می‌گیرد که مذهب سلاح تسلط طبقه بورژوازی است. علاوه بر این ما می‌دانیم که همان‌طور که بیان کردم اینجا مارکسیسم سه چیز عمده دارد. فلسفه، اقتصاد و کمونیزم علمی. در هر یک از این بخش‌ها مارکس تحت تأثیر یکی از دانشمندان آن قسمت در اروپای قرن نوزدهم بوده مثلاً وقتی ما از فلسفه صحبت می‌کنیم در ۱۸۷۲-۱۸۴۰ (قرن نوزدهم) فوئر باخ یک فیلسوف ماتریالیسم و ضد مذهبی در آلمان بود و مارکس شدیداً تحت تأثیر فوئر باخ است که بعد توضیح می‌دهم و شواهدش را ذکر می‌کنم. البته مارکس مثل فوئر باخ که منبع الهام مارکس در ماتریالیسم بوده هگل نیز دانشمند دیگر آلمانی، منبع الهام مارکس در دیالکتیک بوده. اگر توجه کنیم گفتیم فلسفه مارکس ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک است این دو بخش یکی ماتریالیسم و دیگری دیالکتیک دو چیز تاریخی جداگانه‌ای است.

مارکس فلسفه خودش را از فوئر باخ گرفته و دیالکتیکش را تحت تأثیر هگل بوده. یا وقتی ما به مباحث (صفحه ۱۰ این مطلب نبود)

اما مشکل فوئر باخ چه بوده، فوئر باخ در عین حالی که فیلسوف ملحد و ماتریالیسم بوده اما چون زائیده فرهنگ اروپایی بوده و فرهنگ اروپایی یک فرهنگ مسیحیت است، در نوشته‌های او یک نوع تمایلات عرفانی مسیحیت دیده می‌شود. مثلاً شما می‌دانید که عشق در مسیحیت محور همه حرکتش است. خدا عاشق انسان بود و تنها پسر خود را فرستاد تا به خاطر گناه اولی که انسان کرده بود به دار آویخته شود و به صلیب کشیده شود تا خدا از سر گناهان انسان بگذرد. «عشق» محور اصلی است و در تمام نوشته‌های فوئر باخ عشق ظاهر است. مثلاً فوئر باخ می‌نویسد: «همیشه و در همه جا عشق معجزه‌ای است که باید انسان را از تمام دشواری‌های زندگی عملی نجات بخشد. به خاطر همین توجهی که فوئر باخ به

عشق می‌کند، می‌گوید که مذهب را فقط قلب می‌داند یعنی خود قلب مذهب است. مذهب رابطه عاطفی و قلبی انسان با انسان دیگری است.

باز هم به خاطر همین تأثیر چون ماتریالیسم هم هست می‌گوید «عشق جنسی را یکی از عالی‌ترین و یا خود عالی‌ترین شکل پیروی از مذهب می‌دانم». فوئر باخ به خاطر همین دوگانگی یا دوآلیته که در خودش دارد، انگلس او را پایان فلسفه کلاسیک آلمان ذکر می‌کند و به این شکل روبرو شده که اصلاً یک تناقضی هست بین برخی از برداشت‌های ماتریالیستی و مذهبی‌اش. مثلاً در اینجا تاریخ را بررسی کرده و می‌خواهد بداند چه تغییراتی در تاریخ رخ می‌دهد، نقش مذهب را بیان می‌کند می‌گوید. «ادوار بشری تنها به وسیله تغییراتی که در مذهب روی می‌دهد از یکدیگر مشخص می‌گردند. جنبش تاریخی معین تنها زمانی مبنای عمیق حاصل می‌کند که عمیقاً در قلب انسان نفوذ یابد».

البته انگلس وقتی این را تحلیل می‌کند، این‌طور جوابش را می‌دهد «چرخ‌های عظیم تاریخی تنها در حدودی با وقوع تغییراتی در مذهب همراه بوده که صحبت از سه مذهب جهانی تاکنون موجود یعنی بودائی وجود دارد. ما در صدد نفی یا اثبات این نیستیم فقط می‌خواهیم بدانیم چه امکاناتی و احتمالاتی وجود دارد. یک استدلال و یک نتیجه دیگر اینکه نه، زیربنا عوض شده؛ پس روابط تولیدی عوض شده، اما مذهب و به خصوص اسلام رو بنای اجتماعی نیست و هیچ رابطه مستقیم علت و معلولی به صورت یک بعدی که مارکس مطرح می‌کند با زیربنا که روابط تولیدی است ندارد. چرا؟ برای اینکه روابط تولیدی در آنجا عوض شده و آن رو بنای مذهب باشد عوض نشده، هنوز آن احساس و بینش مذهبی است، اما اگر چنانچه قضیه را بخواهیم فقط از بعد مارکسیسم مطرح نکنیم، برویم سراغ فروید (که برادر عزیزمان در ریشه‌های روانی مذهب صحبت کرد) بسنجیم فروید می‌گوید «مذهب حاصل ضعف روانی و احساس عدم امنیت است.» اگر این حرف فروید را بپذیریم عبارت از این است که رژیم سوسیالیستی یا رژیم کمونیستی در روسیه شوروی نتوانسته آرامش و امنیت به مردم بدهد. چرا؟ برای اینکه هنوز مردم احساس عدم امنیت می‌کنند، هنوز احساس مذهبی است، هنوز دچار ضعف روانی هستند، اگر حرف فروید درست باشد، چطور می‌توانیم این را بپذیریم. حالا این برای خودمان سوال است که چطور ممکن است پس از آزادی از این همه

بردگی‌های اقتصادی هنوز این افراد احساس ضعف روانی درشان هست که به مذهب پناه ببرند. اما اگر چنانچه بخواهیم نظریه دیگری را مورد بحث قرار دهیم که برادر عزیزمان دیروز مطرح کردند و آن نظریه مذهب به عنوان بعد چهارم روح انسانی است، که نه مذهب، نه به‌عنوان زیربناست و نه به‌عنوان روبناست بخشی است از واقعیت خارجی من و شما به‌عنوان یک انسان، همان‌طور که در من روح زیبایی وجود دارد، غرایز، وجود حالات مختلف نفسانی وجود دارد، مذهب به عنوان یکی از این حالات نفسانی در هر انسانی وجود دارد که این را شما نمی‌توانید از شخصیتش جدا کنید و این را به گفته یکی از روانکاران «طبیعت بشر هرگز با زور و اجبار تغییر نخواهد کرد.» و این همان چیزی است که در معنای لاکراه فی‌الدین است، برای تفسیر آیه لا اکراه فی‌الدین به بحثی که طباطبائی در تفسیر میزان دارد مراجعه کنید که بحث بسیار جالبی است که ما درک نوع دیگری از لاکراه فی‌الدین داریم. ولی طباطبائی در اینجا از یک دید روانی که شما اصلاً نمی‌توانید تکوین عقیده در ذهن من با زور نمی‌شود تابع یک سلسله عوامل وسایل دیگری است که با زور و جبر امکان‌پذیر نیست.

اما آینده مذهب در دنیای کمونیزم چه خواهد شد، در اینجا می‌خواستم از مقدمه‌ای که استاد عزیز من که سهم به‌سزائی در جنبش قرقی و انقلابی اسلامی دارد، مهندس بازرگان در مقدمه‌ای که در راه طی شده بیان کرده، بخوانم و چون فرصت نیست این را به خود شما موکول می‌کنم که به آن کتاب مراجعه کنید، ولی چیزی که می‌خواهم بگویم در اینجا فقط در رابطه با هم این است که مارکسیسم به عنوان یکی از دستاوردهای انسان در کوشش و تلاش خودش برای پیدا کردن حقیقت (اگر به این صورت مارکسیسم را بپذیریم) راه طولانی را طی کرده و در بعضی از مسایل است که به راه انبیاء نزدیک شده و در بعضی مسایل است که نزدیک نشده است. آیا راه آینده چگونه است، در اساس پیش‌بینی مهندس بازرگان آنها به سوی راه انبیاء حرکت می‌نمایند. حالا مقدمه را لازم است بروید بخوانید، شاید بسیاری از شما کتاب را خوانده باشید.

در پایان بالاخره آنچه می‌خواهم نتیجه بگیرم آنکه، تجربه مذهب تحت سلطه کمونیزم به عنوان یک نظام و جهان‌بینی متضاد و متناقض با اسلام که برخوردار از

تمام امکانات تبلیغاتی و سیاسی و قانونی بوده نشان می‌دهد به ما که مذهب یک پدیده‌ای است که جزء شخصیت انسان و قابل تغییر با زور و فشار نیست. نقل قولی از یکی از خود این آقایان می‌کنم که تحلیلی از منبعی که باز هم خود کمونیست‌ها بیان می‌کنند، در اینجا که «مذهب چون میخی است که هرچه محکم‌تر در آن بکوبی عمیق‌تر فرو می‌رود!»

تجربه مذهب با کمونیزم

الحاد، مذهب و فرهنگ در روسیه شوروی^۱

به قلم: «ویلیام بریکمن، استاد تاریخ فرهنگی و آموزش و پرورش دانشکده علوم تربیتی دانشگاه پنسیلوانیا.

مقدمه

تصویب نامه کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست شوروی در سال ۱۹۶۳ مبنی بر «نیاز تدوین الحاد علمی و مخالفت از تبلیغ عقاید مذهبی، به‌خصوص در میان نوجوانان و خردسالان» گواه درستی است بر شکست یک مبارزه طویل. وقایع بعد از آن مخصوصاً پیشرفت‌های سال ۱۹۶۷ این حقیقت را فاش می‌کند که مذهب هنوز زنده است به «اتحاد جماهیر شوروی» به اعتراض برخاسته است. به علاوه مدارک بسیاری در دست است مبنی بر غلبه موضوعات مذهبی و روحانی در کارهای ادبی جدید روسیه.^۲ برای مدتی بیش از نیم قرن از زمان انقلاب بلشویکی ۱۹۱۷، رهبران کمونیست شوروی مروج کفر و الحاد در مدارس و

۱. ترجمه و شرح مفصل «ویلیام بریکمن» تحت عنوان: مبارزات بر علیه مذهب در مدارس روسیه «مجله مدرسه و جامعه». صفحه ۷۳ جلد ۹۳، ۶ فوریه ۱۹۶۵ - نکات عمده کفر، مذهب، فرهنگ در روسیه» به ترتیب زمانی در مجلات «Jewish parent» صفحه ۳۳ جلد ۱۶، مارچ ۱۹۶۵» و «کفر در مقابل مذهب در روسیه در Catholic Educator صفحات ۶۵-۵۹-۵۷ جلد ۳۶ اکتبر ۱۹۶۵.

۲. مقایسه کنید با Zinaida Shalehovskaya اهمیت موضوعات مذهبی در ادبیات روسیه در مجله‌ای به تألیف William C. Fletcher و Anthony J. Strover «مذهبی و جستجو برای ایده‌آل‌های جدید در روسیه» (نیویورک ۱۹۶۷-Pracgar) صفحات ۱۲۹-۱۱۹ و Albert Todd «روحانیت در ادبیات جدید روسیه» خلاصه صفحات ۱۰۷-۹۲ جلد ۶۶ ژانویه ۱۹۶۸.

جوامع بودند و ضمناً آزار پیوسته و شدیدی را بر مذهب و معتقدان مذهبی روا می‌داشتند.

با وجود خفقان حاکم بر مدارس، فرهنگ، جامعه و همه توده‌های متوسط، قدرت کمونیست فاقد آن بود که در روسیه بی‌دینی را یک عقیده عمومی کند. تدریس زیرزمینی و دنباله‌گیری مخفیانه مذهب، در نهایت ایمان و به خوبی سایر مقاومت‌های مذهبی نقشه‌های ضد ایمانی و خیالی کمونیست را خنثی می‌کرد. فشارهای کمونیست و مقاومت‌های ضد کمونیست در مقابل هم با توجه به عدم وجود تشکیلات سازمان‌یافته و مقتدر در توده، گواه اعلانی دست به ارتقاء روح آزاد انسان از «اسارت ایدئولوژیکی». تجدید مبارزات در تحمیل بی‌دینی بر همه مردم روسیه، بدون شک با شکست مواجه خواهد شد. همچنان که دیگران در طول نیم قرن گذشته شکست خوردند.

احتمال کلی می‌رود که تعداد معتقدان در طول تاریخ شوروی کمتر گشته است. اما به هر حال به اندازه کافی هواداران مذهب حتی در خود حزب کمونیست وجود دارند که تهدیدی باشند به بنای محکم کمونیست روسیه.

شکی نیست که کمونیست‌ها از خدا و همه کسانی که به او معتقدند می‌ترسند که چنین ترسی خود باعث آزار و اذیت هرچه بیشتر معتقدان «کاتولیک»، «پروتستان»، «کلیمی»، «مسلمان»، «بودائی» و صاحبان سایر عقاید می‌گردد. می‌توان انتظار داشت موانع خاصی که در سر راه آنها که آرزوی دنباله‌روی از ایدئولوژی و رویه مذهبی چون کاتولیسم و کلیمیت را دارند، ایجاد خواهند کرد و هرچه اختلاف این دو مبارزه بیشتر باشد، اشکالات و دشواری‌ها بیشتر خواهد بود. خلاصه زمانی زیر حقایقی را درباره جدال طولانی بین عقیده و الحاد، خدا و ضدخدا در روسیه، از انقلاب ۱۹۱۷ تا زمان حال عرضه می‌دارد. بعضی مراجعات به ایدئولوژی‌های مارکس، انگلس، لنین و استالین، نشان‌دهنده شدت مخالفت با اعتقاد و معتقدین در روسیه است. نقش تعلیم و تربیت - که بعداً دیده خواهد شد - در نقشه‌ها و برنامه‌های کمونیست، مهم‌ترین و بزرگترین نقش بود. از همان زمان گرچه یافتن مدرک دقیقی عملی نیست، ولی می‌توانیم تصور کنیم که مسلماً یک فرهنگ روحانی مؤثر و محرمانه نقش عمده‌ای در بالابردن سطوح مقاومت‌های ایدئولوژیکی بر علیه تلقین «الحاد» بازی کرده است.

سیر تاریخی الحاد، مذهب و فرهنگ در شوروی

نگاهی به گذشته:

۱. کارل مارکس: «مذهب، تریاک مردم است». «نقل از مقدمه Kritic der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie نوشته شده در سال ۱۸۴۱.
۲. فردریک انگلس: «و حالا مذهب کلاً چیزی نیست جز یک بازتاب خیالی در مغز کسانی که نیروهای خارجی بر زندگی روزانه‌شان حاکم است، انعکاسی که در آن پدیده‌های تازه به شکل نیروهای مافوق طبیعت رخ می‌نماید.» از «Antc duhring سال ۱۸۷۸»
۳. ولادیمیر لنین: «مذهب معجون خواب‌آور مردم است. نوعی ودکای روانی است که بنده‌های بزرگ، نقش خود و خواسته‌های انسانی (خواسته‌های زندگی یک انسان واقعی) را در آن تصویر کرده‌اند.» از «سوسیالیسم و مذهب ۱۹۰۵»
۴. ولادیمیر لنین: «ما جدائی کامل دولت را از کلیسا خواستاریم و برای از بین بردن غبار مذهب باید به روشنفکری و فقط سلاح روشنفکرانه و مطبوعات و سخنرانی‌ها مجهز شد.» «سوسیالیسم و مذهب ۱۹۰۵»
۵. ولادیمیر لنین: «تبلیغات ما، لزوماً تبلیغات بی‌دینی را نیز شامل می‌شود.» «سوسیالیسم و مذهب ۱۹۰۵»
۶. ولادیمیر لنین: «هر نوع عقیده مذهبی، هرگونه اعتقاد به «خدای خوب»، هر فریب حتی با یک خدای خوب چیزی زشت و مکروه است، خطرناک‌ترین کراهت و نفرت‌انگیزترین عفونت است.» از «جلد ۱۷ Collected Works»
۷. جوزف استالین: «حزب نمی‌تواند نسبت به متعصبان مذهبی، روحانیون مرتجع که مسموم کننده افکار توده زحمت‌کشانند، بی‌تفاوت و خنثی باشد. می‌پرسیم که آیا ما روحانیون مرتجع را فرونشاندیم؟ البته که آری. چیزی که باعث بدبختی است، این است که آنها کاملاً برچیده نشده‌اند. و لذا تبلیغات ضد مذهبی وسیله‌ای است که باید توسط آن، تصفیه کامل مذهبیون مرتجع صورت پذیرد.» «لینینسم ۱۹۲۷»
۸. جوزف استالین: «مذاهب همه برخلاف علم‌اند.» «اقتباس از شماره ۸ Agitators Guide می ۱۹۳۷»

۴۹۶ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

۹. تصویب‌نامه کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست شوروی: «انتشارات علمی و ملحدانه (Atheistic)، جزء لازم فرهنگ کمونیستی مردم کارگر است و هدفش انتشار علمی مکتب مادیون در میان توده‌ها است و رهاسازی معتقدان از انجام اعمال مذهبی.» «پراودا - ۱۱ نوامبر ۱۹۵۴»

۱۰. نیکیتا خروشچف: «آموزش عمومی - انتشار تعلیمات علمی و مطالعه قوانین

طبیعت، جایی برای اعتقاد به خدا باقی نمی‌گذارد.» «پراودا - ۲۹ نوامبر ۱۹۵۷»

۱۱. نیکیتا خروشچف: «ما توجه و اعتقاد به خدا را متناقض با چشم‌انداز کمونیست

خود می‌بینیم.» «پراودا - ۲۹ نوامبر ۱۹۵۷»

«انقلاب فوریه ی ۱۹۱۷»

۱. سرمقاله «ایزوستیا» ۱۲ مارچ، جدایی دولت و کلیسا را درخواست می‌کند.

۲. قانون ۲۰ ژوئن - مدارس محلی را در اختیار تام وزارت فرهنگ قرار می‌دهد.

۳. ۳۰ جولای - تشکیل وزارت اعتراف!

دوران اقتدار کارگری «The Soviet Period»

۱۹۱۸ - تصویب جدایی دولت و کلیسا در تاریخ ۱۳ ژانویه در «R.S.F.S.R»

۲۲ ژانویه ۱۹۱۹ در اوکراین، ۱۴ فوریه ۱۹۱۹ در Byelorussia، ۱۵ آوریل ۱۹۲۱

در جورجیا، ۲۶ نوامبر ۱۹۲۲ در ارمنستان.

۱۹۱۸ - ماده ۹ مصوبه ۲۳ ژانویه، در مورد آزادی وجود انجمن‌های مذهبی،

گویند تدریس هرگونه عقاید مذهبی در آموزشگاه‌های دولتی و خصوصی و

مؤسسات فرهنگی ممنوع شد.»

۱۹۱۸ - قانون اساسی (۱۰ جولای): «آزادی تبلیغات مذهبی و ضد مذهبی برای

همه افراد به رسمیت شناخته شده است.» «پاراگراف ۱۳» و «پاراگراف ۴ از خلاصه

قانون اساسی ۱۹۲۹ و ماده ۱۲۴ قانون اساسی، ۱۹۳۶

۱۹۱۸ - مدارس مذهبی کلیمی (Heder and Yeshivah) غیرقانونی شناخته

شدند. ولی آنها به عملیات زیرزمینی خود ادامه دادند.

۱۹۱۹ - مصوبه «۳ مارچ، توسط Narkompros، رئیس فرهنگ مردم» منع

تدریس مذهب به افراد کمتر از ۱۸ سال.

مقالات علمی □ ۴۹۷

- ۱۹۲۰- سومین کنگره برنامه Komsomol: «مبارزه ایدئولوژیکی علیه عفونت مذهبی که باعث فساد نسل جوان کارگر است، و کمکی است به نمایندگان منقرض بورژوازی در راه فریب مردم.»
- ۱۹۲۱-۲۳- طرح اقتصادی جدید. دستگیری و اعدام روحانیون.
- ۱۹۲۱- تصویب نامه ۱۳ ژوئن - «تحریم تدریس اصول مذهب به افراد کمتر از ۱۸ سال (بخش ۳)»
- ۱۹۲۲-۲۳- تعطیل کلیه مدارس مذهب کلیمی در سراسر روسیه «تعلیمات مذهبی در مدارس زیرزمینی ادامه داشت.»
- ۱۹۲۲- (فوریه) تأسیس «مرکز انتشارات ضد مذهبی».
- ۱۹۲۲- (نوامبر) «گشایش سمینارهای ضد مذهبی» مسکو.
- ۱۹۲۲- ماده ۸ قانون اساسی «جمهوری خلق نجارا» و ماده ۹ قانون اساسی «جمهوری خلق خوارزم» که به علت عدم ثبات با «جمهوری سوسیالیستی ازبکستان» ترکیب شدند، آزادی مطلق مذهبی را تضمین کردند، به اضافه حق انجام عبادات اسلامی، در حالی این ضمانت شامل شرایط ویژه‌ای در مورد آزادی تبلیغات ضد مذهبی نمی‌شد.
- ۱۹۲۲- جمهوری کارگری ترکستان شوروی (جمهوری سوسیالیستی گزاختان فعلی شوروی)، ضمن تصویب نامه‌های ژوئن و دسامبر به عنوان سازش موقت، کلیه دارایی مدارس اسلامی را به آنها برگردانید. این تصویب نامه‌ها هر دو برای لغو مصوبه ۲۳ ژانویه ۱۹۱۸ «تحریم آموزش مذهبی در مدارس» امضاء شد.
- ۱۹۲۲- پیدایش مجله ماهانه «Atheist at the Workbench» دسامبر.
- ۱۹۲۲- تأسیس «Living Church» که کاملاً با نظام کارگری موافقت کرد، توسط یک کشیش ارتدکس روسی به نام «A.I.V vedenskil»
- ۱۹۲۳- روزنامه بی‌دینی «Bezbozhnik Antireligioznik» به معنای «بی‌خدایی و لامذهبی»
- ۱۹۲۳- طبق مصوبه‌ای تدریس خصوصی مذهب در میان بچه‌ها و در گروه‌های بیش از سه نفر تحریم شد. (۲۲ دسامبر)

۴۹۸ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

- ۱۹۲۵- پیدایش «اتحادیه مبارز دینی که خدایی را نمی‌پرستیدند» در اپریل.
(«League of Militant Godless»)
- ۱۹۲۶- کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست روسیه انجمن فوق (League of Militant Godless) را تأسیس و برنامه‌ای برای مبارزه با مذهب تشکیل داد. (۳۰-۲۷ اپریل)
- ۱۹۲۷- بستن بقیه مدارس اسلامی در تارتارستان - بشکریه و کریمه.
(Bashkiria, Crimea)
- ۱۹۲۸- تصفیه نهایی کلیه مدارس اسلامی در روسیه آسیای مرکزی.
۳۵-۱۹۲۹- مجمع موج ضد مذهبی.
- ۱۹۲۹- قسمت هفدهم از قانون R.S.F.S.R (اول اپریل) دستور داد که کلیساها: «نباید برای بچه‌ها - جوانان، زنان و برای برنامه‌های نیایشی خاص، یا اجتماعات دیگر و یا به طور کلی: اجتماعات، گروه‌ها، حلقه‌ها، دپارتمان‌هایی برای تدریس کتاب‌های مقدس، کتابخانه و قرائتخانه، کار خیاطی، تدریس مذهب و غیره داشته باشد. فقط کتاب‌های لازم به منظور عبادت، می‌توانند در ساختمان‌ها و محل‌های مورد استفاده برای نماز و نیایش نگهداری شوند.» بخش هیجدهم: «تدریس هرگونه عقیده مذهبی در مدارس و مؤسسات فرهنگی، دولتی و خصوصی را منع می‌کند.» تحت عنوان بخش هیجدهم می‌افزاید: «آموزش مذهبی انحصاراً به کلاس‌های مخصوص مذهب اجازه داده می‌شود و دانشکده‌های مذهبی برای رهبانیت و کهنیت با اجازه مخصوص دولت تشکیل خواهد شد.»
- ۱۹۲۹- مصوبه لاتینی کردن الفبای عربی اقوام روسیه آسیا. اواخر سال ۱۹۳۰ الفبای Cyrillic جانشین الفبای لاتین شد. این تغییرات موجب شدند که خواندن قرآن و سایر نوشته‌های مذهبی مسلمانان غیرممکن گردد.
- ۱۹۲۹- بستن ۱۴۵۹ عبادتگاه شامل «۱۱۳۹ کلیسا، ۱۹۴ مسجد و ۱۲۶ کنیسه».
- ۱۹۲۹- E.E.yaroslavskii رهبر مخالفان مذهبی، کنگره انجمن ضد مذهبی را رهبری می‌کند. (۱۶-۱۰ ژوئن)
- ۱۹۲۹- تهیه مقدمات تدوین «بی‌خدایی (Godless)» در کلاس‌های درس.

مقالات علمی □ ۴۹۹

۱۹۲۹- ابتدای تحمیل ۶ روز کار در هفته که باعث جلوگیری از عبادت مردم در روزهای شنبه و یکشنبه می‌شد.

۱۹۲۹- طبق قانون اساسی: «عبادت مذهبی و تبلیغات ضدمذهبی برای عموم آزاد شناخته شد.» (بخش ۴)

۱۹۳۰- تأسیس ۱۳ دانشگاه ضدمذهبی در شوروی. پایه‌گذاری کرسی‌های الحاد در همه دانشگاه‌ها. قانون تحصیل اجباری «ضدخدا».

۱۹۳۱- تأسیس «وزارت مذاهب» به عنوان شاخه‌ای از NKVD (که پلیس مخفی روسیه است).

۱۹۳۴- القاء تدریس مارکسیسم در مدارس توسط C.C, C.P. S.U. (دوم اپریل)

۱۹۳۴- قانون R.S.F.S.R. در پاراگراف ۱۳ و در مورد دبیرستان‌ها اظهار می‌دارد که: «... تدریس هر نوع پرستش مذهبی، ترتیب و تشکیل مراسم عبادتی یک مذهب و نیز هرگونه نفوذ مذهبی دیگر بر نسل در حال رشد اکیداً ممنوع و تحریم شده است و متخلفین از این قانون تحت تعقیب قانون جنائی قرار خواهند گرفت. مدارس ابتدائی و متوسطه باید مسئولیت تربیت محصلین را به عهده گیرند و باید فرهنگ و آموزشی بر پایه‌های یک مبارزه جدی بر علیه مذهب و نفوذ آن در دانش‌آموزان و جوانان بسازند.»

۱۹۳۶- توقیف مجله: «Moskovskii Patriarkhii»

۱۹۳۵- ماده ۱۲۴ قانون اساسی جدید روسیه (قانون استالین) (۵ دسامبر): «به منظور حفظ آزادی فردی مردم روسیه، کلیسا از دولت و از مدرسه جدا شناخته شد و به هر کس آزادی تبلیغات مذهبی یا ضد مذهبی داده شد.»

۱۹۳۹-۱۹۴۷- ظهور «Great Purge» موج دیگری است از فعالیت ضد مذهبی.

۱۹۳۷- yarovslavskil وجود هشتاد میلیون معتقد درسراسر روسیه تصدیق می‌کند. نیکولسکی (Nikolsky) تعداد نود میلیون معتقد را در سال ۱۹۴۰ برآورد می‌کند.

۱۹۳۷- پرسش راجع به عقاید مذهبی به سؤالات «سرشماری» افزوده می‌گردد.

۱۹۳۹- پرسش راجع به عقاید مذهبی از سرشماری حذف می‌شود.

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۱۹۳۹. Partiinoe Stroitelstvo. مجله حزب کمونیست، تصدیق می‌کند که: «ریشه‌کن کردن مذهب از ضمیر کارگران، به مراتب مشکل‌تر است از آزادی آنان از قید استثمار سرمایه‌داری.»
۱۹۴۰. (فوریه) «توسعه تدریس مطالب ضد مذهبی در مدارس» توسط Narkompros تصویب شد.
۱۹۴۰. (ژوئن) تجدید هفت روزگار در هفته (یعنی به علاوه روز تعطیل یکشنبه)
- ۱۹۴۱-۴۵. جنگ جهانی دوم: روابط کلیسا و دولت به نرمی گرائید.
۱۹۴۱. قطع انتشار کتاب‌ها و مجلات ضد مذهبی. به عنوان مثال «Antireligioznik, Bezbozhnik»
۱۹۴۲. انحلال انجمن Militant Godless
۱۹۴۲. مجمع کلیه مسلمانان روسیه بعد از یک نشست در تاریخ ۱۹ ژوئن که در ufa انجام گرفت، مصمم شد که همه مسلمانان جهان را به شرکت در مبارزه بر علیه فاشیسم دعوت کند.
۱۹۴۲. نشریه رسمی «حقیقت مذهب در روسیه» توسط Moscow Patriarchate منتشر شد و به زبان‌های فرانسه، انگلیسی و سوئدی ترجمه گردید.
۱۹۴۴. «در شورای نمایندگان مردم روسیه» کمیسیونی جهت رسیدگی به امور «ارتدکس‌های غیر روسی» تشکیل شد که این هر دو (شورای نمایندگان و شورای ارتدکس‌های غیر روسی) غیر رسمی اعلام شده بودند مانند Narkombog و Narkomopium.
۱۹۴۴. تشکیل «شورای اتحاد همه مسیحیان بابتیست.»
۱۹۴۵. از سرگیری مبارزات ضد مذهبی.
۱۹۴۷. اتحادیه واحدهای مختلف برای تبلیغ دانش سیاسی و علمی.
۱۹۴۷. ماده ۱۲۲ قانون جنائی «کیفر آموزش مذهبی خردسالان در مدارس دولتی و خصوصی و یا تخلف از قوانین مربوطه، زندان تأدیبی با کار تا یک سال است.» ماده ۱۳۶: «پاداش تمرین مراسم مذهبی یا جایگزینی هرگونه موضوع مذهب در تعلیمات مدارس دولتی یا خصوصی و یا مبادرت به آنها، زندان تأدیبی، کار تا سه ماه و پرداخت جریمه تا سه روبل است.»

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- ۱۹۵۳- سالنامه «مشکلات، تاریخ کفر و دین» منتشر شد.
- ۱۹۵۴- «C.C.C.P.S.U.» وجود اشتباهاتی را در راه تبلیغ الحاد علمی در میان مردم می‌یابد که به تأیید خروشچف نیز می‌رسد (۱۰ نوامبر). این مطالعه باعث می‌شود که مبارزات ضد مذهبی و تلقین الحاد بر بچه‌ها و نوجوانان در مدارس، خانه‌ها و گروه‌های جوانان شکل تازه‌ای به خود بگیرد.
- ۱۹۵۵- قبول الحاق «اتحادیه بابتیست‌های روسی به اتحادیه»
- ۱۹۵۶- افتتاح دانشکده مذهبی «Yeshivahkol Yaakov» که ترجمه انگلیسی آن: «دانشکده Voice of Jacob Rabbinical» است.
- ۱۹۵۶- ازدیاد مساجد به ۱۸۰۰ بنا در کل شوروی (در حالی که در ۱۹۱۴، ۲۶۰۰۰ بودند که بعد از بسته شدن تعداد کثیری از آنها در سال ۱۹۴۲ به ۱۳۱۲ بنا کاهش یافته بودند).
- ۶۵-۱۹۵۷- تصدیق قمر مصنوعی و فضانوردان به اینکه: «در فضا هم خدایی نیست!!!»
- ۱۹۵۷- چاپ «کتاب سال مربوط به موزه تاریخ اعتقاد و الحاد»
- ۱۹۵۹- مجله ماهیانه (Atheists Conyunion) «طرفداران بی‌دینی» توسط S.I.KoVALEV
- ۱۹۶۲- الحاق اتحادیه بابتیست‌های روسی به اتحادیه جهانی بابتیست‌ها.
- ۱۹۶۳- در جون ۱۹۶۳ تصویب‌نامه کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست شوروی در مورد پافشاری شدید تدریس «بی‌دینی علمی» و جلوگیری از انتشار آموزش مذهب در میان کودکان و بزرگسالان.
- ۱۹۶۳- وارد کردن «اساس بی‌دینی علمی» به عنوان یک درس اجباری در دانشگاهی.
- ۱۹۶۳- تحریم عبادت به وسیله Reformed Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses و مسیحیان Pentecostal به جهت اینکه آنها در امور کشوری و کارهای فرهنگی کمک نمی‌کنند و مردم را به عدم خدمت در ارتش تشویق می‌کردند.
- ۱۹۶۳- در اپریل ۱۹۶۳ مجله U.S.S.R. ارگان رسمی دولت شوروی به نقل قول از Chief Rahhi Y.L.Levin از مسکو می‌گوید که فقط ۹۶ کنیسه در شوروی هست طبق گزارشی که در ژولای ۱۹۵۶ از طرف شوروی به سازمان ملل تحویل

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شده بود ذکر شده بود که ۴۵۰ کنیسه وجود دارد. یعنی حدود ۷۸٪ از کنیسه‌ها در حدود کمتر از ۷ سال بسته شده بودند.

۱۹۶۳- در مقاله (gudaigm by pukras) «یعنی کلیمیت بدون آرایش» که به وسیله T.M.Kichko نوشته شده بود و توسط مؤسسه علمی Uksain به چاپ رسیده بود به مذهب یهود حمله شده است.

۱۹۶۴- تحریض و تشویق مردم به عقاید ضد مذهبی با به وجود آوردن جشن‌ها و مراسم ملی غیرمذهبی به منظور بی‌علاقه ساختن مردم به تعطیلات و جشن‌های مذهبی.

۱۹۶۴- همدستی توطئه‌آمیز All Russian Social Christian برای آزادی مردم. ۱۹۶۴- M.S.Belenkis مقاله ای نوشت به نام «What is the Talmud» که در آن به کلیمیت عموماً و به خاخام‌ها خصوصاً حمله شده بود و این توسط آکادمی علوم روسیه به چاپ رسید. «Talmud» در لغت به معنای کتاب قوانین مذهبی کلیمیان است که شامل دو قسمت اصل و تفسیر است. مترجم»

۱۹۶۵- تشکیل شورای کلیساهای بابتیست انجیلی که مؤسسه‌ای است مخالف روسیه تحت سرپرستی «A.F.Prokofiev»

۱۹۶۶- کمیسیون امور مذهبی تحت نظر کمیسیون روحانیون مسیحی کمیته امور ارتدکس‌های روسی را به کمیته ارتدکس‌های غیرمذهبی جهت انجام مراسم مذهبی ملحق کرد.

۱۹۶۶- تکثیر مجدد (Slovan-ateista) لغت نامه الحاد.

۱۹۶۷- یک سرشماری از افراد ساکن در Naukai Religiya در سال ۱۹۶۷ انجام شد و ضمن آن نشان داده شد که در بین ۴۷۱۰ نفر تعداد ۹۸۹ نفر (یعنی ۲۱٪) معتقد به مذهب هستند و ۳۴٪ از معتقدین به مذهب را کارگران و ۳۰٪ از آنها را اشخاص ۳۰ ساله و جوان‌تر تشکیل می‌دهند.

۱۹۶۸- محکومیت ۱۷ نفر اعضای «اتحادیه مسیحیان آزادی خواه شوروی» به اتهام توطئه جهت برانداختن حکومت به اتکاء کلیساهای ارتدوکس.

۱۹۶۹- در کنفرانس جهانی مذهب که در خانقاه «Zagorak» ۴۴ مایل شمال شرق مسکو برگزار شد نمایندگان از ادیان مختلف در شوروی حضور داشتند و نیز مهمانی از ۴۴ کشور مختلف اروپا- آسیا- آفریقا و آمریکا بودند. بحث اصلی

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کنفرانس مربوط بود به نقش گروه‌های مذهبی در برقراری صلح برای آینده روسیه. در این کنفرانس نمایندگان کشورهای خارجی از دادن رأی مثبت به سیاست خارجی روسیه امتناع کردند.

۱۹۶۹-۷۰ - اقدام جدی و مصرانه به تبلیغات ضد مذهبی با اعلامیه پروپاگاندهای مختلف در میان توده متوسط و مدارس به خصوص از طریق تبلیغات اساسی در مدارس، به خصوص در حین برقراری و تدارک جشن صدمین سال تولد لنین مبنی بر اینکه اگر لنین خدا بنا شد لاقول پیغمبر هست و محترم تبلیغات غیر مذهبی انجام دادند.

خلاصه منتخبی از مطبوعات مذهب و ضد مذهب در روسیه شوروی

لیست زیر به هیچ وجه لیست جامعی نیست و اینها مطالبی اصلی است که در مجموعه کارهای روسی - آلمانی - فرانسوی - انگلیسی - عبری و زبان Yiddish (زمانی که به وسیله عده‌ای از کلیمیان اروپائی به کار برده می‌شود) در دسترس بوده است. توجه مخصوص به نشریاتی است از قبیل: Soviet Society, Current Digest of the Soviet press, Yevreii yevreiski narod, Jews in Eastern Europe (London) «کلیمی و مردم کلیمی» جلب شده است. ولی مجموعه مطالب تجدید چاپ شده در مطبوعات روسی از ۱۹۶۱ تاکنون به لیست فوق اضافه نشده به جهت اینکه دسترسی به آنها مشکل بوده و به علاوه تعداد نوشته‌های خیلی از نویسندگان روسی و Ukrainian که به پاریس و مونیخ یا نیویورک مهاجرت کرده‌اند آورده نشده است. مؤلف نتوانست دسترسی به اخباری که توسط Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordan Ville N.Y. چاپ شده پیدا کند.

بسیار مفید خواهد بود که جهت مقایسه به کارهایی که در مورد مذهب در کشورهای کمونیست دیگر شده است مراجعه کرد.

به عنوان قاعده کلی توضیحاتی از طرف مؤلف در مورد دیگر کتاب‌ها خواهید دید.

لیست کتاب‌ها از صفحه ۲۵۰ تا صفحه ۲۵۲ که مطلب جالبی دیده نشد به جز یک فهرست کامل.

نتیجه

جدال بین کفر و دین در روسیه هر روز ادامه دارد. روزنامه‌ها و سایر انتشارات روسیه به طور مداوم به بحث در مورد مشکلات تثبیت الحاد در جوانان می‌پردازند. به طوری که پراودا (سوم اکتبر ۱۹۶۴) در مقاله ای مشروحاً به جستجوی دلایلی غیر عادی پرداخت که چگونه به موجب آن هنوز بعد از ۴۷ سال تقلین ضد مذهبی افرادی معتقد در روسیه ی کمونیست یافت می‌شوند. نویسنده ی این مقاله مسأله اصلی را اینطور مطرح می‌کند. «این معتقدین از کجا آمده‌اند؟» معمای او غامض تر می‌شود وقتی می‌پرسد «مسأله آن قدر هم ساده نیست زیرا وقتی که معتقد در سرایشب زندگی است شاید بتوان موضوع را توضیح داد اما بندگی یک جوان هفده ساله در برابر خدا چگونه توجیه می‌شود؟ یک بابتیست تحصیل کرده را چطور؟ چگونه چنین چیزی ممکن است؟ ما فقط مترود هستیم که نویسندگان و خوانندگان پراودا با توجه به دلایل موجود در مقاله فوق پایداری پدیدۀ مذهب را در مقابل زجر و آزار واقعاً پذیرفته‌اند یا نه؟ شاید مناسب باشد که گفته Horace را در اینجا نقل کنیم. «طبیعت بشر هرگز با زور و اجبار تغییر نخواهد کرد.»

نتیجتاً با جرأت می‌توان پیش‌بینی کرد که تاریخ تکرار خواهد شد «بدین معنی که کمونیست‌ها در ریشه‌کن کردن مذهب شکست خواهند خورد. همچنانکه در گذشته شکست خوردند» تجدید حیات مذهب ضمانتی است برای پیدایش جامعه آزاد آیندۀ روسیۀ شوروی، همچنانکه در هر جای دیگر موجود هست. مناسب‌ترین تشبیه در این راه، نیم قرن پیش توسط کمونیستی که خود را وقف کمونیست کرده بود بیان شد. Anatolv. Lunacharskii اولین رئیس فرهنگ مردم می‌گوید «مذهب چون میخی است که هر چه محکم‌تر بر آن بکوبی، عمیق‌تر بر درخت فرو می‌رود.»

نکاتی در باره جزوه شناخت مجاهدین - ۱۳۵۳

اشتباه مجاهدین اولیه در جزوه «شناخت»

مقدمه

مقالات علمی □ ۵۰۵

نشریه «شناخت» اولین اثر ایدئولوژیک از «سازمان مجاهدین خلق» اولیه بود که در سال ۱۹۵۲ توسط نماینده سازمان در خاورمیانه، آقای دادار جهرمی (تراب حق شناس)، در دیداری که با صاحب این قلم و دکتر چمران در بیروت داشت، یک کپی از اصل نسخه خطی با زیرنویس‌های آن را در اختیار گذاشت تا تکثیر شود. اما ایرادات اساسی بر جزوه چندان بود که ما حاضر به تکثیر آن نشدیم. این ایرادات به‌طور حضوری با این فرد مطرح شد. او از ما خواست که نقد خود را بنویسیم و بفرستیم تا برای مرکزیت سازمان ارسال گردد. این نقد در همان زمان نوشته و ارسال شد. اما سازمان به جای پاسخ به ایرادات ما، نشریه را در اختیار ناشرین روزنامه باختر امروز، ارکان جبهه ملی خاورمیانه، که با چریک‌های فدایی خلق همکاری می‌کرد، قرار داد و آنها آن را بدون پاورقی‌ها و یادداشت‌های آن منتشر کردند. متن زیر قسمتی از آن نقد است که در کشاکش روزگار از حوادث مصون مانده است.

جزوه شناخت، که اولین نشریه ایدئولوژیک مجاهدین اولیه است، اشتباهات فاحشی دارد که تماماً ناشی از آن است که دیالکتیک مارکس الگوی اصلی بوده است. در این جزوه تمامی اصول دیالکتیک مارکس، البته به نام «رنالیسم» بحث و عنوان شده است. که به هر حال در محتوای مطالب تفاوتی ایجاد نکرده است. در سال ۱۳۵۰ که این جزوه را برای انتشار وسیع جهت ما فرستاده‌اند ما بعد از مطالعه آن از چاپ و تکثیرش خودداری کردیم و سپس همراه با برادر شهید چمران در بیروت با نمایندگان سازمان به بحث و گفتگو نشستیم و تمامی ایرادات آن را مطرح ساختیم. استدلال ما این بود که کار شما مثل خیاطی است که پارچه بسیار زیبا و محکم و اعلائی را دارد و می‌خواهد با آن پیراهنی بدوزد و الگویی را به کار گرفته است. اما وقتی که پیراهن تمام شده است به تن مشتری برآزنده نیست یا خیلی تنگ و یا گشاد است. از دور داد می‌زند که این پیراهن برآزنده و مناسب با تن شما نیست. در جزوه شناخت درست است که از آیات قرآن و از نهج البلاغه و اخبار و احادیث دیگر مثال‌ها و شواهد فراوان آورده‌اید اما تمامی آنها را بروی یک الگوی غیر اسلامی نامناسب و غیر برآزنده به نام دیالکتیک مارکس انداخته و بریده‌اید. از دور داد می‌زند که این درست نیست.

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یکی از اشکالات اساسی آن جزوه درباره همین مسأله هدفداری در جهان است. چون دیالکتیک مارکس هدف کلی و نهایی جهان را مطرح نمی‌سازد در آن جزوه نیز این سؤال اساسی که هدف نهایی در حرکت جهان چیست، به طور کلی مسکوت مانده است. چطور می‌توان به حرکت در طبیعت معتقد بود اما درباره هدف حرکت طبیعت سخن نگفت و نپرسید و نفهمید که آخرین پدیده‌های طبیعی به‌سوی چه هدفی در حرکتند؟

نکاتی درباره جزوه «شناخت»

الف: مقدمه؛ ب: تذکرات - انتقادات و اصلاحات عبارتی و یا «اصطلاحی»؛ ج: انتقادات اساسی بر جزوه

الف. مقدمه

چندی قبل کتابی به فارسی درباره «سرطان» ترجمه دکتر مقدم از تبریز، را می‌خواندم نویسنده کتاب، دانشمندی است متخصص در در رشته خودش به نام دکتر هاریس، از انگلستان. اصل کتاب در حدود ۱۵۰ تا ۲۰۰ صفحه است اما مترجم کتاب، دکتر مقدم، مقدمه‌ای شامل بر ۷۰ تا ۸۰ صفحه بر آن نوشته است و در آن «تذ» خود را درباره «علت سرطان» و طرز معالجه آن بیان کرده است. وی تئوری‌هایی ارائه داده که بحث در صحت و سقم آن‌ها، مورد نظر ما نیست. اما آنچه در این کتاب جالب است، مقایسه دو نوع برخورد و تجزیه و تحلیل است. در بحثی که دکتر مقدم می‌کند، در همه جا مسائل را با جزم و قطع بیان کرده است و اینکه نتیجه‌گیری‌های او «همین است و جز این نیست». و دکتر مقدم نه سوابق تحقیقات سرطانی دارد و نه وابسته به یک مؤسسه تحقیقاتی سرطانی است که به‌هرحال بتوان او را صاحب نظر در رشته خواند. اما رویه دکتر هاریس، در معرفی مطالبش که خود از صاحب‌نظران شناخته شده در این رشته است، تماماً با جملاتی نظیر «ممکن است این‌طور باشد»، «احتمال چنین داده می‌شود» و یا «اگر این نتایج ما درست باشد»، پس چنین و چنان است و نظایر آن، توأم می‌باشد و این دو طرز معرفی افکار و عقاید، نمونه‌های جدا و تنها و منحصر به‌فرد نیستند.

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مقدم، نمونه کلی و عمومی رویه بسیاری از مردم ما را معرفی می‌کند و طرز برداشت‌های دکتر هاریس نیز نمونه‌ای است از آنها که صاحب نظرند و اهل عملند و دانش آموخته‌اند. «علم» به ما می‌آموزد که «دانش»، یا به اصطلاح جزوه «شناخت»، شناسایی جهان، نسبت به اشیاء و پدیده‌ها نسبی هستند و از آنجا که تابع زمان و مکان (به معنای فلسفی - علمی) هستند، در هیچ جا نمی‌توان از آنها به عنوان جزم و قطع سخن گفت. «علم» به ما می‌آموزد درحالی که پدیده‌های جهان واقعیت‌های عینی هستند، ادراکات و استنباطات و شناسایی ما از این جهان «حقیقی» هستند که ممکن است منطبق با واقع باشند (در یک شرایط معین و مشخص) و ممکن است که ذهنی باشند و میزان و رابطه ذهنی بودن حقایق جهان و درجه نزدیکی آنها با واقعیت‌ها، رابطه با «شناسایی» ما و نقد شناسایی ما دارد. در جزوه شناخت، خواننده با موارد متعددی روبرو می‌شود که مسائل به صورت جزم و قطع آمده‌اند. درحالی که درباره آنها «حرف» بسیار است و سؤالات فراوان. پژوهشگری که به اسلحه «علم» مجهز است، هیچ‌گاه درباره حقایقی که کشف کرده است و یا روابطی که در اشیاء و پدیده‌ها مشاهده کرده است، سخن از عینیت به میان نمی‌آورد.

اما درباره متن جزوه، به جای آنکه آنها را به ترتیب بالا (ب و ج) مطرح کنم به ترتیب «صفحات» مطرح می‌سازم. علت طبقه‌بندی بالا (ب و ج) صرفاً برای توجه به اهمیت نوع انتقادات و یا پیشنهادات اصلاحی است.

۱. ص ۱: اولین عبارت جزوه چنین شروع می‌شود: «شناسایی صحیح منشاء عمل و اقدام صحیح است. انسان نمی‌تواند بدون شناسایی صحیح، عمل صحیح انجام دهد». ... موفقیت در هر کاری بدون شناسایی از قوانین آن به هیچ‌وجه امکان‌پذیر نیست و البته در پایان کتاب هم شناسایی صحیح در چهار مرحله خلاصه و معرفی شده است.

حالا ببینیم آیا تعمیم این اصل، که در مواردی کاملاً درست و عملی است به هر کاری درست است؟

مثلاً یکی از کارهای ما راه رفتن است. یاد گرفتن انسان (بچه) و به راه افتادن او به دنبال کشف قوانین راه رفتن نبوده است، بلکه به تبعیت و الهام از غرائز و محیط

او است. همچنین خوابیدن و خواب دیدن. هنوز علم نمی‌داند که چرا ما می‌خوابیم، تحت تأثیر چه عواملی می‌خوابیم و یا خواب می‌بینیم. اما می‌دانیم که میلیون‌ها انسان می‌خوابند و نمی‌توان گفت که عمل خواب آنها صحیح نیست، چه شناسایی صحیحی از خواب ندارند.

خیلی از «اعمال» انسانی تحت تأثیر و هدایت گزینه انجام می‌گیرد و میلیون‌ها انسان بدون شناسایی و یا آشنایی با قوانین مرتبط با آن کارها و اعمال، عمل کرده‌اند و نتایج اعمالشان موفقیت‌آمیز هم بوده است. مسأله روابط جنسی میان زن و مرد را در نظر بگیرید که یک نوع کار و عمل است و تابع هدایت گزینه است. میلیون‌ها انسان بدون آنکه بدانند چه قوانینی این گزینه را هدایت و یا کنترل می‌نماید (قوانین بیولوژیک، قوانین فیزیولوژیک، قوانین روانی جنسی) از دستور گزینه تبعیت کرده‌اند و «موفقیت» هم داشته‌اند. چه هم گزینه را «ارضاء» کرده‌اند و هم «نسل» ادامه یافته است. البته در آنجا ما از مشکلات و دیگر مسائل مربوط به امور جنسی انسانی بحث نمی‌کنیم و آنچه را هم که گفته شد نسبی می‌دانیم یا مطلق.

لذا بیان جزوه‌ای که در بالا آمد، به نظر می‌رسد که خیلی کلی و عمومی است و طرح آن به صورت «علمی» قابل تأمل است.

۲. در جای دیگر «چه غرایزی در انسان سست و یا تعطیل شده‌اند. این را اگر در مقایسه با «حیوانات» بیان کنیم، البته درست به نظر می‌رسد. اما اگر در رابطه با خود انسان باشد، قابل تأمل و سؤال‌برانگیز است. چراکه انسان با تمام مشخصات و حالات نفسانی و غرائزش «انسان» است. در مقایسه با «حیوانات» برخی از غرائزش «سست» و برخی دیگر تشدید شده‌اند. گزینه جنسی در انسان به مراتب «شدیدتر» از گزینه جنسی در حیوانات است. حیوانات فقط در فصل و زمان معینی «جنسی» (sexual) و در سایر مواقع غیرجنسی (Asexual) هستند. درحالی که انسان در تمام فصول، «جنسی» است. مثلاً فقط در زمان جفت‌گیری (hot season) گربه نر و گربه ماده داریم و بعد از فصل مربوطه، آن‌ها فقط گربه هستند. گزینه صیانت ذات یا حفظ خود در انسان، نسبت به حیوانات، ضعیف است. حیوانات با تبعیت از گزینه، غیرممکن است گیاهی را که سمی است بخورند. اما انسان هر آشغالی را

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می‌بلعدو به اصل ضرر و یا زیان به خودش توجهی ندارد. در حیوانات غریزه بقای ذات، از طریق احساس گرسنگی و تشنگی او را به جانب محل آب و یا غذا می‌کشاند. یا او را مجبور به حمله به سایر حیوانات می‌سازد. و حیوانات وقتی سیر شدند، دیگر بیش از حد ظرفیت معده خود نمی‌خورند و نمی‌آشامند. اما در انسان طبیعت عامل کنترل خود را برداشته است. انسان تنها می‌تواند و باید خودش وسیله کنترل و تعادل را برقرار سازد. یا آنکه انسان برخلاف غریزه بقای ذات یا فقط خود، راه‌هایی را انتخاب می‌کند. مثلاً یک مجاهد، می‌داند که راهش به شهادت ختم می‌شود، که با غریزه‌اش تناقض است اما به راه خود ادامه می‌دهد. لذا نمی‌توان گفت که انتخاب راه مجاهد به واسطه سست شدن یا تعطیل شدن غرائزش می‌باشد.

۳. در جزوه آمده است «در عمل باید راه حل‌های ما موفقیت‌آمیز باشد» در چه واحد زمانی؟ و تعریف شما از «موفقیت» چیست؟ و کدام است؟ بسیاری از مردم، حتی برخی از آنها که مبارزه هم می‌کنند، نمی‌توانند به درستی نتایج زودرس مبارزات را ببینند و برای تفاوت در موفقیت یا عدم موفقیت «اعمال» به انتظار نتایج زودرس هستند و مواقعی که نتایج زودرس اعمال ما، موفقیت‌آمیز نیستند. حتی ممکن است در نظر بیاید که با کل مبارزه و یا اهداف تناقض دارد. مثلاً هستند کسانی که استدلال می‌کنند اعمال مجاهدین و مبارزین نتیجه موفقیت‌آمیزی نداشته است، چرا؟ چونکه اعمال آنها باعث ایجاد فشار و اختناق بیشتری شده است. حتی در مساجد را هم بسته‌اند و از مختصر فعالیت‌های اسلامی هم که ممکن بود انجام شود، جلوگیری به عمل آمده است. به نظر نمی‌آید که بتوان برای سنجش و درستی و صحت و سقم اعمال فقط به نتایج موفقیت‌آمیز در یک واحد زمانی محدودی توجه داشت و تعریف مهم «موفقیت» یک ضرورت اجتناب‌ناپذیر است.

۴. در تعریف مشخصات «ایدالیسم خطرناک» گفته شده است که «انسان به جای آنکه بازگوکننده واقعیت خارجی منعکس در ذهن باشد، ذهن خود را ملاک قرارداده و راجع به واقعیات خارجی قضاوت می‌کند. چیزی از ذهن خود به آن اضافه می‌کند و یا کم می‌کند».

این از مشخصات انسان است انسان که آئینه نیست. به همین دلیل است که انسان برای قضاوت دربارهٔ تأثیر واقعیت‌های خارجی در ذهن، احتیاج به گام مقایسه یا شاهد دارد. تا بین حقایقی که کشف می‌کند و واقعیت‌هایی که وجود خارجی دارند، رابطهٔ عینی برقرار سازد. فرآیند عمل مغز و شناسایی علمی تابع سلسله مراتبی است که در آنها ذهن خود انسان در تحلیل نهایی، تعیین‌کننده است. و اصولاً در هر روند علمی، ابتدا هدف از «مشاهده» باید روشن گردد. چه مطالبه هر پدیده‌ای می‌تواند از زوایای مختلف و متعدد باشد. مشاهدهٔ یک هنرمند از یک گل سرخ با مطالعه و مشاهدهٔ یک گیاه‌شناس فرق دارد. لذا تعیین هدف در مشاهده و بررسی پدیده‌ها اولین شرط ضروری شناسایی علمی است. دوم آنکه در فرایند علمی شما باید مشاهدات خود را بدون کم و کاست، صرف نظر از ذهنیات خودتان بیان کنید. رنگ گل، طعم و بوی گل، اندازه آن و غیره ... سپس در پایان می‌بایستی از مشاهدات خود نتیجه‌گیری کنید و در این نتیجه‌گیری ذهن شما (که منظور محتوای آنست) عامل تعیین‌کننده است. در پایان این جزوه، شاید ضرورت داشته باشد که مختصری دربارهٔ متدولوژی علمی بحث شود.

۵. آمده است که «تمام حدسیاتی که بدون داشتن مواد اولیه تفکر در ذهن خود می‌سازیم، ایدآلیستی محسوب می‌شوند ... چگونه ممکن است «ذهن انسان» بدون داشتن مواد اولیه بتواند فعالیت داشته باشد؟ و محصولاتی که «حدسیات» باشند تولید کنند؟ مغز ما در رابطه با دنیای خارج است که «تولید» می‌کند. خواه تولیدات ذهنی و یا تولیدات عینی. بیان بالا با اصل «فونگسیون» مغز تناقض دارد.

۶. در ص ۱۳: دربارهٔ بینش رئالیستی و متد و شیوه، آمده است که «ملاک این است که به رئالیسم به عنوان اصالت جهان خارج در برابر ذهن عمیقاً مؤمن بود»: این را می‌گویند بینش یا جهان‌بینی و این با متد یا روش تحقیق و بررسی فرق دارد.

فردی ممکن است برخوردار از جهان‌بینی رئالیستی (به اصطلاح شما) باشد اما عقیده‌هایش ذهنی باشند. چراکه تحول و تکامل بینش و جهان‌بینی یک مسأله است و توسعه و تکامل بررسی مسئله دیگری است جدای از آن. مثلاً مارکس

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جهانبینی‌اش - به ادعای خودش رئالیستی است. اما متد بررسی‌اش درباره «مذهب» کاملاً ذهنی بوده است (همان‌طور که شما هم بدان اشاره کرده‌اید).

۷. ص ۱۵: در بسیاری موارد، نویسندگان دو اصطلاح را با هم مخلوط می‌کنند یکی واقعیت و دیگری «حقیقت».

مثال: از قول فلاسفه ایدئالیست «هرگز نمی‌توان واقعیت را آن‌طور که هست دریافت کرد». و در جای دیگر در اعتراض به آنها آمده است که «دیگر بهانه عدم توانایی جهت کشف حقیقت به هیچ‌وجه قابل قبول نیست. در اینجا مفاهیم واقعیت و حقیقت با هم مخلوط شده‌اند.

علم هیچ‌گاه ادعا نکرده است و نمی‌کند که واقعیت هستی، پدیده را شناخته است و درباره شناخت نهایی واقعیت‌ها هم نظر مثبت نمی‌دهد. بلکه علم دائم در جهت کشف حقایق جهان حرکت می‌کند. حقایقی که دائم به واقعیت نزدیک می‌شوند. اما تنها در یک بی‌نهایت است که احتمالاً این دو به هم خواهند رسید. در جهان واقعیت‌هایی هستند که علم معترف است هرگز قادر به کشف کامل حقیقت آنها نخواهد شد. نظیر پیدایش هستی. چرا که ما که ابزار علم هستیم، در زمان و مکان محدودیم.

۸. اصطلاح «متد شناسایی دینامیک»، منبع این اصطلاح شما کجاست؟ از خودتان درآورده‌اید؟ از این سه لغت، دو تای آن خارجی هستند و قاعدتاً باید منبع اصلی این اصطلاح خارجی باشد و تا آنجا که نویسنده این سطور آگاه است، چنین اصطلاحی وجود ندارد؟

۹. «طرز فکر مکانیستی» آیا این اصطلاح درست است؟

۱۰. در تعریف «ارتباط ارگانیکی» می‌گویند: «نوع ارتباط بین اجزاء یک موجود زنده را ارتباط ارگانیکی گویند. اولاً چه کسانی می‌گویند؟ بهتر نبود که شما خودتان آن را تعریف کنید و بگویید، این نوع ... چنین می‌خوانیم «ثانیا» چه «نوع» ارتباطی است که «نوع» مکانیکی فرق دارد؟ «علم» هنوز تعریفی از «زنده و زندگی ندارد.

۱۱. ... «هیچ پدیده‌ای را به‌طور مستقل و جدا از پدیده‌های دیگر نمی‌توان تصور کرد» همان‌طور که گفته شد بستگی دارد به «هدف» از بررسی و مشاهده.

مثلاً یک «پدیده» هورمون جنسی است (استروژن). اگر من بخواهم این پدیده را از جهت ساختمان شیمیایی اش بررسی کنم، باید آن را در حالت «استاتیک» مطالعه کنم یعنی آن را از «کل نظام» اش جدا کنم. هر قدر خالص تر، بهتر و درست تر و سپس آن را با وسایل و متدهای مختلف علمی مطالعه کنم. ساختمان شیمیایی اش را تعیین کنم و در این نوع مطالعه اصلاً احتیاجی به رابطه بین پدیده با سایر هورمون های بدن ندارم. اما اگر بخواهم «وظیفه» هورمون را مطالعه کنم و نقش هریک از اجزاء ساختمان شیمیایی اش را تعیین نمایم، بدون شک مجبورم آن را در رابطه با سایر پدیده ها، سلول، هسته سلولی، هسته ای، سایر ترکیبات شیمیایی مشابه، زمان، درجه حرارت، رطوبت و غیره را بررسی کنم. بیانی با قاطعیت بالا، در یک بحث علمی «درست به نظر نمی رسد» در همین قسمت است که شما خالق را هم جزو «پدیده ها» می آورید... «در طرز تفکر مکانیستی، خالق به صورت کنترل کننده یک ماشین درمی آید. در حالیکه اگر ارتباط پدیده ها و حوادث را ارگانیکی بدانیم، در این صورت خالق جدا از اشیاء نیست».

۱۲. گفته شده است که «در علم، حاکمیت بی چون و چرای قوانین جهان را «جبر علمی» تعبیر می کنند. اگر جبر علمی ترجمه Scientific می باشد، اصطلاحی است که فقط مارکس و مارکسیست ها به کار برده اند (این انتقاد نیست، تذکر است) ۱۳. آمده است که «بدین ترتیب خود را پای بند اصول و دستورالعمل ها کردن در حقیقت پشت پا زدن به خصلت دینامیک شناسایی و معرفت می باشد».

اولاً چگونه می توان «اصول» را با «دستورالعمل ها» در یک سطح قرار داد. شما برای شناسایی صحیح، اصولی را تعیین کرده اید و اصرار دارید که برای شناسایی باید نه تنها بدانها پای بند بلکه مؤمن بود. دستورالعمل ها براساس «اصول» است که تعیین می شوند. تغییر و نفی دستورالعمل ها که تابع زمان و مکان هستند، نفی اصول باید فرق داشته باشند. آنچه باید متحرک باشد (دینامیک) دستورالعمل ها هستند نه «اصول».

۱۴. ... «دگماتیسم به افکار و نظریات خود بیش از حد لازم ارزش دادن و بالاتر از شناخت های خود خود و اعتقادات خود را خطاناپذیر دانستن ...»
اولاً «حد لازم» را چگونه و بر چه مبنایی تعیین می کنید؟ و بالاتر از شناخت های خود کجاست؟ اینگونه بیان را «سوترکتیو» می گویند!

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ثانیاً «خود را خطاناپذیر دانستن» آیا با اعتقادات خود را خطاناپذیر دانستن، یکی است؟ (در اینجا اعتقادات به معنای مسلکی به کار رفته است نه اصطلاح عامیانه آن).

در همین زمینه آمده است: «دست کشیدن از آراء و عقاید خود در مقابل مسائل، کنارانداختن خودمدل‌ها و دگم‌های خشک به منظور قبول واقعیت‌های روشن‌تر...».

باز هم: آیا آراء و عقاید با خودمدل‌ها و دگم‌های خشک برابرند؟ خواننده‌ای آن را این‌گونه تعبیر کرده است که آراء و عقاید مدل‌های دگم و خشک، عقاید و فقه اسلامی است. مسائل جدید و نو: جنبش انقلابی، استعمار، استثمار، امپریالیسم، و واقعیت‌های روشن‌تر: مارکسیسم و مارکسیسم نیسم است؟ (در جلسات کنفدراسیون‌ها).

۱۵. در رابطه با مسائل بالا، سپس در همین صفحه از عدم رعایت «اصل اجتهاد» اظهار تأسف شده است. (توجه کنید که اصل: شریعت است. خودمدل‌های دگم و خشک: احکامی فقهی است و اجتهاد فرآیندی است که ضرورت و نوع تحرک را منعکس و تعیین می‌کند).

۱۶. در بحث: تغییرات کمی تدریجی و تغییرات کیفی ناگهانی. به‌طورکلی برداشت‌ها، نارسا و متعلق به «علم قرن نوزدهم» است (زمان مارکس) و با کمی اختلاف در لغات و کلمات، مطالب مشابهی، یا شاید عیناً، در کتاب «اصول مقدماتی فلسفه، نوشته ژرژ پولیتسر (که این روزها مجدداً در کلیه حوزه‌های مارکسیستی، به‌عنوان یک کتاب ابتدایی بحث می‌شود)، آمده است.

اشکال اول = تعریف «کمی» و «کیفی» است.

اگرچه در این نشریه تعریفی از کمی و کیفی نشده است، اما از مثال آبی که ذکر شده است (و تنها مثالی است که در این رابطه تا به حال - کلیه کتب مارکسیستی هم زده‌اند)، چنین استنباط می‌شود که نویسنده درک روشنی از «کمی» و «کیفی» نداشته است. همین مثال آب را بررسی می‌کنیم. وقتی آب را حرارت می‌دهیم. تغییرات تدریجی در آب (بالارفتن درجه حرارت) یک تغییر «کیفی» است نه «کمی». به این عبارت که «به تعداد مولکول‌های» آب (تغییر کمی) اضافه نمی‌شود. بلکه تغییری در فواصل میان ذرات یا ملکول‌ها ایجاد می‌شود (تغییر

کیفی). تعریف حرارت چیست؟ وقتی آب ۵ درجه به ۱۰ درجه تبدیل می‌گردد، به چه معنایی است؟ جدول‌های متعددی، و در هر کتاب منبع رجوع (.....) در مسائل فیزیکی و یا شیمیایی وجود دارد که وزن مخصوص آب و یا هر مایع دیگری را در درجات حرارت‌های مختلف تعیین کرده است (وزن مخصوص عبارتست از وزن یک سانتی‌متر مکعب از آب، چون حجم آب تغییر می‌کند (تغییر کیفی) لذا وزن مخصوص نیز تغییر می‌نماید. این تغییرات کیفی تدریجی (دورشدن ذرات از هم) به جایی می‌رسد که به یک تغییر کیفی ناگهانی (انتقال از حالت مایع به حالت بخار) منجر می‌گردد. بنابراین در این مورد به‌خصوص «تغییرات کیفی تدریجی به تغییر کیفی ناگهانی تبدیل شده است».

اشکال دوم: در جزوه آمده است که «در پدیده‌ها ابتدا تغییرات کمی ظهور می‌کنند. سؤال این است که آیا کلیه تغییرات، در پدیده‌ها تغییر کمی هستند یا کیفی؟

جواب آنست که حکم مطلق وجود ندارد. حالات زیر را می‌توان تصور کرد:

۱. تغییر کیفی تدریجی به تغییر کیفی ناگهانی. نظیر آب که مثال زدیم.
 ۲. تغییر کمی تدریجی به تغییر کیفی ناگهانی. نظیر انعقاد نطفه در رحم.
- ایجاد سلول مادر (نطفه) و آغاز تغییرات کمی تدریجی (اضافه شدن تعداد سلول‌ها) و در حد مشخص، تغییر کیفی ناگهانی (تولد بچه). (در همین جا باز باید توجه کرد که در پروسه، تغییرات کمی تدریجی، تغییرات کیفی تدریجی نیز حاصل می‌شود. به این عبارت که جریان دیفراسیون سلولی (Cellular Differentiation) – تخصص سلول‌ها – از یک سلول، نطفه، سلول‌های عصبی، خونی، عضلانی و غیره که هر کدام وظایف متفاوتی دارند. تحقق می‌پذیرد. تغییرات کیفی در سلول‌ها خود نتیجه تغییرات کیفی و کمی تدریجی در درون سلول‌هاست که ماهیت آنها هنوز به درستی معلوم نیست.
- مرگ، یک تغییر کیفی ناگهانی است و حاصل تغییرات کمی و کیفی تدریجی است.
- بلوغ یک تغییر کیفی در انسان است (نه ناگهانی) که حاصل تغییرات کمی (رشد اندازه، زیاد شدن تعداد سلول‌ها) و کیفی تدریجی است.

- تغییر یک انسان خوش، مرده، استعمارزده، خواب به یک انسان متحرک، زنده، انقلابی، مبارز و مجاهد، حاصل تغییرات کیفی تدریجی در اوست.

تذکر - نه انتقاد: در ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک (یا به اصطلاح جزوه شناخت متد شناسایی دینامیک) مسئله گذر از تغییرات کمی تدریجی به تغییرات کیفی ناگهانی در توجیه به اصطلاح «علمی» ماتریالیسم تاریخی مارکس مورد انتقاد قرار گرفته است. مارکس که ابتدا حرکت جوامع بشری را در مراحل مختلف مورد بررسی قرار داده است و سپس «عامل تولید و توزیع» را زیربنای جامعه و عامل اصلی در تغییرات روبنایی در نظر می‌گیرد، برای توجیه آن به طرح دیالکتیکی «تغییرات کمی و تدریجی» متوسل می‌گردد که در آن تکامل وسایل تولید (تغییرات کمی - تدریجی) باعث دگرگونی انقلابی روبنای جامعه، نظام اقتصادی و غیره (تغییر کیفی ناگهانی) می‌گردد. صرف نظر از آنکه وسایل تولید و توزیع را زیربنا و عامل اصلی تغییرات بدانیم یا نه، اصل تغییرات کمی تدریجی به تغییرات کیفی ناگهانی، به صورتی که مطرح شده است، نادرست به نظر می‌رسد.

۱۷. در پایان همین بحث آمده است که اصل «حاوی حقیقت دیگری نیز هست و آن سخت‌گیری این تغییرات است به سوی کیفیت‌های بالاتر و پرمحتواتر، که می‌توان آن را به «حرکت مارپیچی» تشبیه کرد. اولاً در طبیعت کلیه تغییرات به سوی کیفیت‌های بالاتر و پرمحتواتر نیستند، بلکه به صورت «حلقه» هستند. نظیر «حرکت» کربن، ازت و غیره در طبیعت. هیچ‌یک از اینها به صورت مارپیچی!! نیستند. ثانیاً وقتی در ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک از حرکت مارپیچی سخن می‌گوئید، منظور تکرار حلقه‌های حرکت است اما در مدارهای بالاتر، و در جوامع بشری است نه در کلیه پدیده و کائنات و هستی.

اما چنین حرکتی برای کلیه پدیده‌ها و کلیه تغییرات نمی‌توان قائل شد. مسئله مرگ، یک تغییر ناگهانی کیفی است اما درباره یک پدیده، انسان چگونه می‌تواند خاصیت «مارپیچی» داشته باشد.

۱۸. تذکری دربارهٔ ژن: عبارت و محتوای آن قسمت به ترتیب زیر اصلاح گردد:

«... ترکیبات آلی (مجموعه‌ای از اکسیژن، هیدروژن و کربن) به تدریج و تحت شرایط مناسب و خاصی در اختلاط و... با هم، مولکول‌های بزرگتری را به وجود می‌آورند و ترکیب این مولکول‌ها با عناصر دیگری نظیر ازت و گوگرد و غیره مولکول‌های شیمیایی بزرگتری را تولید می‌کنند. در فرآیند تکاملی این تحولات، مولکول‌های جدیدی به وجود می‌آیند که دارای مشخصات جدیدی هستند. به این عبارت که اولاً ادامهٔ فعالیت‌های آنها به وجود و فعالیت مولکول‌های دیگری وابسته می‌گردد و ثانیاً مجتمع جدید مولکول‌های بزرگ باید از تاثیر منفی (سمی) موادی که در محیط عمل هستند و یا محصول و اثر فعل و انفعالات شیمیایی خود این مولکول‌ها می‌باشند، لذا به تدریج برخی از مولکول‌های بزرگ وظیفهٔ حفاظتی را برعهدهٔ خود گرفته و یک نوع غشاء یا پوستهٔ خارجی به دور این مجتمع مولکول‌ها بسته می‌شود (غشاء یا پوسته یا ... سلولی) و اولین سلول ساده به وجود

۱. ژن‌ها قسمتی از کروموزوم‌ها هستند. هر سلولی دارای تعداد معینی کروموزوم است. تعداد این کروموزوم‌ها در هر یک از حیوانات نباتات و موجودات فرق دارد. در انسان تعداد آنها ۴۸ عدد است به‌جز سلول‌های معینی (نظیر اسپرم مرد و اوول زن) که نصف این مقدار است و بعد از ترکیب دو سلول نر و ماده و تشکیل سلول جدید، مجدداً تعداد ۴۸ عدد می‌باشد. ترکیب اصلی کروموزوم‌ها اسید دی‌اکسی‌نوکلئیک یا دی.ان.ای (DNA) می‌باشد که خود مرکب است از چندین میلیون واحد شیمیایی به نام «نوکلئوتاید (Nucleotide)». نوکلئوتایدها همچون واحدهای تسبیح در دو ردیف (Double Helix) به موازات هم ولی به صورت یک فنر، حلقه‌دار- مارپیچی (Helical) در کنار هم قرار گرفته‌اند. ژن‌ها، از نظر شیمیایی، قسمتی از کروموزوم می‌باشد که دارای حدود ۱۲۰۰ واحد شیمیایی، نوکلئوتاید است. این واحدهای شیمیایی بیش از ۴ نوع اصلی نیستند (A,G,T,C) اما نحوه و چگونگی در کنار هم قرارگرفتن آنها در ترکیب آنها با هم طوری است که ژن‌های متعدد و متفاوتی را به وجود می‌آورند. درست نظیر که با تعداد چند «حرف» می‌توان تعداد زیادی «لغت» ساخت. آنچه به صورت «رمز» (CODE) در ژن‌ها (یا لوح محفوظ)، اسرار صفات ارثی مشخص و سلولی را حفظ می‌نماید. طرز قرارگرفتن این واحدهای شیمیایی در کنار هم هستند. در عمل، ژن‌ها، مشخصات کار و نوع ترکیبات شیمیایی را که باید سلول تهیه کند، به ملکول‌های دیگری «دیکته» (Transcription) می‌کنند و آنها این «دیکته»ها را به قسمت دیگر سلول برده و به زبانی که برای سایر مولکول‌ها قابل هضم باشد «ترجمه» (Translation) می‌کنند.

می‌آید. این غشاء مانند یک صافی عمل می‌کند و تنها به موادی اجازه ورود می‌دهد که مفید و لازم هستند و به سرعت مواد سمی و منفی را خارج می‌سازد. برای آنکه این مجتمع بتواند وظایف و اعمال خود را عیناً تکرار کند و در صورت تقسیم شدن، خواص خود را به سلول بعدی منتقل سازد، ملکول‌های جدیدی به وجود می‌آیند که مشخصات و هویت کامل هریک از مولکول‌های فعال و سازنده درون سلول را در خود به صورت رموزی حفظ می‌کنند و به این ترتیب ژن‌ها به وجود می‌آیند و از آن پس، ژن‌ها مشخصات کامل هر سلول را در خود ثبت می‌کنند. نه تنها ثبت‌کننده مشخصات هستند، بلکه کنترل‌کننده مشخصات هریک از مولکول‌های جدیدی که در سلول تهیه می‌شوند، می‌گردند و در موقع تکثیر و تقسیم سلولی عیناً خواص مجتمع مولکول‌ها (سلول) را به سلول‌های جدید که تولید می‌شوند، منتقل می‌سازند. (۱)

اما چند نکته کلی درباره جزوه

۱. ای کاش انتشار جزوه در خارج از کشور، با مقدمه اصلی آن و با کلیه یادداشت‌های مربوط به آن - که در اصل بوده است، انجام می‌شد. به نظر من خیلی بیشتر مؤثر و مفید می‌توانست باشد.

۲. در این جزوه، به خواننده این احساس دست می‌دهد که با مهارت تمام، اصول «ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک» بدون به کار رفتن اصطلاح، بیان و اثبات شده است. و در اثبات آنها از قرآن و سخنان علی (ع) هم مدد گرفته شده است، این خیلی جالب است. اما این اولین کوشش در این راه نبوده است.

اولین بار، تا آنجاکه این حقیر به یاد دارم، در جلسات انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان، در تهران (سال‌های ۱۳۲۵ تا ۱۳۲۷) دندان‌پزشکی به نام «دکتر نقدی» شرکت می‌کرد و عین همین مسائل را مطرح می‌ساخت؛ به نام «ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک اسلامی». برای بار دوم، مسائلی مشابه، اما در سطحی خیلی عمیق‌تر در محضر درس‌هایی که با مرحوم فروغی (برادر فروغی نخست‌وزیر) با شرکت برادران اعضای انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان داشتیم، مطرح گردیده است. مرحوم فروغی این نظرات را جمعاً گویا به فرانسه به نام «دینامیسم اسلامی» که ظاهراً تز دکترایش بوده، چاپ کرده است و اکنون برای بار سوم، جزوه شناخت، در یک

سطح دیگری، خیلی کامل‌تر اما بدون تغییر و یا تبدیل اساسی در «ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک» آن را مطرح ساخته و این چند اشکال را به وجود آورده است.

الف. «حرکت» امری است نسبی، یعنی تنها در مقایسه با یک پدیده یا پدیده دیگری است که می‌توان «حرکت» را بیان و تعیین و به‌طور مشخص اندازه‌گیری کرد. مثلاً حرکت ماشین یا هواپیما را نسبت به زمین که نسبت به متحرک، ساکن است، فرض می‌کنیم. اما خود زمین در مقایسه با خورشید در حرکت است. حالا سؤال کلی که مطرح می‌گردد، این است که «حرکت کلی» جهان هستی را که در تمام پدیده‌ها وجود دارد و اسلام هم آن را می‌پذیرد، با چه «گامی» و یا چه «شاهدی» می‌سنجیم. ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک در جزوه شناخت (متدشناسی دینامیک) حرکت جهان هستی قبول شده است اما شاخص را بیان نمی‌کند. در دینامیسم اسلامی، حرکت جهان هستی، را با ابتدا و انتهایش می‌سنجند. «جهان حادث است نه قدیم». خودش، حالت حرکت را بیان می‌کند که پیدایش خلقت است و از خدا سرچشمه می‌گیرد. معیار و مأخذ سنجش «حرکت» تشخیص و تعیین آن «خدا» است که «حرکت» ندارد، تغییر نمی‌کند و لایزال است.

ب: هر حرکتی باید جهت داشته باشد. نمی‌توان حرکتی را بیان و یا مطالعه کرد بدون آنکه «جهت» آن را مشخص نمود. تعیین «جهت حرکت» بعد از اصل پذیرش حرکت، از سرعت «حرکت» مهم‌تر است. وقتی شما راه می‌افتید (آغاز حرکت)، بلافاصله باید «جهت حرکت خود را تعیین کنید. بعد به کندی و یا تندی حرکت می‌اندیشید. در علوم هم، نظیر بررسی الکترون‌ها در اتم، در حرکت الکترون‌ها، جهت حرکت آن‌ها، مهم‌تر است از «سرعت» حرکت آن‌ها. در اسلام «جهت» حرکت «خدا» است. اما در جزوه شناخت، جهت حرکت کلاً ندیده گرفته شده است. این قصوری یا کمبودی است در جزوه شناخت. شاید این قصور به این دلیل باشد که نویسنده، یا نویسندگان، الگویی که به کار برده‌اند، ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک بوده است.

۳. کوشش جزوه شناخت و در گذشته هم کوشش‌های مشابهی در تلفیق دینامیسم اسلامی با ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک، شاید انعکاس یک ضرورت مهم دیگری در جامعه ما و سایر جوامع مشابه ما (اسلامی) باشد و آن اینکه در برخورد با دنیای

غیراسلامی و یا ضد اسلامی، ما (مسلمان‌ها) موضع خود را در برابر پدیده‌های اجتماعی نظیر استبداد، استعمار، استثمار، امپریالیسم و ناسیونالیسم و غیره تعیین کرده‌ایم.

اما جنبش مترقی اسلامی، تا به حال نتوانسته دقیقاً موضع خود را در برابر مارکسیسم (به لحاظ ایدئولوژی) و در برابر کمونیسم (به لحاظ جنبش سیاسی) روشن سازد. مثلاً ما در برابر غرب موضع خود را روشن ساخته‌ایم. با استعمار و امپریالیسم غربی مخالفیم و مبارزه می‌کنیم. اما پیشرفت‌های علمی و دستاوردهای فنی آنها را می‌پذیریم. دربارهٔ مسئلهٔ مارکسیسم و کمونیسم چطور؟ از آنجا که جوامع ما شدیداً تحت تأثیر فرهنگ غربی است و استعمار غربی هم، در سطح جهانی، حداقل در نیمهٔ اول قرن بیستم، تنها با مبارزات و مخالفت‌های شدید جنبش کمونیستی و مارکسیستی روبرو بوده است، لذا استعمار خارجی، در کشورهای اسلامی با استفاده از «احساس مذهبی» در مردم و با تکیه بر واقعیت فلسفی مارکسیسم، مردم ما را آنچنان از مارکسیسم ترسانیده است که ما نتوانسته‌ایم با مارکسیسم و جنبش‌های کمونیستی هم یک برخورد واقع‌بینانه، نظیر آنچه با غرب داشته‌ایم، پیدا کنیم. به نظر می‌رسد که زمان آن رسیده باشد که ما این بررسی را بنماییم و خطوط کلی واضح خود را چه به لحاظ سیاسی و چه به لحاظ فلسفی و ایدئولوژیک تعیین کنیم. نه می‌توان یک سره قلم نفی بر کلیه مسائل مربوط به مارکسیسم کشید و نه می‌توان یکجا آن را پذیرفت و سعی کرد اسلام را با آن تطبیق داد.

از لحاظ سیاسی، موضع‌گیری سازمان مجاهدین خلق، یک موضع‌گیری واقع‌بینانه بوده و می‌باشد. دربارهٔ این‌گونه موضع‌گیری‌ها باید کار توضیحی بیشتری انجام گیرد. ما تا آنجا که بتوانیم «ماهیت اصلی اسلامی» خود را حفظ کنیم، نباید از کار با کمونیست‌ها هراسی داشته باشیم. همان‌طور که به غرب می‌آییم در محیط آنها زندگی می‌کنیم و از کلیهٔ امتیازات جوامع آنها برخوردار می‌شویم اما حاضر نیستیم که ماهیت اصلی خود را از دست بدهیم. تنها کسانی ماهیت خود را از دست می‌دهند و تغییر می‌کنند که اساس شخصیت اعتقادی آنها خدشه‌پذیر بوده و قوی نبوده و درک درستی از اسلام نداشته‌اند.

راه چاره هم، نمی‌توانست راه نسل گذشته باشد که به مدرسه نرو، به فرنگ نرو که بی‌دین می‌شوی. البته خیلی‌ها آمدند و بی‌دین هم شدند اما در یک نظریه دوردست، می‌بینیم که آن «ایزوله» کردن راه عملی و درستی نبود. در عوض به تدریج نسل جدیدی با مجهز شدن به علوم جدید، اما مسلمان به وجود آمده است. ما می‌توانیم و باید از ره‌آورد های کمونیسم، در مبارزات سیاسی و انقلابی درس‌های گران‌بهایی بیاموزیم. (این بحث را به وقت دیگری موکول می‌نمایم چراکه در ارسال یادداشت‌های جزوه شناخت می‌باید تسریع نمایم).

تحلیل سیاسی اوضاع کنونی ایران

متن سخنرانی لندن در ۱۳۵۷/۳/۲۹ - سالروز شهادت دکتر علی شریعتی

۱. پیشگفتار

برادران و خواهران عزیز سلام علیکم. صلح و آرامش بر شما باد. این یک سنت اسلامی است که وقتی یک فرد مسلمان بر کسی وارد می‌شود به او سلام می‌دهد، چه آن فرد مسلمان باشد یا نباشد و باز هم سنت اسلامی است که اگر کسی با سلام بر ما وارد شد او را با سلام بپذیریم. سلام یعنی صلح و آسایش. این برای من نهایت خوشبختی است که امروز در حضور شما خواهران و برادران عزیزمان باشم و آنچه را که به‌عنوان برداشت‌هایی از اوضاع کنونی ایران و از وقایع گذشته و ارتباطی که این وقایع احتمالاً باهم دارند درک کرده‌ام با شما در میان بگذارم و در سایه یک تبادل نظر آزاد بتوانیم راه خودمان را بهتر و مصمم‌تر با بینش و بصیرت بیشتری انتخاب کنیم و ادامه دهیم.

همانطور که گفته شد و می‌دانید امروز سالگرد شهادت برادرمان علی شریعتی است و برای بزرگداشت او جمع شده‌ایم. اما لازم به گفتن نیست و همه شما می‌دانید که در اسلام، ارزش اشخاص و افراد به پیامشان است نه به خودشان و اگر اینجا جمع شده‌ایم که روز شهادتش را گرامی بداریم، بیش از هر چیز به پیام علی و به راه علی فکر می‌کنیم. بنابراین با الهام از قرآن که ما را دعوت می‌کند که: «ای کسانی که ایمان آورده‌اید، قبل از هر چیز و قبل از آنکه در راه خدا قدم بردارید، تبیین کنید تا بصیرت پیدا کنید» (نسا ۹۴ و حجرات ۶) در جهت بزرگداشت راه

مقالات علمی □ ۵۲۱

برادر شهیدمان علی ما به تبیین و بررسی اوضاع کنونی کشورمان می‌پردازیم. این بررسی چرا ضروری است؟

این بررسی را از این جهت ضروری می‌دانیم که در قرآن به ما می‌آموزد که تفاوت احساس و بینش و دانش را از یکدیگر تمیز دهیم. نیاستی این سه مقوله را با هم مخلوط کنید: در قلمرو مذهب و سیاست احساس مذهبی یا سیاسی با بینش سیاسی یا مذهبی و یا دانش مذهبی و سیاسی فرق‌های اساسی دارند.

احساس چیست؟ می‌دانیم که در کشورمان احساس مذهبی مردم قوی است. مثلاً در نیمه شعبان تعطیل عمومی می‌شود. در عاشورا و تاسوعا دستجات سینه‌زنی و عزاداری به راه می‌افتد. در این مراسم انگیزه حرکت مردم احساس مذهبی است. قرآن با این نوع احساس مذهبی که در سطح همین احساس بماند، مبارزه می‌کند. قرآن می‌گوید که باید این احساس و انگیزه مذهبی به بینش اسلامی و یا به اصطلاح قرآنی به بصیرت تبدیل شود. چرا؟ برای اینکه احساس، انگیزه شما در حرکت است و همانند موتوری است که شما را به حرکت درمی‌آورد. اما بینش اسلامی آن چیزی است که به شما جهت می‌دهد. اکثریت قاطع مردم کشور ما فاقد بینش اسلامی بوده ولی احساس مذهبی‌شان خیلی قوی است. این احساس مذهبی صرف از آن مشکلات بزرگی است که در یک جامعه می‌تواند وجود داشته باشد. برای اینکه احساس مذهبی به تنهایی قابل استفاده یا سوء استفاده می‌باشد. اگر شما می‌بینید که شاه می‌رود در مشهد جلوی ضریح می‌ایستد و عکس می‌گیرد و چاپ می‌کنند، این می‌خواهد از آن احساس مذهبی مردم سوء استفاده کند. همیشه در طول تاریخ از این احساس مذهبی سوء استفاده زیادی شده است، چون احساس مذهبی ریشه در فطرت انسان دارد و یکی از ابعاد اجتناب‌ناپذیر روح انسانی است که اگر با بینش توأم نباشد، خطرناک می‌شود. همین‌طور، در صحنه مبارزات سیاسی بسیاری از مردم هستند که با انگیزه احساس سیاسی وارد مبارزه می‌شوند ولی چون بینش سیاسی ندارند گول می‌خورند. چطور ممکن است حزبی بعد از شهریور ۲۰ به وجود بیاید و بزرگترین حزب سیاسی زمان شده و بهترین استعدادهای کشور را به صورت زندان بزرگ در خودش متمرکز کرده و آخرش هم به منافع و مصالح ملی خیانت کند؟ حزب توده نمونه بارزی است از اینکه اکثریت

کسانی که عضو حزب توده شده بودند، از موضع احساس سیاسی شرکت کرده بودند نه بینش سیاسی. اگر شما هم بینش سیاسی نداشته باشید به راحتی آلت دست قرار می‌گیرید. پس اگر می‌خواهید در دام و فریب سوء استفاده از احساس سیاسی قرار نگیرید، لاجرم بایستی بینش سیاسی خودتان را گسترش بدهید. ما ناظر این حقیقت تلخ بوده‌ایم که از احساس سیاسی بسیاری از هموطنان ما سوء استفاده‌های زیادی شده است. این احساس سیاسی ریشه در عشق و تنفر دارد. خداوند انسان را آزاد خلق کرده است. نیاز به آزادی، انگیزه درونی و وجودی در انسان در مبارزه بر علیه هر عاملی است که آزادی را از انسان سلب کند. احساس سیاسی، یک امر عاطفی است که موجب تنفر ما از نظام موجود می‌شود. شما با پوست و رگ و خونتان ظلم و ستم را در کشورتان حس کرده و از آن متنفرید و هیچ احتیاجی به استدلال هم ندارد، اما اگر بخواهید فقط در همین سطح قانع بوده و با این احساس وارد میدان بشوید، به راحتی از این احساس شما سوء استفاده خواهند کرد. یا خود شما به بیراهه می‌روید. احساس مذهبی هم چنین است. اینکه لازم است که شما بصیرت مذهبی پیدا کرده و صاحب بصائر شوید، چیزی است که قرآن می‌گوید. بنابراین کوششمان در این تحلیل اینست که مقدمه‌ای باشد که چگونه با تحلیل حوادث و نه با شرح آنها می‌توان به این بصیرت رسید. البته نمی‌گوییم که می‌توانیم این کار را در یک فاصله کوتاهی در یک ساعت و یا دو ساعت انجام بدهیم. بلکه همان‌طور که گفته شد، فقط به عنوان مقدمه بتوانیم راهی را باز کنیم که بتوانیم با تحلیل حوادث به این بینش برسیم.

مقدمه

آنچه که امروز در کشور ما می‌گذرد حاصل فعل و انفعالات سه عامل عمده است این سه عامل یا این سه بازیگری که در صحنه حضور دارند، عبارتند از:

۱. امپریالیسم آمریکا یا بزرگترین متکثر جهان

می‌دانید که امپریالیسم در فارسی یعنی توسعه طلب. توسعه طلبی خودش معلول است و اما معلول چه هست؟ معلول کثرت طلبی است. چون سرمایه داری در یک مرحله‌ای لاجرم به تکاثر می‌افتد. تکاثر به توسعه طلبی و تجاوز، بنابراین امپریالیسم

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تجلی و تظاهر خارجی عینی متکثری است که قرآن بیان می‌کند. یکی از بازیگران صحنه وقایع و متکثر جهان، آمریکا و یارانش و یا به‌طور کلی آنچه را که ما به نام استیلای خارجی اسم می‌بریم هست. بنابراین برای ما لازم است که از عملکرد این متکثر جهان بررسی به‌عمل بیاوریم و ببینیم در این ربع قرن گذشته چه شیوه‌هایی را به‌کار برده و چرا این شیوه‌ها به طرح حقوق بشر در ایران و در سطح جهانی منجر شده است.

۲. استبداد داخلی و نظام طاغوتی

ریشه‌های این دو یکی است. در دنیا دو جهان‌بینی بیشتر نیست. یا جهان‌بینی توحیدی است و یا جهان‌بینی شرک و کفر. تکاثر جلوه‌ای است از نظام شرک و کفر، و طاغوت جلوه دیگر آن است. به این علت است که طاغوت و متکثر همیشه در کنار هم و با هم می‌آیند و به همین علت هم استبداد و استیلای خارجی با هم کار می‌کنند و هر دو ریشه از یک جا دارند و هر دو انعکاس یک جهان‌بینی هستند. می‌دانید که کفر هم برای خودش یک دین است. چنانچه در سوره «کافرون» می‌گوید: «لکم دینکم ولی دین - دین شما از آن خودتان و دین ما از آن خودمان. سوره کافرون آیه ۶». اسلام برای شرک و کفر هم جهان‌بینی قائل است. آنها هم جهان‌بینی و نظام ارزش‌های متناسب خود را دارند و می‌خواهند نظام ارزش‌هایشان را بر انسان تحمیل کنند.

۳. سومین بازیگر این صحنه ملت ما در جنبش اسلامی است

با این مقدمه حال با اجازه شما به بررسی این سه عامل می‌پردازیم. هر وقت احساس کردید که وقت زیادتری گرفتم و بایستی ختمش کنم، تکبیر بگویید. عادت معمولاً من اینست که برای هر یک مایلی که سفر می‌کنم، یک دقیقه صحبت می‌کنم حالا می‌توانید فکر کنید که از کجا آمده‌ایم تا کجا (از آمریکا به لندن).

بررسی هر یک از عوامل یادشده

سیاست خارجی آمریکا بعد از جنگ دوم جهانی به‌خاطر اینکه با خطر توسعه کمونیزم در دنیا روبرو شده بود، در رابطه مقابله با چنین سیاستی، یعنی تجاوزات و توسعه‌طلبی کمونیزم، دست به یک سلسله تدارکاتی زد. برای اینکه در این دوران

بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم پایه سیاست خارجی آمریکا را در رابطه با بلوک شرق، درگیری نظامی عادی قرار داده بود و به اصطلاح «کانونشنال وار». بلوک غرب و سرمایه‌داری غرب در مقابله با خطر توسعه کمونیزم تصورش این بود که این درگیری به صورت جنگ‌های عادی خواهد بود. شما می‌دانید که دو نوع جنگ در جهان داریم یکی جنگ‌های عادی (Conventional Wars) است و دیگری جنگ‌های غیرعادی، یا جنگ‌های انقلابی، یا جنگ‌های کوچک و محدود و یا جنگ‌های پارتیزانی (People' War, Guerrilla Wars, Irregular Wars etc.).

هریک از این دو نوع جنگ از یک سلسله قوانین ویژه‌ای تبعیت می‌کنند. قوانینی که بر جنگ‌های عادی حاکم است قابل انطباق و استفاده در جنگ‌های انقلابی و محلی و کوچک نیست یا برعکس. مثلاً در جنگ‌های عادی اگر سربازی از برابر دشمن فرار کند، اعدامش می‌کنند. درحالی که در جنگ‌های پارتیزانی یکی از خصوصیات مجاهد جنگجو اینست که می‌تواند به درستی و به موقع به دشمن حمله کرده و به موقع هم فرار کند. اساس جنگ چریکی بزن درروست. اینجایی که دشمن منتظر توست که حمله کنی و خودش دانه پاشیده و تحریک کرده که حمله کنی، حمله نمی‌کنی و فرار می‌کنی. چون به نفع تو نیست که حمله کنی. آنجایی که او منتظر است که فرار کنی، می‌ایستی و حمله می‌کنی. بنابراین به‌طور کلی قوانین جنگ‌های عادی و جنگ‌های چریکی دو مقاله از هم جدا هستند و وقتی ما صحبت از جنگ عادی می‌کنیم، به این معناست که، سرمایه‌داری غرب به رهبری آمریکا پس از جنگ جهانی دوم آینده‌ای که پیش‌بینی می‌کند اینست که با جهان کمونیزم در یک جنگ عادی روبرو خواهد شد و تمام تدارکاتش را بر این پایه قرار داده بود. سیاست آیزنهاور دالاس پایه‌اش بر اساس انتقام وسیع (Massive Retaliation) و همه‌جانبه ریخته شده بود. در قوانین جنگ‌های عادی، که به قوانین ناپلئونی معروف است هرگاه دو لشکر هر دو از نظر کمیت یکسان باشند، آن که زودتر حمله می‌کند و مراکز دشمن را از بین می‌برد، پیروز می‌شود. بر این اساس در زمان آیزنهاور برای مقابله با توسعه کمونیزم، آمدند و سیاست خارجی و استراتژی مقابله با کمونیزم را بر این قرار دادند که با ایجاد پیمان‌های نظامی منطقه‌ای در سرتاسر جهان، مثل حلقه‌ای دور تا دور کشورهای شرق را بگیرند.

می‌دانید که یکی از این پیمان‌ها ناتو (آتلانتیک شمالی) است با عضویت کشورهای اروپای غربی و آمریکا. یک پیمان، پیمان مرکزی بغداد بود که بعد از تغییر رژیم در عراق و خروج عراق از این پیمان، به پیمان مرکزی یا سنتو تغییر نام پیدا کرد. پیمان سنتو بین کشورهای مرزی شوروی یعنی ترکیه و ایران و پاکستان از یک طرف و انگلیس و آمریکا از طرف دیگر بسته شده است. و یکی هم پیمان سیتو است. پیمان سیتو بین کشورهای جنوب شرقی آسیا بسته شده است و کشورهای فیلیپین و تایلند هم عضو هستند. این سه پیمان نظامی با عضویت کشورهای رابط و واسطی به هم متصل شده‌اند. مثلاً ترکیه هم عضو پیمان ناتو است و هم عضو پیمان سنتو، به طوری که این دو پیمان به وسیله ترکیه به هم متصل شده‌اند و آمریکا و انگلیس هم در تمام این پیمان‌ها شریک و عضو هستند. اما حاصل و عصاره این پیمان‌ها چیست؟

الف: چون در آن زمان موشک‌های قاره‌ای دور پرواز وجود نداشت که بتواند از مسافت‌های دور مواد انفجار اتمی و هسته‌ای را با خودش حمل کند و لازم بود که پایگاه‌های پرتاب موشک در نزدیکترین مناطق به کشورهای اروپای شرقی و روسیه شوروی به وجود بیاید.

بنابراین به پایگاه‌های نظامی در ایران و ترکیه و پاکستان احتیاج داشتند تا در صورت لزوم بتوانند از این پایگاه‌های نظامی، موشک‌های مجهز به سلاح‌های هسته‌ای را به طرف آماج مورد نظر در داخل خاک کشور دشمن پرتاب کنند.

ب: هرگاه کشورهای کمونیستی به یکی از کشورهای عضو این پیمان‌ها حمله کنند و به یکی از کشورهای عضو این پیمان‌ها تجاوزی بشود، تمامی کشورهای غربی به بهانه این تجاوز و حمله، یک حمله وسیع و همه‌جانبه‌ای را علیه متجاوز شروع کنند. به عنوان مثال اگر به ایران حمله می‌شد، لاجرم بایستی ترکیه به نفع ایران وارد جنگ شود و وقتی ترکیه شرکت کرد، یعنی تمام کشورهای اروپای غربی وارد صحنه می‌شوند و به این ترتیب شوروی و بلوک شرق در محدوده مرزهایشان مهار شدند.

این اساس و عصاره پیمان‌های نظامی منطقه‌ای بود.

یکی از اختلافاتی که دکتر مصدق با کشورهای غربی به خصوص با آمریکا بر سر شرکت ایران در پیمان نظامی بغداد یا سنتو بود. آمریکا کوشش می کرد که مصدق بپذیرد که ایران عضو پیمان منطقه ای شود، ولی چون سیاست خارجی دکتر مصدق، برپایه بی طرفی مثبت و عدم شرکت در درگیری های نظامی جهانی بود، از قبول این امر خودداری می کرد.

جنگ کره و شکست آمریکا در این جنگ نشان داد که استراتژی غرب برپایه تقابل و جنگ کلاسیک نادرست بوده است. طراحان سیاست خارجی آمریکا متوجه شدند که از این پس درگیری آمریکا با کشورهای کمونیستی به شکل جنگ های عادی نخواهد بود بلکه با جنبشها و نهضت ها و جنگ های آزادیبخش و از نوع جنگ های کوچک محلی و انقلابی است. و آمریکا آمادگی مقابله با این نوع جنگ ها را ندارد. بنابراین برنامه جدیدی را تدوین و آغاز کردند، برای اینکه بتوانند:

۱. ماهیت این نوع جنگ ها را بشناسند.

۲. طرق مقابله با این جنگ ها را بیاموزند.

از بعد جنگ کره است که مطالعات فراوان و وسیعی درباره جنگ های مردمی و چریکی در محافل آمریکایی شروع می شود و تمام مغزهای متفکر و همه دکترها و جامعه شناسان را جمع می کنند و با میلیون ها دلار پول شروع به مطالعه ای وسیع و همه جانبه می کنند و بودجه در اختیار دانشگاه های بزرگ قرار می دهند. تمام مدارک و اسناد جنبش های آزادیخواهی و انقلابی دنیا در قرن گذشته را جمع آوری و تحلیل می کنند. از جنگ داخلی اسپانیا، قبرس، یونان، برمه، فیلیپین، ایران و لورنس عربی ها، تمام مدارک و اسناد این جنگ ها را جمع کردند و تحلیل می کنند تا بفهمند که رمز این ماجرا که یک آدم گرسنه و تشنه و پابرهنه در جنگل های برمه با یک مشت برنج در کوله پشتی و یک تفنگ کهنه در دستش راه می افتد و بزرگترین امپریالیسم جهان را به بازیچه می گیرد، چیست؟ و در این حرکت او چه انگیزه های نهفته است و چه قوانینی بر چنین حرکتی حاکم است.

حاصل این مطالعات در تحلیل این مسائل، کتاب های متعددی است که از سال ۶۰ به بعد در آمریکا منتشر می شود که کتاب «شورشگری و ضد شورشگری» بخشی از این نتایج را منتشر می کند و به جمع بندی هایی می رسد که این

جمع‌بندی‌ها با روی کارآمدن کندی به مرحله اجرا درمی‌آید. کندی و مکناما را قهرمان یا مبتکر و یا پیش‌قراول چنین سیاستی هستند، دولت آمریکا بعد از رفتن آیزنهاور و دالاس لازم می‌بیند که برای مقابله با جنگ‌های آزادیبخش تدارکاتی در زمینه‌های نظامی، سیاسی اجتماعی، سیاسی اقتصادی ببیند. در کتاب جنگ بی‌پایان، که جلد اولش اخیراً توسط نهضت آزادی ایران چاپ شده است، این تدارکات به‌صورت مفصل شرح داده شده و خواهران و برادران عزیز می‌توانند به این کتاب مراجعه کنند که بسیار آموزنده می‌باشد.

برخی از نکات قابل توجه این است که اولاً در برنامه‌های نظامی، آموزشی و سازماندهی تغییراتی داده شد. برای اولین بار مراکز ضد شورشگری در آمریکا تأسیس شد. در آکادمی پلیس در واشنگتن مرکز ویژه‌ای برای آموزش پلیس‌های دنیای سوم تأسیس شد. این آموزش‌ها شامل پیش‌بینی و پیشگیری شورشگری بود. ثانیاً پژوهش‌های علمی وسیعی در زمینه‌های مربوط به جنگ، به خصوص در دوران جنگ ویتنام صورت گرفت. به عنوان مثال چگونه یک شورشگر یا یک رزمنده ویتنامی را در عمق جنگل انبوه پیدا کرد و هدف قرارداد. در آمریکا کمپانی‌های بزرگ مواد غذایی وجود دارد که کارشان بسته‌بندی مواد غذایی است. این شرکت‌ها برای استاندارد کردن طعم و مزه و بوی غذاهایشان سنسورها یا حسگرهای الکترونیکی خاصی درست کرده‌اند که بوی غذا را تبدیل به عدد می‌کند و با این وسیله مزه و بوی غذاها استا ندارد و ثابت شدند. وزارت دفاع آمریکا با این کمپانیها قرار داد بست که سنسورهایی بسازند که با نصب آنها بر روی هلی‌کوپترهای نظامی بتواند هنگام پرواز بر فراز جنگل از بوهایی که از عمق جنگل می‌آیند، وجود انسانی را که در جنگل حرکت می‌کند تشخیص دهد. وسایل الکترونیکی بسیار دقیقی درست شدند و در ویتنام مورد استفاده قرار گرفتند. به این ترتیب که هلی‌کوپتری بالای جنگل پرواز می‌کرد و اگر موجود زنده‌ای، و یا انسانی آنجا راه می‌رفت، از بوی عرق بدنش، حضورش را تشخیص داده و علامت می‌دادند و بدین طریق بمب‌افکن‌ها منطقه را بمباران می‌کردند. یا مثلاً با اشعه مادون قرمز حضور انسان‌ها و تغییراتشان را در شب تشخیص می‌دادند. در تاریکی شب در کوهستان‌ها، و مناطق و یا جاده‌ها به مراکز نظامی حمله می‌کردند. دوربین

اشعه مادون قرمز را روی تفنگ‌ها و مسلسل‌ها و دستگاه‌های دیده‌بانی کار گذاشتند که تاریکی را به روشنایی تبدیل می‌کرد (لازم به ذکر است که تاریکی مطلق وجود ندارد و فقط درجه‌اش فرق می‌کند). آمریکایی‌ها با این کار توانستند نور را در تاریکی شب از دو هزار تا بیست‌هزار برابر بزرگتر کنند و موفق شدند انسان در حال حرکت را ببینند. اسرائیلی‌ها هم در جنگ صحرای سینا از این دوربین‌ها استفاده کردند. چگوارا را با همین ابزار در بولیوی پیدا کردند. به هر حال این‌ها تدارکات نظامی‌شان بود، گذشته از این تدارکات، آمدند گفتند خوب در این نوع جنگ‌های پارتیزانی و این جنگ‌های آزادیبخش، انگیزه و محرک شورشگران چیست و چه نقشی دارد. بعد به این نتیجه رسیدند که در دنیای سوم چون اکثریت قاطع مردم دهقان‌های بی‌زمین هستند، بنابراین مسئله زمین و دهقان‌ها عامل اصلی و به اصطلاح پتانسیل اصلی برای شورشگری می‌باشند. با این پیش‌فرض آمدند اصلاحات ارضی و تغییر نظام زمین‌داری را مطرح کردند. این برنامه اولین بار در فیلیپین پیاده شد و با اجرای آن توانستند جنبش هاگ‌ها را از بین ببرند. جنبش هاگ‌ها یک جنبش کمونیستی در فیلیپین بود که در دوران جنگ با همکاری آمریکا علیه ژاپنی‌ها می‌جنگید و بعد از پایان جنگ تفنگ‌ها را به زمین نگذاشتند و با خود دولت حاکم جنگیدند و دولت فیلیپین و آمریکا برای مقابله با اینها آمدند تقسیم اراضی را در فیلیپین پیاده کردند و با دادن زمین به دهقانان، توانستند آنان را از هاگ‌ها جدا کنند. اما جنگ ویتنام و درگیری آمریکا در این جنگ امکان آزمایش‌های دیگری را هم فراهم ساخت. به عنوان مثال یکی از روش‌های ضد شورشگری، که فرانسوی‌ها در جنگ الجزایر به کار بردند به اصطلاح «پسی فیکشد» (Pacification) بود. به این ترتیب که چون جنگجوی انقلابی از مردم و با توده مردم است و از آنها الهام می‌گیرد، برای اینکه این پایگاه از او گرفته شود، بایستی مردم را از مناطقی که به اصطلاح مناطق قرمز و یا مناطقی که چریک‌ها و مجاهدین فعال هستند، برداشت و به مناطقی که قدرت دولت مرکزی و ضد شورشگری و ضد انقلابی مسلط هست و می‌شود کنترل‌شان کرد، کوچ‌شان داد. «پسی فیکیشن» اولین بار توسط فرانسوی‌ها در الجزایر انجام گرفت و بعد از آمریکا در ویتنام به طور وسیع به مرحله اجرا گذاشته شد. به این ترتیب ویتنام و هند و

چین به یک صحنه آزمایشگاه روش‌های ضد شورشگری تبدیل شد. آمریکا می‌خواست این برنامه را در ویتنام پیاده کند. اما نتوانست. آقای سولیوان سفیر فعلی آمریکا در ایران، که قبلاً در ویتنام بود، متخصص در «پسی فیکیشن» است. یکی دیگر از این روش‌ها معروف به «فینکس اوپریشن» است. یعنی هرگاه به کسی مشکوک می‌شدند که با جنبش انقلابی رابطه دارد، او را می‌گرفتند و تا آنجایی که می‌توانستند تا تخلیه کامل اطلاعات شکنجه‌اش می‌دادند و اگر نه، طرف را می‌کشتند یا رهایش می‌کردند و سپس تحت تعقیب قرار می‌دادند تا روابطش کشف می‌شد و اگر هم دستگیر نمی‌شد، در خیابان او را می‌کشتند. وقتی ویلیام کلی رئیس سیا در کنگره آمریکا مورد بازجویی قرار گرفت، معلوم شد که سیا مسئول اجرای عملیات فینکس بوده است.

از اوایل دهه ۱۳۴۰ اجرای این سیاست‌ها در ایران در دستور کار آمریکا قرار گرفت. بررسی‌های انجام شده آمریکا نشان داد که در ایران زمینه‌های بسیار جدی برای شورشگری وجود دارد و ایران ویتنام دومی برای آمریکا خواهد بود و متوجه شدند در کشوری مثل ایران که ۷۵ درصد جمعیت را دهقان‌های بی‌زمین تشکیل می‌دهند، نظام ارباب و رعیتی قابل ادامه نیست و اگر ادامه پیدا کند پتانسیل انگیزه‌ای برای انقلابیون آینده خواهد بود. طرحی ریخته شد که آن پتانسیل و انگیزه‌ای که وجود دارد، از بین برود و به‌خاطر اینکه دهقان‌ها قیام نکنند زمین‌ها از مالکین بزرگ گرفته و به دهقانان داده شود و ظرفیت انقلابی مناطق از بین برود. البته هدف دیگری هم مطرح بود و آن تبدیل زمینداران بزرگ به طبقه جدید کارخانه‌داران. وقتی در سال ۱۹۶۰ کندی روی کارآمد شروع کردند به پیاده کردن این برنامه در تمام کشورهای جهان سوم تا ظرفیت انقلابی را در این کشورها تقلیل دهند. علاوه بر این، بسیاری از آمریکایی‌هایی که در ویتنام بودند، الان در ایران هستند. برخی از این برنامه‌ها نظیر فینکس اوپراشین در ایران به کار می‌برند. شما می‌دانید در ایران در یک مرحله افراد را دستگیر و در دریاچه نمک در نزدیکی قم می‌انداختند و این همان از بین بردن کامل است. نه زندانی کردن و نگه‌داشتن و غیره، هیچ‌کدام. از وقتی که فعالیت‌های دفاعی در خارج از کشور اوج گرفته است، دیگر افراد را دستگیر نمی‌کنند بلکه به راحتی آنها را می‌کشند. به‌عنوان نمونه وقتی

تمام روابط سازمانی و تشکیلاتی حسن آلاپوش را از طریق شبکه تعقیب و مراقبت کشف کردند و همه چیز روشن شد، او را زدند و کارش را تمام کردند، درحالی که اگر نیاز داشتند می توانستند با زدن گلوله‌ای به پایش و یا جای دیگری مجروح کرده و بگیرند. ولی آلان دیگر این‌طور نیست، به‌طوری که سرور آلاپوش را که اصلاً با آنها درگیری نداشته و در خیابان راه می‌رفته و از پشت، تحت تعقیب بوده، تصمیم می‌گیرند که باید کارش را تمام کنند و زدند و کارش را تمام کردند. دیگر مثل سابق کسی را دستگی نمی‌کنند که بعد سروصدای به پا شود و شکنجه‌اش بدهند. این صحبت‌ها نیست. روش دیگری که آلان به کار می‌بندند بمب‌گذاری در خانه اشخاص، مانند مهندس بازرگان و غیره، می‌باشد.

غیر از نظریه برخورد نظامی با بلوک شرق، گروه دیگری به اصطلاح سرمایه‌داران آمریکا بودند مثل راکفلر، لیلیتال و فورد که معتقد بودند برای تقلیل قدرت تحریک‌کنندگی و شانتاژ سیاسی بلوک شرق (کمونیست‌ها) علیه بلوک غرب و رام کردن روسیه و چین، بایستی از طریق روابط اقتصادی وارد عمل شد. باز هم شما می‌دانید که در کنگره آمریکا سابقاً قوانینی مطرح شده بود که روابط اقتصادی را با کشورهای کمونیست بسیار محدود می‌کرد. حالا همه آن محدودیت‌ها را برداشته‌اند. مثلاً اگر چنانچه یک کارخانه ماشین‌سازی در آمریکا نظیر جنرال موتورز می‌خواست به روسیه کامیون بفروشد و روسیه هم به کامیون احتیاج داشت، نمی‌توانست بفروشد، مگر اینکه کنگره آمریکا تصویب کند و کنگره هم تصویب نمی‌کرد. چرا؟ برای اینکه خط مشی اینها بر اساس محاصره اقتصادی بلوک کمونیست بود. اما گروه راکفلر و لیلیتال بر این باور بودند که با برقراری روابط اقتصادی با این کشورها می‌توان به مراتب بهتر آن‌ها را مهار کرد و اینها دیگر نمی‌توانند با آزادی در مقابل ما در دنیا بازی در بیاورند. نیکسون که روی کار آمد، با همکاری کیسینجر و با اصرار هرچه تمام‌تر جنگ ویتنام را پایان داد. روابط اقتصادی با شوروی گسترش پیدا کرد و روابط سیاسی با چین برقرار شد. برای اولین بار شعبه بانک چیبیس مانهاتان آمریکا در مسکو دایر گردید. سیاست به اصطلاح دی‌تانت نیکسون - کیسینجر به نتیجه می‌رسد و باب تازه‌ای در روابط

شرق و غرب باز می‌شود. در این وضعیت نوبت به آقای کارتر می‌رسد که سیاست حقوق بشر را مطرح کرده است. اینها همه به هم ربط دارند.

سیاست حقوق بشر کارتر در چه شرایطی به وجود آمد:

۱. بعد از جنگ ویتنام اعتبار و حیثیت آمریکا در دنیای سوم به پایین‌ترین سطحش رسیده بود، بنابراین لازم بود که رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا در سیاست مبارزاتی انتخاباتی‌اش حقوق بشر را به‌عنوان شعار و مبارزه سیاسی خود قرار دهد و این بی‌دلیل نبود، برای اینکه می‌خواست در دنیای بعد از جنگ ویتنام و جنایاتی که در آنجا رخ داده بود، حیثیت از بین رفته آمریکا را احیا کند.

۲. مسئله دیگر این بود که در طی جنگ ویتنام و به دنبال جنبش ضد جنگ گرایش‌های سیاسی آگاهانه‌ای در میان مردم آمریکا به وجود آمده بود که خواستار تغییر سیاست خارجی آمریکا، که ضد حقوق مردم جهان سوم بود به سیاستی قابل قبول تبدیل کند. کارتر می‌خواست این نیروی عظیم را که پس از پایان جنگ ویتنام دیگر انگیزه‌ای نداشتند، به سوی خود و به پشتیبانی‌اش جذب کند. برای این کار حقوق بشر را مطرح می‌کند. اما در بعد سیاست خارجی و مهمتر از همه ملاحظات داخلی، لبه تیز سیاست حقوق بشر متوجه بلوک شرق و روسیه شوروی است. چرا؟ برای اینکه نقض مزمن حقوق بشر در کشورهای شرقی پاشنه آشیل «الهیة سوسیالیزم» در جهان شده است. شما می‌دانید که در کشورهای شرقی حقوق بشر وجود خارجی ندارد و بزرگترین نقطه ضعف سیاسی این کشورها فقدان حقوق بشر و آزادی‌های دموکراتیک می‌باشد و به همین دلیل است که شما در کشورهای اروپای شرقی و یا روسیه شوروی یا چین، هیچ‌وقت ندیده و یا نشنیده‌اید که این همه که شاه در ایران جنایت می‌کند و دنیا علیه این جنایات فریادش به هواست، یک دانشمند روسی تلگراف بزند که آقا ما هم اعتراض داریم، هیچ‌وقت چنین چیزی دیده نشده است و یا وقتی می‌بینید که شاه به لهستان سفر می‌کند و کارگران کارخانه‌های نان‌پز می‌آیند به استقبال، در واقع این کارخانجات و مردم لهستان نیستند که استقبال می‌کنند بلکه استقبال آنها از همان نوع استقبالی است که در خود ایران مردم را مجبور می‌کنند به تظاهرات صدهزار نفری یا

سی هزار یا ده هزار نفری حزب رسواخیز و یا وقتی که فرح یا خاندان شاه به چین سفر می‌کند و آن تظاهرات را به نفع اینها به راه می‌اندازند و آن پرچم‌هایی را که دخترها و پسرها تکان می‌دهند. این در واقع به این معنا نیست که شعور سیاسی آن دخترها و پسرها در کوره آدم‌سازی سوسیالیسم مائوئی به آن حدی رسیده که حالا تشخیص دادند که فرح، رهبر دنیای سومی است که مستقل از ابرقدرت‌ها کار می‌کند که بایستی صف کشید و برایش هورا کشید. نه، همچین خبرهایی نیست.

طرح حقوق بشر به این خاطر است که کارتر می‌خواهد درست به بلوک شوروی و شرق حمله کند و به همین دلیل شما می‌بینید که سیاستمداران روسی شدیداً به حقوق بشر کارتر حمله می‌کنند و می‌گویند که این با سیاست تنش‌زدایی یا دیتان مغایرت دارد. به‌رغم این اعتراض شوروی آمریکا شرط ادامه مذاکرات، محدود کردن سلاح‌های اتمی که بین شوروی و آمریکا و در اصل بین شرق و غرب، را رعایت حقوق بشر در کشورهای بلوک شرق و به‌خصوص روسیه شوروی قرار می‌دهد.

۳. طرح مسئله حقوق بشر برای جلب پشتیبانی یهودیان در رابطه با خاورمیانه، جمعیت یهودیان در دو کشور روسیه و آمریکا از هر کجای دیگر دنیا بیشتر است. دولت اسرائیل مهاجرت یهودیان به اسرائیل را از هر کجای دنیا تشویق می‌کند. اما مهاجرت یهودیان شوروی از اولویت بالایی برخوردار است. یهودیان آمریکا هر وقت بخواهند می‌توانند به اسرائیل بروند. بهترین متخصصین و بالاترین رقم کمک مالی، حدود ۷۰۰ میلیون دلار، فقط یهودیان آمریکا در اختیار اسرائیل است. اما یهودیان شوروی آزاد نیستند که هر موقع بخواهند به اسرائیل بروند چون دولت روسیه اجازه نمی‌دهد. انواع محدودیت‌ها برای مهاجرت یهودیان روسیه به اسرائیل وجود دارد. طرح حقوق بشر کارتر فشاری است بر روسیه شوروی که به این یهودی‌ها اجازه خروج بدهد. اما طرح حقوق بشر کارتر درباره کشورهای دنیای سوم به‌نظر نمی‌رسد که خیلی جدی باشد.

متأسفانه من یادداشت‌هایم را در این مورد همراه ندارم ولی توجه شما را به گزارش مجله «نیوزویک»، هفته اول آوریل، جلب می‌کنم. گزارشی است که اعضای اصلی کابینه کارتر در مورد سیاست خارجی کارتر در رابطه با حقوق بشر به

کارتر داده‌اند. در پایان این گزارش آمده است که ادامه و اجرای حقوق بشر نایستی تناقضی با منافع سیاسی آمریکا در نقاط مختلف جهان پیدا کند، به‌علاوه اجرا و اعمال سیاست حقوق بشر بایستی باتوجه و با در نظر گرفتن سوابق سیاسی و تاریخی و منافع خاص آمریکا در آن کشورها باشد. این در مورد ایران یعنی کشک. شاید به همین دلیل سیاست جدید کارتر در ایران جیمی‌کراسی نام گرفته است، یعنی دموکراسی نوع جیمی کارتر! قبل از اینکه بحث را راجع به سیاست آمریکا پایان بدهیم، یک نکته را باید عرض کنم و آن این است که برای فهم بعضی از مسائل خاورمیانه، از جمله ایران، بایستی توجه کنید که وقتی می‌گوییم دولت آمریکا و یا هیئت حاکمه آمریکا، بایستی بدانیم که آمریکا یک نیرو و یک گروه حاکم نیست. جناح‌های مختلفی در تعیین سیاست خارجی آمریکا مؤثر هستند، که مهمترین و مؤثرترین آنها نظامیان و صنایع نظامی و یهودیان هستند. ولی همیشه جهت‌گیری این سه جناح و سه نیرو با هم منطبق نیست. اینها در بعضی از مراحل و موضوعات با هم اختلاف پیدا می‌کنند و در مقابل هم می‌ایستند.

اگر دقت کنیم می‌فهمیم که چطور در «جنگ رمضان» خاورمیانه، دولت عربستان سعودی که از مرتجع‌ترین دولت‌های منطقه هست، نفت را به روی غرب می‌بندد. این خودش سؤالی است که چطور ممکن است عربستان سعودی که از مرتجع‌ترین دولت‌هاست این‌طور در برابر غرب بایستد. این کدام قدرتی است در عربستان که شیرهای نفت را به روی غرب می‌بندد، این قدرت ملک فیصل است یا قدرت کمپانی‌های نفتی است که می‌خواهد یک سیاستی را در منطقه اعمال کند و این شیرها را می‌بندد. این کدام است؟

حل این مشکل و سؤالات وقتی است که شما به جناح‌های فعال در سیاست خارجی آمریکا یعنی سرمایه‌داران بزرگ از جمله کمپانی‌های نفت، نظامیان و صاحبان صنایع نظامی و یهودیان توجه کنید. در حال حاضر در چگونگی حل بعضی مشکلات منطقه میان صیهونیست‌ها با سرمایه‌داران و کمپانی‌های بزرگ و قدرتمند نفتی، اختلاف به وجود آمده است که در رویدادهای خاورمیانه اثرگذار است. یک نویسنده آمریکایی کتابی نوشته به نام: «لسن یانکی: یانکی گوش کن» که به فارسی هم ترجمه شده است. کتاب بسیار جالبی است یکی از موضوعات

اساسی در این کتاب این است که چه کسی جنگ سوم جهانی را شروع خواهد کرد. نویسنده نشان می‌دهد که نیروها و قدرت‌هایی در آمریکا وجود دارند که همه چیز را کنترل می‌کنند، چگونه کنترل می‌کنند و چه فعل و انفعالاتی بین این‌ها وجود دارد. پس بازیگر اول، دولت آمریکاست که می‌گوید می‌خواهد رعایت حقوق بشر را دنبال کند. هدف اولیه این سیاست هم کسب حیثیت بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم و بعد از جنگ ویتنام است. منافع و مصالحش را در این می‌بیند که نوعی از دموکراسی را در کشورهای تحت نفوذش سامان دهد تا منافع درازمدتش به خطر نیفتد و ثباتی در منطقه نفوذش به وجود آید. این را هم باید بدانیم که آمریکا عاشق چشم و ابروی شاه نیست. چه در ویتنام و چه در جاهای دیگر، آمریکا نشان داده است که ارزش اینها برای آمریکا در حد یک وسیله است و هر کجا تشخیص دهد که خود این عناصر به دلیل پفیوزی و بی‌کفایتی و بی‌عرضگی و استبداد سد راه منافع درازمدتش شده‌اند، باکمال سهولت بیرون‌شان می‌اندازد و دیگری را به جایش می‌گذارد.

اما بازیگر دوم صحنه، رژیم شاه یا استبداد داخلی ایران است. رژیم داخلی ایران یا استبداد سلطنتی با یک پیچیدگی تاریخی روبرو است که در طی این پنجاه سال به کرات خواسته که آن را حل کند، ولی نتوانسته است. این معضل چیست؟ نظام کنونی ایران برای ثبات خود فاقد دو پیش‌نیاز اساسی است. برای اینکه دولتی بتواند تثبیت شود و بتواند با مردمش رابطه ارگانیک برقرار کند و برنامه‌هایش را پیاده کند، باید دو خصوصیت یا دو پیش شرط را داشته باشد: یکی مشروعیت و دیگری مقبولیت. یعنی نظامی که روی کار می‌آید ممکن است از طرف نهادهایی که در آن جامعه مورد قبول مردم هستند روی کار بیاید اگر دولتی از طریق نهادهای قانونی، موجه باشد یا نباشد، کهنه باشد، یا درست باشد، یا جدید باشد، روی کار بیاید این دولت، مشروع است. ممکن است مقبول نباشد، ممکن است فاسد باشد ولی براساس آن نهادهای اجتماعی که در آن جامعه هست این دولت مشروع است. مثلاً در کشور ما مردم قیام کردند، انقلاب کردند، و با مشروطیت و انقلاب، اساسی را به وجود آوردند و پارلمانی، که اگر دولتی از طریق این نهاد و قانونی روی کار بیاید، مشروع است. حالا ممکن است دولتی که از طریق این

نهادها روی کار می‌آید فاسد باشد، خودش را به خارجی بفروشد و علیه مصالح و منافع ملی حرکت کند، در آن صورت مشروعیت خود را از دست می‌دهد و در نتیجه مردم علیه آن قیام می‌کنند. بنابراین صرف مشروعیت کافی نیست باید مقبولیت هم داشته باشد و یا برعکس، ممکن است نظامی، حکومتی و رژیمی از طریق درهم‌کوبیدن نهادهای مشروع جامعه روی کار بیاید در نتیجه مشروعیت نداشته باشد اما با ارائه خدمات به مردم مقبولیت پیدا کند. مثل یک نظام انقلابی، مثل دولت انقلابی که همه نهادهای قانونی جامعه را از بین می‌برد و به این ترتیب به یک معنی غیرقانونی است، اما چون با نیروی خلق روی کار می‌آید مقبولیت دارد و خود این مقبولیت مشروعیت هم می‌آورد.

مثلاً از لحاظ تاریخی شیعیان معتقدند که حکومت ابوبکر مشروعیت نداشت و براساس اصل امامت که باید از طریق نصب باشد، علی جانشین بوده است. حکومتی که غیر از این باشد غیرمشروع است. اما تا زمانی که ابوبکر و عمر رعایت یک سلسله قوانین اسلامی را می‌کردند، خود امام برحق با آنان همراهی و همکاری می‌کرد. اما به محض اینکه عثمان می‌آید تخطی می‌کند علاوه بر آنکه غیر مشروع است، مقبولیتش را هم از دست می‌دهد و مردم علیه وی قیام می‌کنند. حالا دولت و نظام حاکم بر ایران نه مشروع است و نه مقبول: «خسرالدنیا والاخره» و این خسران بزرگی است.

اما عدم مشروعیت نظام کنونی: در سه مرحله تاریخی، نظام حاکم بر ایران، از طریق اجانب روی کار آمده است. در فرهنگ ملی ما، به دلایل و علل تاریخی عنصر ضد سلطه اجنبی خیلی قوی است. هر موقع که لبه تیز مبارزات ملی در کشور ما ضد سلطه اجنبی بوده است، مبارزه رشد و شکوفایی داشته است. در شورش تنباکو محور اصلی مبارزه بر ضد اجنبی بود. در دوران جدید از مبارزات دکتر مصدق برای ملی‌شدن نفت، محور اصلی ضد اجنبی و ضد سلطه استعمار انگلیس در ایران بود. این عنصر ضد اجنبی در فرهنگ ملی ما با آموزه‌های قرآنی و منع سلطه غیر مسلمانان بر مسلمانان تقویت شده است. در چنین جامعه‌ای و فرهنگی در سه نوبت در تاریخ معاصر ما در این پنجاه سال، خاندان پهلوی به

دست اجانب روی کارآمده و روی کارمانده است و این خود، ریشه نامشروع بودن این نظام است:

الف: در سوم اسفند ۱۲۹۹ با کودتای یک افسر انگلیسی (آیرون ساید) شخصی به نام رضاخان پالانی به سلطنت نشانده می‌شود. رضاخان یک افسر قزاق بود. پالانی یعنی کسی که مهتر است. رضاخان در سوادکوه مهتر بود. رژیم برخاسته از این کودتای اجانب نامشروع بود. این کودتا در واقع به نوعی پاسخی بود به شورش تنباکو. امتیاز توتون و تنباکو در ایران با قیام علیه امتیازاتی که دولت ایران و استبداد ناصرالدین شاه به استعمار انگلیس داده بود، لغو شد. شورش تنباکو یک معنای دیگری هم برای ما دارد. چرا از میان تمام امتیازهایی که ناصرالدین شاه به انگلیس‌ها داده بود، نظیر امتیاز راه‌آهن، امتیاز بانک و معادن و غیره، امتیاز توتون و تنباکو توانست موجب شورش بر ضد استبداد و استیلای خارجی شود. این از لحاظ آموزش سیاسی مهم است. بعداً وقتی راجع به شرایط کنونی و انگیزه مبارزه صحبت شود، به این نکته بیشتر خواهیم پرداخت که چرا انگیزه در یک مبارزه سیاسی باید اولاً دربرگیرنده حداکثر نیروهای اجتماعی باشد. ثانیاً برای توده‌های مردم قابل فهم باشد. درست است که واگذاری امتیاز تأسیس بانک به انگلیس مدخل ورود استعمار به کشور ما بود اما پدیده بانک برای کارگر، دهقان و پیشه‌ور زحمتکش که پولی ندارد تا به بانک بدهد، چه معنایی داشت. بانک پدیده‌ای نبود که برای همه، حتی خواص جامعه مفهوم باشد. مرحوم سیدجمال‌الدین اسدآبادی در نامه معروفی که به میرزای شیرازی می‌نویسد، برای اینکه توجه میرزا را به اهمیت بانک جلب کند، از اصطلاحات قرآنی استفاده می‌کند و می‌نویسد: ای میرزا ما ادریک ما البانک - درک تو از این بانک چیست؟ آیت‌الله طالقانی در تفسیر «ما ادریک ما القارعه و ما ادریک ما الحطمه» - «چگونه درکی از قارعه و حطمه دارید»، می‌گویند که قرآن در این آیات می‌خواهد دو چیز را بیان کند:

یکی اینکه می‌خواهد توجه مخاطب را جلب کند به این که این قارعه یا حطمه پدیده‌ای است که احتیاج به تفکر و تفحص بیشتر دارد. با نگاه سطحی نمی‌توان درک کرد که این حطمه چه آتشی است. دوم جلب توجه به اهمیت موضوع. وقتی سیدجمال به میرزای شیرازی می‌نویسد که «ما ادریک ما البانک» تو از این بانک

چه می‌فهمی، منظورش همان دو نکته است. بانک موضوعی نیست که بتوان آن را شعار یا انگیزه در یک مبارزه توده‌ای قرار داد و همین‌طور راه‌آهنی که هنوز به ایران نیامده و مردم هنوز نمی‌فهمند و می‌توانند بگویند که خوب، چه اشکالی دارد که به جای سفر با الاغ سوار راه‌آهن شویم. شناساندن استعمار نامریی پشت سر بانک و راه‌آهن به توده مردم خیلی مشکل است. برای اینکه هنوز بانک و راه‌آهن نیامده تا مردم بفهمند. اما هر آدم باسواد و بی‌سوادی چپ و سیگار را می‌کشد و می‌داند که چیست و این از لحاظ انگیزه برای مبارزه خیلی مهم بود. به‌علاوه وقتی کارکنان شرکت با سربازهاشان برای جمع‌کردن محصول و اجراکردن مقررات قرار داد به دهات و مزارع می‌رفتند دهقانان و طبقات پایین جامعه با مأموران استعمار به‌طور عینی برخورد پیدا می‌کردند. بر این اساس یک حرکت اجتماعی که می‌خواهد توده‌های مردم را به میدان بکشاند باید انگیزه یا شعاری انتخاب کند که برای همه مردم مفهوم باشد. حالا با این انگیزه جنبش رشد پیدا می‌کند و با پیروزی بر شاه و کمپانی رژی، از مرحله ضد استعمار و استیلای خارجی به استبداد داخلی ارتقاء پیدا می‌کند. جنبش مشروط و عدالتخانه در روند تکاملی خود به قیام مسلحانه‌ای که پانزده سال در شمال طول کشید و هفت‌هزار جنگنده در جنگل مسلح کرده منجر می‌شود. خوب این تحولات امر ساده‌ای نبود که استعمار منطقه بتواند به راحتی از آن بگذرد. در شرایطی که تمام کشورهای جهان سوم زیر سلطه مستقیم استعمار خارجی هست، چطور می‌تواند اجازه دهد که چنین جنبشی در منطقه رشد پیدا کند، نمی‌تواند، بایستی فکری برای این بکند و برای این کار مترصد اوضاع و احوال است و دنبال این است که موازنه مثبتی به‌وجود بیاورد و قراردادهای دوجانبه بین روس و انگلیس برقرار شود تا بتواند تقسیم کنند و قضیه را ختم کنند. اما حوادثی که در روسیه رخ می‌دهد، شکست دولت تزاری و خلایی که به وجود می‌آید و سرنوشتی که دولت عثمانی پیدا می‌کند، به انگلیس‌ها امکان می‌دهد که تا تنور گرم است و تا فرصت هست فکری نکنند. مقدمات یک کودتا در ایران برای تغییر وضع آماده می‌شود. اما تا وقتی که یک قیام مسلحانه ملی در شمال هست و در جامعه ریشه و زمینه دارد، کودتای رضاخان قابل توجیه نبود. یعنی هرگاه با حضور جنگل در شمال، رضاخان کودتا

می‌کرد کودتا موفقیت‌آمیز نمی‌شد. در مقدمه کودتای رضاخان بایستی جنبش جنگل تکلیفش روشن شود و بعد کودتا پیاده شود. به این دلیل است که تمام نیروهایشان را به کار می‌اندازند و با همکاری دولت جدید در روسیه جنبش جنگل را منکوب می‌کنند. به این ترتیب نظام کنونی ایران یعنی حکومت پهلوی‌ها از همان اولین مرحله روی کارآمدنش یک نظام نامشروع بوده است، زیرا به دست اجنبی و برای تأمین مصالح و منافع آنها روی کار آمد. روی کارآمدنی که دستاوردهای جنبش مشروطیت را از بین ببرد. ممکن است کسی با معیارهای کنونی بگوید که آن جنبش چیزی نبود. ولی شما باید جنبش و دستاوردهایش را در هر مرحله از زمان با شرایط خاص آن زمان بسنجید. جنبش مشروطیت بزرگترین دستاوردها را در آن مقطع زمانی داشته است.

پس از موفقیت کودتای رضاخان بلافاصله کوشش‌هایی برای کسب مقبولیت انجام می‌شود. اول «سیدضیاءالدین طباطبایی» را که یک روحانی و روحانی‌زاده بود و هیچ رابطه‌ای با خانواده‌های اشرافی سلطنه‌ها و دوله‌ها نداشت و یک روزنامه‌نگار معمولی بود نخست‌وزیر می‌کنند. او اشراف را دستگیر و زندانی می‌کند. بعد رضاخان به راه می‌افتد و از احساس مذهبی مردم استفاده کرده و دسته راه می‌اندازد و گل به سرش می‌مالد و سینه می‌زند و با دسته موزیک ارتش به تکیه دولت می‌رود. دولت کودتای نه فقط عوام، بلکه روشنفکران اعم از غربی و کمونیست‌ها را هم می‌فریبد. حزب کمونیست ایران (در کنگره ارومیه) براساس معیارهای مارکسیستی تحلیل می‌کند که چون جامعه ایران یک جامعه فئودالیت‌هست و در آستانه انتقال به بورژوازی ملی است و رضاخان هم آمده که فئودالیت‌ه را از بین ببرد و بورژوازی ملی را روی کار بیاورد، بنابراین دولت رضاخان یک دولت مرفقی است و از رضاخان پشتیبانی می‌کند. از لحاظ سیاسی تئوری بسیار جالب و درست و حسابی بود. اما یک بورژوازی ملی برایشان درست کردند که تا چند نسل بعد، مرتباً چوبش را می‌خورند. اما استبداد رضاخانی که به تدریج قدرت گرفته بود فکر کرد که می‌تواند در برابر استیلای خارجی مانور بدهد. رضاخان در اواخر دوران حکومتش برای اینکه بتواند خودش را از زیر بار نفوذ مستقیم انگلیس خارج کند به آلمان متمایل و نزدیک شد. اما توفیقی به دست نیاورد. با شروع

جنگ جهانی دوم و حمله نیروهای متفقین به ایران و نیاز به آرامش پشت جبهه، رضاخان را همان‌طور که آورده بودند، بردند. ولی جوری بردند که حداقل هزینه را بدهند، یعنی تغییر در چهارچوب حفظ مصالح خودشان. از تفری که مردم از استبداد رضاخان داشتند، استفاده می‌کنند و رادیو لندن به شاه فراری فحش می‌دهد. روزنامه اطلاعات علیه رضاخان مقاله می‌نویسد و فحش می‌دهد. حتی خود محمدرضا شاه نیز در مجلس اقرار می‌کند که پدرش ظالم بود، این‌طور بود و آن‌طور بود، اراضی مردم را به زور گرفت. محمد رضا همه اراضی را به دولت واگذار کرد. اگرچه بعداً که قدرت گرفت آن‌ها پس گرفت. انگلیس‌ها رضاخان را با چمدان‌های پر از جواهرات و لوله‌های تریاک، (رضاخان تریاکی بود) از تهران می‌برند به جنوب و در کرمان کنسول انگلیس منتظر می‌ماند تا دستور بیاید که خاندان سلطنتی و رضاخان را به جایی که تعیین می‌شود، ببرند. یکی از ملتزمین رکاب (بهبودی)، در خاطراتش می‌نویسد در باغی در نزدیکی کرمان، که گویا مال فرمانفرمائیان یا شخص دیگری بود، منزل کردند. شاه در اطاق راه می‌رفته و با خودش حرف می‌زده. این گزارش‌دهنده می‌گوید که من گوشم را تیز کردم که ببینم اعلیحضرت چه می‌گوید. رضاشاه خیلی خیلی بد دهن بود و در برخورد با زیردستانش فحش می‌داد، فحش‌های رکیک چاله میدانی. راوی می‌گوید دیدم که شاه در حال راه رفتن با خود حرف می‌زند: «اعلیحضرت، قدرقدرت، قوی شوکت رضاشاه پهلوی! آی زکی!!» این را پدر همین شاه فعلی به خودش می‌گفته نه اینکه شما شننامه علیه‌اش صادر کنید و بگویید. نه، او خودش این فلاکت را دید و اقرار کرد که چه قدرقدرتی! چه کشکی!! اینجا یک پرائنز باز کنم. تاریخ سراپا درس و آموزش است. وقتی قرآن (در: آیه ۱۳۷ آل عمران؛ آیه‌های ۳۶ و ۶۹ نحل؛ آیه ۴۲ روم) می‌گوید در روی زمین بگردید و ببینید قدرت‌هایی بودند که قدرت آن‌ها به مراتب بیشتر از این‌ها بود، کجا رفتند و چه شدند. سرنوشت رضا شاه عبرتی است برای آن‌ها که اهل تفکر هستند.

نامشروع بودن نظام حاکم بار دیگر در شهریور ۱۳۲۰ تکرار می‌شود. وقتی رضاخان قدرقدرت را با آن شکل بردند. دوباره انگلیس‌ها پسر آن پدر را برای حفظ و استمرار نظامی که خودشان به‌وجود آورده و نیز ادامه برنامه‌هایشان، روی

کار می‌آورند. محمدرضا شاه هم در ابتدا وقتی روی کار می‌آید گام‌هایی برای مقبولیتش برمی‌دارد. به‌طور مثال اراضی مصادره شده توسط پدرش را به مردم برمی‌گرداند و سوگندهای غلیظ و شدید می‌خورد که مثل پدرش رفتار نخواهد کرد. قسم‌های شدید و غلیظی می‌خورد که مصداق «خلاف مهین» بود (قلم - ۱۰). برای تائید سخنم می‌توانید به روزنامه‌های کیهان و اطلاعات سال ۱۳۲۰ رجوع کنید. اما به تدریج که جای پایش را محکم می‌کنند و قدرت می‌یابند دوباره به سرشت خود برمی‌گردد و دوباره همان روش‌های استبدادی را اعمال می‌کند. تحلیل‌کنندگان روحیات شاه فعلی می‌گویند او یک آدم عقده‌ای است؛ راست هم می‌گویند. او از این که پدرش و خودش را انگلیس‌ها بر تخت نشانند، احساس عقده می‌کند. با وجود این می‌گوید من قدر قدرت هستم. مثل اینکه حرف آخر باباش به گوشش فرونرفته است. به‌رغم همه تمهیدات برای مهار مردم، مبارزات ملی، هم در محور ضد استیلای بیگانه و هم بر ضد استبداد داخلی، رشد می‌کند. و از محور ضد استعماری به محور ضد استبدادی ارتقا پیدا می‌کند. نفت ملی می‌شود ولی برای اینکه جنبش توسعه پیدا بکند بایستی تکلیف ملت با دربار، که به‌صورت کامل نقش پایگاه قدرت‌های خارجی ایفا می‌کند، یکسره شود.

ج. سومین مرحله تاریخی در نامشروع بودن نظام کنونی کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲ است. همه شما کم و بیش این جریانات را خوانده‌اید و می‌دانید که آمریکا و انگلیس چگونه طرح کودتا علیه دکتر مصدق را ریختند و اجرا کردند. وقتی که در ۲۵ مرداد شاه از کلاردشت فرار کرد و به بغداد رفت، مجله تایمز یک هفته بعد از کودتا در شرح وقایع ایران و شکست کودتای ۲۵ مرداد در توصیف شخصیت شاه می‌نویسد محمد رضا شاه کسی است که جز ماشین‌های کورسی و هواپیماهای جت و زنان زیبا به هیچ چیز دیگر علاقه نداشته و دنبال شهرت و شهوت بوده است. در عین حال خیلی ترسو بوده و می‌ترسیده و اهل سیاست و اینها هم نبوده است. در کودتا می‌ترسید و با فشار اشرف یک ورقه سفید امضا می‌دهد و فرار می‌کند. بعد از اینکه شاه ورقه را امضاء می‌کند آن وقت هیراد، منشی مخصوص شاه، در این دو برگ سفید امضا دو حکم صادر می‌کند. یکی عزل دکتر مصدق و دیگری نصب زاهدی. نصیری که زمانی رئیس سازمان امنیت بود، در آن زمان رئیس گارد سلطنتی بود. او در ساعت ۱۱ شب با دو تانک به منزل دکتر مصدق

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می‌رود تا حکم عزل او را ابلاغ کند، که منجر به بازداشتش می‌شود. دکتر مصدق در دادگاه نظامی می‌گوید که اگر اینها اطمینان داشتند که عملشان قانونی است و در کجا سابقه داشته است برای ابلاغ یک حکم اداری به کارمندی با دو تانک ساعت ۱۱ شب به خانه طرف بروند. به این ترتیب کودتای ۲۵ مرداد شکست می‌خورد. شاه با هواپیمای شخصی‌اش از کلاردشت به عراق فرار می‌کند. برای تنوع بحثمان بد نیست عرض کنم که روزنامه توفیق عکس شاه را کشیده بود که شاه دست ثریا را گرفته و داد می‌زند و می‌گوید: «بیا برویم از این ولایت من و تو، تو دست من و بگیر و من دامن تو».

اخیراً کتابی در آمریکا چاپ شده است که جریان‌ات تازه‌ای از فعالیت‌های سازمان سیای آمریکا در ایران را شرح داده و می‌نویسد که چگونه شوارتسکف، لی هندرسن و اشرف در سوئیس طرح کودتا را نهایی کردند و چگونه هلمز رئیس بخش حقه‌های کثیف در سیا مسئولیت کودتا را برعهده داشته و آفایی به نام کیم روزولت، که بعداً به نام مستر ایران معروف شد، مسئول اجرای آن در ایران بوده است و از زیرزمینی در تهران شخصاً کودتا را رهبری و پول پخش می‌کرده است. توزیع پول توسط کیم روزولت از طریق آیت‌الله بهبهانی آخوند درباری آن چنان با عجله بود که فرصت تبدیل آن را نداشتند و پول‌ها را به صورت دلار به دست اراذل و اوباش داده بودند. به این ترتیب کودتای ۲۸ مرداد پیاده می‌شود.

کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲ سومین رویدادی است که مشروعیت نظام کنونی را به طور کامل از بین برده است. در سنت پادشاهی ایران هرگاه پادشاه به دلیل مخالفت مردم با سلطنتش از کشور بگریزد و سپس با کمک یک نیروی خارجی تاج و تخت خود را مجدداً به دست آورد، سلطنتش فاقد مشروعیت است.

کودتای ۲۸ مرداد دو نوع هدف داشت: هدف‌های کوتاه‌مدت و هدف‌های درازمدت. هدف‌های کوتاه‌مدت سرنگونی حکومت ملی دکتر مصدق، به عنوان اولین و تنها حکومت ملی که در پنجاه سال اخیر ایران و تأمین تسلط کامل بر منابع نفتی ایران و جریان مجدد نفت به بازارهای جهانی. ولی هدف درازمدتشان این بود که جنبش ملی را ریشه کن کنند و دستاوردهای این جنبش را از بین ببرند. با روی کار آمدن حکومت کودتا، سرکوب نیروهای مردمی آغاز شد. احزاب ملی

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و مراکز مقاومت جنبش درهم کوبیده شدند. اما در رسیدن به این اهداف، به رغم تلاش‌هایشان، ناکام ماندند. بنابراین بعد از این‌که زاهدی مأموریت خود را در رابطه با هدف‌های کوتاه‌مدت کودتا انجام می‌دهد، علاء را روی کار می‌آورند. علاء برخلاف زاهدی که قیافه‌خشن قلدر نظامی داشت، پیرمردی غیرنظامی با قیافه‌ای آرام را روی کار آوردند تا با دعوت از برخی از همکاران سابق دکتر مصدق بتواند زمینه‌آشتی با مخالفان را ایجاد کنند. این برنامه تحت عنوان نهضت ملی منهای مصدق در همان زمان مطرح و افشا شد.

در بخش سوم راجع به جنبش ملی و نهضت مقاومت ملی هم صحبت خواهیم کرد. ولی اینجا اشاره می‌کنم که نهضت مقاومت ملی در آن زمان نشریاتی داشت و روزنامه‌هایی منتشر می‌کرد. در این روزنامه و نشریات مقالات تحلیلی تحت عنوان نهضت مقاومت ملی منهای مصدق چاپ و آن را محکوم کرد. (رک: اسناد نهضت مقاومت ملی، از انتشارات نهضت آزادی ایران ۱۳۶۳) از طرف دیگر هیچیک از همکاران دکتر مصدق حاضر نشدند ننگ همکاری با رژیم شاه را بپذیرند. بعد از علاء منوچهر اقبال با هدف جذب دانشگاهیان روی کار آمد. در جریان مبارزات علیه کنسرسیوم حدود شصت و چند نفر از رهبران ملی، از علماء و بازاریان و دانشگاهیان نامه‌ای را در اعتراض به قرارداد کنسرسیوم امضاء کردند. زاهدی خیلی فشار آورد که رئیس دانشگاه این استادان را اخراج کنند. علما را که نمی‌توانستند اخراج کنند و بازاری‌ها هم که شغل آزاد داشتند. اگرچه سقف بازار را بر سر بازاریان خراب کردند اما نمی‌توانستند آن‌ها را هم تحت فشار زیادی قرار بدهند و از طرفی می‌دانستند که امضا و انتشار این نامه ابتکار دانشگاهیان است. بنابراین فشار را روی رئیس دانشگاه آوردند که استادان امضاکننده نامه را از دانشگاه اخراج کنند. اما در آن زمان دانشگاه استقلال داشت و دولت نمی‌توانست در امور دانشگاه دخالت کند. رئیس هر دانشکده را کادر آموزشی همان دانشکده انتخاب می‌کرد. شورای دانشکده نماینده‌ای انتخاب و به شورای دانشگاه می‌فرستاد و شورای دانشگاه هم رئیس دانشگاه را انتخاب می‌کرد. در آن زمان دکتر سیاسی رئیس دانشگاه بود و زیر بار اخراج استادان نرفت. در نتیجه دولت مجبور شد برخلاف قانون توسط جعفری وزیر فرهنگ کودتا حکم انتظار خدمت استادان را صادر کنند.

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اسامی برخی از استادان اخراجی که در خاطرمان مانده است، عبارت بودند از: مهندس بازرگان، دکتر سبحانی، دکتر معظمی، دکتر نعمت‌اللهی، دکتر عابدی، دکتر قریب و... یازده نفر از این استادان اخراجی شرکتی تأسیس کردند به نام شرکت «یاد»- یازده استاد دانشگاه تهران که هنوز هم وجود دارد. اقبال که روی کار آمد سعی کرد که خلاء و فاصله‌ای را که بین روشنفکران و رژیم کودتا به وجود آمده بود، از بین ببرد. بنابراین اول به دانشگاه تهران آمد و رئیس دانشگاه تهران شد و اصلاحاتی کرد و کارهایی انجام داد. به‌طور مثال صبح ساعت پنج به دفتر کارش می‌رفت و در آنجا هر دانشجویی کاری داشت مستقیماً به دیدن اقبال می‌رفت و بدون حاجب و مانع حرف‌هایش را می‌زد و یک مقدار هم کارهای صنفی برای دانشجویان انجام داد که برای کسب مقبولیت بود. از جمله کارهایی که اقبال به‌خاطر مقبولیت انجام داد برگرداندن استادان اخراجی به دانشگاه بود. البته انگیزه اقبال تنها کسب و جاهت نبود بلکه این بود که بعضی از کرسی‌های این استادان خالی مانده بود و هیچ‌کس حاضر نبود خلاء استادان اخراجی را پر کند. مثلاً مهندس بازرگان در دانشکده فنی استاد هیدرولیک بود ولی هیچ استادی حاضر نبود که بیاید و در برابر این جریان خودش را به آن اندازه خراب کند و بپذیرد که به جای مهندس بازرگان درس بدهد. اقبال می‌خواست با یک تیر چند نشان بزند. اقبال با این مقدمه نخست‌وزیر شد. اما هنگامی که انگلیس، فرانسه و اسرائیل به مصر حمله کردند، دانشجویان دانشگاه تهران اعتصاب کردند و تظاهراتی برای ابراز همدردی برپا کردند. در همین زمان اقبال که با لباس رسمی از سلام شاهنشاهی برگشته بود، آمده بود تا با گردهمایی و تظاهرات دانشجویان روبرو می‌شود، با چنان تبختر و نخوتی که انگار از دیدار فرعون بزرگ آمده است، با لحنی موهن به دانشجویان پرخاش می‌کند که چرا شلوغ کرده‌اید بروید سر کلاس. عباس شیبانی، که خدا او را حفظ کند، که به حق یکی از پایه‌گذاران جنبش دانشجویی ماست، جلو می‌آید و شروع می‌کند به اعتراض به اقبال و تأیید دانشجویان. اقبال هم لب و لوجه آویزان با عصبانیت به دفترش می‌رود و حکم اخراج عباس شیبانی را صادر می‌کند و حکم اخراجش را همانجا، جلوی دانشجویان تظاهرکننده به دستش می‌دهند. دولت مصر به رغم دولت ایران از

شیبانی دعوت می‌کند که برای ادامه تحصیل به قاهره برود. دولت که می‌بیند خیلی بد شد، بعد از یکسال ترک تحصیل، شیبانی را می‌پذیرند که به مشهد برود و در آنجا ادامه تحصیل بدهد. اقبال هم در پرکردن شکاف میان دولت و ملت شکست می‌خورد. سپس در حالی که هر نوع اعتراض و انتقاد با خشونت سرکوب می‌شد، به نمایی از دموکراسی پرداختند. دو حزب درست کردند، اقلیت و اکثریت. شاه نه به این بازی‌ها اعتقاد داشت و نه شعورش می‌رسید. آن اربابانی که با شعورتر از او هستند و به‌عنوان داروی حکیم فرموده، فشار می‌آورند که یک قیافه دموکراتیک به این کشور بدهد و بر این اساس دو حزب درست می‌کنند. دو حزب دوقلو که اصلاً فرقی باهم ندارند، یکی مردم و دیگری ملیون. تنها فرقی این بود که اقبال امضاء می‌کرد، چاکر جان‌نثار، و علم امضاء می‌کرد غلام خان‌زاد!!! و همین اواخر هردوی اینها نیز مردند. وقتی اینها مردند من یاد مقاله‌ای افتادم از اوریانا فالاجی در کتابش به نام «مصاحبه با تاریخ». از شما هم می‌خواهم که این کتاب را بخوانید. اوریانا فالاجی یک مصاحبه هم با شاه کرده است که خواندنی و خیلی جالب هست. اوریانا فالاجی در این کتاب با خیلی‌ها مصاحبه کرده است. از جمله با یکی از رهبران جنبش مقامات و مبارزه انقلابی در یونان. وقتی ارتش در یونان کودتا کرد و اختناق در ابعاد بسیار گسترده‌ای اعمال شد. هوداران یکی از رهبران جنبش مقاومت یونان، که زندانی شده بود توانست چندین بار از زندان فرار کند. پس از سقوط دولت نظامیان در یونان و آزادی این رهبر مقاومت از زندان، اوریانا فالاجی با او مصاحبه‌ای می‌کند. او داستان‌های فرارش را می‌گوید و چون چندبار از زندان فرار کرده بود آخرین بار او را در اطاق مخصوصی از بتن آرمه، که از هیچ طرفش نتواند سوراخ کند و دربرود زندانی می‌کنند. او سه سال تمام و یا بیشتر در این دخمه تاریک انفرادی بود تا وقتی آزاد می‌شود که در آن زمان، نخست‌وزیر مرده بود. اوریانا فالاجی از وی می‌پرسد که حالا که این نخست‌وزیر مرده است احساس خوشحالی نمی‌کنی؟ او می‌گوید نه، من احساس شرم می‌کنم. هرگاه این خائنین به ملت اینجوری و به این سادگی می‌میرند من از خودم احساس شرم می‌کنم. وقتی من این داستان را خواندم من نیز از این‌که خائنین به این ملت و مملکت به این مفتی و راحتی می‌میرند، احساس شرم کردم. با شکست برنامه اقبال در سال ۱۳۳۶ سرکوب مجدد نیروهای ملی آغاز شد. تمام کادرهای نهضت

مقاومت ملی در تهران و اصفهان و شیراز و مشهد و تبریز دستگیر می‌شوند. اما بار دیگر تعارضات درونی حکومت، این بار در قالب گزارش سفیر جدید آمریکا در ایران، آقای سلدن چاپین، پیرامون فساد مالی مسئولان و حیف و میل کمک‌های مالی آمریکا به دولت ایران، ظاهر می‌شود. بدنبال گزارش چاپین، کمسیون بودجه سنای آمریکا برای بررسی وضعیت به ایران می‌آیند و سوء استفاده‌ها را تأیید می‌کنند. از اواخر سال ۳۸ و اوایل سال ۳۹، بار دیگر ضرورت باز شدن فضای سیاسی، فشار که بایستی دریچه اطمینانی باز شود و گرنه نظام در حال انفجار است، مطرح می‌گردد. اگر در سال ۳۴ با روی کار آمدن علاء صحبت از اجازه فعالیت به جنبش ملی منهای مصدق بود، این بار کوشش در جهت به وجود آوردن نوعی دموکراسی مهار یا هدایت شده و دادن امکان فعالیت به مخالفین وفادار یا «لویال اپوزیسیون» بود. جریانی که مخالف حاکمانند، و خود دستگاه هم می‌داند، ولی در واقع وفادار به رژیم و نظام هستند. علاوه بر باز شدن فضای سیاسی، در راستای کاهش پتانسیل‌های انقلابی اصلاحات ارضی نیز مطرح گردید. این برنامه‌ها همزمان بود با روی کار آمدن کندی. اصلاحات ارضی و انقلاب سفیدی که مطرح شده هم دارای هدف‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی و هم هدف‌های اقتصادی است. برای روشن شدن مطلب من تحلیلی را که در همان زمان منتشر شد برایتان می‌خوانم. عنوان این تحلیل این است: «ایران در آستانه یک انقلاب بزرگ و درصدد برگرداندن تاریخ» که در تاریخ سوم بهمن ۱۳۴۱ با امضای شورای مرکزی نهضت آزادی ایران منتشر شده است. در ابتدای این سند آمده است:

«نهضت آزادی ایران درباره اعلام رفراندم شش ماده‌ای شاهانه و تحول عظیمی که خبر آن را داده وظیفه خود می‌داند که با اتکای به خداوند سبحان و علیرغم محیط خفقان و...». سپس اظهار نظر و اعلام خطر می‌نماید. حالا اعلام خطرش چیست؟ صحبت از انقلاب می‌کند. بعد می‌گوید که عامل این انقلاب نه دهاتی‌ها هستند و نه شهری‌ها و نه ملت و نه مجلس و نه دولت. بلکه یک نفر است. توجه کنید می‌گوید عامل انقلاب، نه مبتکر، عامل انقلاب فقط یک نفر است شخص پادشاه مملکت، و این در تاریخ انقلاب‌های جهان، خود انقلابی است (خنده حضار). نه مردم منکر این حرف ما هستند و نه دولت و نه خود اعلیحضرت (خنده حضار). این انقلاب از آن جهت خود یک انقلاب و پدیده نوظهور تاریخ

است که معمولاً انقلاب دو طرف دارد و انقلاب‌کننده آن، طرف توسری خورد، زجرکشیده، محروم شده، خشمگین شده و مظلوم اجتماعی است و انقلاب را در برابر طبقه قاهر و غاصب و حاکم و ظالم انجام می‌دهند. اما امروز هیئت حاکمه و دستگاهی انقلاب می‌نماید که تا دیروز خود از طریق ارباب‌ها و مالکان و مأمورین دولت بیگانه حامی نظام ارباب رعیتی و فئودالیت و وکیل‌ساز، و برخوردار از اقتصاد و اجحاف و مالکیت و سرمایه‌داری بود و در مرحله نهایی عامل تمام فشارها و فسادها که بر رعایا و بر ملت وارد می‌شود، محسوب می‌شد. انقلاب از این بزرگتر نمی‌شود که با یک گردش کوچک زمان، ضارب، خودش زبان مدافع مضروب بی‌زبان می‌شود». بعد در جای دیگری تحت عنوان، چرا انقلاب می‌کنند، می‌گوید که با اشاعه فشار و تعمیم و توسعه اختلاس کلان، به کلیه دستگاه‌های کشوری و لشکری پرده ننگ را آنقدر بالا می‌زنند و ارکان دولت و سلطنت را علیرغم ادعاهای ثبات سیاسی و اجتماعی ایران آنقدر متزلزل می‌نمایند که داخل و خارج متوحش می‌شود و می‌ترسند که مبدا ملت پرمادارای ایرانی کاسه صبرش لبریز شود و شالوده انقلاب و قیامی آزاد را بریزند. به این خاطر سیاست توافقی به بازکردن یک سوپاپ خطر دیگری در این دید زنگ‌خورده پوسیده را اجرا کرده و شروع به مبارزه مصمم و جدی و واقعی ولی محدود با فساد و اعطای مختصر آزادی می‌گردند. می‌بینید که این‌هایی که می‌خوانم منظور دارم که ببینید و آشنا بشوید با این بازی‌هایی که دارند می‌کنند. قبلاً عرض کردم که این انقلاب هدف سیاسی اجتماعی داشت، هدف سیاسی اجتماعی‌اش چیست؟

در همان زمان هم خود منابع خارجی از جمله «لندن آبرور» تحلیل کردند و مقاله نوشتند در تحلیل اوضاع ایران که در ایران گروه‌هایی که مؤثر هستند چه کسانی هستند و خطر از کجاست. گفتند که خوب اعلیحضرت در رأس قدرت هستند و ارتش را هم در اختیار دارند و اگر ما بیاییم معجزه‌ای بکنیم که کارگران و دهقانان را پشتیبان و حامیان شاه کنیم، آن وقت شاه از یک طرف ارتش دارد و از طرف دیگر دهقان‌ها و کارگران را، و دیگر چه کسانی می‌مانند؟ یک مشت روشنفکران شهری. این‌ها هرچه دلشان می‌خواهد داد بزنند. این‌ها برای شاه خطر نیست چون قدرت اصلی را شاه دارد. به این صورت و با این برنامه می‌خواستند

پایگاه سیاسی و اجتماعی برای شاه درست کنند. در همان تاریخ نهضت آزادی ایران درباره انقلاب سفید شاه نوشت که: «حالا باید آتوی بزرگ را بر زمین زد و از ناصرها و فیدل کاستروها و نهروها و قاسم‌ها ولو به صورت ظاهر و بازی جلو افتاد و دستی بالای دست‌ها و شعاری بالای شعارها. در واقع شاه می‌خواهد به‌عنوان فیدل کاسترو به دهات ایران برود. اگر کاسترو در کوبا به‌عنوان قهرمان تقسیم زمین رفته چرا من نروم؟ (خنده حضار). این از لحاظ سیاسی - اجتماعی. از طرف دیگر و از لحاظ اقتصادی باید گفت که اینها بر این عقیده هستند که هرگاه بتوانند از نظر سیاسی این تز را عملی کنند، سرمایه داری غربی که بر سر عقل آمده و امینی نیز سخنگویش هست می‌گوید که اگر از یک تومان هفت ریالش را حفظ کنیم و سه ریالش را به مردم بدهیم و آرامشان کنیم، می‌توانیم تثبیت و تداومی برای این نظام به‌وجود بیاوریم. خوب حالا بایستی تغییرات و تدارکاتی بعد از تغییرات سیاسی اجتماعی در زمینه اقتصادی صورت بگیرد. به این معنا که اقتصاد مملکت وابسته به نفت است و شما می‌دانید که در زمان ملی شدن صنعت نفت وقتی جریان نفت در حکومت ملی دکتر مصدق قطع شد، به دنبال آن درآمد نفت نیز قطع شد. سیاست‌های بیگانه حکومت دکتر مصدق را محاصره اقتصادی کردند و این امر مشکلات بزرگی برای ایران به‌وجود آورد. اگرچه دکتر مصدق با پشتیبانی مردم قرضه ملی، که هم جناح ارتجاعی راست و هم حزب توده آن را تحریم کردند، توانست پیروزمندانه با محاصره اقتصادی مقابله کند اما این بار بایستی کاری بکنند که هرگاه مردم در مبارزه‌شان پیروز شدند محاصره اقتصادی واقعاً شکننده باشد. به چه صورت؟ با تبدیل هرچه بیشتر اقتصاد ما به یک اقتصاد تک‌محصولی و جانشین کردن نفت به‌عنوان تنها عامل درآمدها و ازبین بردن تمامی تولیدات داخلی. در اینجا من از همان سند نهضت آزادی ایران می‌خوانم که با اصلاحات ارضی باید منتظر چه باشیم: «اربابان خارجی که جانشین اربابان ایرانی می‌شوند، هم از آخور خواهند خورد و هم از توبره. یعنی اسماً سرمایه و بلافاصله کارشناس و ماشین می‌آورند و با بهره و بهای هنگفت و با ضمانت عایدات دیگر و با نونوار کردن دهاتی‌ها و پاشیدن قرضه‌ها و قسط‌ها، رسماً انواع بنجل‌های بازار خودشان از قبیل رادیو و تلویزیون و ماتیک و پلاستیک و غیره سیل‌وار به کوه و دشت ایران به

قیمت‌های دلخواه سرازیر خواهند کرد درحالی که صنعت تازه مولود ایران با ضربه‌ای که بر پیکرش خورده است، نخواهد توانست جواب این احتیاجات روزافزون را بدهد و بازار ایران پیشاپیش قبضه تجاوز یهودیان و سوداگران زالوصفت بین‌المللی خواهد شد. نه تنها از جهت مصنوعات و احتیاجات غیرخوراکی زندگی، بلکه از جهت محصولات داخلی و محلی نیز چنان کمبود و کسری در کشت و تولید در اثر بی‌صاحب و سامانی و بی‌بندوباری پدید خواهد آمد که اگر به مرحمت دولت‌های بعد از کودتا کسری گندم و کلم و کنسرو و سالاد بیشتر از خارجه می‌آید به‌زودی کاه و یونجه و نخود و لوبیا و خیار و گوجه‌مان را نیز باید از خارجه وارد کنیم». این پیش‌بینی درستی در سال ۴۱ بود. امروز، سال ۵۷ سالیانه ۲ میلیارد دلار محصولات کشاورزی از خارج وارد می‌کنند، دهات ما تخم مرغ‌هایشان را از خارج وارد می‌کنند و پیازمان را از هند وارد می‌کنیم و مملکتی که برنج صادر می‌کرد الان برنج وارد می‌کند. مملکتی که گندم صادر می‌کرد حالا گندم وارد می‌کند. مملکتی که گوشت صادر می‌کرد، الان گوشت وارد می‌کند. و این هدف‌هایی بوده که آن اصلاحات ارضی و برنامه انقلاب شاه داشت. پس هم برنامه سیاسی - اجتماعی بود و هم برنامه اقتصادی. اما برنامه سیاسی رژیم شکست خورد. پیامد آن برنامه‌ها، توسعه و گسترش جنبش‌های بخش ایران و از درون آن مبارزه مسلحانه برای سرنگونی نظام استبداد سلطنتی بود. با خیانت و انحراف منافقین در سازمان مجاهدین به جنبش مسلحانه در ایران لطمه بزرگ و اساسی وارد شد.

تا اینجا دیدیم سیاست آمریکا و استبداد داخلی، برای برون‌رفت از تنگناهای سیاسی و اجتماعی و تناقضاتی که به‌طور مزمز دچار آن بود لاجرم برنامه‌هایی را اجرا می‌کرد. اما این برنامه‌ها موفقیت‌آمیز نبودند، لاجرم به فکر افتادند مقداری عقب‌نشینی کنند تا بتوانند خود را نجات دهند. این موضوع ما را به وضعیت کنونی می‌رساند. اما قبل از پرداختن به آن نقش سومین بازیگر صحنه را بررسی کنیم:

سومین بازیگر صحنه

مردم، سومین بازیگر صحنه سیاسی ایران هستند. این‌طور نیست که شرایط سیاسی کنونی ایران نتیجه سیاست‌ها و برنامه‌های آمریکا و ابتکار دست آنهاست، باید

بگوییم که خود آمریکایی‌ها این موقعیت را به وجود آورده‌اند. این نگرش یعنی این که این شما نیستید که در مساجد و خیابان‌ها اجتماع می‌کنید و کسی دستگیر نمی‌شود و همچنین این ملت نیست که اعلامیه می‌دهد و دستگیرشان نمی‌کنند. چهار سال پیش بود که افرادی را برای اعلامیه‌ای کوچک ۱۲ سال زندانی کردند. پس چرا حالا این کار را نمی‌کنند؟ پس کار کار خود آمریکاست. گفتن این حرف‌ها درست نیست. این را باید بدانید که حالا دیگر آن زمان نیست و این مردم هستند که جنبش را به اینجا رسانده‌اند نه آمریکا.

در اینجا این سؤال پیش می‌آید که ابتکار دست کیست؟ خود شاه که نخواسته این کار را بکند. پس ابتکار دست آمریکا بود و آنها به رژیم فشار آورده‌اند. ولی همه آنچه ما شاهد هستیم محصول ابتکارات شاه و آمریکایی‌ها نمی‌باشد. درست است که فساد و بی‌کفایتی و پفیوزی شاه و دولت‌هایش و مشروع نبودنش و شکست برنامه‌های آشتی با مردم باعث این وضع شده است، اما این‌ها همه علل سلبی پیدایش وضعیت کنونی هستند. اگر مردم ما مبارزه نمی‌کردند و ساکت می‌ماندند و به استقبال گلوله و زندان نمی‌رفتند این وضع به وجود نمی‌آمد. بنابراین در تحلیل حوادث نمی‌توان گفت که این سیاست و یا آن بازی‌ها باعث پیدایش این وضعیت شده است؛ بلکه باید پذیرفت که شرایط کنونی ناشی و در رابطه مستقیم با مبارزه و مقاومت مردم در طی این چند سال به خصوص بعد از ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲ می‌باشد. از ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲ تا به کنون حتی یک روز هم صحنه مبارزه خالی نبوده است. این که شما می‌بینید این پرچم‌ها برافراشته هستند، فکر نکنید که فقط به خاطر همین دوسه سال است. در حقیقت شما وارثین تجارب مبارزات این ربع قرن هستید. درست‌تر و واقع‌بینانه‌تر این است که بپذیریم که این مبارزه از ۲۸ مرداد شروع نشده است. اگر بتوانیم برای مبارزات ملی آغازی را تعیین کنیم و زمانی قائل شویم، این مبارزه از **شورش تنباکو** شروع شده است.

قرآن به ما پیوستگی رویدادهای تاریخی می‌آموزد. قرآن انکار می‌کند که اسلام با محمد(ص) آغاز شده است. می‌گوید تمام انبیاء مسلمان بودند و اسلام از بدو خلقت بود و اصلاً قرآن منکر است که اسلام برای انسان است. می‌گوید که در تمام آفرینش همه مسلمان هستند، ماه و خورشید و فلک همه مسلمانند و تسلیم به

ارادهٔ پروردگار عالم هستند. به این ترتیب می‌خواهد حرکت اسلامی شما به ابراهیم پیوند بخورد. دکتر شریعتی با صراحت و دقت به این مسأله توجه کرده و در اکثر نوشته‌هایش این پیوند را بیان می‌کند. در زیارتنامه‌ها هم حسین وارث آدم و تمام پیامبران است. از نظر جامعه‌شناسی این مسأله‌ای مهمی است که شما هیچ‌وقت فکر نکنید که حرکت‌های اجتماعی بدون سابقه و بدون زمینه به‌وجود می‌آیند. درست نقطه مقابل این نگرش استعمار خارجی هر کجا قدرت و سیطره پیدا می‌کند می‌کوشد تا رابطه نسل‌ها را با ریشه‌های تاریخی‌اش قطع کند. در ترکیه زبان را عوض کردند و رابطه فرهنگی مردم را با گذشته قطع کردند. در ایران بیست سال دیکتاتوری رضاخان ارتباط ارگانیک مردم را با دستاوردهای مشروطیت قطع کرد. به‌طوری که مشروطیت برای نسل جدید فقط یک تاریخ است. نسل جدید تجارب مشروطه و قیام جنگل را با وجود خود حس نمی‌کند بلکه به‌عنوان تاریخ می‌خواند. اما نسل کنونی مبارزات بعد از شهریور ۱۳۲۰ و ملی‌شدن را با وجودش حس می‌کند و مصدق برایش زنده است. علت اینکه رژیم مصدق بد می‌گوید و می‌گوید که مصدق خائن است، بی‌وطن و غیره است به خاطر این است که اگر مصدق و حرکت ملی بعد از ۲۸ مرداد مرده بود، لزومی نمی‌دیدند که به مصدق حمله کنند. در باور ما استمرار مبارزه یک امر ضروری است. بنابراین معتقد نیستیم که این مبارزه ملت ما و جنبش کنونی بدون مقدمه بی‌ربط به گذشته است و یک رویداد جدید است که به تازگی شروع شده است. بلکه حداقل هفتاد سال سابقه دارد و شما وارث همهٔ تجارب گذشتگان هستید و ادامه‌دهندگان مبارزات گذشتگان هستید و باید دائم در جهت زنده کردن و حفظ موازین انقلابی کوشا باشید، بدانید پدران شما چه تجاربی داشته‌اند و چه زحمتهایی کشیده‌اند، در جنبش جنگل چه گذشته و چگونه می‌توانید از این تجارب استفاده کنید.

در رابطه با نقش ملت به عنوان بازیگر اصلی در صحنه ایران باید کمی به عقب برگشت. وضعیت کنونی جنبش ادامه رویدادهای از شهریور ۱۳۲۰ به بعد است. از شهریور ۲۰ دوجریان به موازات هم، یکی سیاسی و دیگری ایدئولوژی شروع می‌شود.

جریان سیاسی آن به صورت جنبش ملی شدن نفت به رهبری دکتر مصدق آغاز شد و ادامه یافت و به پیروزی رسید و دستاوردهای زیادی داشت و پیروزی‌های بزرگی به دست آورد. دشمن را سنگر به سنگر وادار به عقب‌نشینی کرد و مهمترین دستاوردی که داشت بازسازی اعتماد مردم به خودشان بود. که خیلی مهم است و توضیح خواهم داد.

قرآن کریم در سوره (ص - ۵) می‌فرماید: *وَعَجِبُوا أَنْ جَاءَهُمْ مُنْذِرٌ مِنْهُمْ وَ قَالِ الْكَافِرُونَ هَذَا سَاحِرٌ كَذَّابٌ* «در شگفت شدند از اینکه بیم‌دهنده‌ای از میان خودشان به سوی آنها آمد. و کافران گفتند این جادوگری دروغگوست». وقتی شما نمی‌توانید روابط پدیده‌ها را درک کنید و روابط علت و معلولی را نمی‌فهمید تعجب می‌کنید، و چون علم به روابط درونی آن پدیده ندارید تعجب می‌کنید. وقتی مردم در یک جامعه شرک‌زده و در یک جامعه کفرزده، اساس جهان‌بینی‌شان برپایه نفی شخصیت انسانی است و برپایه‌ای است که انسان‌ها اصولاً به خودشان اعتقاد ندارند، چگونه می‌توانند با ابرقدرت‌ها بجنگند. اساس نظام استبدادی و سلطه‌گر بر نفی ارزش انسان و خود باوری است. نظام شرک و کفر هرگز باور به خود را تشویق و ترغیب نمی‌کند. وقتی پیامبری و انزاردهنده‌ای از بین خود مردم می‌آید، آنها تعجب می‌کنند. یعنی مگر ممکن است؟ این تعجب و پرسش بازتاب عدم اعتقاد به خودشان است. حال با این نگرش به رفتارهای جمعی مردم به صحنه سیاسی برگردیم.

در شهریور ۱۳۲۰ رضاشاه از ایران می‌رود. اما پس‌مانده‌های استبداد ۲۰ ساله، از جمله بی‌اعتمادی و بی‌اعتقادی مردم به خودشان در جامعه باقی مانده و حاکم است. حزب توده در این دوره نقش مهمی در فضای سیاسی ایفا می‌کند. هنگامی که مبارزه با سلطه استعمار انگلیس مطرح می‌شود نظریه‌پردازان حزب توده می‌گویند که جهان دوقطبی است و دو بلوک بیشتر نیست. یا بایست به روس‌ها وابسته بود و یا به انگلیس‌ها. اگر با شرکت غاصب نفت می‌خواهی بجنگی و متکی به روسیه نیستی پس حتماً آمریکایی هستی. بخشی از این نوع تفکر، نتیجه یا توجیه وابستگی و ارتباط این حزب با شوروی است و بخشی انعکاس بی‌اعتقادی به خود می‌باشد. این درست انطباق دارد بر آن جهان‌بینی شرک و کفر و نفی ارزش

انسان. عقده حقارت در من و شما و مردم تحت سیطره استبداد وجود دارد. این ذهنیت در تمام زندگی و رفتارهای روزمره ما حاکم است. در کالاهای مصرفی اگر بنویسند «مید این جرمانی - ساخت آلمان» یعنی پارچه خیلی خوبی است و یا اگر بنویسند ساخت انگلستان، پارچه خوبی است. اما اگر بنویسند کازرون، اصفهان، بانه، این مرغوب نیست. این طرز فکر در مبارزات سیاسی مان هم حاکم بود. به طوری که گفتم بزرگترین مسأله‌ای که در آن زمان برای تمام مبارزین ما از شهریور ۲۰ تا روی کار آمدن دکتر مصدق مطرح بوده و حتی تا زمان ۲۸ مرداد، این بوده که آقا چطور ممکن است شما با ابرقدرت‌ها بجنگید، اینکار برای ما غیرممکن است.

احسان طبری در این باره، در یکی از نشریات حزب توده می‌نویسد که بایستی منافع و مصالح روس‌ها را در ایران به رسمیت بشناسیم همان طوری که مال انگلیس را به رسمیت می‌شناسیم و برای توازن مثبت همان امتیازاتی را که انگلیس‌ها دارند به روس‌ها بدهیم و در بلوچستان و کرمان هم همان امتیازات به آمریکا داده شود تا توازن برقرار گردد و به این ترتیب بتوانیم ادامه حیات بدهیم. دکتر مصدق در مجلس ۱۴ در پاسخ به این موضع حزب توده می‌گوید که اگر این کارها را بکنیم آقا دیگر چه می‌ماند برایمان که حفظش بکنیم. (خنده حضار)

این نگرش منحصر و محدود به حزب توده نبود. رزم‌آرا نخست‌وزیر مملکت در مخالفت با ملی شدن نفت در مجلس شورای ملی گفت مگر ممکن است آقا بتوانیم خودمان نفتمان را اداره کنیم، ما لوله هنگ هم بلد نیستیم بسازیم. با این وضع مگر می‌توانیم صنایع نفت را اداره بکنیم؟ و این همان فلسفه سیاسی استبداد است چه حزب توده، و چه رزم‌آرا و چه حزب دموکرات قوام‌السلطنه می‌گفتند که ما باید وابسته باشیم و شما نمی‌توانید انگلوفیل یا آمریکوفیل نباشید و بجنگید. نظریه موازنه مثبت از این نگرش و جهان‌بینی سرچشمه می‌گیرد. حرکتی که جهان‌بینی‌اش بر اساس شرک و کفر است و جهان را از این دریچه می‌بیند به خودش اعتقاد نداشته و خودش، وجودش و انسانیت خودش را نفی می‌کند. یکی از بزرگترین دستاوردهای جنبش ملی به رهبری دکتر مصدق این بود که آمد و این سحر را، نه با بحث‌های نظری بلکه با عمل سیاسی، باطل کرد. تعلق و احساس

وابستگی ملی و اعتماد به نفس را در مردم ما به وجود آورد. ملت ما و مردم جهان در صحنه مبارزات سیاسی دیدند که چگونه یک ملت کوچک و ضعیف، بزرگترین امپراطوری‌های زمان خویش را شکست داد. این دستاورد بزرگ ملی، به‌رغم پیروزی کودتای ۲۸ مرداد از بین نرفته است، برای ما برجای مانده است. به طوری که هنوز هم من و شما به‌رغم اینکه تمامی دنیا پشت سر شاه ایستاده، جرأت می‌کنیم در برابر شرق و غرب بایستیم و بگوییم که می‌جنگیم. مگر نه اینست که شاه توانست تمامی شرق و غرب را با خودش متحد کند.

گفته قرآن مصداق دیگری هم دارد. انکارکنندگان آیات الهی وقتی تأثیر کلام پیامبر را در مردم می‌بینند، به جای ریشه‌یابی آن و قبول واقعیت، می‌گویند: هَذَا سَاحِرٌ كَذَّابٌ «این جادوگری دروغ‌گوست». معلوم است که اگر کار پیامبر اثر نداشت نمی‌گفتند که او جادوگر است. به علت حرف زدن که نمی‌گویند ساحر است. سحر وقتی است که کسی کاری می‌کند و مردم توجه می‌کنند و جذب می‌شوند. هذا ساحر کذاب یعنی هم دروغ می‌گوید و هم ساحر است و چشم‌بندی کرده است. همان کسان‌ی که می‌گفتند رضاخان آمده بورژوازی ملی را در کشور پیاده کند و او را تأیید می‌کردند، مصدق را به بهانه نماینده بورژوازی ملی نفی کردند و گفتند وابسته به آمریکاست. چرا؟ برای اینکه روس‌ها که از او پشتیبانی نکرده‌اند و وابسته به روس‌ها نیست. با انگلیس‌ها هم که دارد می‌جنگد پس حتماً وابسته به آمریکاست. اما نهضت ملی در آن شرایط یک کمبود درونی داشت که ناشی از روند تکاملی حرکت ملی بود. به این معنا که حرکت ملی در بعد سیاسی رشد خطی کرد ولی بعد ایدئولوژیک نداشت. نه اینکه مصدق یا رهبران جبهه ملی مسلمان نبودند، یا آنهایی که از مصدق پشتیبانی می‌کردند مسلمان نبودند. توده‌های مسلمان بزرگترین پشتیبان نهضت ملی بودند. اما جنبش ملی با فرهنگ ملی، که یک رکن آن اسلامی بود پیوند پیدا نکرد. از انگیزه‌های اسلامی به این معنا که امروزه ما می‌فهمیم در مبارزه ملی نبود. بنابراین حرکت سیاسی در یک بعد به صورت خطی رشد کرده بود و اگر ۲۸ مرداد نمی‌شد و یک ۲۸ مرداد دیگری هم پیش می‌آمد. تا زمانی که این کمبود را داشت حرکت شکست می‌خورد. همان طوری که ناسیونالیسم غرب علیه رشد خطی در بعد سیاسی، من الخلیج

الی محیط، شکست خورد. نه تنها با فرهنگ توده‌های مردم پیوند نخورد با آن رو در رو درگیر شد. این مطلب اول. اما مطلب دوم: بعد از شهریور ۲۰ یک حرکت فکری و ایدئولوژیک در درون جامعه آغار می‌شود و آرام آرام حرکت می‌کند. مثل انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان دانشگاه تهران و کانون تبلیغات اسلامی و... ولی خیلی آرام. در ظاهر خیلی ناچیز و در مقایسه با احزاب قدرتمند آن زمان، به‌خصوص حزب توده، حتی مسخره هم جلوه می‌کند. دفتر انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان دانشگاه تهران در یک بالا خانه‌ای روبروی کوچه میرزا داوود وزیر. آنهایی که خیابان ری را بلدند می‌دانند کجا را می‌گویم، بالای نانوائی یک اتاق ۹ در ۹ و ۴ تا جوان زیر ۲۰ سال و ۴ تا نیمکت شکسته صحبت از انقلاب جهانی اسلام می‌کنند. درحالی که در خیابان‌ها حزب توده میتینگ‌های چند صد هزار نفری راه انداخته بود. اصلاً قابل قیاس با هم نبودند. در آن اوضاع و احوال شاید خیلی‌ها به آنها می‌خندیدند که آقا چطور شما ۴ نفر آدم نشست‌اید و از انقلاب اسلامی صحبت می‌کنید، بیرون را نگاه کنید انقلاب جریان دارد. راست هم می‌گفتند چون اعضای این جریان واقعاً فداکاری‌های بی‌سابقه زیادی می‌کردند. اما گذشت زمان چه چیزی را نشان داد؟ اینست که می‌گویم دنبال کمیت نروید، نگاه درازمدت و بینش اخروی داشته باشید.

در آن دوران این حرکت فکری به کار تعریف خود و تنظیم اندیشه‌هایش و بازشناسی از اسلام سرگرم بود. ایدئولوژی‌اش را تدوین می‌کرد. تا این بازشناسی را نمی‌کرد نمی‌توانست به مرحله بعدی ارتقاء پیدا کند. به پیغمبر هم که وحی می‌شود که: یا ایها المزمّل - ای جامه بر خود پیچیده‌ای که ما بزودی بار سنگین بر دوش تو خواهیم نهاد و تو را به یک مأموریتی خواهیم گماشت: انا سنلقی علیک قولاً ثقیلاً. بلافاصله می‌گوید: و رتل القرآن ترتیلاً - «قرآن را شمرده و روشن بخوان». آن زمان قرآن نبود و تازه یک یا دو سوره نازل شده بود. منظور از رتل قرآن یعنی این که باید جهان‌بینی و ایدئولوژی را خوب بفهمی و برای تو خوب جا بیفتند و بعد حرکت کنی. بر این اساس حرکت انقلابی امکان ندارد بدون ایدئولوژی به جایی برسد. اگر می‌خواهید در جامعه تغییر اساسی و بنیادی به‌وجود بیاورید، حتماً باید بر اساس یک ایدئولوژی باشد. اما حرکت اسلامی در مرحله‌ای

بود که لاجرم دوران بازسازی اندیشه خود را طی می‌کرد. کاستی این حرکت نبود، بعد سیاسی بود. بنابراین لازمه تحول و رشد حرکت اسلامی تعریف مواضع سیاسی بر اساس اندیشه دینی بود. حرکت اسلامی در فرایند رو به رشد خود، هنگامی معنا و مفهوم پیدا می‌کند که کاربرد اندیشه را در قلمرو تحولات سیاسی تبیین نماید. دو حرکت سیاسی و فکری در نقطه‌ای باید با هم تلاقی می‌کردند و در هم ادغام می‌شدند. بهد از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد وقتی نهضت مقاومت ملی تشکیل شد هسته مرکزی در دست مبارزان سنتی نبود. نه اینکه اصلاً مبارزان سنتی در مرکز نبودند، بودند. اما آن‌ها ضربات سنگینی خورده بودند. در روز ۲۸ مرداد و روزهای بعد عوامل کودتا ریختند و مراکز و دفاتر تمام احزاب را آتش زدند و رهبران و فعالان را گرفتند و بردند و تبعید کردند. از طرفداران حزب توده گرفته تا طرفداران ملیون و مصدقی‌ها و همه را، حتی انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان ما را که در آن تاریخ در میدان بهارستان، کوچه نظامی طبقه بالای روزنامه «باختر امروز» بود. وقتی ریختند باختر امروز را آتش زدند، انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان را هم چابیدند و تمام وسایل را هم بردند. سران احزاب را به نقاط دوردست تبعید کردند. ناظم‌زاده کرمانی، نماینده مجلس که با رأی طبیعی مردم از کرمان انتخاب شده بود، را هم گرفته و به قلعه فلک‌الافلاک، در اراک تبعید کرده بودند. ناظم‌زاده کرمانی وقتی می‌بیند که خلیل ملکی و ژندی، مدیر روزنامه «به‌سوی آینده»، ارگان حزب توده را هم آن‌جا آورده‌اند، شعری وصف حال می‌گوید:

ژندی بنگر بازی چرخ فلکی را آورده کنار تو خلیل ملکی را (خنده حضار)
طنز روزگار این است که خلیل ملکی به همراه دوستانش از حزب توده انشعاب کرده بود و به همین مناسبت روزنامه‌های حزب توده به‌طور مرتب به آن‌ها حمله می‌کردند. این‌ها با هم می‌جنگیدند و به هم فحش می‌دادند.

به هرحال نهضت مقاومت ملی که تشکیل شد، شخصیت‌های دینی و فعالان جنبش فکری، آیت‌الله زنجانی، مهندس بازرگان و آیت‌الله طالقانی و دکتر سبحانی و اشخاصی نظیر این‌ها رهبری سیاسی را به دست گرفتند. در نتیجه هم جنبش ملی بعد فرهنگ و پشتوانه دینی پیدا کرد و هم جنبش فکری وارد عرصه سیاسی شد.

اعضای انجمن‌های اسلامی دانشجویان از یک طرف در جلسات انجمن یا در مسجد هدایت کار قرآنی می‌کردند و از طرف دیگر نشریه «راه مصدق» را چاپ و

توزیع می‌کردند. هم در تظاهرات خیابانی ۱۶ مهر اولین ۲۱ آبان، روز محاکمه دکتر مصدق، ۱۶ آذر و مبارزات انتخاباتی شرکت می‌کردند و هم در مراسم عید فطر و عید قربان.

فعالیت نهضت مقاومت ملی از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۳۲ تا حدود سال ۳۶ با فراز و نشیب‌هایی ادامه داشت. نشریه راه مصدق و سایر نشریات منتشر می‌شد. اعتراضات خیابانی انجام می‌شد. نهضت مقاومت ملی در انتخابات دوره ۱۸ مجلس شورای ملی با شعار یا پیروز می‌شویم یا رسوا می‌کنیم وارد شد، کاندیدا معرفی کرد. شورایی را برای نظارت بر انتخابات بریاست مرحوم «دهخدا» تشکیل داد. مردم برای شرکت در انتخابات دعوت شدند و مردم هم استقبال کردند. اگرچه دولت با تقلب در انتخابات مانع پیروزی ملیون شد، اما شرکت مردم و واکنش دولتی‌ها موجب رسوایی حکومت شد. مردم دعوت شده بودند که در مسجد یا منزل روحانی مورد اعتماد خود گرد هم آیند و سپس به اجتماع برای رأی دادن به محل رأی‌گیری بروند. در آن زمان منزل آیت الله طالقانی در خیابان امیریه کوچه قلعه وزیر بود. من هم همراه با جمعی از جوانان از منزل طالقانی به همراه ایشان به طرف مسجد فخریه در خیابان امیریه راه افتادیم. در همین جلوی فخرآباد مردم برای رأی دادن صف کشیده بودند. ناگهان «شعبان بی‌مخ، معروف به سیف‌السلام تاج بخش، با جمعی از چاقوکشان آمدند و با زور اوراکی که دست مردم بود می‌گرفتند و هر کس که لیست اسامی کاندیداهای ملی را داشت کتک می‌زدند. آن‌ها یکی از کسانی را که می‌خواست به ملیون رای بدهد گرفتند و با نوک چاقو روی پیشانی او کردند: خائن. یک روزنامه سوئیسی عکس این فرد و شعبان بی‌مخ را چاپ کرد. که موجب سر و صدا و رسوایی رژیم کودتا شد. مبارزه در مراحل مختلف ادامه یافت. از قبیل تظاهرات به نفع مصر، تظاهرات به نفع مردم چک‌اسلوواکی، هزاره بوعلی سینا و غیره. شیوه مبارزات مخفی بوده و همه خصوصیات مبارزه مخفی را داشت. که لاجرم محدود بود. این فعالیت‌ها اگرچه از سال ۳۶ به بعد کاهش محسوسی پیدا کرد، اما تا سال‌های ۳۹ و ۴۰ تحت شرایطی که به فعالیت‌های خود، اگرچه بسیار محدود ادامه می‌داد.

از اواخر سال ۱۳۳۹ با روی کار آمدن دولت کندی در آمریکا و فشار بر شاه برای بازکردن فضای سیاسی مسأله ضرورت فعالیت سیاسی علنی مطرح می‌شود. تحلیل انگلیس و آمریکا از وضعیت ایران و شاه این بود که شاه بعد از ۲۸ مرداد تمام مخالفان خود را از بین برده است، حزب توده متلاشی شده است، همکاران دکتر مصدق و ملیون فلج شده‌اند. از میان روحانیان کسی با شاه مخالف جدی نیست. شاه ارتش را دارد. با اصلاحات ارضی دهقانان و با سهیم کردن کارگران در کارخانه‌ها، این قشر جامعه حامی شاه خواهند شد. ملیون و روحانیون و روشنفکران مخالف شاه و یک عده توده‌ای، خطر بالفعل یا بالقوه‌ای برای نظام نیستند. این که هدف و انگیزه دولت آمریکا از فشار برای بازشدن فضای سیاسی چه بوده است، یک بحث است و این که نیروهای ملی می‌بایستی از این فرصت برای توسعه مبارزات ملی استفاده کنند، موضوع دیگری است. شیوه مبارزه را شرایط حاکم بر جامعه تعیین می‌کند. وقتی فضای سیاسی تغییر می‌کند بی‌تردید شیوه مبارزه هم باید، از مبارزه مخفی و محدود به شیوه مبارزه علنی تغییر کند. مبارزه سیاسی مطلوب در هر حال مبارزه علنی است. شیوه مبارزات مخفی را حاکمان بر مبارزان تحمیل می‌کنند. نیروهای سیاسی می‌بایستی از هر فرصتی برای تحمیل مبارزه علنی بر حاکمان استفاده کنند. اما منظور از مبارزه علنی این نبوده که از طریق مبارزات پارلمانی دو یا سه و چهار وکیل به مجلس فرستاده شوند. بلکه هدف اصلی تحمیل مبارزه علنی به دشمن و گسترش مبارزه بود. برای این هدف فعال کردن مجدد جبهه ملی و سامان دادن آن ضروری بود. گام‌هایی برداشته شد. اما اختلافاتی هم بروز کرد. اولین موضوع موضع‌گیری علنی در برابر شاه و نیز اعلام حمایت علنی از دکتر مصدق به عنوان رهبر جنبش ملی. همه شخصیت و احزاب ملی موضع یکسان نداشتند. برخی موافق نبودند که لبه تیز حمله متوجه شاه باشد. و عنوان کردن نام مصدق را هم، که شاه نسبت به نام او خیلی حساس بود، به مصلحت نمی‌دانستند. اینان تصور می‌کردند که با رعایت این موارد می‌توان به مبارزه ادامه داد. برخی دیگر از نیروها این منطقی را نمی‌پذیرفتند و بر این امر اصرار داشتند که حمله بایستی به سوی نظام استبدادی و شاه باشد.

مسأله دیگر تنظیم رابطه با روحانیان ضد استبداد بود. که در آن زمان مطرح شد. در این زمان پدیده تازه‌ای وارد صحنه سیاسی ایران شده بود. روحانیت ایران بر سر مسائلی که برای آن‌ها اولویت داشت در برابر شاه قرار گرفته بودند. جنبش ملی نمی‌توانست و نمی‌بایست نسبت به این جریان بی‌توجه باشد. در تاریخ معاصر ایران، به‌خصوص از زمان شورش تنباکو و انقلاب مشروطه همکاری و همکنشی میان روحانیان و روشنفکران مطرح بوده است. بررسی این مسأله بحث جداگانه‌ای می‌خواهد. نقش روحانیت در خیزش‌های صدسال اخیر ایران چه بوده است؛ روابطی که این جناح‌ها با یکدیگر داشته و نقش سازنده همکاری این‌ها و نقش تخریبی تفرقه میان آنان چگونه است، که باید جداگانه بحث شود. اما توجه به برخی رویدادها لازم است.

بعد از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۳۲ ایادی حکومت کوشش زیادی کردند که بین روحانیون ضد استبداد و مبارزین اصیل ملی اختلاف ایجاد کنند. البته ریشه بعضی از اختلاف‌ها از قبل از ۲۸ مرداد بود. اما بعد از ۲۸ مرداد تقریباً کلیه روحانیانی که از طرف مردم به نمایندگی در مجلس انتخاب شده بودند، در حمایت از ملت و دکتر مصدق، به نهضت مقاومت ملی پیوستند. روحانیان هوادار جنبش ملی، از جمله آقایان آیت‌الله طالقانی و مرحوم سید ضیاءالدین حاج سید جوادی عمومی همین سید احمد صدر حاج سید جوادی، جلالی نائینی، غروی، انگجی، رضوی قمی و... روزهای چهارشنبه بعد از نماز صبح دور هم جمع می‌شدند و به «اصحاب چهارشنبه» معروف شدند. علت این نامگذاری این بود که روحانیان درباری شب‌های جمعه در منزل بهبهانی امام جمعه تهران جمع می‌شدند و به «اصحاب پنج‌شنبه» معروف شده بودند. بهبهانی کسی بود که با دربار رابطه بسیار نزدیکی داشت. او در روز ۲۸ مرداد پول‌های کودتا را که به‌صورت دلار بود بین ارادل و اوباش جنوب شهر پخش کرد. بین این دو گروه، یعنی اصحاب پنجشنبه و اصحاب چهارشنبه یک جنگ اعلام نشده‌ای بر سر جلب نظر مرجعیت بود. اصحاب پنجشنبه می‌خواستند مرجعیت را به نفع دربار به‌کار بیندازند و در مقابل، اصحاب چهارشنبه می‌خواستند مرجعیت را نسبت به رویدادهای جامعه آگاه کنند. یکی از اصحاب چهارشنبه میرزا سید علی قمی بود، که خدا رحمتش کند، در این ماجراها نقش بسیار مؤثری داشت. با شروع فعالیت مجدد جبهه ملی و سپس

تأسیس نهضت آزادی ایران و فعالیت دانشجویان دانشگاه‌ها، مبارزات ملی ابعاد گسترده‌ای پیدا کرد. همزمان با طرح اصلاحات ارضی و تقویت قانون انجمن‌های انتخابات و انجمن‌های ولایتی و ایالتی که به زن‌ها حق رأی می‌داد، روحانیت به مخالفت برخاست. ابتدا اصحاب پنجشنبه، به رهبری بهبهانی مخالفت را آغاز کردند. این مخالفت بسیار معنادار بود. اولاً کل مبارزه ضد استبدادی را مخدوش و بدنام کنند و این‌طور جلوه دهند که یک جریان ارتجاعی با برنامه‌های مترقی شاه مخالفت می‌کند. ثانیاً با بی‌اعتبار کردن روحانیان از نزدیکی و همکاری میان روحانیون و مبارزین ملی جلوگیری کنند. اما اقداماتی صورت گرفت و برنامه‌هایی اجرا شد که تدریجاً برنامه روحانیت درباری اصحاب پنجشنبه شکست بخورد و روحانیت مترقی روزبه‌روز پایگاه بیشتری پیدا کند. با به میدان آمدن آیت‌الله خمینی و با قرارگرفتن روحانیت مبارز در کنار نهضت آزادی ایران جنبش ضد استبداد وارد فاز تازه‌ای می‌شود. برای جدا ساختن این دو از یکدیگر، علیه دکتر شریعتی و حسینیه ارشاد بلوا برپا می‌کنند. مسأله تنها شخص شریعتی نبود، مسأله مطالبش نبود، بلکه، مسأله ایجاد شکاف و اختلاف بین آن جناح از مبارزان که مظهرش شریعتی است با آن جناحی از مبارزه که روحانیت مترقی مظهر آن است، بود. شکست این برنامه‌ها و تهاجم به جنبش و سرکوب قیام و کشتار ۱۵ خرداد موجب تولد حرکت جنگ مسلحانه می‌شود. حرکت ما تا آن تاریخ دویعدی بود، بعد ایدئولوژی و بعد سیاسی. پس از ۱۵ خرداد، بعد سوم، جنگ و جهاد مسلحانه را هم پیدا کرد. سه بعدی شدن مبارزه باعث می‌شود که جنبش در هر سه بعد به‌طور وسیع گسترش پیدا کند. از اوایل سال ۱۳۵۵ تغییراتی در ایدئولوژی سازمان مجاهدین خلق صورت می‌گیرد. این تغییر ایدئولوژی و رویدادهای درون سازمان ضربات سختی را بر جنبش وارد می‌سازد. پیامد این رویداد و تأثیر آن در معادلات سیاسی چه می‌باشد؟

هر حرکتی که ابعاد تکامل‌یافته‌ای پیدا کند، رشدش سریع‌تر می‌شود. وقتی مبارزات سیاسی در ابعاد ایدئولوژیک و نظامی رشد می‌کند که تجلی آن را در سخنان و آثار دکتر شریعتی از یک طرف و کار مجاهدین را از طرف دیگر می‌توان دید، دشمن احساس خطر و احساس نگرانی می‌کند. برای مقابله با وضعیت نگران‌کننده دشمن، علاوه بر سرکوب تدابیر دیگری را می‌اندیشد. یکی از این

راه‌کارها بازکردن فضای سیاسی و دادن نوعی آزادی است. این فضای باز سیاسی متأثر از دو عامل درونی و بیرونی است. بعد از آنچه در درون سازمان مجاهدین خلق به دست یک گروه منافق صورت گرفت و تأثیرات مخربی که بر کل جنبش بر جای گذاشت و بعد از جنگ ویتنام و تأثیرات گسترده جنبش ضد جنگ در آمریکا و روی کارآمدن کارتر، مسأله حقوق بشر به طور عام و بازشدن فضای سیاسی در ایران به طور خاص مطرح می‌گردد.

آیا می‌توانیم باز شدن فضای سیاسی را به این علت که خواست آمریکاست محکوم کنیم و از آن برای پیشبرد اهداف جنبش استفاده نکنیم؟ برخی اینگونه فکر می‌کنند اما برای یافتن پاسخ و راهیابی بایستی بررسی کنیم که هدف از این تغییرات چیست و در این مرحله چه آلترناتیوهایی دارند و چه بازی‌ها و چه برنامه‌هایی را می‌خواهند پیاده کنند.

به طور خلاصه ما می‌توانیم سه آلترناتیو، یا بازی و نقشه یا توطئه را در حرکت آمریکایی‌ها و شاه در ایران پیش‌بینی کنیم:

آلترناتیو اول اینست که دریچه‌های اطمینان و فضایی را باز کنند که تغییرات دموکراتیک را، با حفظ شاه و با بودن شاه در رأس این نظام، به دنبال داشته باشد. این همان برنامه‌ای است که در سال‌های ۳۹ و ۴۰ داشتند. کوشش زیادی هم شد ولی استبداد داخلی زیر بار این نرفت و منجر به تغییراتی شد که به اینجا رسید. اگر این آلترناتیو عملی نباشد و نتواند موفق شود آلترناتیو دوم راعملی‌کنند.

دومین آلترناتیو تغییرات مطلوب‌شان را در چارچوب حفظ نظام سلطنتی، بدون شاه و با شورای نیابت سلطنت انجام دهند. و اگر این هم عملی نباشد، آلترناتیو سوم را پیاده خواهند کرد. سومین آلترناتیو تغییرات درجهت مطلوب برای ادامه سلطه خودشان، بدون حضور شاه و بدون نظام سلطنتی. به بیان یک مفسر و تحلیل‌گر خارجی، ایران را هم ضیاءالحقی کنند، یعنی کودتای نظامی. برای آلترناتیو اول آمریکا و انگلیس و نظام، یعنی استبداد داخلی و استیلای خارجی می‌بایستی با هم به توافق برسند. این برنامه دو بخش دارد. حفظ شاه و به‌کارگیری آنالوگ‌ها و بازی‌های متناسب با آن تا بتوانند توجه مردم را به آن جلب کنند. من فعلاً نمی‌توانم وارد رویدادهای داخلی بشوم چراکه وقت‌مان کوتاه است. به

اعلامه‌هایی که منتشر شده و به جهت‌گیری‌هایی که شده و به بازی‌هایی که انجام می‌شود و در زمینه‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی و اخلاقی و غیره بایستی دقت کنید و حواستان و حواسمان باید جمع باشد که در قبال جنبش چه بازی‌هایی انجام می‌گیرد و چه آنالوگ‌هایی وارد بازی می‌شوند.

شاید لازم باشد درباره آنالوگ‌ها توضیحی بدهم. آنالوگ یعنی شبیه یا مشابه. این واژه‌ای است که من از شیمی وام گرفته‌ام. در شیمی وقتی فرمول دو ترکیب شیمیایی شبیه هم هستند ولی خیلی جزئی با هم فرق دارند، آنالوگ خوانده می‌شوند. به عنوان مثال دو حلقه ۶ کربنی بنزن را در نظر بگیرید که تعداد کربن‌ها و پیوندهای مضاعف، تعداد هیدروژن‌ها و اکسیژن‌ها در هر دو برابرند، اما در یکی از آن‌ها جایگاه اتصال OH در کربن ۱ (جایگاه ارتو) و در دیگری در کربن ۲ (جایگاه متا) یا ۳ (جایگاه پارا) می‌باشد و یا جایگاه پیوندهای مضاعف در آنها متفاوت است. در پزشکی ما از این آنالوگ‌ها برای درمان برخی از بیماری‌ها سوء و یا حُسن استفاده را می‌کنیم. مثلاً احتمالاً شما مریض شده‌اید و برای درمان عفونت از سولفامیدها استفاده و نجات پیدا کرده‌اید. کار سولفامید چیست؟ سولفامید آنالوگ شیمیایی ویتامینی در میکرب است به نام اسید پارامینوبنزوئیک. هیچ فرقی با این ویتامین ندارد جز یک گوگرد اضافی. بنابراین می‌تواند وارد سیستم حیاتی میکروب شود. این بنده خدا میکروب دنیانگر است (خنده حضار). میکروب تفاوت بین سولفامید و ویتامین را درک نمی‌کند و به آن اجازه ورود به سیستم را می‌دهد. وقتی سولفامید وارد سیستم میکروب می‌شود عین ترکیب ویتامین عمل می‌کند و هیچ فرقی ندارد، همه فعل انفعالات را عین آن ترکیب اصلی انجام می‌دهد و به اصطلاح کارهای متابولیسم درون سلول مثل سابق انجام می‌شود. با آنکه مقدار این گوگرد اضافی بدبو کم و ناچیز است، اما چون در این جهان عظیم و وسیع، بودن یا نبودن هیچ چیز بدون دلیل نیست همان یک گوگرد اضافی که نباید باشد و یا یک هیدروژنی که باید باشد نیست و یا اگر هست جایش اشتباه است، و تمام این‌ها دلیل دارد و فلسفه دارد و هر یک به موقع بایستی در مراحل مختلف فعل و انفعالات شیمیایی - حیاتی کارشان را انجام بدهند، ولی نیست یا عوضی است کار نمی‌کند و کل سیستم را فلج می‌کند و می‌کشد. این

میکروب بنده خدا گول آنالوگ را خورده که وارد سیستم می‌شود. این آنالوگ مثل یک مبارز انقلابی وارد سیستم شده و خوب هم کار کرده ولی یکباره جای حساس و دقیق که می‌رسد زهر خودش را می‌ریزد و سیستم را می‌کشد و نابود می‌کند. قرآن می‌گوید که با یک آنالوگ سیاسی نمی‌توانید مبارزه اصیل و مؤثر سیاسی بکنید و با یک آنالوگ انقلابی نمی‌توانید کاری کنید. مواظب باشید که آنالوگ انقلابی برایتان نسازند. ما دونوع آنالوگ داریم یکی آنالوگ طبیعی است و یکی آنالوگ‌های مصنوعی. آنالوگ‌های طبیعی در مواد غذایی وجود دارند. سفیده تخم مرغ حاوی آنالوگ ویتامینی است که اگر شما تخم مرغ را نپخته بخورید مانع جذب آن ویتامین می‌شود. اما سولفامیدیک آنالوگ مصنوعی است. در حرکت‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی هم آنالوگ‌های طبیعی وجود دارند و هم آنالوگ مصنوعی، که سیاست خارجی و دشمن مردم می‌تواند برای ما بسازد و جلو بیاندازد و رهبر جنبش کند و از آن‌ها به سود خود بهره‌برداری کند. در مواردی آنالوگ را سنتز می‌کنند و برایتان می‌فرستند. حتی ممکن است برایتان سازمان انقلابی آنالوگ درست کنند. مگر نخواندید که ساواک چه‌طور کمیته تهران را درست کرد. کتابی در انگلستان چاپ شده است که خاطرات یک مأمور سیا ست. من توصیه می‌کنم آن را بخوانید و ببینید که چگونه و چه‌طور در کشورهای مختلف، سیا خودش سازمان‌های انقلابی آنالوگ درست و وارد سیستم مبارزات مردمی کرده است. اما گاهی اوقات آنالوگ از درون خود ما بیرون می‌آید. مثلاً وقتی فردی که رهبر می‌شود، خیلی هم سختکوش است اما رفتارهای خودخواهانه و خودمحوارانه دارد. اطرافیان و گردانندگان شروع به توجیه رفتارها و مغزشویی می‌کنند، ای بابا چه عیبی دارد که رهبر حالا یک ذره خودخواه باشد، مهم نیست همه این خودخواهی را داریم یا مثلاً وقتی بحث سیاسی می‌کنیم و یا درباره سرنوشت انقلاب تصمیم می‌گیریم، اگرچه مسلمانیم اما نماز را فراموش می‌کنیم. بعد هم توجیه می‌کنیم که بابا نماز را بگذار بعد بخوان، مگر چه می‌شود، حالا داریم بحث سیاسی می‌کنیم و برای جنبش مسلحانه برنامه‌ریزی می‌کنیم و نماز مهم نیست. و از این‌جور حرف‌ها که مبارزین راستین را از همان ابتدا به بیراهه بکشند. نیابستی گول این‌ها را خورد. در صحنه مبارزات سیاسی یکی از شیوه‌هایی که به کار برده می‌شود درست‌کردن

آنالوگ است. در تاریخ مدینه «مسجد ضرار» که قرآن می‌گوید، یعنی آنالوگ مسجد توحیدی. مسجد ضرار آنالوگ مسجد قباست. «تشیع صفوی» آنالوگ تشیع علوی و تسنن اموی آنالوگ تسنن نبوی است. آخوند درباری می‌خواهد آنالوگ خمینی بشود. در مبارزات سیاسی اگر بصیرت و بینش سیاسی و آن نگرش کلی و سیستماتیک را نداشته باشید و یک ذره بخواهید اغماض یا غفلت کنید یک آنالوگ وارد سیستم می‌شود و این شیوه‌ای است که دشمن ما به‌کار می‌برد. متنها از دو طریق، هم از راست و هم از چپ. خیال نکنید که همیشه آنالوگ از زیر عبای آخوند درباری می‌آید، خیر، آنالوگ زیر پوشش انقلاب مسلحانه هم می‌آید، باید حواستان جمع باشد. هم‌اکنون در شرایط سیاسی ایران این مسأله مطرح است. این که من بیان می‌کنم بی‌دلیل نیست. در داخل ایران می‌خواهند حرکت‌هایی را به صورت آنالوگ حرکت واقعی جا بیندازند. باید حواستان جمع باشد و نگذارید، به چه شکل؟ با تشدید مبارزات اصیل. به قول مرحوم دکتر شریعتی بایستی بین مدینه خودمان و احزاب، خندق بکشیم. آنها آن سوی خندق باشند و ما هم این‌سو. بایستی خطوط مشخص شوند، بایستی مفاهیم روشن شوند، تو برای چه می‌جنگی و با که می‌خواهی بجنگی؟ در این مرحله هر کلمه و هر لغت و هر عنوانی مفاهیمی را با خود افاده می‌کند. بنابراین بایستی حواستان جمع باشد و یک خط مشی و خط‌کشی قاطعی چه در زمینه ایدئولوژی و چه در زمینه سیاسی باشد. تنها شعارهایی را که بتواند خط‌کشی‌ها را قاطع کند، مطرح کنید.

اما نقشه دوم، تفرقه‌اندازی در میان جناح‌های جنبش است. یک مورد آن در مورد شریعتی به‌طور خیلی وسیع‌تری اعمال شد و شما ناظر جریان علیه شریعتی بودید. این جنگ علیه خود شریعتی و افکار او نبود، بلکه می‌خواستند جدال و نزاع را سطح جنبش به‌وجود آورند. بعد از انتشار بیانیه مواضع از طرف منافقین، که دشمن حداکثر بهره‌برداری را از این بیانیه، چه در داخل زندان و چه در خارج زندان کرد. چه بسیار روحانیانی که تا پای مرگ در برابر شکنجه‌ها مقاومت کردند ولی وقتی با این نفاق روبرو شدند، عکس‌العمل‌های نامطلوب با تحریکات دشمن بروز دادند. شما بایستی از این کارها اجتناب کرده و مبارزه را تشدید کنید و این سالگردی که شما می‌گیرید خیلی مهم است. برای اینکه در این شرایط که اعلامیه

منافقین منتشر شده و کوشش کرده جنگ بین روحانی و دانشجو را تشدید کند، این کار شما چشم دشمن را کور می‌کند. وقتی علی شریعتی در چنین شرایطی به خارج مهاجرت می‌کند و شهید می‌شود، ضربه‌ای به کل جنبش وارد می‌شود. دستگاه که خیلی عاقل‌تر از سال‌های پیش شده و از ویتنام و جاهای دیگر تجربه اندوخته و سیاست و تحرک پیدا کرده بلافاصله نقش خودش را عوض می‌کند و می‌خواهد جنازه را برداشته و به ایران ببرد و از او به عنوان یک استاد عالی‌مقام و اسلام‌شناس تجلیل نماید. در مخالفت با اینکار در همان موقع یک جنگ اعلام نشده بین ما و سازمان امنیت جریان یافت. ساواک می‌خواست جنازه را برداشته و به ایران ببرند و تشییع جنازه مفصلی به راه بیندازند و به عنوان یک اسلام‌شناس عالیقدر در کنار قبر شیخ بهایی در شهرمشهد به خاک بسپارد. ولی طرفداران دکتر شهید عقیده داشتند که اگر این کار عملی شود، ده‌ها شریعتی دیگر هم بیابند توسط رژیم خراب شده و بی‌اعتبار می‌گردند. شما در برابر امکانات وسیع تبلیغاتی دستگاه نمی‌توانید کاری بکنید و اتهامات رژیم را رد کنید. هنوز نرفته یک عده می‌گویند که خودشان فرستادند. به این خاطر بود که با تمام نیرو کوشش شد جنازه به ایران نرود و به زینبیه رفت و برنامه رژیم خنثی شد. اما هنوز شکافی که در جنبش ایجاد کردند وجود دارد و متأسفانه در حال گسترش است. ولی از آنجایی که مکر خدا بالاتر از مکر آن‌هاست ۱۶ آذر امسال، که روز دانشجوست، با عاشورا همزمان می‌شود. رژیم که می‌خواهد و کوشش می‌کند بین این دو حرکت جدایی بیفکند در موضع بازنده قرار می‌گیرد. در این شرایط مراسم ۱۶ آذر و عاشورا در یک زمان برگزار می‌شود. علاوه بر این از آنجایی که بعضی‌ها بازنده بودندشان و بعضی‌ها با مرگشان به جنبش کمک می‌کنند، درگذشت یا شهادت «مصطفی خمینی» هم شوک دیگری برای تقویت جنبش می‌شود. شهادت شریعتی که یک بخش از جنبش را متأثر کرده و به حرکت درآورده بود، درگذشت مصطفی خمینی بخش دیگری از جنبش را. در چنین زمینه‌ای است که پیام خمینی که «من از روشنفکران گله دارم، من از روحانیون گله دارم» به تمام ماجراها خاتمه می‌دهد. جنجالی که شروع شده بود، به کلی ختم می‌شود.

ناگهان با انتشار مقاله‌ای در اطلاعات توسط ایادی حکومت حوادث قم، تبریز و... پیش می‌آید. انتشار این مقاله و بازتاب و واکنش‌ها، جنبش را در سطح دیگری گسترش من دهد. انتشار این مقاله آیا اشتباه در محاسبات سیاسی و بی توجهی به پیامدهای آن بود یا با توجه به پیامدها به طور عمدی منتشر شد. اما، قضیه ابعاد دیگری هم دارد.

اشاره شد که آترناتیو اول این بود که همه تغییرات در چارچوب حفظ نظام شاه انجام شود. خوب این آترناتیو قابل قبولی نبود و باید با آن برخورد می‌شد. برای این کار لازم بود مردم بسیج شوند. برای بسیج مردم به یک شعار یا یک درخواست همگانی نیاز است. آیا ما می‌توانیم شعار ملی شدن نفت را که در زمان دکتر مصدق بوده دوباره مطرح کنیم؟ نه، نمی‌شد، کشش نداشت. برخی شعار بازگشت خمینی به ایران را مطرح می‌کنند. شعار بازگشت خمینی به ایران یک شعار سیاسی است و در متن خودش یعنی رفتن شاه. مسأله این نیست که بگوییم می‌خواهیم خمینی برگردد زیرا دوره تبعیدش تمام شده است. بازگشت خمینی یعنی رفتن شاه. اما در شرایط کنونی و در آغاز این دوره از مبارزه کسی نمی‌تواند شعار بدهد یا علنی در نمی‌شود بالای منبر گفت که شاه بایستی برود. اینکار مقبول و عملی نیست. زیرا مبارزات علنی از قوانین خاص این شیوه از مبارزه پیروی می‌کند. با رشد و توسعه مبارزه این کار عملی است. یک خصوصیت دیگر شعار بازگشت خمینی این است که وقتی شما شعاری را مطرح می‌کنید باید از نوعی باشد که هیچ کس با آن مخالفت نکند و برای همه هم قابل فهم باشد. مثل تحریم استعمال توتون و تنباکو در شورش تنباکو. بر این اساس شما نمی‌توانید یک نفر از مبارزین را پیدا کنید که مخالف بازگشت خمینی به ایران باشد مردم هم می‌گویند که مرجع‌مان را که تبعید کرده‌اند می‌خواهیم برگردد. اما برای بی‌اثر کردن آترناتیو اول یعنی حفظ شاه و نظام، می‌توان و بایستی حملات علیه شاه تشدید شود. براساس تحلیل‌هایی که ارائه شد، خمینی لبه تیز حمله علیه شاه را شدید تر و شدیدتر کرده است و این بی‌حساب و بی‌دلیل نیست. سپس تدریجاً شعارها و حملات نه تنها علیه شاه، که ضد سلطنت، ضد نظام شاهنشاهی، در جهت خنثی کردن آترناتیو دوم، توسعه پیدا کند. و بالاخره سومین راهکار این است که در

داخل ایران حرکت سیاسی علنی شود. هر جنبش اصیلی باید بتواند به طور علنی و آشکار فعالیت کند. باید در داخل ایران جهت کلی مبارزات به صورتی باشد که مبارزه سیاسی علنی به کل نظام تحمیل شود. این کار به تأخیر افتاده است. این تأخیر شاید به این دلیل باشد هنوز نمی‌توان به طور علنی به شاه حمله کرد. در سالهای ۳۹ و ۴۰ و آغاز مبارزات علنی آن زمان تلویحاً به شاه حمله می‌شد و مؤثر بود اما در شرایط کنونی امکان‌پذیر نیست. حمله به شاه باید با صراحت و شجاعت باشد. نظیر آن چه که مهندس بازرگان در مصاحبه خودش با تلویزیون بلژیک، که در همین چند هفته پیش منتشر شد، مطرح کرد.

بازرگان بحث اصلی را بر این می‌گذارد که هیچ نوع رابطه سببی و نسبی و خونی و غیرخونی بین آزادی و حقوق بشر با نظام شاهنشاهی وجود ندارد. او مطرح می‌کند که ما خواهان آزادی هستیم و آزادی و استقلال می‌خواهیم و این هم با بودن این نظام و شاه امکان‌پذیر نیست. یکی دیگر از کارهای ضروری در جنبش ایجاد هماهنگی در میان نیروهای اسلامی است. نکته دیگر که باید توجه شود ایدئولوژیک شدن جنبش است. به علت رشد جنبش و حرکت جنبش به طرف به‌کارگیری شیوه‌های انقلابی نمی‌توند بدون تکیه‌گاه ایدئولوژیک مبارزه کند. خود این یکی از علل حملات شدید علیه مسلمان‌هاست. آن چیزی را که شما هیچ‌وقت نباید بخواهید و ملت نمی‌تواند بخواهد و ما نمی‌توانیم بخواهیم یک راه حل میان‌بر و فوری است. استبداد ۲۵۰۰ ساله را نمی‌شود یک شبه از بین برد. ما یک مبارزه طولانی‌مدت و درازمدت در پیش داریم. همانطوری که خداوند در سوره المدثر به پیغمبر و به همه انبیاء و روشنفکران و همه پیام‌آوران می‌گوید: انتظار زیاد و فوری از کاری که می‌کنی نداشته باش. تو از برگزاری چهار جلسه، چهار میتینگ و انجام چهار بار تظاهرات انتظار این رانداشته باش که شاه استعفا بدهد، سلطه بیگانگان تمام شود. نه این چنین نیست، راهی طولانی در پیش داریم، راهی که از بین خون و آتش و گلوله می‌گذرد، راهی که بایستی علیرغم تمام این مشکلات لاجرم خودمان به سازماندهی آن پردازیم. بایستی با تمام نیرو وارد میدان شویم، با یک دست پیش‌زدن و یک دست پس‌کشیدن مبارزه به جایی نمی‌رسد. یا در مبارزه هستیم یا نیستیم. معذرت می‌خواهم این را می‌توان به حاملگی یک زن

تشبیه کرد. غیرممکن است زنی بگوید که ۱۰٪ حامله است یا هست یا نیست. باید صددرصد بود و یا اصلاً نبود؛ یا حرف شریعتی است که می‌گفت: «شهیدانی که کشته شدند و رفتند کاری حسینی کردند، ما که مانده‌ایم باید کاری زینی بکنیم و گرنه یزیدی هستیم.

«علی» که امروز ما به یاد او در اینجا جمع شده‌ایم، هم خودش شمع بود و هم کنیه‌اش. شمع مخفف علی شریعتی مزینانی است. او با نام شمع امضاء می‌کرد. اما صفتش هم شمع بود، شمعی بود که می‌سوخت و با سوختنش در این تاریکی کویری حاکم در جامعه ما، در شرایط بسیار بحرانی و خفقان‌آور، در کنار بقیۀ مبارزین داخلی کشور نورافشانی می‌کرد. یکی از برادرانمان در ایران به علی ایراد گرفت که آقا شما چرا اینقدر حرفتان را طول می‌دهید، سروقت بیایید حرفتان را بزنید و سر وقت هم تمام کنید. گفت آقا به کسی که درد دارد و دردمند است نمی‌توانید بگویید که کی ناله را آغاز کند و کی تمام کند. بایستی دردمندانه صحبت کرد و با درد حرکت کرد. وقتی ناله می‌کنی با تمام وجودت باشد. اگر این‌طور شد، آن‌وقت می‌توانی علی‌وار و به یاد علی، برادری که امروز دور هم جمع شده‌ایم که یادش را گرامی بداریم، خالصانه و هرچه صادقانه‌تر و بیشتر کار کنیم، به امید اینکه بتوانیم این یادبودها را زنده نگه داریم و به تحقق آرمان‌هایمان نزدیکتر شویم. برای جلب توجه شما من فقط بعضی از مسائل را مطرح کردم ولی پیگیری و ادامه آن برعهده خود شماست.

برادران و خواهران امروز ما در برابر شیپور و نوای حرکتی حماسه‌آفرین و امیدبخشی که از اعماق و کرانه‌های خلق مستضعف ما به گوشمان می‌رسد، نمی‌توانیم بی‌تفاوت و بی‌طرف باشیم. یا این طرف خندق با پیامبری و یا آن طرف خندق با احزاب. اگرچه شما همه اینجا هستید اما صدای نفیر گلوله‌ها و مسلسل‌ها را درحالی که بوی باروت و خون و آتش، خیابان‌ها و مساجد و کارخانجات، مدارس و دانشگاه‌ها و مغازه‌ها و بازارها را پر کرده و در زیر همه این گلوله‌ها و فریادهای مردم را می‌شنویم، به این فریادها باید لبیک گفت.

ما امیدوار و از خدا خواهیم که به ما قدرت و شهامت و آگاهی بدهد که اسلام را بفهمیم و جرأت و شهامت آن را بدهد که اسلام را عمل کنیم.

پرسش و پاسخ

پرسش: آیا حرکت اخیر ایران منجر به کودتای ساختگی می‌شود؟

پاسخ: اگر منظور از کودتای ساختگی اجرای آلترناتیو سوم است، بله همین است. اگر حرکت کنونی ایران رشد کند و در یک ارزیابی نهایی آمریکایی‌ها ببینند که نمی‌توانند نظام کنونی و نظام شاهنشاهی را حفظ کنند، ممکن است با استعفای شاه، شورای نیابت سلطنت را به ریاست فرح روی کار بیاورند. شما می‌دانید دو سال پیش شاه در مصاحبه‌ای گفت که به نفع پسرش استعفا می‌دهد و در کار او هم دخالت نمی‌کند. از همان زمان هم شروع کردند به فرستادن پسرش به نقاط مختلف دنیا. در همین رابطه بود که فرح سه یا چهار بار به آمریکا سفر کرد. همه سفرهایش و ملاقات‌هایش سیاسی بود، ملاقات با برژینسکی رئیس شورای امنیت آمریکا و با راکفلر و با کارتر. در این ملاقات‌ها قطعاً گفتگو درباره مسائل هنری نبوده است. در همین رابطه روزنامه‌های ایران چند ماه پیش به دکتر علی امینی حمله کردند. این حملات به علی امینی بی‌ارتباط با این قضایا نبوده است. علی امینی کاندیدایی بود که در صورت استعفای شاه و روی کار آمدن فرح و ولیعهد، به عنوان نخست‌وزیر روی کار می‌آمد و آلترناتیو دوم به شدت مطرح بوده و هست. ولی آلترناتیو سوم، کودتا به دست خودشان، تا یک ضیاءالحق ماندی را بیاورند. بعضی‌ها می‌گویند که کشتن سپهد مقربی در این رابطه بوده و مقربی به صورت جاسوس نبوده، بلکه به عنوان مهره‌ای برای انجام این کار بوده، اما تا چه اندازه‌ای می‌شود به اینها استناد کرد، احتیاج به اسناد و مدارک بیشتری دارد.

پرسش: آیا اگر دشمن نتوانست کودتای ساختگی خود را به انجام برساند سرانجام اوضاع را به یک جنگ درازمدت شبیه ویتنام تغییر خواهد داد و مملکت پس از تاراج به چند منطقه تقسیم خواهد شد؟

پاسخ: به نظر من خیر. ما از یک جنگ درازمدت شبیه ویتنام فاصله زیادی داریم.

پرسش: اگر آنالوگ‌ها با آن صورتی که شما در موردش قائل هستید وجود داشته باشند، ضربه‌ای که این‌ها می‌توانند به جنبش اسلامی بزنند خیلی شدیدتر از خود رژیم و امپریالیست‌ها است، آیا صحیح نیست که برای مسلمان‌ها روشن کنید

که چه کسانی هستند و چطور باید با این‌ها مبارزه کرد و این آنالوگ‌ها در جنبش اسلامی کدامند و همچنین:

۱. رژیم درمقابل خمینی چه آنالوگ‌هایی درست کرده است؟

۲. چه کسی گفته من ۱۰٪ مسلمان هستم و خواسته خودش را به جنبش اسلامی قالب کند؟

۳. خط‌کشی که آیت‌الله خمینی در اعلامیه‌های اخیرش می‌خواهد در جنبش اسلامی بکند، بین چه کسانی است و چه کسانی می‌خواهند از ایران فرار کنند. این‌ها مسائلی هست که فکر می‌کنم در مقطع فعلی جنبش اسلامی لازم است روشن کرده و آن‌هایی که در قالب آنالوگ می‌خواهند جنبش را به پرتگاه ببرند روشن کنید، البته شما در حرف‌های خودتان گفتید که آنالوگ‌ها را رژیم حتی در بعد مبارزات مسلحانه نیز وارد کرد. فکر می‌کنم نظر شما مسأله منافقین باشد. اگر این هست جواب سؤال را محبت بفرمایید و منافقین اگر قایل باشید که آنالوگ‌هایشان توسط رژیم ساخته شده، آیا در ابعادی ما می‌توانیم با هم بیائیم؟

پاسخ: اولاً درمورد آنالوگ‌ها روش ما این نیست که آن‌ها را معرفی کنیم. روش ما اینست که در شما بینش به‌وجود بیاوریم با به‌وجود آمدن بینش معیار پیدا می‌کنید و با این معیارها جواب خودتان را داده و محک می‌زنید.

پرسش: اشتباه کمونیست‌ها در گذشته چه بوده است و راجع به مشروعیت و مقبولیت مختصری شرح دهید.

پاسخ: یکی از بزرگترین اشتباهاتشان این بود که در یک مقطع کوتاه رضاخان را به عنوان سردار ملی پذیرفتند ولی **قیام جنگل** را به‌عنوان نماینده فتودالیسم محکوم کردند. با دکتر مصدق به ستیز برخاستند. اما راجع به مقبولیت و مشروعیت، گفتم در یک مراحل مقبولیت مردمی یک حکومت ممکن است به مشروعیتش بیانجامد. توجه و نظرم به یک مورد خاص نبود، بلکه طرح یک مسأله کلی بود. وقتی در یک جامعه انقلاب می‌شود و تمام نهادهای جامعه را برهم می‌ریزد و رهبری انقلاب تمام نهادهایی که تا آن روز قانونی بوده‌اند برهم می‌زند و یک نظام انقلابی به‌وجود می‌آورد، اگرچه این نظام انقلابی که روی کار آمده بر اساس قانون و نهادهای گذشته غیرمشروع است. ولی چون با پشتیبانی

۵۷۰ □ مجموعه آثار دکتر یزدی

اکثریت مردم روی کار آمده است مقبولیت دارد و این مقبولیتش موجب مشروعیتش هست. اما اگر نتواند به خواست‌های مردم جواب بدهد مقبولات خود را از دست می‌دهد.

توطئه بزرگ سخنرانی در انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان آمریکا و کانادا

حوزه واشنگتن دی سی، تیر ۱۳۵۷

قرار نبود که من امروز اینجا صحبت کنم و به این منظور هم نیامده بودم. برنامه ما این بود که امروز برگردیم به هیوستون ولی دوستان مرا به این کار موظف کردند. حال اگر در سخن من عدم پیوستگی یا انسجام مشاهده می‌کنید آن را حمل بر کمبود وقت و نبودن فرصت بگذارید.

آیاتی که قرائت شد از سوره «قلم» بیانگر وضع خاص در یک مقطع زمانی مشخص و معین است. امروز همین وضعیت بر جنبش ما حاکم است. جا دارد به مفاهیمی که در این آیات عنوان شده توجه شود و به زبانی که قرآن در اینجا به کار برده و خطابی که به پیامبر می‌کند توجه شود. من ابتدا توجه شما را به دو یا سه نکته بسیار اساسی در آیاتی که قرائت شد جلب می‌کنم و بعد دوباره در بین صحبت‌ها به این آیات برمی‌گردیم.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ ن وَالْقَلَمِ وَمَا يَسْطُرُونَ؛ «سوگند به قلم و آنچه که می‌نویسند».

خداوند به قلم سوگند می‌خورد. «سطر» عبارت است از مجموعه لغاتی که در رابطه با هم یک معنا را افاده کند.

اگر شما یک مشت پیچ و مهره و سیم را روی هم بریزید هیچ معنایی را بیان نمی‌کند. اما اگر اینها را در یک رابطه‌ای با یکدیگر قرار بدهید و شکلی پیدا کند، می‌گویید این رادیو است. اگر شما مجموعه‌ای از کلمات داشته باشید ولی هیچ رابطه‌ای با هم نداشته باشند، مثل سوپی که با ماکارونی کلمات درست می‌کنند هیچ معنایی ندارد. «سطر» عبارت است از در کنار هم قراردادن یک سلسله کلمات و حروفی که یک معنا را بیان می‌کند و حامل یک پیام است.

خداوند در اینجا به قلم و آنچه را که با این قلم نوشته می‌شود سوگند می‌خورد. می‌دانید که تمدن بشر با کتابت و قرائت پیوند خورده است. انتقال تمدن‌ها از طریق کتابت است شما از طریق بیان تفکرات خود، در یک مقطع زمانی به طور افقی با سایر انسان‌ها تماس برقرار می‌کنید. اما اگر بخواهید پیامتان برای مخاطبین غایب و نسل‌های آینده بماند این تنها از طریق قلم میسر است. بدون قلم و بدون کتابت شما نمی‌توانید پیام‌های گذشتگان را دریافت کنید یا پیامتان را به آیندگان برسانید بنابراین خداوند در اینجا به این قلم و آنچه که از این قلم ساطر یا نوشته می‌شود، سوگند می‌خورد. سپس با این قسم می‌گوید ای پیامبر:

«مَا أَنْتَ بِنِعْمَةٍ رَبِّكَ بِمَجْنُونٍ، که تو به خاطر فضل پروردگارت دیوانه نیستی».

بعضی اوقات تبلیغات دشمنان و مخالفین ما آنقدر زیاد قوی است که آدم به یافته‌هایش شک می‌کند. آخر دیوار حاشا به این بلندی که نمی‌شود، «چین اوآن» رفته ایران بین چه خبر است. چین تا چند سال پیش تمام دنیای جدا از دو ابرقدرت را مسحور خودش کرده بود. ببینید یک دفعه چه‌طور ببری کاغذی از آب درآمد. درحالی که درکشورما خون مردم در خیابان‌ها جاری است رهبر بزرگ زحمتکشان جهان پایگاه بزرگ پرولتاریا و ستاد پیروزی اندیشه مائویا مارکسیسم و لنینیسم به ایران می‌رود و جام شراب خود را به سلامتی شاه ایران سر می‌کشد و سیاست مستقل شاه را تجلیل می‌کند. عده‌ای از هموطنان ما هم، که خود را انقلابی می‌دانند، برایش هورا می‌کشند. بعد پیش خودمان می‌گوییم نکند ما واقعاً خُل شده باشیم. خوب می‌بینید بعضی‌ها واقعاً خُل شده‌اند که اینقدر به سروکله هم‌دیگر می‌زنند. معطل مانده و گیج است. خطاب این آیه به پیغمبر است. اما معنی آیه این نیست که پیغمبر واقعاً خیال می‌کرده که دیوانه شده است و حالا خداوند می‌خواهد به او اطمینان قلبی بدهد. پیام این آیه خطاب به همه مسلمان‌ها و مؤمنین سراسر زمان و تاریخ است. هوشیار باشید اگر تمام عوامل جهان علیه شما بسیج شدند و احساس کردید که هیچ قدرت و نیرویی ندارید و به ظاهر چهار تا و نصفی آدم هستید، که گاهی اوقات هم بر سر هم می‌زنید و این به اون می‌پرد اون به این، درحالی که با یک استبداد بی‌رحم و استیلای خارجی حامی او می‌جنگید، شک می‌کنید و می‌گویید نکند من دیوانه شده‌ام. خیر: «مَا أَنْتَ بِنِعْمَةٍ رَبِّكَ بِمَجْنُونٍ،

به خاطر نعمت پروردگار تو مجنون نیستی». می‌دانید «جن» یعنی چیزی که پنهان و پوشیده است. به زمینی که پوشیده از درخت و گیاه و سنبل و اینهاست «جنت» می‌گویند. «مجنون» هم کسی است که عقلش پوشیده است، عقل دارد ولی فعال نیست و نمی‌تواند نقش خود را ایفا کند. بچه درون رحم مادر را هم که از نظر ما پوشیده است «جنین» می‌گویند. نه، شما مجنون نیستید. عمل خیر شما، مبارزه با ظلم و ستم بی اجر و بازتاب و نتیجه نخواهد بود:

«وَإِنَّ لَكَ لَأَجْرًا غَيْرَ مَمْنُونٍ، وَتُو رَاسْتَ پَادَاشِی پَایان‌نَپَذِیرَ»؛ «وَإِنَّكَ لَعَلَىٰ خُلُقٍ عَظِيمٍ، وَتُو هَمِ اِی پِیغَمبِر دَارَای خَلْقِ عَظِیْمِی هَسْتِ».

این آیات هرکدام معنایی دارد که ما فرصت برای بحث نداریم. اما چند نکته جالب را باید توجه کرد. اول این که در این راه پر پیچ و خم اگر با انگیزه رضایت پروردگار حرکت می‌کنی، از هیچ کس انتظار پاداش نداشته باش. اجر بی حساب تو با خداوند است. دوم این که پیامبر از خلق عظیمی برخوردار است. باز هم این خطاب به پیامبر است. اما نه منحصر به پیامبر. هر کس که در وادی تغییرات و تحولات اجتماعی وارد می‌شود باید خلق عظیم پیامبرگونه داشته باشد. اگر نداشته باشد مردم از او فاصله می‌گیرند. سومین نکته این که صبر و مقاومت داشته باش: «فَسَتُبْصِرُ وَ يُبْصِرُونَ» به زودی هم تو می‌بینی و هم آنها خواهند دید». شب درازی در پیش داریم. اما به زودی معلوم می‌شود که ارتجاع سیاه کیست؟ معلوم خواهد شد چه کسانی عاطفی و غریزی و ناخودآگاه عمل می‌کنند و معلوم خواهد شد که در این درگیری‌ها و در این جنگ و جدال‌ها چه کسی برحق است و چه کسی باطل: «فَسَتُبْصِرُ وَ يُبْصِرُونَ». یعنی پس به درستی که بزودی، خیلی زود خواهی دید و آنان هم خواهند دید که طلوع فجر نزدیک است. با طلوع فجر آن‌ها چه چیزی را می‌بینند:

«يَا أَيُّكُمْ الْمَقْتُولُ» دیوانگی در کدامیک از شما است». این همان پیام سوره‌ والعصر است خدا به زمان قسم می‌خورد. یکی از خصوصیات که مسلمانان باید داشته باشند صبر است. صبر قرآنی یعنی با تمام نیرو و وظیفه‌ها را انجام بده و ناراحتی‌ها و مشکلات را تحمل کن، از میدان در نرو، نه صبری که می‌گوید در خانه‌ات بنشین و هیچ کاری نکن.

در دوره‌ای که دانشجوی دانشگاه تهران بودم یکی از فعالان توده‌ای در حمله به ما گفت آقا ملت‌های جهان سال‌ها زحمت کشیده مذهب را از صحنه دانشگاه بیرون رانده‌اند، حالا شما چهار تا و نصفی آدم دوباره می‌خواهید مذهب را به صحنه دانشگاه بکشانید!! ما نمی‌گذاریم. می‌گفتند دکتر مصدق نوکر اجنبی است، خرف است، پیر خرف آمریکایی است. ما هم می‌گفتیم رهبران شما خائن هستند، توده نفتی هستند. خوب دعوی فیزیکی نداشتیم، ما هیچ وقت با آنها دعوا نمی‌کردیم حرفمان را می‌زدیم، آنها به ما حمله می‌کردند فحش می‌دادند. خوب امروز جلوی برخی از مارکسیست‌ها اسم «کمیته مرکزی حزب توده» را نمی‌توانید بیاورید. بلانست هر دوی آنها، عین جن و بسم‌الله، از شنیدن نام کمیته مرکزی ناراحت می‌شوند که نگو و نپرس. ما ۲۰ سال پیش، ۲۵ سال پیش، ۳۰ سال پیش همین حرف‌ها را در دانشگاه می‌زدیم. خوب زمان صورت مسأله را روشن کرده است دیدیم و دیدند که: «بایکم المفتون»، بعد خداوند می‌فرماید: «إِنَّ رَبَّكَ هُوَ أَعْلَمُ بِمَنْ ضَلَّ عَنْ سَبِيلِهِ وَهُوَ أَعْلَمُ بِالْمُهْتَدِينَ». هر آینه پروردگار تو بهتر می‌داند چه کسی از طریق او گمراه گشته، که او به ره یا فتگان دانایتر است».

به معنای رب در اینجا توجه کنید. این آیه مقدمه است برای بیان مطلب بعدی. پس حالا: «فَلَا تُطِعِ الْمُكَذِّبِينَ، پس از تکذیب‌کنندگان اطاعت مکن». آیا پیامبر، پناه بر خدا، احتمال بود که از تکذیب‌کنندگان اطاعت کند؟ مسلماً خیر. خطاب آیه به من و شماست. یکی از شگردهای بیراه رفتگان این است که با شما از و داد و دوستی سخن می‌گویند: «وَدُّوا لَوْ تُدْهِنُ فَيُدْهِنُونَ، دوست دارند که نرمی کنی تا نرمی کنند». دهن یعنی روغن و مداهنه یعنی گریس کاری. پیچ و مهره‌ها روی هم که می‌افتند به علت اصطکاک از بین می‌روند. برای جلوگیری از نابودی مهره‌ها روغن کاری یا گریس کاری می‌کنند. در فارسی می‌گوییم فلان کس اهل مداهنه است. مداهنه بار معنایی منفی دارد، می‌خواهد روغن کاری یا به اصطلاح خودمان ماست مالی کند. خطاب به پیغمبر است. به دنبال اخطار و اعلام که اطاعت مکذبین را نکن، می‌گوید اینها دوست دارند که نرمی کنی. و داد و ودو یعنی اینها دوست دارند، خیلی مایل هستند با تو نزدیک شوند. ولی در اینجا دوست داشتن و عشق ورزیدن به معنای عرفانی و فلسفی‌اش نیست، چنین خبرهایی نیست. ودو یعنی

دوست دارند، مصالحشان اقتضا می‌کند به تو نزدیک شوند. هر کاری که کردند توی پیغمبر را از بین ببرند نتوانستند، هر بامبولی که زدند نتوانستند این جنبش را از بین ببرند. آمدند به پیغمبر گفتند تو چه می‌گویی؟ حرف حسابت چیست؟ ما بهترین و زیباترین دختران عرب را به تو می‌دهیم. خوب روانشناسی آنها هم خوب بود. خوب پیغمبر در ۲۵ سالگی با خدیجه ۴۰ ساله ازدواج کرده است. گفتند شاید از این راه بتوانند او را منحرف کنند. گفتند ما زیباترین زن عرب را به تو می‌دهیم، هرچه پول بخواهی به تو می‌دهیم، از دید خودشان به جهان نگاه می‌کردند و خیال می‌کردند پیامبر هم برای همین محرکات می‌خواهد مبارزه کند، گفت تو زن می‌خواهی به تو می‌دهیم، ثروت می‌خواهی به تو می‌دهیم، تمام ثروت عرب را، قدرت سیاسی هم می‌خواهی به تو می‌دهیم و تو را هم پادشاه مملکت خودمان می‌کنیم. دیگر چه دردی داری؟ پیغمبر گفت به خدا قسم اگر خورشید را در یک دستم و ماه را در دست دیگرم قرار بدهید من دست از این دعوت برنمی‌دارم.

اگر تقویم را عوض می‌کنند، اگر عرض کنم می‌گویند هواپیمای اختصاصی می‌فرستیم، همه اینها، که بعداً توضیح می‌دهیم برای این است که دوست دارند و می‌خواهند جنبش متوقف شود. اما فراموش نکنید آن کس که پیشنهاد سازش و دوستی می‌دهد یعنی دریک وضعیت تدافعی قرار گرفته است. می‌بینید جنبش به‌رغم همه فشارها و شکنجه‌ها و بریان‌کردن زندانیان، در حال گسترش است. آن موقع هم پیروان پیامبر را بریان می‌کردند، منتها نه روی میزهای الکتریکی با استفاده از آخرین متدهای اختراعی آمریکایی‌ها و تعلیمات سازمان‌های جاسوسی بزرگ، بلکه بازداشت‌شدگان را روی شن‌های داغ مکه می‌خواباندند، لخت می‌کردند و سنگ‌های سنگین روی سینه‌هاشان می‌گذاشتند. در زیر گرمای شدید عربستان بدن بازداشت‌شدگان بریان می‌شد. خوب حالا البته کار را آسان‌تر کرده‌اند. آن موقع در فضای باز بریان‌شان می‌کردند و حالا در فضای بسته زندان‌های کمیته. البته حالا فضا را باز کرده‌اند. یعنی آن موقع در زندان‌های کمیته بی سروصدا می‌کشتند حالا توی خیابان‌ها و در فضای باز با مسلسل می‌کشتند. اما آن شکنجه‌ها فایده نکرد پس از در دوستی درآمدند. اما خداوند به پیغمبر می‌گوید این‌ها دوست دارند با تو

مداهنه کنند که تو را به مداهنه با خودشان بکشانند. آنها پیش قدم شده‌اند تا تو را به سازشکاری بکشانند. خط مشی و تاکتیک آنها را بیان می‌کند تمام ارزش پیغمبر به این است که حرف خود را قاطع بزند. اگر قرار باشد سازشکار بشوی و با آنها کنار بیایی دیگر چه داری که عرضه کنی. آنها می‌خواهند تو را خلع سلاح کنند و تو را به سازشکاری بکشانند.

اما تو «وَلَا تُطِعْ كُلَّ حَلَّافٍ مَهِينٍ» از هر فرومایه‌ای که بسیار سوگند می‌خورد پیروی مکن». حلاف و حلف یعنی سوگند، پیمان. مهین یعنی پست و فرومایه. روزنامه‌های کیهان و اطلاعات را خوانده‌اید و کسی که از این سوگندها و قسم‌های خیلی بزرگ می‌خورد را دیدید. به زبان بی‌زبانی می‌گویند: جان من، بالاغیرتاً، به خدا مملکت در خطر انفجار است؛ ای مردم بیایید همکاری کنید، مملکت منفجر نشود. خوب اگر مملکت منفجر می‌شود چه کسی را از بین می‌برد.

این «حَلَّافٍ مَهِينٍ» چه خصوصیتی دارد: «هَمَّازٍ مَشَّاءٍ بِنَمِيمٍ عِيبِجَوِيٍّ» که برای سخن‌چینی اینجا و آنجا می‌رود». همزه می‌دانید که یعنی چه؟ یعنی کسی که مردم را دست می‌اندازد، کسی که ارزش برای شخصیت انسان‌ها قائل نیست. دست انداختن نه به معنای اینکه با هم شوخی می‌کنید و همدیگر را دست می‌اندازید، دست‌انداختن در اینجا یعنی او اصلاً ارزشی برای شخصیت انسان‌ها قائل نیست. علاوه بر این، پیامد این بی‌اعتنایی و بی‌اعتقادی او به شخصیت، منافع و حقوق دیگران این است که او: «مَنَّاغٍ لِلْخَيْرِ مُعْتَدٍ أَثِيمٍ» باز دارنده از خیر، متجاوز گناهکار» است. عدوان یعنی تجاوز. معتد شخص متجاوز است. معتد یعنی کسی که از تمام حدود تجاوز کرده است اثم یعنی گناه و اثم و ائیم گناهکار.

درآمد نفتی ما در سال بیست و چند میلیارد دلار است اما یک مدرسه حسابی نداریم. هنوز برق‌ها نوبتی قطع و وصل می‌شود، هنوز آب لوله‌کشی نوبتی است، پیاز و سیر و تخم مرغ و گوجه فرنگی و کلیه مایحتاج روزانه مردم از خارج می‌آید. مملکتی که ۱۵ یا ۲۰ سال پیش صادرکننده برنج بود حالا از آمریکا برنج وارد می‌کند و این حلاف مهین قسم می‌خورد که ما به پشت دروازه‌های تمدن بزرگ رسیده‌ایم. این نظام و شاه مصداق هَمَّازٍ مَشَّاءٍ بِنَمِيمٍ است، مُعْتَدٍ أَثِيمٍ، متجاوز بسیار

گناهکار است. خیال می‌کنند، همانطور که آقا در اعلامیه‌شان آورده‌اند، مردم بچه هستند که با یک توپ بازی‌شان بدهند.

او کیست: «عُلُّ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ رَنِيمٌ، خشن مردی ناشناخته نسب». قرآن در واقع ماهیت این‌ها را به یک معنایی بیان می‌کند و می‌گوید این‌هایی که دائماً از مردم عیبجویی می‌کنند کسانی هستند که اصل و نسب‌شان معلوم نیست و می‌پندارند که: «أَنْ كَانَ ذَا مَالٍ وَ بَنِينَ، بدان جهت که صاحب مال و فرزند است». پس می‌توانند قوانین هستی را نادیده بگیرند. مال و فرزند در اینجا نماد قدرت اقتصادی و جمعیت است. خیال می‌کنند چون صاحب قدرت اقتصادی هستند، حزب رستاخیز هم درست می‌کنند که ذابین بشوند. بنین در اینجا نماد جمعیت است. با این پندارها به خود حق می‌دهند که: «إِذَا تُلِّيٰ عَلَيْهِ آيَاتُنَا قَالَ أَسَاطِيرُ الْأَوَّلِينَ، چون آیات ما بر او خوانده شود گویند اساطیر پیشینیان است».

سرنوشت او و این نظام، چه خواهد بود: «سَنَسِيْمُهُ عَلَى الْخُرْطُومِ، به زودی بر بینی‌اش داغ می‌گذاریم». ترجمه به اصطلاح عامیانه خودمان از این سَنَسِيْمُهُ عَلَى الْخُرْطُومِ یعنی پوزه‌شان را به خاک می‌مالیم و این نزدیک است.

با این مقدمه و توضیحاتی که از این آیات سوره قلم به عرضتان رسید به بحث در مورد مسائل ایران و وضعیت کنونی کشورمان می‌پردازیم.

در هفته‌های اخیر حوادثی در کشور ما رخ داده است که اگر کسی سابقه این حوادث را نداشته باشد و بخواند روزنامه‌های امروز را با روزنامه‌های یکسال پیش مقایسه کند دچار یک تعجب بزرگ خواهد شد. وقتی روزنامه را ورق می‌زنید، با یک سلسله تضادهایی در درون نظام روبرو می‌شوید. از یک طرف رژیم با تمام قوا می‌کوشد که فضای باز سیاسی که وعده داده آن را داده است، نشان بدهد. آموزگار نخست‌وزیر منصوب شاه استعفاء می‌دهد و یک نخست‌وزیر دیگری منصوب و روی کار می‌آید، کابینه عوض می‌شود و وزرای جدید می‌آیند. صفحات روزنامه‌ها همه پر است از خبرهای زیاد که حتی چند ماه پیش اصلاً تصور اینکه روزنامه‌ها این حرف‌ها را بزنند امکان‌پذیر نبود. اما در عین حال شما می‌بینید سازمان‌ها و جمعیت‌های مختلف اعلامیه می‌دهند نشریه می‌دهند و دستجات مختلف خودشان را معرفی می‌کنند. در عین حال در قم و مشهد و بهبهان و آبادان و شیراز ما شاهد

شدیدترین درگیری‌های مردم با پلیس هستیم. در قم مردم مسلحانه در برابر نیروهای پلیس تظاهرات می‌کنند. در اصفهان تظاهرات مسلحانه مردم منجر به دخالت نیروهای نظامی و اعلام حکومت نظامی می‌شود. این‌ها همه بروز تضادها ست. اگر فضا باز است پس این کشتارها چیست؟ مگر اینکه، همانطور که عرض کردم، منظور از فضای باز سیاسی این است که قبلاً در فضاهای بسته می‌کشتند و حالا در فضاهای باز. لازم است که بدانیم که جریان چیست. حتماً شما از خودتان سؤال کرده‌اید که قضایا از چه قرار است چه چیزی در حال وقوع است. البته من ادعا نمی‌کنم که تحلیلی که ارائه می‌دهم صددرصد درست باشد چرا برای اینکه دشمنان این‌طور نیستند که بیابند نقشه‌ها و برنامه‌های خودشان را در یک سلسله بخشنامه‌هایی به مردم ابلاغ بکنند و بگویند که ما این خیالات را داریم حالا شما خود دانید. بصیرت سیاسی و بینش سیاسی و دانش سیاسی یعنی اینکه بتوانیم با مطالعه نوشته‌ها و گفته‌های دشمن و از خلال خطوط و سطوری که گفته می‌شود و نوشته می‌شود و از تحلیل وقایع و از کنار هم قراردادن این وقایع بفهمیم که چه خبر است. این یعنی بینش سیاسی. اساسی‌ترین مسأله‌ای که شما امروز لازم دارید همین بینش سیاسی است. اگر ما بینش سیاسی نداشته باشیم، سرمان کلاه می‌رود. در صحبت‌های قبلی‌مان به کرات بحث کرده‌ایم که چه فرقی است بین احساس سیاسی و بینش سیاسی و دانش سیاسی. همان‌طور که فرق بین احساس مذهبی و بینش مذهبی و دانش مذهبی را بیان کردیم. همان‌طوری که احساس مذهبی به تنهایی باعث سوءاستفاده از مذهب می‌شود، احساس سیاسی نیز همین‌طور است. بارها و بارها و به کرات اتفاق افتاده است که از احساس مذهبی مردم سوءاستفاده شده است. با احساس مذهبی مردم را بسیج کردند و علیه دوستان واقعی خودشان شوراندند. رژیم ایران به کرات از این موضوع استفاده و بهره‌برداری کرده است. یادمان نرود که در زمان جنجال علیه شریعتی و حسینیه ارشاد چگونه از احساس مذهبی مردم بهره‌برداری می‌کردند. با آن تلفن‌هایی که از بالای منبر به حضرت زینب می‌زدند از احساس مذهبی مردم بهره‌برداری می‌کردند. اینکه شاه با فرح و پسرش می‌روند به مشهد، و می‌بینیم که «گرچه شد زاهد و عابد و مسلمانا» و دست به دعا برمی‌دارند و عکس می‌گیرند و شرح و تفضیلات آن را در روزنامه‌ها چاپ

می‌کنند، چه چیزی را می‌رساند. آنها می‌خواهند در اوج مبارزات ملت علیه استبداد از احساس مذهبی مردم بهره‌برداری کنند. اما این وقتی است که مردم فاقد بینش مذهبی باشند. رابطه احساس و بینش سیاسی همین است. شما اگر بینش سیاسی نداشته باشید و نتوانید قضایا را درست درک کنید، از احساس سیاسی شما بهره‌برداری می‌کنند. این شما هستید که مایه می‌گذارید، وقت و انرژی می‌گذارید و داد می‌زنید و حتی جلوی گلوله مسلسل می‌روید و خون می‌دهید و کشته می‌شوید. اما اگر فقط با محرکات احساسی و عاطفی در این جریان‌ها شرکت کرده باشید از مابهران از این بهره‌برداری خواهند کرد و باز هم می‌بینید که سرتان کلاه رفته است، این اتفاق خواهد افتاد. بنابراین لازم است که ما و همه کسانی که به سرنوشت جنبش علاقه دارند و دست‌اندرکار مبارزات سیاسی هستند، بدانند که این حوادث چگونه است و چرا این اتفاقات می‌افتد، دشمن ما دارد چگونه عمل می‌کند. اگر نفهمیم و نتوانیم تحلیل بکنیم سرمان کلاه می‌رود و دوباره علی‌رغم همه خون‌هایی که مردم داده‌اند و می‌دهند، یک دیکتاتوری می‌رود و یک دیکتاتوری بدتر از آن جایش را خواهد گرفت. کوشش من در این تحلیل این است که بعضی نکات مختصراً مطرح شوند و تحلیل بیشتر و وسیع‌تر آنها را به وقت دیگر موکول کنیم. به اصطلاح معروف یک سرنوشتی دست شما می‌دهد که خود شما دنبال قضایا را بگیرید. وقایع کنونی ایران حاصل عملکرد چه نیروهایی است. این وضع چرا در ایران به وجود آمده است. چرا چهار سال پیش اگر رساله آقای خمینی را در منزل کسی پیدا می‌کردند، او را می‌گرفتند و زندانی می‌کردند. اگر کسی کتاب شریعتی را داشت، ده سال یا کمتر یا بیشتر زندانی می‌شد. ولی امروز این کار را نمی‌کنند چه اتفاقی افتاده است. آیا اینها توبه کرده‌اند؟ این اوضاع و احوال را چه کسی به وجود آورده است؟ برای چه و چه نیروهایی دست‌اندرکار بودند؟

در صحبت‌های گذشته ما این را تحلیل کردیم و گفتیم که سه نیروی عمده هستند که در به وجود آمدن اوضاع و احوال کنونی ایران نقش عمده و اساسی دارند. این سه نیرو عبارتند از: سیاست‌های خارجی در راس آن آمریکا، رژیم شاه و عواملش و جنبش خلق. این سه نیرو هیچکدام در خلاء عمل نمی‌کنند که آزادانه

هرجورخواستند رفتارکنند و هر مسیری را که خواستند انتخاب کنند. این سه نیرو دائماً روی هم اثر می‌گذارند و از هم اثر می‌پذیرند. هر عمل و عکس‌العملی که می‌کنند روی نیروهای دیگر اثر می‌گذارد. درس‌خوانی ارلینگتون، نگراس و درلندن این بحثها را کرده‌ام. به‌خصوص سیاست خارجی آمریکا بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم تاکنون را بررسی و ریشه‌های سیاسی - اقتصادی و تاریخی آن را نشان دادیم. چراسیاست خارجی آمریکا در شرایط کنونی به اجبار بر پایه حقوق بشر نهاده شده است و منظور از سیاست حقوق بشر کارتر چیست و کدام کشورها مورد توجه هستند. چرا در مورد کشورهای مثل ایران این سیاست مورد توجه نیست. یعنی آنها کاری به کار ایران در این مورد به‌خصوص ندارند. در تحلیل‌های گذشته بیان کردیم که از نظر ملت ایران و نیروهای داخلی رژیم شاه و عواملش چگونه و چرا به بن بست کنونی رسیده‌اند. گفتیم که نظام شاه در ایران فاقد مشروعیت و مقبولیت است. رژیم پهلوی در سه نوبت به دست خارجی بر سر کار آمده است: کودتای سوم اسفند سال ۱۲۹۹، شهریور سال ۱۳۲۰ و کودتای ۲۸ مرداد سال ۱۳۳۲. برغم ۵۰ سال سلطنت پهلوی‌ها، چه در طی دوران رضاخان و چه از شهریور ۲۸ تا ۲۰ مرداد و چه از ۲۸ مرداد تا به امروز، به‌خصوص از کودتای ۲۸ مرداد به بعد در مراحل مختلف رژیم شاه سعی کرده است برای خود مقبولیت به‌وجود آورد و لی نتوانسته و شکست خورده است. الآن رژیم در بن بست است. اگر سیاستهای خارجی برای حفظ مصالح و منافع خودشان، اعمال تغییراتی را ضروری می‌بینند، به این دلیل است که در خلأ نیستند و لاجرم تحت تأثیر نیروهای دیگر قرار دارند. از آن جمله است مقاومت و مبارزه مردم ما در ۲۵ سال گذشته. مردم مایک روزیک هم دست از مقاومت برنداشتند، یک روز هم نبوده که زندانها خالی از مبارزین باشد، اگر شما به خواهید تقویم ایام را در ایران در این ۲۵ سال گذشته بنویسید یک روز نیست که ما شهید نداشته باشیم. بنابراین درست است که رژیم شاه یک رژیمی است غاصب و منحط و نتوانسته از خودش هیچ نوع کفایتی را نشان بدهد. برغم پشتیبانی بزرگترین قدرت‌های جهان غرب و برغم پشتیبانی بلوک شرق، چین و روسیه شوروی سوسیالیستی، و بر خورداری از تمامی امکانات بین‌المللی و سالی ۲۰ میلیارد دلار درآمد نفت نتوانسته هیچ کاری موثر در دراز مدت انجام دهد. با هر معیاری نهایت

بی عرضگی و بی کفایتی یک دستگاه رامی رساند. اما اگر مردم مبارزه و مقاومت نمی‌کردند و فریب تظاهرات پوشالی دستگاه را خورده بودند، امروز این مبارزه و این بن بست در ایران نبود. یابرعکس اگر مردم مامبارزه می‌کردند و مقاومت می‌کردند ولی رژیم توانسته بود به طور نسبی در اجرای برنامه‌های خودش موفقیت به دست بیاورد، امروز باز هم این نظام در بن بست نبود. می‌بینیم که هر دو عامل روی هم تأثیرات متقابل دارند. برای اینکه آمریکا و سیاست خارجی و رژیم شاه از این بن بست درآیند، در بحث‌های گذشته گفتیم که سه راه حل یا به اصطلاح ما سه نوع آلترناتیو مطرح است. راه حل اول اینست که حداقل تغییرات ضروری را با حضور شاه ادامه بدهند. یعنی شاه همچنان بر اریکه سلطنت و قدرت نشسته باشد بعد آزادی‌های به اصطلاح دموکراتیک را بدهند، احتمال موفقیت این راه حل بود. وقتی شاه در نوامبر به آمریکا آمد، صحبت‌هایی کردند، شاه برگشت و سپس کارتر در ژانویه به ایران سفر کرد. ظاهر قضایا نشان می‌داد که روی این راه حل توافق شده است. اما حوادث واشنگتن و تظاهرات گسترده ایران این راه حل را منتفی کرد. راه حل یا آلترناتیو دوم این است که شاه استعفاء بدهد برود و فرح به‌عنوان نایب‌السلطنه بیاید روی کار و سلطنت حفظ شود و تغییرات لازم و ضروری در چهارچوب نظام شاهنشاهی صورت گیرد. اما اگر ببینند که این راه حل هم عملی نیست راه حل سوم یا آلترناتیو سوم این خواهد بود که ارتش کودتا کند شاه را به خارج بفرستد، نظام سلطنتی را از بین ببرد و نظام جمهوری را اعلام کند. حال باید دید این راه حل‌ها را چه کسانی ترجیح می‌دهند و جهت جنبش باید کدام طرف باشد و جنبش چگونه موضع گرفته و در آینده باید چه موضعی داشته باشد. قبل از این بررسی مطلبی را باید به صحبت‌های قبلی اضافه کنم و آن تحلیلی از نیروهای حاکم و مؤثر در آمریکاست و اینکه این نیروها در رابطه با کل منطقه خاورمیانه چه موضعی و چه نقشی دارند و بازتاب جدالی که بین این نیروها در رابطه با مسائل منطقه است در وضع ایران چگونه است و چگونه هر یک از این نیروها سعی می‌کنند راه حل یا آلترناتیو مورد نظر خودشان را در ایران پیاده کنند.

نیروهایی که در آمریکا حاکم هستند و قدرت را در دست دارند عبارتند از:

۱. کمپانی‌های نفتی و سرمایه‌داران بزرگ،

۲. ارتشیان و نظامی‌ها و صنایع نظامی

۳. یهودیان آمریکا و صهیونیست‌ها

هر کدام از این سه نیرو یک قدرت دارند و هر کدامشان به یک مشکلی در تعیین خطوط کلی سیاست خارجی و رویدادهای داخلی آمریکا در رابطه با آن سیاست خارجی اثر می‌گذارند و بدون شناخت عملکرد این سه نیرو ما نمی‌توانیم عملکرد سیاست خارجی آمریکا را در منطقه و در ایران بفهمیم. وقتی که می‌گوییم سیاست آمریکا یا آمریکایی‌ها این کار را کردند، باید روشن کنیم که منظور ما کدامیک از این نیروها هستند. نیرو یا قدرت مؤثر اول کمپانی‌های نفتی و سرمایه‌داران بزرگ می‌باشند. شما می‌دانید که از بین چندین هزار کمپانی بزرگ که در آمریکا هست ۵۰۰ کمپانی تمام اقتصاد آمریکا و شاید قسمت اعظم جهان را در دست دارند. مجلات معتبر اقتصادی آمریکا هر سال لیست این ۵۰۰ شرکت را، میزان فروش و درآمد آن‌ها را منتشر می‌کنند. جایگاه بعضی از کمپانی‌ها در این لیست تغییر می‌کند و بالا و پایین می‌رود. بعضی‌ها از لیست خارج می‌شوند. اما در دو دهه یا سه دهه گذشته چند کمپانی هست که همیشه و در تمام این سال‌ها در ردیف‌های اول لیست قرار دارند. یکی از آنها کمپانی نفتی «اکسان» است، که در دو سه سال گذشته همیشه در صدر این فهرست قرار دارد. یعنی بزرگترین کمپانی در آمریکا «اکسان» است. بعد از آن «جنرال موتورز» است بعد از آن کمپانی نفتی «گلف» یا «موبیل اویل» است. البته یک بحث است که این کمپانی‌ها نه آمریکایی هستند نه آلمانی و نه اروپایی؛ نه دین دارند نه ملیت. اینها فقط یک خدا بیشتر ندارند و آن هم پول است. لابد شما بحث چندملیتی‌ها را شنیده‌اید. کمپانی‌هایی که «چندملیتی یا مولتی نشنال» هستند. کمپانی‌هایی هستند که آمریکایی است ولی مرکزش در سوئیس است. کمپانی‌هایی که مثلاً سهام آن را هم ژاپنی‌ها و هم آمریکایی‌ها هم ایتالیایی‌ها و هم انگلیسی‌ها دارند. «بل هلی کوپتر» مرکزش در تگزاس است اما بزرگترین شعبه‌اش در ایتالیا است. این کارتل‌ها و تراست‌ها مرزها را از بین برده‌اند. درعین حال که مولتی نشنال هستند اما در آمریکا قدرت دارند. اینها برای خودشان CIA دارند نه اینکه CIA باشند، نه، یعنی برای خودشان سازمان‌های جاسوسی و ضدجاسوسی دارند، کودتا می‌کنند، دولت می‌برند دولت

می‌آورند. شاید شما شنیده باشید که در شیلی شرکت ITT علیه آئنده کودتا کرد. وقایع CIA به این‌ها متوسل می‌شود. این‌ها مافیایا را در اختیار دارند. گاهی CIA برای انجام برنامه‌ای به «هاوارد هیوز» متوسل می‌شود. اگر من بخواهم داستان اینها را شرح بدهم بحث طولانی می‌شود. بازار نفت تنها صنعت و تجارتی است که استخراج نفت از تپه چاه نفت، در هر کجای دنیا، تصفیه و پالایش، فروش و توزیع، تا آنجا که در باک ماشین شما ریخته می‌شود، همه در اختیار و انحصار کمپانی‌های نفتی است. هیچ صنعت دیگری مثل نفت نیست. تمام اینها مولتی نشنال هستند. چند شرکت هم بیشتر نیستند و تمامی منابع نفتی دنیا را هم بین خودشان تقسیم کرده‌اند. اینها از طریق بالا و پائین بردن قیمت نفت اقتصاد جهان را کنترل می‌کنند. در آمریکا شرکت‌های نفتی در سیاسی‌های کلان نقش کلیدی دارند. اما گروه دوم نظامی‌ها هستند. برادرانی که اقتصاد می‌خوانند، می‌دانند که اقتصاد آمریکا یک اقتصاد نظامی است و بدون جنگ نمی‌تواند به زندگی خودش ادامه دهد. یا حداقل تا این زمان چنین بوده است. قبل از جنگ بین‌الملل دوم، در دهه ۱۹۳۰ آمریکا در حال ورشکستگی بود. جنگ جهانی دوم و شرکت آمریکا در جنگ، آمریکا را نجات داد. بعد از آن جنگ کره بعد از جنگ کره، جنگ ویتنام و حالا هم معلوم نیست کدام جنگ. اما بنا به دلایلی که در صحبت‌های قبلی توضیح داده‌ام آمریکا نمی‌تواند به این جنگ‌ها به این صورت ادامه دهد. لازم است تغییری در این سیاست‌ها بدهد و وضع اقتصادی خود را از راه‌های دیگری ترمیم کند. بازکردن راه ارتباط اقتصادی با کشورهای چین و روسیه شوروی یک مقدار با این موضوع رابطه دارد. رابطه‌ای هم میان عملکرد کمپانی‌های نفتی با صنایع نظامی وجود دارد. پولی که بابت درآمد نفت به عربستان سعودی و ایران داده می‌شود بایست به نحوی به آمریکا برگردد و صنایع نظامی آمریکا را بچرخاند. بنابراین، این دو کشور یعنی ایران و عربستان سعودی سالی ده‌ها میلیارد دلار بابت خرید اسلحه به آمریکا برمی‌گردانند. شاید شما بدانید که دولت ایران مخارج تحقیقاتی را که کمپانی‌های آمریکایی برای تکمیل هواپیماهای «اف ۱۸» لازم دارند می‌پردازد. یعنی هواپیماهایی که هنوز درست نشده‌اند برای اینکه تحقیق و مطالعه بکنند، ایران خرید آن‌ها را سفارش داده است. یعنی دولت ایران با سفارش خرید خود، مخارج

تولید این هواپیما را می‌دهد. بدون چنین کمک‌هایی، بدون چنین خریدهایی امکان ندارد صنایع نظامی آمریکا به کار خودشان ادامه دهند. کارخانجات نظامی، ارتش آمریکا به طرق مختلف قوه مقننه آمریکا را کنترل می‌کنند و بر سیاست خارجی آمریکا اثر می‌گذارند. یک مثال می‌زنم: کمپانی بل هلی‌کوپتر در شهر آرلینگتون تگزاس با دولت ایران قرارداد فروش چندین هزار هلی‌کوپتر را منعقد کرده است. همین‌طور با عربستان سعودی. ادامه حیات این شرکت و دادن خدمات به ارتش آمریکا به ادامه فروش هلی‌کوپترهایش به ایران و عربستان بستگی دارد. حالا برای اینکه ارتش آمریکا با این کمپانی بل هلی‌کوپتر قرارداد ببندد، نماینده آن شهر در کنگره باید به آن لویجی که ارتشی‌ها و نظامی‌ها ارائه می‌دهند رأی بدهد. اگر رأی ندهد و این لویج تصویب نشوند، چه می‌شود؟ وزارت دفاع به بل هلی‌کوپتر سفارشی نمی‌دهد. در نتیجه چندین هزار کارگر در آن شهر بیکار می‌شوند. مردم در انتخابات دوره بعد این آقا را انتخاب نمی‌کنند. برخلاف آنچه که مارکسیست‌ها پیش‌بینی می‌کردند، کارگر آمریکایی که در بل هلی‌کوپتر کار می‌کند احساس مشترکی با کارگران ایران ندارند و اگر ببینند که این هلی‌کوپترها کارگران ایرانی را می‌کشند به نفع کارگر ایرانی اعتصاب نمی‌کنند. کارگران آمریکایی بدشان نمی‌آید که این هلی‌کوپترها ساخته شوند و روانه ایران شود و پول نفت بیاید. حالا دولت ایران با این هلی‌کوپترها می‌خواهد کارگران کارخانه ذوب آهنی را که روس‌ها ساخته‌اند بکشد، خوب بکشد. برایش مهم نیست. هر کاری که می‌خواهد بکند. از این طریق نظامیان آمریکا قوه مقننه را کنترل می‌کنند. بودجه عظیم نظامی آمریکا، در میان تمام بخش‌های مختلف دولت تنها وزارتخانه‌ای است که قوه مقننه کنترل عمده‌ای روی آن ندارد. تا سال‌های اخیر حتی نمی‌دانستند که بودجه CIA چقدر است. این‌هایی را که می‌گویم توضیحات بیشترش را برادران و خواهرانی که مایل باشند می‌توانند به کتاب «مسبب جنگ جهانی سوم، نوشته استاد دانشگاه کلمبیا» رجوع کنند. در این کتاب نویسنده با اسناد و مدارک نشان می‌دهد که چه نیروهایی و با چه قدرتی جهان را دوباره به سوی جنگ سومی می‌کشاند. کتاب دیگری است به نام: «بحران در پنتاگون» و نیز کتاب *The Pointe of Rebellion* نوشته ویلیام داگلاس قاضی بزرگ آمریکایی. این‌ها عناوین چند کتابی است که

الان در ذهنم هست. در مطبوعات آمریکا در مورد موافقین و مخالفین ادامه مسابقه تسلیحات و مذاکرات خلع سلاح میان آمریکا و روسیه شوروی، سالت ۱ و سالت ۲ و سالت ۳ مطالب فراوانی وجود دارد. مطالعه این مطالب به شما کمک می‌کند تا نقش نظامیان آمریکا در سیاست‌های کلان دنیا را بهتر بفهمید.

اما گروه سوم یهودیان آمریکا هستند. این‌ها آنچنان قدرتی دارند که حتی در انتخابات رئیس‌جمهور مؤثر هستند و نقش تعیین‌کننده‌ای را ایفا می‌نمایند. یک روزنامه‌نگار آمریکایی آمار داده بود که اسرائیل ۷۵٪ آرای سنای آمریکا را دارد. هر لایحه‌ای را که اسرائیل بخواهد سنای آمریکا تصویب می‌کند. در آمریکا مؤسساتی هستند که به سناتورهای آمریکا، براساس رأی به لویح مربوط به اسرائیل، نمره می‌دهد. مثلاً سناتور جکسون نمره‌اش ۱۰۰ است. یک سناتور دیگر فولبرایت نمره‌اش می‌شود «صفر». یا معینان برای اینکه سناتور بشود اول شهردار نیویورک می‌شود، که یهودیان خیلی نفوذ دارند. بعد وقتی خوب به یهودیان خدمت می‌کند، می‌تواند سناتور هم بشود. هر رئیس‌جمهوری که حمایت دو گروه از این سه گروه را داشته باشد، انتخابش قطعی است. هرگاه رئیس‌جمهوری با حمایت نظامیان و کمپانی‌های نفتی و بدون حمایت یهودیان انتخاب شود، می‌تواند مستقل از فشار یهودیان عمل کند. یک نمونه آن آیزنهاور بود. آیزنهاور یک قهرمان نظامی آمریکا در جنگ جهانی دوم و مورد علاقه مردم بود. او هم یک نظامی ضد فاشیست جنگیده در اروپا بود و هم کاندیدای کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامی‌ها. بدون اینکه احتیاج به آراء و کمک یهودیان داشته باشد، انتخاب شد. دولت آیزنهاور مجری برنامه کمپانی‌های نفتی در خاورمیانه از جهت قراردادهای و روابط نفتی در منطقه هم بود، که منجر به کودتای ۲۸ مرداد در ایران شد و هم از جهت برخورد با اسرائیل در منطقه. کمپانی‌های نفتی به دلیل منابع نفتی خاورمیانه در کشورهای عربی در مورد چگونگی راه حل مشکل خاورمیانه با صهیونیست‌ها اختلاف دارند. به این معنا که کمپانی‌های نفتی معتقدند اسرائیل بایستی به مرزهای قبل از جنگ سال ۶۷ برگردد. کمپانی‌های نفتی معتقد بودند که با توجه به تشکیل دولت اسرائیل منافع درازمدت آمریکا در نزدیکی و همکاری با اعراب است. سیاست آمریکا در مورد اعراب و فلسطینی‌ها و یهودی‌ها باید بر اساس سیاست موازنه مثبت باشد.

یعنی هرگونه کمکی که به اسرائیل می‌کند به همان نسبت هم به اعراب بکند مثلاً در زمان آیزنهاور وقتی که قرار شد یک کارخانه تبدیل آب شور دریا به آب شیرین به اسرائیل بدهند، آیزنهاور گفت: «می‌دهم به شرطی که عین همین را به اعراب بدهیم». بنابراین یک کارخانه هم به کویت و یکی هم به اردن دادند. ظاهراً یک کارخانه هم به عربستان سعودی دادند. در سال ۱۹۵۶ وقتی سه کشور انگلیس، فرانسه و اسرائیل به مصر حمله کردند، دولت آیزنهاور گفت: «اسرائیل باید عقب‌نشینی کند». بعد از جنگ ۶۷ سیاست کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان آمریکا، هماهنگ با کمپانی‌های نفتی و به دلایلی که عرض کردم، این بوده است که دولت اسرائیل بایستی سرزمین‌های اشغالی را تخلیه کند و به مرزهای قبل از جنگ برگردد. اعراب هم اسرائیل را به رسمیت بشناسند، بین اعراب و اسرائیل صلح بشود و دولت مستقل فلسطینی در غرب رودخانه اردن و باریکه غزه به وجود بیاید. اما اسرائیل با این راه حل مخالف است. اسرائیل حاضر به صلح نیست. اسرائیل حاضر به تخلیه سرزمین‌های اشغالی نیست. صلح و تخلیه سرزمین‌های اشغالی با اصل موجودیت اسرائیل تناقض دارد. اگر فرصتی شد، توضیح می‌دهم که چرا اسرائیل نمی‌تواند صلح کند و پذیرفتن صلح و عقب‌نشینی از سرزمین‌های اشغالی، حتی اگر اعراب هم آن را به رسمیت بشناسند، برای اسرائیل حکم خودزنی را دارد و نمی‌تواند به اسرائیل ادامه حیات بدهد. ولی جنگ ۶۷ و شکست اعراب راه حل کمپانی‌های نفتی را تقویت کرده است. تا زمان جنگ ۶۷ امید کشورهای غربی این بود که بشود با سازش بین دولت‌های عربی و اسرائیل قضیه را تمام کرد. یعنی اگر کشورهای عربی می‌آمدند و با هم و با اسرائیل می‌ساختند، قضیه می‌توانست تمام بشود. اما بعد از جنگ ۶۷ این امکان از بین رفت. چرا؟ برای این که شکست اعراب در این جنگ موجب شد که از درون فلسطین «سازمان الفتح» و قیام مسلحانه و آزادیبخش مردم فلسطین به وجود آید. قیام مسلحانه مردم فلسطین سابقه‌ای از سال‌های ۱۹۳۸ دارد. اما تا سال ۶۷ مردم فلسطین دچار این توهم بودند که دولت‌های عربی و ارتش‌های عربی می‌توانند سرزمین‌های اشغالی آنان را پس بگیرند. صدای قاهره دائماً می‌خواند که: «اننا عائدون - ما می‌آییم» اما جنگ ۶۷ به این افسانه پایان داد. مردم فلسطین دیدند جز اینکه خودشان اسلحه بردارند و

بجنگند، هیچ راه حل دیگری ندارند. الفتح، که در سال ۱۹۶۵ تأسیس شده بود، یک زمینه سیاسی بسیار مناسبی برای گسترش فعالیت‌های نظامی خودش پیدا کرد. بنابراین ناگهان جوانان فلسطینی با سرعت عجیبی به الفتح و جبهه آزادیبخش فلسطین روی آوردند. تا آن زمان مردم فلسطین نقش مؤثر و کلیدی در مبارزه با اسرائیل نداشتند. علاوه بر این، جنگ ۶۷ عدم کارآیی ناسیونالیزم عرب را به‌عنوان یک حرکت سیاسی یک بعدی و ضعف ارتش‌های عربی را در برابر اسرائیل به‌خوبی نشان داد. سوم اینکه باعث شد که سرزمین‌های بیشتری به تصاحب و اشغال اسرائیل دربیاید. مجموعه اینها تشنجات منطقه را در ابعاد جدیدی تشدید کرد. به‌طوری که «ساف» لانهٔ زنبور در منطقه شد و مجاهدین ایران آنجا تربیت شدند و تعلیم دیدند. مارکسیست‌های ایرانی نیز آنجا تعلیم و تربیت دیدند. همچنین رزمندگان جنبش ظفار و اریتره و فیلیپین در آنجا تربیت می‌شوند. اگر در زمان ناصر، مصر از طریق رادیو و تبلیغات سیاسی دنیای عرب را علیه غرب می‌شورانید و دائم فریاد می‌زد و با شعار «من الخلیج الی المحيط - از خلیج تا اقیانوس اطلس» اعراب را به وحدت عربی دعوت می‌کرد و یک نوع آگاهی سیاسی میان اعراب به وجود آورده بود، جنبش مسلحانهٔ مردم فلسطین بعد جدیدی به مبارزات منطقه می‌افزاید. این امر باعث تشدید نگرانی کمپانی‌های بزرگ نفتی می‌شود که ادامه تشنجات را به هیچ‌وجه در نفع خود نمی‌دیدند. مرگ زودهنگام ناصر باعث می‌شود که مرکزیت سیاست‌های عربی از قاهره به ریاض منتقل شود. برنامه‌ای که کمپانی‌های نفتی، حتی در زمان ناصر، کوشش می‌کردند زیر لوای اسلام و اینکه عربستان خادم‌الحرمین است، مرکزیت فعالیت‌های عربی را از قاهره به ریاض منتقل کنند با مرگ ناصر تحقق پیدا کند. و ریاض، عربستان سعودی می‌شود مرکز فعل و انفعالات فعالیت‌های سیاسی منطقه به رهبری سعودی‌ها و کمپانی‌های نفتی در دو بعد: ۱. با پول فراوان نفت و ۲. زیر لوای اسلام و کنفرانس اسلامی و رابطهٔ «العالم الاسلامیه». این تحول دومی است که در منطقه رخ می‌دهد. تحول اول بعد از جنگ ۶۷ و به‌وجود آمدن جنبش مسلحانه مردم فلسطین است و تحول دوم بعد از مرگ ناصر و پایان داستان عصر ناسیونالیزم عرب و انتقال مرکزیت عربی به ریاض. حال باید دید با این تحولات

در منطقه، برنامه‌های کمپانی‌های نفتی را چگونه بایستی در کشورهای عربی پیاده کرد. این برمی‌گردد به همان تحلیلی که در جلسه «انجمن اسلامی دانشجویان - گروه فارسی زبان وست ویرجینیا» ارائه شد. در برخورد و مبارزه با کمونیزم و دشمنان احتمالی آمریکا از زمان آیزنهاور دو تز و نظریه مطرح شد. یک نظر تقابل نظامی و به پیروی از آن تشکیل پیمان‌های نظامی منطقه‌ای. اما نظر سرمایه‌داران آمریکایی مهار کمونیزم از طریق ایجاد روابط اقتصادی بود. سیاست نیکسون در واقع پیگیری نظر سرمایه‌داران بزرگ آمریکا در تقابل با بلوک شرق بود. اما ابتدا او سعی کرد تا جنگ ویتنام را هرچه زودتر آبرومندانه و با حفظ آبروی خارجی آمریکا پایان بدهد. سپس سیاست «دی تان» یا به اصطلاح سیاست «تقلیل تشنج» بین آمریکا و کشورهای روسیه شوروی و چین را پیاده کند. در زمان نیکسون این سیاست با جدیت پیگیری و اعمال می‌شود. برای اولین بار رئیس جمهور آمریکا به چین می‌رود و روابط اقتصادی و سیاسی برقرار می‌شود. برای اولین بار تمامی محدودیت‌هایی را که برای فروش کالاهای اقتصادی و صنعتی به روسیه شوروی بود، غیر از کالاهای نظامی برداشته می‌شود. تا قبل از آن چنانچه روس‌ها به کامیون‌های عادی بارکش یا وانت‌های آمریکایی احتیاج داشتند و جنرال موتورز می‌خواست بفروشد نمی‌توانست، ممنوعیت قانونی وجود داشت. اما تمام این محدودیت‌ها برداشته می‌شود. برای اولین بار بانک «چیس مانهاتان» گروه راکفلر در مسکو شعبه دایر می‌کند. این اولین بانک غربی است که در مسکو شعبه باز کرده است. همین برنامه را کمپانی‌های نفتی در منطقه پیاده کرده‌اند. بعد از مرگ ناصر و ورشکستگی اقتصادی عظیمی که مصر با آن روبرو شده بود، برای اجرای برنامه‌های کمپانی‌های نفتی، بهترین راه این بود که عربستان سعودی به مصر که به کلی ورشکسته شده بود سالی یک میلیارد دلار کمک کند تا مصر بتواند روی پای خود بایستد. علاوه بر عربستان، ایران هم کمک‌های زیادی به مصر کرد. عربستان سعودی نیز همین کمک‌ها را به سوریه و در ابعاد کمتری به مقاومت فلسطین می‌کند. قسمت اعظم بودجه مقاومت فلسطین از عربستان سعودی و کویت می‌آید. برای پایان دادن جنگ ظفار در عمان، ارتش ایران اعزام شد و آمریکا امیدوار بود ارتش ایران بتواند جنبش آزادیبخش ظفار را منکوب کند. اما این ارتش ایران نبود

که جنبش ظفار را منکوب کرد بلکه از طریق عربستان سعودی مسأله ظفار را ختم کردند. به این صورت که عربستان سعودی به یمن جنوبی نزدیک می‌شود، یمن جنوبی قبول می‌کند که دست از پشتیبانی و کمک اقتصادی به جنبش ظفار بردارد و به ازای آن عربستان سالی ۵۰۰ میلیون دلار به یمن جنوبی کمک کند و نیز نفت عربستان از طریق لوله‌های نفت به بندر حضرموت منتقل شود و کشتی‌های نفتکش از آنجا بارگیری شوند و این یک درآمد ثابت نفتی برای یمن جنوبی باشد. مطبوعات آمریکا در همان سال‌های ۷۳ نوشتند که ارتش آمریکا سربازان خود را برای جنگ در صحرا و در مناطق بی آب و علف و شنزار تعلیمات می‌دهد. جنگ ظفار محلی بود برای آزمایش کارایی آن آموزش‌ها. اما در عمل دیدند که این آموزش‌ها چندان کارایی نداشت. و از طریق عربستان سعودی مسأله ظفار را حل کردند. با همین روش مقدمات اهلی کردن جنبش فلسطین را هم فراهم کردند. اما در مورد مقاومت فلسطین شرط موفقیت این بود که حق مردم فلسطین برای داشتن کشور مستقل و نماینده سازمان آزادیبخش را به رسمیت بشناسند. همان‌طور که در جنگ الجزایر کردند و جنبش جبهه آزادیبخش را به‌عنوان نماینده برحق مردم الجزایر پذیرفتند. همین برنامه را در مورد فلسطین اجرا کردند. در کنفرانس رباط کشورهای عربی جبهه آزادیبخش فلسطین را به‌عنوان نماینده مردم فلسطین و دولت در تبعید پذیرفتند و تدریجاً، به عنوان دولت فلسطین با آن روابط دیپلماتیک برقرار کردند. از نظر سیاسی این به نفع جبهه آزادیبخش در سطح جهانی و منطقه بود اما شمشیر دودم بود. وقتی به رسمیت شناخته شد و در کشورهای مختلف دفتر سیاسی یا سفارت باز کرد، نیاز به بودجه عظیمی پیدا می‌کند. یک سازمان انقلابی با یک تفنگ شکسته‌اش با یک ارتش بزرگ می‌جنگد. ولی وقتی تبدیل به یک نهاد سیاسی - اجتماعی شد، لاجرم دیگر به آن صورت قبلی نمی‌تواند فعالیت کند. هیئت‌های نمایندگی خرج دارند، از کجا باید تأمین شود. دولت‌های عربی عضو اتحادیه عرب تعهد کردند که این مخارج را بدهند. ولی کدام دولت عربی؟ مصر که خودش ورشکسته است. عربستان سعودی و کویت قسمت اعظمش را تضمین می‌کنند. از طریق این کمک‌ها مقاومت فلسطین را می‌توانند به جایی برسانند که مقاومت فلسطین امروز آن تر کمپانی‌های نفتی را پذیرفته است: اسرائیل

سرزمین‌های اشغالی را تخلیه کند به مرزهای قبل از جنگ سال ۶۷ برگردد، یک دولت مستقل فلسطینی در غرب رودخانه اردن و غزه به‌وجود بیاید؛ اعراب اسرائیل را به رسمیت بشناسد و با آن پیمان صلح ببندد. همه دولت‌های عربی این را پذیرفتند. مقاومت فلسطین هم این را پذیرفته است. مجلس شورای فلسطین در ژانویه سال ۷۶ یا ۷۷ که در قاهره تشکیل شد، نشستی که حتی جبهه‌الرفض و گروه جرج حبش هم در آن مجلس شرکت داشتند، به تأسیس دولت مستقل فلسطینی در هر بخشی از سرزمین فلسطین رأی دادند. در حالی که این گروه‌ها تا آن زمان مخالف بودند و به نام جبهه‌الرفض یعنی رد «جبهه رد» معروف شدند. آن‌ها هم این تأسیس را پذیرفتند و رأی دادند. اما این سیاست در درازمدت به ضرر اسرائیل است و اسرائیل معتقد به این نیست. اسرائیل می‌خواهد سرزمین‌های اشغالی را حفظ کند و حاضر نیست از این سرزمین‌ها دست بردارد. بنابراین اختلاف عمده‌ای بین کمپانی‌های نفتی از یک طرف و صنایع نظامی از طرف دیگر با صهیونیست‌ها و یهودی‌هاست. انعکاس چنین اختلافی در جنگ اکتبر سال ۷۳ معروف به جنگ رمضان بروز کرد. عربستان سعودی شیرهای نفت را می‌بندد و صدور نفت را قطع می‌کند. هیچ قابل تصور بوده که دولت مرجعی مثل عربستان جریان نفت را در همدردی با مردم عرب قطع کند. این چیزی نیست جز برنامه‌ای که کمپانی‌های نفتی داشتند. که می‌خواستند در تقابل با تبلیغات وسیع صهیونیست‌ها به جهان بفهمانند که به نفع دنیاست که این برنامه اجرا شود. اولین آگهی تبلیغاتی در آمریکا توسط کمپانی نفتی «مویل اویل» در «وال استریت ژورنال» چاپ شد. در این آگهی راه حل مشکل اعراب و اسرائیل و ضرورت عقب‌نشینی اسرائیل به مرزهای قبل از جنگ ۶۷ تبلیغ شده بود. چاپ این آگهی با اعتراض خیلی از یهودی‌ها روبرو شد. در واکنش به آن علیه این کمپانی تبلیغ کردند و سهامشان را در بورس فروختند. بعد از جنگ ۷۳ جدال بین کمپانی‌های نفتی و صهیونیست‌ها در منطقه و در کل جهان و در آمریکا تشدید می‌شود. یک جنگ تبلیغاتی درباره‌ی نیاز آمریکا به نفت خاورمیانه به راه می‌افتد. برای جایگزین کردن سایر انواع انرژی به جای نفت در سنای آمریکا برنامه‌هایی مطرح می‌شود. آمارهای ضد و نقیضی درباره‌ی نیاز آمریکا به نفت خاورمیانه منتشر می‌شود. علاوه

بر این در سنای آمریکا کوشش‌هایی علیه شرکت‌های نفتی می‌شود، که انحصارات نفتی را باید بشکنند. در سنای آمریکا و در روزنامه‌های آمریکایی داد و بیداد راه افتاد که این کمپانی‌های نفتی همه چیز را منحصر کرده‌اند و این خلاف قانون ضد تراست‌ها یا انحصارات است و باید شکسته شود و این که دلیلی ندارد که یک کمپانی نفتی از دم چاه تا توی ماشین مصرف‌کننده، همه را کنترل کند. فشار برای شکستن این مونوپولی‌ها و انحصارات. اما این برای خاطر این نبود که دلشان به حال مصرف‌کننده سوخته بود، اینها می‌خواهند دعوای خودشان را با کمپانی‌های نفتی حل کنند. جنگی است بین یهودیان علیه کمپانی‌های نفتی. در همین رابطه می‌بینید در سنای آمریکا جنجال بزرگی است علیه فروش اسلحه به ایران و عربستان سعودی. عرض کردم که اکثریت سنای آمریکا دست یهودی‌هاست. حتی می‌بینیم که در جاهای مختلف فشارها و به اصطلاح درگیری‌هایی به وجود می‌آید. مثلاً تا چه اندازه مسأله واترگیت و نیکسون را باید در رابطه با این مسائل دید. من نمی‌دانم ولی به نظر من این تصادفی نبوده که رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا، استعفایش را به وزیر می‌دهد که تصادفاً یهودی است (کسینجر). وقتی نوارهایی را که نیکسون در کاخ سفید از مکالمات روزانه ضبط می‌کرده است علنی شد، اظهار نظرهای ضد یهودی در آن زیاد بود. نیکسون در محاورات خصوصی خودش مرتباً جوک‌های ضدیهودی به کار می‌برده است. افشای آن‌ها باعث به اصطلاح خجالت و شرم آقایان شد. مسأله واترگیت و جنجال علیه نیکسون احتمالاً با این موضوع ارتباط دارد. رفتارهای ناشایست و خلاف توسط رؤسای جمهوری یا معاونان آن‌ها زیاد بوده است. دستیار مخصوص جانسون، رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا را در خانه جوانان مسیحی (YMCA) در نزدیک کاخ سفید در حال لواط با یک جوان رنگین پوست توسط پلیس دستگیر می‌کند. ادوارد کندی، در حال مستی در نیمه‌های شب رانندگی می‌کرده و با دوست دخترش به یک دریاچه سقوط می‌کند و آن دختر کشته می‌شود. در بین رجال آمریکایی و آن‌هایی که صاحب قدرت و پول و مقام هستند، انواع خلافاکاری‌های مالی و اخلاقی سر زده است. این‌ها مسائل تازه‌ای نیست. اما این‌که چرا در مورد نیکسون افشاگری شد، بخشی از آن برمی‌گردند به تشنجات درونی بین این دو گروه. ژنرال براون رئیس ستاد کل ارتش آمریکا است

که در زمان ریاست جمهوری فورد سه سال پیش در سخنرانی خود در نورث کارولینا به یهودیان آمریکا حمله می‌کند و می‌گوید یهودی‌ها تمام روزنامه‌های ما، تلویزیون، رادیوها و بانک‌های ما را تحت کنترل خود دارند. تجارت و نظام مالی آمریکا در دست یهودی‌هاست. داد و فریاد یهودی‌ها بالا می‌رود و به فورد فشار وارد می‌کنند که تو بایستی وی را معزول کنی؛ فورد هم البته زیر بار نمی‌رود. خوب معلوم است برای اینکه نظامی‌ها ناراضی می‌شدند. این عمل که یهودیان آمریکا داد و فریاد کردند که ژنرال براون باید معزول شود و یا معذرت‌خواهی کند، خودش موجب واکنش‌های شدیدی شد، همه فهمیدند که یهودیان آمریکا چه قدرتی دارند.

در اینجا بحثم را متوقف می‌کنم. بعد از تنفس و نماز عشا بحث را ادامه خواهیم داد و نشان می‌دهیم که هریک از این قدرت‌ها در رابطه با ایران چه موضعی دارند و چرا بعضاً تناقضاتی بروز می‌کند. مثلاً چرا شاه به اسرائیل اولتیماتوم می‌دهد که اگر راه حل صلح را نپذیرد، فروش نفت را به اسرائیل قطع می‌کند و چگونه تشنجات و اختلافات این قدرت‌ها به ایران منتقل شده است.

ادامه بحث: قبل از نماز عشاء چگونگی اختلافاتی را که بین کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان آمریکا از یک طرف و یهودیان از طرف دیگر در رابطه با حل مسائل خاورمیانه بروز کرده است، توضیح داده شد. حال ببینیم تعمیم و گسترش این اختلافات به ایران و در رابطه با مسائل ایران چگونه ظاهر شده است. قدرت‌های خارجی فعال در ایران عبارتند از کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان آمریکا صهیونیست‌ها و فراماسونرها و انگلیس‌ها و اسرائیلی‌ها. انگلیس‌ها پایگاه اجتماعی و شبکه فراماسیون‌ها را دارند و از طریق فراماسیون عمل می‌کنند. صهیونیست‌ها دارای تشکیلات فعالی هستند. پس از ۲۸ مرداد ۳۲ شبکه فراماسیون در ایران تجدید سازمان کردند و به تدریج از سال‌های ۳۴ به بعد لژها و شعب مختلفی را به وجود آوردند. انواع و اقسام لژهای جدید را تأسیس کردند و به تدریج قسمت اعظم مقامات حساس مملکتی را تصاحب کردند. نظامیان آمریکا در ارتش پایگاه و نفوذ دارند و همین‌طور ما می‌دانیم که بعد از ۲۸ مرداد بیش از گذشته نظامیان ارتش آمریکا در ایران پایگاه پیدا کردند. نفوذ آمریکا در ارتش ایران از سال‌های بعد از

جنگ جهانی دوم، از هنگامی که «ژنرال شوارتسکف» برای تعلیم و تربیت ژاندارمری به ایران می‌رود، شروع می‌شود. شوارتسکف همان ژنرال معروفی است که در کودتای ۲۸ مرداد ۳۲ دست داشته است. نفوذ ارتش آمریکا بعد از ۲۸ مرداد تشدید می‌شود به طوری که تدریجاً ارتش و سازمان امنیت یکپارچه زیر نفوذ و مدیریت آمریکایی‌ها قرار می‌گیرد. آمریکایی‌ها در شرایط کنونی با چهل هزار آمریکایی شاغل در ایران و با داشتن چندین هزار مستشار نظامی و غیرنظامی، بزرگترین قدرت در ایران محسوب می‌شوند. اکثر معلمین و کارشناسان آمریکایی که در ایران هستند قبلاً در ویتنام بوده‌اند. «سولیوان» سفیرکبیر آمریکا در ایران متخصص به اصطلاح Pacification در ویتنام بوده است. تجارب زیادی در مبارزه با انقلابیون دارد. در ۲۸ مرداد برای بار سوم و به دنبال یک کودتا شاه به قدرت نشست و تدریجاً به کمک آمریکایی‌ها و ساواک و سیا قدرت خود را گسترش داد. وی برای اینکه قدرتش را تثبیت کند کوشش کرد که با همه این نیروها کار کند و همه آن‌ها را راضی نگه دارد. اما به تدریج که اختلاف بین نفتی‌ها و صهیونیست‌ها شدت پیدا می‌کند، لاجرم شاه هم به یک چنین اختلافاتی کشیده می‌شود. به طوری که روز به روز مواضع شاه به مواضع کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان نزدیک می‌شود و متناسباً مواضعی علیه اسرائیل اتخاذ می‌کند. به طوری که برای بعضی‌ها تعجب‌آور می‌شود و سؤال می‌کنند آخر اگر شاه پشتیبان اسرائیل است پس چطور می‌گوید بایستی سرزمین‌های فلسطین را تخلیه کنند و بدهند به فلسطینی‌ها؟ چرا می‌گوید اسرائیل بایستی به مرزهای سال ۶۷ برگردد. این در واقع همان موضع و خط کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان آمریکا در منطقه است که شاه تکرار می‌کند. اگر به مصاحبه شاه با مایک والاس در سال گذشته توجه کرده باشید، می‌بینید همان حرف‌هایی را که ژنرال براون رئیس ستاد کل ارتش آمریکا در مورد یهودیان آمریکا می‌زند، شاه در مصاحبه‌اش با مایک والاس عیناً تکرار می‌کند. می‌گوید یهودیان آمریکا همه چیز را کنترل می‌کنند. بعد مایک والاس می‌گوید یعنی چه؟ چطور؟ شاه می‌گوید بله بانک‌ها دست اینهاست، والاس می‌گوید خوب دیگر کجا را کنترل می‌کنند، شاه می‌گوید روزنامه‌ها، واشنگتن پست را، نیویورک تایمز را. چند هفته پیش شاه اعلام کرد که اگر اسرائیل دست از سماجت خودش بردارد و به مرزهای

سال ۶۷ برنگردد و تسلیم صلح نشود، من نفت را به روی اسرائیل می‌بندم. آیا شاه با قدرت خودش این حرف را می‌زند و اصلاً چرا شاه این حرف را می‌زند. شاه می‌خواهد جواب کدام حمله یهودی‌ها را بدهد. در این دو سال گذشته روزنامه‌های آمریکایی، در بسیاری موارد، ولی نه همیشه، لحن خوبی نسبت به شاه نداشتند. روزنامه‌های واشنگتن پست و نیویورک تایمز در موارد متعدد لحن حمله‌آمیزی به شاه داشتند. تا قبل از نوامبر که شاه به آمریکا بیاید در مطبوعات آمریکا هروقت صحبت از شاه می‌شد از او به‌عنوان یک دیکتاتور و جانی و جنایتکار خیلی خشن اسم می‌آوردند. برای رفع هرگونه شبهه‌ای باید روشن کنم این مقاومت و مبارزه مردم ما در داخل کشور است که چنان بن‌بستی را به‌وجود آورده است. و برای خروج از این بن‌بست مجبور هستند به این راه حل‌ها دست بزنند. منتها اختلاف یهودیان و کمپانی‌های نفتی و نظامیان به این اوضاع کمک کرده است. یعنی موجب آن است که هرکدام از این نیروها یک راه حل را دنبال کنند. اما همان‌طور که گفتیم اینها در خلاء عمل نمی‌کنند. بی‌تردید مبارزات ملت در داخل و خارج از کشور بر این روندها تأثیر بسیار جدی برجای می‌گذارد. در هر سه آلترناتیو ایجاد فضای باز سیاسی پیش‌بینی شده است. به محض اینکه فضای سیاسی باز می‌شود گروه‌های سیاسی مردمی از این فضای سیاسی استفاده می‌کنند و مطالبات مردم را پیگیری می‌نمایند. محور اصلی مطالبات مردم برکناری شاه و تغییر نظام است. اگر توجه کرده باشید از سال قبل که مسأله بازشدن فضای سیاسی ایران به‌طور جدی از طرف مقامات ایرانی مطرح شده، بعضی‌ها آن را یک بازی سیاسی مطرح کردند. اما در همین فضا و با توجه به همین برنامه‌ها لحن اعلامیه‌های آقا پیش از پیش ضد شاه و به تدریج ضد خاندان پهلوی و ضد سلطنت شد(..... متأسفانه نوار دوم این سخنرانی در دسترس نیست و ادامه مطلب میسر نمی‌باشد).

۱۸. اکثر قریب به اتفاق سرمقالات تحلیلی پیام مجاهد، ارگان نهضت آزادی ایران - خارج از کشور به قلم این ناچیز می‌باشند. علاقمندان می‌توانند به «مجموعه پیام مجاهد» در سایت «نهضت آزادی ایران - خارج از کشور» رجوع کنند.